IN RE: Damian K. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION (corrected)

On March 6, 2013, the commissioner of the department of children and families (the department or DCF) filed a petition pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112 to terminate the parental rights of the respondent mother Rosemary K.¹ and the respondent putative father Andre Doe with respect to the minor child Damian K., born on June 20, 2011.   For the reasons set forth below, the court finds in favor of the petitioner and terminates the parental rights of Rosemary K. and Andre Doe with respect to Damian.

I

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 2, 2012, Damian was taken into the care of the department on an administrative ninety-six-hour hold.   The department filed a motion for an order of temporary custody and a neglect petition with respect to Damian on February 3, 2012.   The court (Sommer, J.) granted the order of temporary custody and issued preliminary specific steps for the respondent mother on that date.   Judge Sommer sustained the order of temporary custody by agreement on February 9, 2012.

On February 9, 2012, the court (Sommer, J.) granted the department's motion to cite in Domingo V. as the putative father of the minor child.   Judge Sommer ordered paternity testing on March 1, 2012.   The paternity test confirmed that Domingo V. was not Damian's father, and the petition was dismissed as to Domingo V. on April 17, 2012.

On May 17, 2012, Rosemary K. entered a written plea of nolo contendere to the neglect petition.   Damian was adjudicated neglected and committed to the department until further order of the court (Sommer, J.).   Judge Sommer also ordered final specific steps for Rosemary K. at that time.

The department filed a motion for review and approval of its permanency plan for Damian on November 8, 2012.   The proposed permanency plan was termination of parental rights and adoption.

On January 10, 2013, the court approved the permanency plan without prejudice to Rosemary K.'s objection to the plan.   The court also found that further efforts to reunite Damian with Rosemary K. were not appropriate.

The department moved to cite in Andre Doe as a putative father on January 10, 2013.   On January 31, 2013, Andre Doe was defaulted for failure to appear in the neglect case.

On March 6, 2013, the department filed a petition for termination of the parental rights of Rosemary K. and Andre Doe with respect to Damian.   Andre Doe was defaulted for failure to appear in the termination of parental rights proceeding on April 4, 2013.

II

FINDINGS OF FACT

The hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights took place on July 26, 2013.   The respondent mother Rosemary K. appeared at the hearing and was represented by counsel.   The minor child Damian was represented by counsel.   The department was represented by an assistant attorney general.

Neither the respondent mother nor the respondent putative father has claimed to have Native American tribal affiliation.   The court is not aware of any proceedings pending in any other court regarding the custody of the minor child.   The court has jurisdiction.

The court heard testimony from Lorraine Rodrigues, adult probation supervisor;  Nakia Hurdle, DCF social worker;  and the respondent mother Rosemary K. The court reviewed the documents that were entered into evidence and, as requested by the department, took judicial notice of the following:  that service was found on the respondent putative father Andre Doe, and that Andre Doe was defaulted on January 31, 2013 for his failure to appear in the neglect proceeding.

After considering all of the testimony and documentary evidence presented and judicially noticed, and having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses, the court finds that the following facts were proven by clear and convincing evidence, unless otherwise specified.

The respondent mother Rosemary K.:  Rosemary K. was born on November 4, 1977 in Stamford, Connecticut, to John K. and Katherine M. Her paternal aunt Debra K. told the department that Rosemary K.'s parents left her with her paternal grandparents John K., Sr. and Anna K. when she was approximately nine months old.   Her parents returned for her when she was about a year old, but they brought her back to her paternal grandparents soon thereafter.   Rosemary K.'s paternal grandparents obtained legal custody of Rosemary, and she remained in their home until 1994.   Her parents eventually separated, and her mother did not maintain contact with her.

After Anna K., Rosemary K.'s paternal grandmother, died in 1994, Rosemary K. lived with her paternal uncle George K. for approximately two years.   She attended the Stamford public schools, where she received special education services for a learning disability.   Rosemary K. graduated from high school.

