Tad C. Lincoln v. Heba Hafi Lincoln (2013)

CORRECTED MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BY JUDGE;  MOTION TO REDUCE AMOUNT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND VERDICT;  MOTION FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES

This case arises out of a domestic dispute in which the plaintiff claimed that the defendant fabricated the events which led to him being arrested and prosecuted.   The complaint was in two counts.   The first count alleged malicious prosecution, specifically that the defendant falsely and maliciously reported to Glastonbury police officers that he had just engaged in conduct which, if true, would constitute the crimes of disorderly conduct, assault in the third degree and interfering with a 911 call.   In the second count for slander, the plaintiff alleged that he was defamed by the defendant when she stated to a third person, Alma Gusic, that he had criminally assaulted her.

The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the first count, and in favor of the defendant on the second count.   The jury awarded damages in the amount of $17,552.80, and also answered that the plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages.

The defendant filed a motion to set aside the verdict as well as a motion for a new trial by the court rather than jury, and a motion to reduce the amount of punitive damages and verdict.¹  The basis for the motion to set aside the verdict is that the defendant is claiming that the verdict is contrary to the law and evidence.   She contends that the plaintiff failed to prove the four elements of malicious prosecution, specifically the element that the defendant acted without probable cause.   Furthermore, she asks the court to reduce the amount of the damages because the jury ignore the evidence presented at trial.   She also asks the court to determine the punitive damages awarded to the plaintiff, and specifically requests that said amount awarded be zero.

The plaintiff has filed an affidavit in support of an award of punitive damages.   He requests that the court award $7,792.72, which consists of $5,850.92 for the representation of the plaintiff in this case, $1,609.98 in litigation expenses, and $331.81 in payments for transcripts marked as exhibits in this matter.

The court heard oral argument on these matters on October 7, 2013.

In ruling on the defendant's motions, the court is mindful of the standard relating to sustaining a verdict.  “The evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the prevailing party and to sustaining the verdict ․ A court is empowered to set aside a jury verdict when, in the court's opinion, the verdict is contrary to the law or unsupported by the evidence ․ A verdict should not be set aside, however, where it is apparent that there was some evidence on which the jury might reasonably have reached its conclusion.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  McDermott v. Calvary Baptist Church, 68 Conn.App. 284, 293–94, 791 A.2d 284 (2002).

A jury “verdict will be set aside and judgment directed only if [the court] find[s] that the jury could not reasonably and legally have reached their conclusion.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Smith v. Greenwich, 278 Conn. 428, 441, 899 A.2d 563 (2006).  “[T]he [trial] court must determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, reasonably supports the jury's verdict.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Cheryl Terry Enterprises, Ltd. v. Hartford, 270 Conn. 619, 639, 854 A.2d 1066 (2004).   Litigants have a constitutional right to have factual issues resolved by the jury.  Seals v. Hickey, 186 Conn. 337, 350, 441 A.2d 604 (1982).   This right embraces the determination of damages when there is room for a reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded persons as to the amount that should be awarded.  Id., 351.

Addressing the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence, the court instructed the jury as to the four elements needed to prove a claim of malicious prosecution.  “An action for malicious prosecution against a private person requires a plaintiff to prove that:  (1) the defendant initiated or procured the institution of criminal proceedings against the plaintiff;  (2) the criminal proceedings have terminated in favor of the plaintiff;  (3) the defendant acted without probable cause;  and (4) the defendant acted with malice, primarily for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice.”  McHale v. W.B.S. Corp., 187 Conn. 444, 447, 446 A.2d 815 (1982).

The court, having heard the same evidence that was heard by the jury, cannot accept the defendant's assertion that the jury could not have found that the defendant acted without probable cause, or that the jury did not follow the court's instructions.   The jury could have reasonably credited the testimony of the plaintiff as to the version of the events of that day rather than the version submitted by the defendant, and found she acted without probable cause.   The court finds that the jury could reasonably, logically and legally have reached its conclusion from the evidence viewed most favorably to the plaintiff.   The motion to set aside the verdict is denied.

With respect to the motion for remittitur, the defendant claims the sum awarded is contrary to the evidence because the jury could not have found in favor of the plaintiff on the claim of malicious prosecution.   The standard for a trial court in reviewing a motion for remittitur is very similar to the standard for deciding a motion to set aside the verdict.   A trial court may disturb a jury's award of damages only where such award is deemed excessive as a matter of law.  General Statutes § 52–216a.  “[I]n ruling on the motion for remittitur, the trial court [is] obliged to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff in determining whether the verdict returned was reasonably supported thereby.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Embalmers' Supply Co. v. Giannitti, 103 Conn.App. 20, 54, 929 A.2d 729, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 931, 934 A.2d 246 (2007).

The evidence submitted to the jury indicated the amount of $17,552.80 expended by the plaintiff in order to defend himself in the criminal actions instigated by the defendant.   The jury only awarded that amount, and it is clear that their award was reasonably supported by said evidence.

“Punitive damages are awarded when the evidence shows a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights.”  Vandersluis v. Weil, 176 Conn. 353, 358, 407 A.2d 982 (1978).   The jury on the verdict form indicated that an award of punitive damages was warranted.   The court specifically instructed them that this award would be based upon a finding by the jury that the defendant had acted with reckless indifference to the rights of the plaintiff.   There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the defendant acted with reckless indifference to the rights of the plaintiff.   See, Bhatia v. Debek, 287 Conn. 397, 948 A.2d 1009 (2008) (noting trial court's broad discretion to award punitive damages in the form of attorneys fees in a malicious prosecution action).

The plaintiff is seeking $5,850.93 in attorneys fees based upon a written fee agreement, $1,609.98 in litigation-related expenses, and $331.81 in costs related to obtaining court transcripts necessary to prosecuting this action.   The court finds said amounts to be fair and reasonable and awards $7,792.72 in punitive damages.

The defendant's motion to set aside verdict (# 137) is denied.   The motion for new trial by judge (# 138) is denied.   The defendant's motion to reduce the amount of damages (# 139) is denied.   The court grants the plaintiff's request for punitive damages in the amount of $7,792.72.

So ordered.

Swienton, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The defendant is pro se.   The court shall treat the motion to reduce the amount of damages as a motion for remittitur..  FN1. The defendant is pro se.   The court shall treat the motion to reduce the amount of damages as a motion for remittitur.

Swienton, Cynthia K., J.