Kenneth Bove v. Howard W. Bove (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This court will today attempt to write the final chapter in this family drama now entering its fourteenth year on the docket.   The three parties are the Bove brothers, plaintiff Kenneth and defendants Douglas and Howard.   Returnable on October 17, 2000, the complaint sought the partition of the trio's common ownership of two parcels of land, one in Thompson and one in Putnam.   At this time, both parcels have been sold, the clerk's office is holding the sum of $159,635.32, and the task at hand for this court is how in equity to distribute this money among the three parties.

While brother Douglas is a defendant and has filed an appearance, he has not taken an active role in the litigation that has so thoroughly occupied his two siblings.   Howard, on the other hand, has been scrupulous in his insistence upon both procedural precision and substantive justice since the inception of the suit, and has pursued five appeals thus far:  Bove v. Bove (Bove I), 77 Conn.App. 355 (2003);  Bove v. Bove (Bove II), 93 Conn.App. 347, cert. denied, 277 Conn. 919 (2006);  Bove v. Bove (Bove III), 103 Conn.App. 347 (2007);  Bove v. Bove (Bove IV), 115 Conn.App. 902 (2009);  and Bove v. Bove (Bove V), 128 Conn.App. 811, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 904 (2011).

As expressed at a trial management conference held on October 15, it is Howard's position at this time that the court should order the sales proceeds (as adjusted, as set forth below) distributed equally among the parties.   Kenneth, in contrast, urges that certain litigation conduct on Howard's part warrants a disparate distribution.   Both parties presented their evidence and arguments to this court at a hearing held on October 21.   The court informed them that it would consider their testimony, exhibits, and arguments, and take judicial notice of the voluminous file that has accumulated in the case.

I. Introduction

The partition of commonly-owned real estate is authorized and delineated by §§ 52–495 through 503 of the General Statutes.   Partition by sale is one of two options, and the court's earlier election to divide the Bove interests by sale rather than in kind is not in dispute.   Now, with the sales having taken place and the receipts thereof having been deposited with the clerk of the court, the remaining duty facing this court, as prescribed by § 52–502(b), is to direct the payment of the reasonable costs and expenses of the work done to date, and to distribute the remaining proceeds among all persons interested in the property in proportion to their interests.

Here, while it is conceded that all three parties possess an equal one-third legal interest in the real estate that has been liquidated, the early case of Rentz v. Eckert, 74 Conn. 11 (1901), establishes that determining how much of the proceeds is due to each party is more than a matter of dividing the proceeds in strict proportion to their legal interests.   In that suit, the Supreme Court reversed a trial court award of one-half of the sales proceeds to each half-owner because that court had not accounted for the fact that one of the two co-owners had unilaterally encumbered their land with a mortgage in the amount of $300.   The Court declared that recognizing the equities of the matter was indispensable, and that in dividing the amount on hand equitably it is “the duty of the court ․ to protect the real interests of the parties,” 74 Conn. 11, 16.   See also, Lemay v. Lemay, 137 Conn. 92, 96 (1950), citing Rentz in noting that “[a]lthough each party was the owner of an undivided one-half interest in the property, it does not follow that he or she will necessarily be entitled to equal shares of the moneys obtained from the sale.   Equities must be considered and, if established, must be liquidated before distribution is ordered.”

Fernandes v. Rodriguez, 90 Conn.App. 601 (2005), illustrates the broad scope of the matters that may be material in determining the equities in cases such as this.   The distribution to the two co-owners there of the proceeds of sale of their property took into account the monetary contributions of each party toward the purchase, rents received (including the fair rental value of portions of the premises used by a party), access to the premises, repair and upkeep expenses, and net losses incurred in some years of co-ownership.  “A partition action is equitable in nature ․ Accordingly, the determination of what equity requires is a matter for the discretion of the trial court”;  DiCerto v. Jones, 108 Conn.App. 184 (2008).

Here, plaintiff contends that continuous and vexatious bad faith in Howard's conduct of his defense warrants 1) that Howard be penalized with respect to the division of the proceeds, and 2) that Howard ought to be taxed with paying a portion of Kenneth's legal fees incurred in responding to that conduct.   Aside from bringing Fernandes to this court's attention, plaintiff has offered no further support for the premise that bad faith conduct by a partition suit litigant is a factor to be weighed in determining the equitable division of the sales proceeds.

On the attorneys fee award issue, plaintiff relies upon cases such as Maris v. McGrath, 269 Conn. 834 (2004), Mangiante v. Niemiec, 98 Conn.App. 567 (2006), and Anom v. Ofori–Tenkorang, DN# FA01 0184721, Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield at Stamford (2005;  Tierney, J.) [38 Conn. L. Rptr. 800].

II. Findings of Fact

A. Amounts To Be Distributed

The court will begin with a brief accounting of the sums actually received on the sales, and explain why the clerk's office is holding a different amount on hand.   The various orders of sale of the properties entered over the years have yielded total gross proceeds and sums remitted to the clerk's office, as follows:

Table One

Gross Remitted to

Property:  Sale Date:  Proceeds:  Clerk:  Note:

476 Woodstock July 29, $17,500 $17,500 Deposit on first sale

Ave., Putnam 2006 ordered forfeited

476 Woodstock May 12, $42,500 $23,761.53 Sale price, less one-

Ave., Putnam 2012 third as Howard was

purchaser and less

committee's retention of

$4,571.80 for 2012 fees

and expenses

511 Brandy August 10, $206,000 $137,196 ¹ Sale price, less one-

Hill Rd., 2012 third as plaintiff was

Thompson purchaser

TOTAL $266,000 $178,457.53

From the amount received, and pursuant to prior orders of the court, the clerk has already disbursed committee fees and expenses totaling $18,822.21, yielding the balance on hand of $159,635.32.

Unpaid by the clerk at this time is a previous award of fees and expenses to Anne Hoyt, committee, in the total amount of $3,830, although plaintiff has tendered to her $800 of that amount (representing her expenses).

Additionally, the court finds and will award to plaintiff his incurred costs including filing fees, marshal's fees, appraisers' fees, printing of briefs for the various appeals etc., totaling $2,065.   These are amounts paid by plaintiff after 2006, and in order to keep this lawsuit moving forward following the first two of the appeals listed above.

After reducing the $266,000 of gross proceeds by the total of all awarded costs and total committee fees ($29,289.01), and excluding the unaccounted for $137.33 (see footnote 1), the proceeds realized amount to $236,573.66, or $78,857.886 each.   If the net proceeds received were divided equally among the three parties, the clerk would be distributing the following amounts:

Table Two

Less Discount Plus Expenses

One-third:  on Sale Price:  Awarded:  Total:

To Douglas $ 78,857.90 0 0 $ 78,857.90

To Howard $ 78,857.88 -$14,166.67 0 $ 64,691.21

To Kenneth $ 78,857.88 -$68,666.67 $2,865 ² $ 13,056.21

To Anne Hoyt, $3,030 $ 3,030

Committee

TOTAL $236,573.66 -($82,833.34) $5,895 $159,635.32

The parties stipulated that at the inception of this lawsuit they held equal legal shares in the two properties which are its subject.   Any disparity in distribution must therefore hinge upon events occurring after October 17, 2000.

B. Claim of Bad Faith on the Part of Howard Bove

Plaintiff directed the court's attention to a number of the pleadings filed by Howard Bove as additional support for his claim of bad faith on his brother's part.   The court notes numerous objections, requests for continuance, and motions attributable to Howard, most of which were denied by various judges;  those rulings, in turn, became in turn the basis for the appeals cited above.

Those five appeals are the primary reason this suit has endured for as long as it has.   In Bove I, he achieved a technical victory in having the court's first judgment (entered April 12, 2002) thrown out on the basis of inadequate service of process upon him.   That was a waivable defect, as there was no argument that he did not have actual knowledge of the pendency of the action well before that judgment entered, yet he opted instead to appeal;  that appeal caused the matter to be held in abeyance for fourteen months, until June 12, 2003.   No later appeal had any merit.  Bove II challenged the second judgment, entered October 28, 2004, but his claims were rejected by both the Appellate and the Supreme Courts.   Since his efforts included a petition for certification from the Appellate Court's decision, he succeeded in delaying meaningful resolution another eighteen months, until the petition was denied on March 2, 2006.   On June 5, 2006, the trial court set a new sale date, auctions on both properties were held on July 29, 2006, and thereafter, on August 21, 2006, the court approved the Committee's reports as to both sales.   But Howard then filed post-judgment attacks upon, inter alia, the integrity of Judge Riley who entered those approvals.   The denial of those efforts led to Bove III, alleging “due process (sic), judicial misconduct, [and] judicial conspiracy to defraud,” which Howard lost, on August 21, 2007.

Because of the year-long delay of the closing on the Putnam property, the successful bidders on that property became unable or unwilling to complete the closing.   Their $17,500 deposit was eventually declared forfeited and remains in the clerk's account for distribution today.   Their default, however, led to a new judgment of sale entered on February 11, 2008, ordering an auction on the premises on March 29, 2008.   On March 25, the trial court denied Howard's motion to vacate that sale order, whereupon he filed Bove IV just two days ahead of the sale.   In that appeal he alleged, without foundation, proof, or success at the appellate level, judicial bias, judicial incompetents (sic), judicial disregard for appeal opinion # 1 (sic), and attorney misconduct.   That remained an active appeal until the trial court's order was affirmed, per curiam, on June 18, 2009, fifteen months later, with a remand to the trial court to yet again schedule another auction.   The trial court dutifully did so, with the auction to be held on February 27, 2010.   That order precipitated Bove V, which of course caused the February 27 sale to not go forward.   Bove V, decided by the Appellate Court on May 24, 2011, yielded yet another petition by Howard for certification which the Supreme Court denied on July 13.   Again, both appellate courts saw no reason to reverse the trial court, and the matter was once again remanded for the court to enter a new sale date.

All in all, these five appeals caused a cumulative delay of over seventy-six months at the appellate level, the Putnam auction was finally held on May 12, 2012.

As an additional indicator of bad faith, the court notes amidst the haystack of pleadings which a case thirteen-plus years old will generate that Howard Bove has strewn a number of needles aimed at all participants in this case except himself.   Just in written entries in the court's file, he has claimed that plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel “conspired to commit perjury”; ³  that their “pleadings are deceitful and fraudulent”; ⁴  that Judge (Francis J.) Foley should recuse himself “based on bias and prejudicial remarks”; ⁵  that the Committee (Anne Hoyt) was involved in “a conspiracy of misconduct”; ⁶  that the successor Committee (Mark Brouillard) and the appraiser were both “incompetent”; ⁷  that Judge (Michael) Reilly (sic) was “hostile and abusive”; ⁸  that plaintiff's attorney is “a liar”; ⁹  and that Committee Brouillard “abused his position of trust for personal gain.” ¹⁰  These are merely the assertions made in this court;  the record indicates that some or all of these canards have been repeated in filings at the Appellate Court, and in a complaint to Governor Rell concerning one of the judges involved.

At the hearing on October 21, Howard testified that he was unhappy with the prospect of partition as he believed that the pieces should stay in the family's ownership at least throughout his lifetime.   Nevertheless, he contended, it was not his intention to cause undue delay;  he professed that his only concern was “to assure that the sales were done properly.”   Whatever his subjective intentions, the test of a party's good faith must take into account his objective acts and utterances in the case.   Here, these demonstrate at best a wanton querulousness and at worst a cynical inclination to sabotage every effort to bring about a just resolution in this case.   The test looks not simply at the quantity of his tactical decisions but their quality (or, more accurately, lack thereof).   Howard's aggregate work product over the life of this action, informed by his unsubstantiated critiques of everyone involved in the case, unmistakably displays a strategy of waging a war of attrition.   As a co-owner of real estate, Kenneth Bove had a right to seek a partition of the common ownership;  Howard's pervasive and oppressive disruption of that right for more than a decade leads this court to a finding that he did indeed litigate this matter in bad faith.

C. Other Material Factors

1. Plaintiff's Fees and Costs

The court finds that plaintiff expended $12,436.60 in attorneys fees after the filing of Bove III, and that such fees were fair and reasonable.   Further, he paid $800 to Anne Hoyt, Committee on the first sale.   He incurred an additional $1,865 of expenses for updates of property appraisals and filing fees for motions to open judgment, and should be awarded all of these sums as additional items of costs.   The court also finds that he paid $445.45 as the cost of printing briefs on appeals III, IV, and V, and awards him $200 thereof pursuant to § 52–257(d)(2) of the General Statutes.

2. Course of Committee Sales

Three auctions were held on the Putnam property.   The first, on July 29, 2006, yielded a high bid of $227,000, against a fair market value appraisal of $175,000.   That sale aborted, however, and as noted above the buyers' $17,500 deposit was forfeited.   The second auction occurred on March 29, 2008, and the high bidder was Howard Bove at $151,000, against an appraisal which remained at $175,000.  (That sale was set aside in light of the appellate stay which had entered two days earlier.)   In anticipation of the subsequently cancelled February 27, 2010, auction, the court found that the value of the premises had fallen, to $125,000.   Prior to the third auction on May 12, 2012, the court found the value to be $117,000.   That auction yielded a high bid, again from Howard Bove, at $42,500.

The reports filed by the Committee indicate that while Kenneth Bove did not register as a bidder at the 2006 auction, his attorney did, claiming to be an agent of a limited liability company which appears to be a stranger to this action.   Plaintiff's counsel submitted the first bid, at $80,000.   Kenneth Bove registered personally as a bidder at the 2008 auction, and entered an opening bid of $50,000.   There is no indication that he or his attorney attended, registered, or entered any bid at the 2012 auction.

III. Discussion

Having found that Howard Bove acted in bad faith in this case, I will next consider the two-fold remedy demanded by plaintiff.

His quest for an award of his attorneys fees is on solid ground.   The “American rule,” which is that in the absence of statute or contract provisions regarding attorneys fees each party will be responsible for paying his or her own, was expressly recognized in Maris v. McGrath, 269 Conn. 834 (2004), to have a “bad faith exception” in cases where litigants behave oppressively.   Building upon its earlier ruling in CFM of Connecticut, Inc. v. Chowdhury, 239 Conn. 375 (1996) (holding that bad faith on the part of an attorney could justify an attorneys fee award to the offended party), the Court affirmed the trial court's award of attorneys fees against a party whose litigation claims were entirely without color.   The American rule “does not apply ․ where the opposing party has acted in bad faith ․ It is generally accepted that the court has the inherent authority to assess attorneys fees when the losing party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons ․” 269 Conn. 834, 844–5, citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765–66 (1980).

As applied to a party, rather than to his attorney, a “claim is colorable, for purposes of the bad faith exception to the American rule, if a reasonable person, given his or her first-hand knowledge of the underlying matter, could have concluded that the facts supporting the claim might have been established.”  Maris, at 847.   Before imposing any such sanctions, the court must afford the sanctioned party or attorney a proper hearing on the proposed sanctions, and that has occurred here.   This bad faith exception applies, not only to the filing of an action, but also to a party's conduct of the litigation;  “[t]he appropriate focus for the court ․ is the conduct of the party in instigating or maintaining the litigation,” id., 846.   This court does not believe that any rational and honest person could have concluded that Howard's chronic and quarrelsome claims of misconduct on the part of the various persons involved in this case were provable.   His behavior warrants an exception to the American rule.

The further claim that equity ought to adjust the distribution so as to penalize Howard beyond requiring him to pay attorneys fees is unprecedented.   Neither party was able to cite any authority for or against the proposition that a court determining the equities of a partition sale in preparation for distribution of the proceeds can consider the litigation conduct of a party in that calculation, and the court has found none.   What Kenneth precisely seeks is that Howard be held to have acquired an asset, in the form of the Putnam property, worth $227,000, for the much-reduced price of $42,500 in 2012.   In his opinion, equity should order the difference of $184,500 to be imputed to him at this time because the filing of Bove III caused the loss of the 2006 sale and created the circumstances allowing Howard to buy that parcel on the cheap in 2012.

The claim is tantamount to an abuse of process claim.   In Mozzochi v. Beck, 204 Conn. 490 (1987), at page 493, the Court explained that “an action for abuse of process lies against any person using ‘a legal process against another in an improper manner or to accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed.’  “ Here, the process abused was the privilege of filing the 2006 and subsequent appeals.   The Mozzochi plaintiff had sued an attorney who had allegedly (1) filed amendments to the pleadings in a prior action knowing that the allegations of those amendments were false;  and (2) refused to withdraw that action after learning that it was utterly without merit.   This conduct was allegedly undertaken for “an unlawful ulterior purpose, to wit:  to inflict injury upon the plaintiff and to enrich themselves and their said client although they knew that their said lawsuit was without merit.”   The Court noted that the complaint did not allege that the defendants undertook any action outside of the normal course of proceedings in the prior case itself, made no claim that defendants used the pleadings or the process in that case as leverage to coerce the plaintiff to pay a debt or surrender property unrelated to that litigation, or that they used unreasonable force, excessive attachments or extortionate methods to enforce the right of action asserted in that case.   Mozzochi's core assertion that Beck continued to pursue litigation for an unlawful ulterior purpose was rejected as an insufficient basis upon which to distinguish his behavior from the level of acrimony often attendant upon involvement in litigation generally.   Howard Bove's behavior appears analogous.

The later case of Larobina v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 394 (2005), included a longer litany of alleged specific acts constituting abuse of process, including issues relating to conflicts of interest, multiple requests for continuances, communications with plaintiff, stubborn refusal to concede the verity of the plaintiff's claims, and other assorted improprieties.   While the Court ultimately rejected these contentions on the facts of the case, Larobina did establish that initiation of an action that constitutes malicious prosecution or vexatious litigation is not the sole means by which one might commit the tort of abuse of process;  the decision cites favorably a set of decisions from other jurisdictions suggesting, at page 406, that the term may be construed broadly as encompassing the “entire range of procedures incident to litigation process ․ the tort evolved as a ‘catch-all’ category to cover improper uses of the judicial machinery that did not fit within the earlier established, but narrowly circumscribed, action of malicious prosecution.”

Plaintiff has not indicated that abuse of process is the label that properly attaches to this claim, or even that he is alleging conduct that is tortious, so the court need not determine that it is.   However, assuming that equity should take contumacious litigation misconduct into account in determining a fair distribution of partition sale proceeds, it would follow that customary legal and equitable defenses would also come into the calculus.

Plaintiff overlooks these in making his demand.   First, it is not clear that Howard's appeal in 2006 was the sole or even a contributing cause of the bidders' default.   The record reveals a claim that their financing was in jeopardy as a result of the delay, but also that they believed upon reflection that they had overbid by almost seventy thousand dollars and sought a price reduction;  in the end, one can only speculate whether they lost their loan, or made a business decision to simply walk away from their deposit rather than throwing good money after bad.

Secondly, it should be well-known to plaintiff, or at least to his counsel, that partition sales (and their more common kin, foreclosure sales) are not the way real estate is typically sold.   The intensely focused time frame in which such sales occur, the lack of a mortgage contingency, the likelihood that a property will be sold “as is,” all lead to the pool of potential purchasers at such sales being quite finite.   Frequently, aside from the plaintiff, only a handful of bargain hunters will be in attendance—”foreclosure sales are often at a price substantially less than fair market value”;  Cronin v. Gager–Crawford Co., 128 Conn. 688, 692 (1942).   All counsel practicing in this area must remember the case of Dime Savings Bank of New York v. Grisel, 36 Conn.App. 313 (1994), which reversed a trial court's order approving a sale on technical grounds, but specifically upheld the trial court's discretionary rejection of a challenge to a foreclosure auction at which a parcel appraised at $170,000 had sold at $30,000;  the bidding had started at noon and was finished at 12:10, moments before plaintiff's counsel arrived with bidding authority, late because he had gotten lost on the way to the property.   A plaintiff, in such cases, must be vigilant in attending and bidding at this type of sale lest someone walk away with a steal.

Kenneth did not bid at the 2012 auction, because, in his words, he believed it unethical to bid upon a property which he did not want to own.   Either that scruple arose between 2008 and 2012, or he changed his mind about acquiring the Putnam parcel, because the record reflects that the, himself bid $50,000 at the 2008 sale, and that his attorney bid $80,000 at the 2006 sale.   Obviously, a bid cast in 2012 at either number would have changed the dynamic and the result of that auction.   There is no sure explanation for Kenneth's absence from the 2012 sale, but it ought not to matter whether that absence was due to inadvertence or design;  “when the committee [or an opposing party] had ‘played by the rules,’ “ the court cannot reject the sale on account of a plaintiff's absence “ ‘because of its own mistake or error’ without undermining the integrity of the foreclosure by sale concept”;  Dime Savings, 321.   The same observation is true of the partition by sale concept.

Without necessarily intending to do so, Kenneth has created a situation where, without any investment on his part, he could partake of his share of the proceeds if the 2012 sale had yielded a sufficient return, or sit back and demand that Howard be a guarantor for the difference if it did not.   No one can deny that sometime in the fall of 2008 the bottom fell out of the world economy, real estate values plummeted, and the market for all properties in 2012 was substantially different from what it had been in 2006.   The appraisals submitted to this court—$175,000 in 2006 and 2008, $125,000 in 2010, and $117,000 prior to the 2012 sale, graphically illustrate the direction the market was taking, and informed any diligent participant in a suit of this nature that an auction sale in 2012 was not an event to miss if one had a desire to protect the value of one's interest.

Lastly, the court deems it significant that Kenneth did not challenge the sale when the court approved it on May 29, 2012.   Had he done so, the option of ordering another sale remained, whereas that is no longer possible.   As much of a nuisance to all as another sale might have been, that may yet have been a fairer response to the argument that the 2012 sale was at an unacceptable price than would be charging Howard with a non-existent $184,500 which might never have materialized regardless of what he did or did not do.

IV. Conclusion and Orders

For the foregoing reasons, this court concludes that Howard ought to be ordered to pay $12,436.60 towards Kenneth's attorney fees, that Kenneth should be awarded fees and expenses totaling $2,865 from the proceeds held by the clerk, that the unpaid committee fee should be satisfied, and that the remaining sums set forth in Table Two, above, should be disbursed to the parties in proportion to their interests taking court-ordered discounts on the sale prices into account.

Accordingly, it is hereby ADJUDGED and ORDERED:

On November 19, 2013, if no appeal has been taken, the Clerk of this Court shall make the following disbursements:

To Douglas Bove $ 78,857.90

To Howard Bove $ 52,254.61

To Kenneth Bove $ 25,492.81

To Anne Hoyt, Committee $ 3,030.00

TOTAL:  $159,635.32

In the event that an appeal is filed and a stay of this order becomes effective, the Clerk's office shall make no disbursements from this fund until further order of the court.

BY THE COURT

Boland, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The court has compared the committee's transmittals with all applicable offsets and orders found in the file, and notes an unexplained discrepancy of $137.33 on the Thompson property.   The court allowed Kenneth, as a one-third owner, to pay two-thirds of his high bid to the Committee. $206,000 minus one-third—68,666.67—leaves $137,333.33.   The clerk's office received only $137,196.   At the trial management conference, the court indicated that it had noticed a slight discrepancy, although the exact amount thereof awaited later calculation.   Neither party had apparently noticed this discrepancy, or could explain how it had arisen, and neither expressed a desire then or at the October 21 hearing to engage in the sort of intensive investigation of the complicated record in this case that might be required to explain what expenditure accounts for this de minimis deviation.   It must be pointed out that today's order disposes of all funds now held by the Clerk, as well as all prior orders of payments not yet made..  FN1. The court has compared the committee's transmittals with all applicable offsets and orders found in the file, and notes an unexplained discrepancy of $137.33 on the Thompson property.   The court allowed Kenneth, as a one-third owner, to pay two-thirds of his high bid to the Committee. $206,000 minus one-third—68,666.67—leaves $137,333.33.   The clerk's office received only $137,196.   At the trial management conference, the court indicated that it had noticed a slight discrepancy, although the exact amount thereof awaited later calculation.   Neither party had apparently noticed this discrepancy, or could explain how it had arisen, and neither expressed a desire then or at the October 21 hearing to engage in the sort of intensive investigation of the complicated record in this case that might be required to explain what expenditure accounts for this de minimis deviation.   It must be pointed out that today's order disposes of all funds now held by the Clerk, as well as all prior orders of payments not yet made.

FN2. This includes the $800 he has previously paid to Attorney Hoyt..  FN2. This includes the $800 he has previously paid to Attorney Hoyt.

FN3. April 8, 2002, “Ex Par Tee (sic) Appearance Before Judge Foley, No Docket Entry # assigned (wrong case number on caption)..  FN3. April 8, 2002, “Ex Par Tee (sic) Appearance Before Judge Foley, No Docket Entry # assigned (wrong case number on caption).

FN4. May 16, 2002, “Objection to Motion to Terminate Stay,” Docket Entry # 122..  FN4. May 16, 2002, “Objection to Motion to Terminate Stay,” Docket Entry # 122.

FN5. June 10, 2002, “Motion for Recusal,” Docket Entry # 124..  FN5. June 10, 2002, “Motion for Recusal,” Docket Entry # 124.

FN6. April 22, 2004, “Objection to Motion for Payment of Committee Fees,” Docket Entry # 140..  FN6. April 22, 2004, “Objection to Motion for Payment of Committee Fees,” Docket Entry # 140.

FN7. August 2, 2006, “Motion to Void Improper Sale and Investigate,” Docket Entry # 174..  FN7. August 2, 2006, “Motion to Void Improper Sale and Investigate,” Docket Entry # 174.

FN8. September 1, 2006, “Motion to Vacate Judgments and Rulings, etc.,” Docket Entry # 180..  FN8. September 1, 2006, “Motion to Vacate Judgments and Rulings, etc.,” Docket Entry # 180.

FN9. Undated Letter to Court Clerk, received December 22, 2008, Docket Entry # 219..  FN9. Undated Letter to Court Clerk, received December 22, 2008, Docket Entry # 219.

FN10. November 6, 2009, “Motion for Sanctions,” Docket Entry # 225..  FN10. November 6, 2009, “Motion for Sanctions,” Docket Entry # 225.

Boland, John D., J.