Rosemary K. moved to her father's home and began a relationship with Kenny W. Rosemary K. and Kenny W. were married in 1998.   They resided with his family in Stamford.   Rosemary K. and Kenny W. separated after spending approximately seven years together.   They reconciled in 2005, but their relationship ended when Rosemary K. became pregnant with her son Christian, by another man.

Rosemary K. resided with her father and her paternal aunt Debra K. during her pregnancy with Christian.   After Christian was born, Rosemary K. and Christian lived with Debra K. In 2007, Rosemary K. and Christian moved to the St. Luke's Family Shelter in Stamford, where Rosemary K. first met Loida B. Rosemary K. and Christian left the shelter in 2008.   Rosemary K. next lived with a man named “Freddy” from Bridgeport, to whom she had been introduced by Loida B., and she visited Debra K. in Stamford on occasion.   At some point, Rosemary K. and Christian moved to Newark, New Jersey.

Rosemary K. and Christian first came to the attention of the department in July 2009.   The initial referral came from a social worker with the New Jersey Division of Family and Youth Services, who reported on July 15, 2009 that Rosemary K. and Christian were living in an abandoned apartment, with no electricity or running water.   Six additional reports concerning Rosemary K.'s homelessness, substance abuse, and inadequate supervision of Christian followed.

Rosemary K. and Christian moved back to Connecticut to live with Debra K. Rosemary K. was substantiated for physical neglect of Christian, and treatment services were recommended.   Christian participated in Birth to Three and speech therapy for developmental delays, and Rosemary K. worked with a therapist on anger management.   The neglect case remained open until March 2010, when the department learned that Rosemary K. had left Debra K.'s home with Christian on December 31, 2009, and her whereabouts were still unknown.   The department informed the Stamford police department of its serious concerns regarding Christian's safety and well-being.   The department closed Christian's neglect case on March 5, 2010.

Rosemary K. was arrested on March 28, 2010.   Christian was with her when she was arrested.   Following Rosemary K.'s arrest, Debra K. agreed to care for Christian.   On April 8, 2011, the court approved a subsidized transfer of guardianship of Christian to Debra K.

Rosemary K. was released from prison in September 2010.   She completed a parenting program in December 2010.   Between her release in September 2010 and the transfer of guardianship in April 2011, Rosemary K. did not visit with Christian or participate in his child protection case.   Rosemary K. was already pregnant with Damian when Christian's case was closed with the transfer of guardianship to Debra K.

Damian was born on June 20, 2011.   Rosemary K. reported to the department that she was prepared for Damian's arrival.   She said that she had her own apartment, through the department of social services (DSS), and that she was doing well.   The department noted at this time that Damian appeared to be healthy, clean, and bonded to Rosemary K., but that Rosemary K. seemed to be under stress.   She did not appear to have appropriate hygiene.

On October 15, 2011, the department received a referral from the Stamford police department that alleged physical and moral neglect of Damian by Rosemary K. Rosemary K. had Damian with her when she was arrested for shoplifting.   Rosemary K. cooperated with the department's investigation, and the case was closed without substantiation.

Rosemary K. was arrested again on December 16, 2011 and taken into custody.   She left Damian in the care of her friend Loida B. when she was incarcerated.

Damian next came to the attention of the department on February 2, 2012, when Loida B. reported that she had been caring for Damian for about two months but was no longer able to do so because the department was involved with her own family.   The department executed an administrative ninety-six-hour hold and took Damian into the care of the department.

Rosemary K. requested visitation with Damian while she was incarcerated from December 2011 to June 2012, but the department was unable to bring him to York Correctional to visit her due to his respiratory issues.   Damian was not medically cleared to visit in the prison.   Rosemary K. also participated in parenting groups during this period of incarceration.   She completed Parenting From a Distance, Parenting Education, and a Model Parenting support group.

Rosemary K. was released from York Correctional on June 5, 2012.   Following her release, she did not attempt to contact the department until July 2012, when she called the department's assigned social worker, Nakia Hurdle, approximately five times.   Rosemary K. and Ms. Hurdle exchanged voice mail messages, but they never had a conversation with each other during this time.   Rosemary K. testified that she asked for visitation with Damian in her voice mail messages.   Ms. Hurdle said that in her messages she asked Rosemary K. to come to the department's office so that they could discuss her case and arrange visits with Damian.   She testified that when Rosemary K. called back she just asked for visitation.   Rosemary K. did not give Ms. Hurdle her address, and she did not come to the department's office.   As a result, no visits were arranged, and Rosemary K. did not see Damian during the months that she was not incarcerated.

Rosemary K. testified that she stopped calling Ms. Hurdle because they were not compatible with each other.   She was particularly offended by one of Ms. Hurdle's voice mail messages.

Rosemary K. said that her probation officer referred her to the Saint Joseph parenting program in Stamford following her June 2012 release from York Correctional.   Loida B. also recommended the parenting program to her.   She said that she attended seven of the twenty-one weekly sessions, but then she stopped going to the program.   When she was at one of the Saint Joseph parenting program sessions, Rosemary K. saw Ms. Hurdle's supervisor in the building.   She told him that she had a problem with Ms. Hurdle.

On December 20, 2012, Rosemary K. returned to York Correctional.   The department did not learn that Rosemary K. had been incarcerated again until December 27, 2012, when it received an email from its department of corrections (DOC) liaison stating that Rosemary K. had been readmitted to York Correctional.

Rosemary K. has an extensive criminal history.   On September 21, 2009, she was arrested and charged with interfering with a police officer, General Statutes § 53a–167a.   She failed to appear in court on February 2, 2010.   She was ordered rearrested, and she was charged with failure to appear in the second degree, General Statutes § 53a–173.   Rosemary K. was arrested on March 28, 2010 on a bench warrant.   On May 27, 2010, she was sentenced on each charge to nine months in prison, suspended after serving three months, consecutively, and two years of probation.   She was charged with violating her probation, General Statutes § 53a–32, on January 5, 2012.   Her probation was terminated on March 5, 2012.

Rosemary K. was arrested again on February 21, 2011 and charged with larceny in the sixth degree, General Statutes § 53a–125b.   She was sentenced to ninety days, execution suspended, and one year of probation on October 6, 2011.   She was charged with violating her probation, General Statutes § 53a–32, on January 5, 2012.   Her probation was terminated on March 5, 2012.

On October 15, 2011, Rosemary K. was arrested on charges of larceny in the sixth degree, General Statutes § 53a–125b, and risk of injury, General Statutes § 53–21.   She did not attend her court hearing on November 28, 2011.   Once again, she was ordered rearrested, and she was charged with failure to appear in the second degree, General Statutes § 53a–173.   She was arrested on these charges on December 16, 2011.   On March 5, 2012, Rosemary K. was sentenced on the risk of injury charge to three years in prison, to be suspended after serving six months, followed by three years of probation.   She was also sentenced to serve thirty days on the larceny charge, to run concurrently.   Rosemary K. was charged with violating her probation, General Statutes § 53a–32, on December 7, 2012.   Her probation was revoked, and she was sentenced on the violation to thirty months in prison on May 16, 2013.

Rosemary K. was arrested on December 16, 2011 and charged with larceny in the sixth degree, General Statutes § 53a–125b.   She received an unconditional discharge on February 3, 2012.

On September 24, 2012, Rosemary K. was arrested and charged with larceny in the sixth degree, General Statutes § 53a–125b.   She failed to appear in court on December 18, 2012.   She was ordered rearrested, and she was charged with failure to appear in the second degree, General Statutes § 53a–173.   She was arrested on these charges on March 1, 2013.   On May 16, 2013, Rosemary K. was sentenced to serve thirty months in prison on the larceny charge and one year on the failure to appear charge, to run concurrently.

On October 27, 2012, Rosemary K. was again arrested and charged with larceny in the sixth degree, General Statutes § 53a–125b.   She failed to appear in court on November 23, 2012.   She was ordered rearrested, and she was charged with failure to appear in the second degree, General Statutes § 53a–173.   She was arrested on these charges on December 19, 2012.   On May 16, 2013, Rosemary K. was sentenced to serve ninety days in prison on the larceny charge and six months on the failure to appear charge.

Rosemary K. was arrested on February 13, 2013 and charged with two counts of larceny in the sixth degree, General Statutes § 53a–125b, and one count of forgery in the third degree, General Statutes § 53a–140.   These offenses were alleged to have occurred on September 20, 2012.   On May 16, 2013, Rosemary K. was sentenced to serve ninety days in prison on the two larceny charges.   The forgery charge was nolled.

Since her return to York Correctional, Rosemary K. has participated in various support groups and completed several programs.   She has finished the Coping Skills Group and the Healthy Relationships program.   As of the termination of parental rights hearing, Rosemary K. was in the Marilyn Baker drug recovery program, which she expected to complete in December 2013, and she was planning to start the Advanced Healthy Relationships program.   She was on the waiting list for anger management and self-esteem programs.   She intended to join the parenting group that was starting in the Marilyn Baker program.   She was also on the waiting list for vocational programs in culinary arts and computer skills.   She said that she already had a certificate in hospitality.

Rosemary K. testified that her maximum release date was December 13, 2015.   She said that her parole date was June 13, 2014.   Rosemary K. explained that her parole date would become progressively earlier as she earned credit for complying with her offender accountability plan (OAP), attending group sessions, and remaining free of any disciplinary issues.

Rosemary K. has not been employed since May 2006, when she was pregnant with Christian.   She worked at Forever 21, a clothing store in Stamford, from August 2005 to May 2006.

Rosemary K. testified that she last had her own place to live in September 2010, when she lived in a rooming house in Stamford.   She also said that she had a room on Atlantic Street in Stamford between June and December 2012.

Rosemary K. has unaddressed mental health and substance abuse issues.   Rosemary K. said that she had a mental health evaluation, which was required by probation, and that she went to the Dubois Center in Stamford for mental health services.   She thought that her probation officer would have provided the information to the department, because her probation officer told her that she would do so.

As a result of her incarceration, the child's respiratory issues, and her failure to have a conversation with the department's social worker during the months that she was not in York Correctional, Rosemary K. has not seen Damian in nearly two years.   Although she testified that she loved her son, Rosemary K. has shown little interest in Damian's health or welfare since she was incarcerated in December 2011.   She has not asked about his asthma and the treatment that he is receiving.   She has not inquired about his Birth to Three services or his developmental progress.   The department was unable to invite her to his medical appointments or Birth to Three sessions because she was in prison or her whereabouts were unknown.

Rosemary K. has no relationship with Damian.   She has not provided him with any financial, emotional or moral support.   She has not called him or sent any cards, gifts or letters to him.   She did not acknowledge his birthday.   She has been in prison for much of his life.

The respondent putative father Andre Doe:  At the January 10, 2013 hearing on the permanency plan, Rosemary K. identified an individual with the first name “Andre” as the putative father of Damian, and she provided his telephone number to the department.   Andre Doe was served by publication on January 17, 2013.   He was defaulted on January 31, 2013 for failure to appear in the neglect proceeding.

Ms. Hurdle, the department's social worker, contacted Andre Doe twice by telephone at the telephone number that Rosemary K. had provided.²  Ms. Hurdle testified that Andre Doe said that he did not know Rosemary K., he had not had a sexual relationship with her, and he was not Damian's father.   He refused to disclose any personal information, including his last name, and would not cooperate with the department.   He asked that Ms. Hurdle not contact him again.

After the termination of parental rights petition was filed on March 6, 2013, the department served Andre Doe by publication.   Andre Doe was defaulted on April 4, 2013 for his failure to appear in the termination of parental rights proceeding.

Andre Doe has never met Damian.   Since Damian's birth on June 20, 2011, Andre Doe has not visited him or attempted to visit him.   He has never contacted the department to inquire about Damian.   He has never expressed any interest in Damian's health or welfare or met any of Damian's basic needs.   He has had no interaction with Damian.

Andre Doe has not provided Damian with financial, emotional or moral support.   He has not called him or sent him any cards, letters or gifts.   He has never acknowledged his paternity or Damian's birthday.

Andre Doe never presented himself or a relative to the department as a resource for Damian.   He has not proposed a viable plan for Damian while the child has been in the department's care.   Andre Doe has never asked to assume responsibility for Damian.

Andre Doe has not made himself available to the department.   His whereabouts have been unknown since Rosemary K. identified him as Damian's putative father on January 10, 2013.

The minor child Damian K.:  Damian was born on June 20, 2011 in Stamford, Connecticut.   He is the second child of Rosemary K. Rosemary K. was pregnant with Damian at the time that guardianship of her first child Christian was transferred to her paternal aunt Debra K.

Rosemary K. appeared to be caring for Damian appropriately following his birth, but on October 15, 2011, the department received a referral from the Stamford police department regarding Rosemary K. and Damian.   Rosemary K. had been arrested for shoplifting, and Damian was with her when she was arrested.   Rosemary K. cooperated with the department's investigation.   The department closed the case without substantiating Rosemary K. for neglect of Damian.

When Rosemary K. was arrested again and taken into custody on December 19, 2011, the department was not informed of her arrest.   Damian did not come to the attention of the department again until about two months later, when the department learned that Rosemary K. had left Damian in the care of her friend Loida B. when she was incarcerated.   The department executed an administrative ninety-six-hour hold and took Damian into the care of the department on February 2, 2012.   Damian was placed in a DCF-licensed foster home.

On February 3, 2012, the department sought and obtained an order of temporary custody (Sommer, J.) and filed a neglect petition with respect to Damian.   The court sustained the order of temporary custody by agreement on February 9, 2012.   On May 17, 2012, Damian was adjudicated neglected (Sommer, J.) and committed to the department until further order of the court.

On January 10, 2013, the court approved the department's proposed permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption and found that further efforts to reunite Damian with Rosemary K. were not appropriate.   The department filed the termination of parental rights petition on March 6, 2013.

Damian has been in his current placement since February 21, 2012.³  He lives with his pre-adoptive foster mother and her biological son.   His foster mother's parents care for him in the evening while she works.   Damian is bonded to his foster mother and his foster brother.   He has adjusted well to this home, and he is considered part of the family.   Damian's foster mother is willing to adopt him if he becomes free for adoption.

Damian was certified as medically complex in October 2012.   He has been diagnosed with moderate persistent asthma, and he requires daily breathing treatments with a nebulizer.   Damian was diagnosed as borderline autistic following an evaluation in November 2012.   Damian attends daycare three days a week to improve his socialization skills.   Damian receives physical therapy once a week from Birth to Three due to developmental delays in his gross and fine motor skills.   He has been working with Birth to Three since March 2012.

Almost two years have passed since Damian last saw Rosemary K. He has not seen Rosemary K. since sometime prior to her incarceration in December 2011, when he was six months old.   He was unable to visit her while she was at York Correctional in the first half of 2012 due to his respiratory issues.   He did not see her following her June 2012 release from York Correctional because she did not make her whereabouts known to the department.   He has not visited her since her December 2012 return to York Correctional.

At this point, Damian has no relationship with Rosemary K. She is a stranger to him, having been in prison for much of his life.   He does not mention her or demonstrate any positive memories of her.   He identifies his foster mother, not Rosemary K., as “Mom.”

Damian has never met Andre Doe. Damian would not recognize Andre Doe as his father.   He has never visited with Andre Doe. Like Rosemary K., Andre Doe is a stranger to him.   Damian has no positive memories of him.

Compliance with specific steps:  On January 10, 2013, the court ordered final specific steps for Rosemary K. to follow in order to facilitate her reunification with Damian.   As of March 6, 2013, the adjudicatory date, Rosemary K. had not complied with the specific steps ordered by the court.   Specific steps were not ordered for the non-appearing respondent putative father Andre Doe.

Keep all appointments set by or with the Department of Children and Families.  Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the child(ren)'s court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem.

Rosemary K. did not comply with this step prior to the adjudicatory date.   She failed to keep appointments with the department during the period that her whereabouts were unknown to the department.   She also missed a few administrative case reviews prior to the adjudicatory date.

Let DCF, your attorney and the attorney for the child know where you and the children are at all times.

Rosemary K. did not comply with this step prior to the adjudicatory date.   Following her June 2012 release from York Correctional, Rosemary K. did not make her whereabouts known to the department, her attorney or the child's attorney.   The department did not learn where Rosemary K. was until December 27, 2012, when the department's DOC liaison reported that Rosemary K. had returned to York Correctional.

Take part in counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals (parenting, individual, and family).

The following treatment goal was expressly identified in Rosemary K.'s specific steps:  to gain basic insight on parenting to address her coping skills.   Rosemary K. did not comply with this step prior to the adjudicatory date.   The department was not able to make appropriate referrals for Rosemary K. because she was incarcerated until June 2012, her whereabouts were unknown to the department between June and December 2012, and she was incarcerated again in December 2012.   If, as of the adjudicatory date, Rosemary K. had participated in counseling to improve her parenting and coping skills, she did not make that known to the department at the time.   At the termination of parental rights hearing, Rosemary K. testified regarding her attendance at various courses and programs while at York Correctional, including some for parenting and mental health, before and after the adjudicatory date.   She also said that she attended seven of twenty-one sessions of a weekly parenting program during the period following her June 2012 release from York Correctional.

Accept in-home support services referred by DCF and cooperate with them.

Although ordered by the court, this step has been inapplicable.   The department has not referred in-home support services to Rosemary K. because she has been incarcerated or her whereabouts have been unknown to the department, and Damian has been in foster care.

Submit to a substance abuse evaluation and follow the recommendations about treatment, including inpatient treatment if necessary, aftercare and relapse prevention;  submit to hair tests.

Rosemary K. did not comply with this step prior to the adjudicatory date.   The department was not able to make appropriate referrals for Rosemary K. because she was incarcerated until June 2012, her whereabouts were unknown to the department between June and December 2012, and she was incarcerated again in December 2012.   If, as of the adjudicatory date, Rosemary K. had submitted to a substance abuse evaluation or participated in treatment, she did not make that known to the department.

Submit to random drug testing;  the time and method of the testing will be up to DCF to decide.

Rosemary K. did not comply with this step prior to the adjudicatory date.   The department was not able to make appropriate referrals for Rosemary K. because she was incarcerated until June 2012, her whereabouts were unknown to the department between June and December 2012, and she was incarcerated again in December 2012.   If, as of the adjudicatory date, Rosemary K. had submitted to random drug testing, she did not make that known to the department.

Not use illegal drugs or abuse alcohol or medicine

The department was unaware of Rosemary K.'s compliance with this step either before or after the adjudicatory date, because she was incarcerated or her whereabouts were unknown to the department.

Cooperate with service providers recommended for parenting/individual/family counseling, in-home support services and/or substance abuse assessment/treatment.

Rosemary K. did not comply with this step prior to the adjudicatory date.   The department was not able to make appropriate referrals for Rosemary K. because she was incarcerated until June 2012, her whereabouts were unknown to the department between June and December 2012, and she was incarcerated again in December 2012.   If, as of the adjudicatory date, