IN RE: Christopher T. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

THE COURT:  This decision addresses a petition brought to terminate the parental rights of Christopher T., who was born on December 11, 2006.   Christopher is the biological child of the respondent-mother Melissa B. and of the respondent-father John Doe. This child was adjudicated neglected on April 27, 2011 following the submission of an order of temporary custody and a neglect petition that had been filed with the court on February 17, 2011, all when child had just passed his fifth birthday.   To clarify, the child, it appears, was adjudicated on April 27th, 2011 insofar as mother was concerned;  a putative father had been the subject of the neglect petition and orders were subsequently not entered as to him he was determined to be not the father of this child.

The Department of Children and Families had filed its original termination of parental rights petition for Melissa B. and John Doe under date of September 24th, 2012.   That petition was subsequently amended on September 28th, 2012 and amended again today, which is October 16th, 2013, only insofar as mother is concerned.   The petition insofar as mother's allegations, then, has the sole grounds of consent and best interest.

The grounds that the department alleged with regard to father included that it had made reasonable efforts to locate him, that he was unable or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts, that he had abandoned the child, as contemplated by the statute, and that there was no on-going parent/child relationship, again, as defined by statute.

All parties who were present, which excludes John Doe, were represented by skilled and experienced counsel.   Today, as Christopher approaches his seventh birthday, his attorney, Mr. Lewonka, was able to express the child's desires and also to argue on behalf of termination, consistent with the consent tendered by the mother, and further consistent with the department's petition.

No claim concerning Christopher's custody has been shown to be pending before any other court.   There is no claim that Christopher is an Indian child, as that term is used in this Practice Book. Notice of this proceeding had been provided to John Doe and to the respondent-mother in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Practice Book, and the Court has jurisdiction over this matter.

The Court has received two exhibits, Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2, and without objection has reviewed the status of the court file.   That file reflects that Judge Cofield entered a finding of default for John Doe who had failed to appear, notwithstanding publication in the Bristol Press on the TPR plea date, which was October 24th, 2012.   He was defaulted on that date as well, without prejudice to confirmation of publication in a San Bernardino, California newspaper.   That publication was confirmed by Judge Cofield on November 1st, 2012.   Accordingly, John Doe, having been defaulted, is subject to the orders of this Court by way of entry of judgment, as is the mother, whose consent was tendered and accepted today.

As to the department's obligation to prove by clear and convincing evidence the allegations that it had made reasonable efforts to locate John Doe and that he was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, the Court has considered the adjudicatory date upon which the first TPR petition was filed, that is;  September 24th, 2012.   The two exhibits presented and his failure to appear or participate in any of these proceedings provide abundant and overwhelming evidence to establish that the department has met its burden of proof under General Statute § 17a–112b(j)(1).

As to the adjudicatory grounds, abandonment requires the Court to consider the events that had occurred again prior to the adjudicatory date.   The ground of no on-going as to father allows the Court to consider the evidence of the child's status and relationship, if any, between the father and child up to the date of trial.

Upon consideration of the evidence contained in full in the Exhibits 1 and 2, the Court finds that the department has submitted abundant, overwhelming evidence to establish all of the grounds of abandonment and all of the grounds of no on-going parent/child relationship.   Moreover, General Statutes § 46b–121(a)(1) establishes that Child Protection proceedings are civil matters;  therefore, the default entered by Judge Cofield with regard to John Doe effectively established that he had admitted each of the adjudicatory and as well the dispositional claims set forth in the TPR petition.   He has admitted the material facts related to abandonment;  he has admitted the material facts related to the no on-going parent/child relationship.

Accordingly, this conclusively determines that the petitioner has prevailed on the adjudicatory as well as the dispositional issues raised through the termination of parental rights petition as to John Doe. Commissioner of Social Services v. Smith, 265 Conn. 723, 732–33, 830 A.2d 228, 2003.

In addition our case law notes that a respondent in a child-related proceeding who fails to respond to pleadings is deemed to have judicially admitted the underlying facts of the petition related to that child's well-being.   The Court has previously concluded that Exhibits 1 and 2 clearly and convincingly establish that the department has met the grounds claimed with regard to John Doe of abandonment pursuant to General Statutes § 112b(j)(3)(A), and the no on-going claims raised by the department as presented by General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(D).

The Court next turns to the issue of the child's best interest.   As the requirement is also imposed upon the Department of Children and Families, as petitioner, to establish that the child's best interest would be met by termination of parental rights as contemplated by General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(2), our case law requires that the Court make certain findings consistent with General Statutes § 17a–112(k) in conjunction with the best interest analysis for a child such as Christopher who is the subject of a termination of parental rights petition.

Accordingly, the Court makes the following findings based by clear and convincing evidence, which was established through Exhibits 1 and Exhibits 2 and which is fully consistent with his failure to participate in any of the proceedings related to the child's well-being.   These written findings are made only as to John Doe as the statute indicates that where the termination is based on consent, the Court need not make written findings.   Therefore, the Court focuses upon the status of the father and not the status of the mother.

First, as to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to John Doe and the child by the Department of Children and Families to facilitate reunification, the Court finds that John Doe is effectively whereabouts unknown and has been since the submission of the termination of parental rights petition.   He is, accordingly, unable to benefit from services, as he has never made himself known to the department.   All services would have been offered in a timely manner to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent except that given John Doe's absence from the proceedings and failure to participate in the litigation the department was prevented and precluded from extending such benefits.

Two, as to whether the Department of Children and Families made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, as amended, the Court finds that its reasonable efforts for John Doe, again, were impossible to provide given his failure to present himself and the department's diligent efforts to locate him, which by way of service in two separate newspapers, failed to yield any success.

Accordingly, the efforts to reunify father and child were reasonable within context of the Federal Adoption Assistant and Child Welfare Act.

Third, as to the terms of any applicable court order affecting John Doe, steps were issued for John Doe in the context of these Child Protection proceedings.   However, given again his failure to attend any court sessions, his failure to make himself known to the department, and the department's inability to identify his whereabouts, notwithstanding its diligent location efforts and notwithstanding the publications, John Doe likely never knew about those orders and the department could not reasonably prove whether or not he had fulfilled them.

Fourth, as to the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardian of the child's person, and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least a year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties, the Court notes that he is fully bonded with his present caretakers.   The department is to be applauded by having identified a placement with the maternal grandmother which has survived all of the three years of Christopher's foster care status.   The child had a difficult time, as argued by the child's lawyer, and as is evident upon close examination of Exhibits 1 and 2, at the commencement of his placement.   As the years have gone on, however, he has developed a firm emotional tie with the maternal grandmother and also has a firm emotional tie with the step-grandmother with whom he has consistent contact.

The child has attended daycare and has attended school.   He does not display any behavioral issues at school, has made friends at school and is socially appropriate at school, albeit he has a behavior plan in place.

Christopher has stated as recently as June 14th, 2013, that he wants to live with his mother.   He stated that he wasn't supposed to tell his therapist that, he was supposed to tell that to another lady.   The Court concludes that Christopher knows that Melissa B. is his mother, and he understands that under ordinary circumstances a child would live with his biological mother.   While he misses his mother, he is happy in his present placement and he understands that return to mother's care could expose him to the danger which had caused his commitment so long ago.   Accordingly, the Court finds that the child's emotional ties have best been established with his present caretaker, the maternal grandmother.

Fifth, as to the age of the child.   Christopher was born on December 11th, 2006;  while he is currently six years old, he is fast approaching his seventh birthday.

Sixth, any efforts that John Doe has made to adjust his circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return to his care are absent from this case.   Again, John Doe has failed to participate, could not be located, failed to respond to due and constitutionally appropriate notice of the termination of parental rights proceedings.

This Court concludes then that John Doe did not adjust his circumstances, conduct or his conditions in any way so as to make it in Christopher's best interest to return to his care.

The seventh and final finding is the extent to which any parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.   In considering this ground the Court, again, focuses only upon John Doe for whom the seven findings are applicable.   John Doe is whereabouts unknown, has been for some time.   The department, again, made reasonable efforts to locate him and published not in one, but in two separate newspapers in an effort to try to find John Doe and enable him to participate in these proceedings.   The Court concludes that John Doe has elected not to participate in these proceedings.   He, and he alone, served as the impediment to reunification with Christopher.   No third party is so responsible.

Those seven findings having been concluded, the Court then turns to the last element of the termination of parental rights petition;  that is, determining whether or not the department has met its burden of proof on the issue of best interest in so far as the respondent-father is concerned, mother having consented.   The Court has considered all of the evidence and testimony up until the date of trial and has concluded that in the context of this case Christopher's best interests will be served by termination of parental rights.   Only by terminating the parental rights of Melissa B. and John Doe will the child be enabled to be placed in an environment in which his sustained growth, development, well-being, continuity and stability of care for his physical and mental health and his educational, moral and religious needs will be met.

The department has proved by clear and convincing evidence, through Exhibits 1 and 2, that continuation of either respondent's parental rights is not in Christopher's best interest.   Thus, under all of the circumstances of this case, the department has met its burden of proof required by General Statutes Sec. 17a–112(j)(2), and has established by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights will serve the best interests of Christopher T.

Whereupon, the Court enters the following orders:  the parental rights of Melissa B. and John Doe to Christopher T. are hereby terminated;  the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is appointed the statutory parent for Christopher for the purpose of securing adoptive or other permanent placement for this child.   Primary consideration for adoption shall be afforded to the maternal grandparents, Bonnie and Paul W., with whom the child has been placed for the entirety of his foster care stay.

The clerk of the probate court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption for this child shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters in New Britain of the date when the adoption is finalized.   The department shall submit permanency plans and such other further reports as are required by law in a timely manner, according to the schedule, to be established by the clerk and made a part of this Court's written orders.

So ordered by this Court on 16 October 2013.

BY THE COURT,

N. Rubinow, J.

Rubinow, Nicola E., J.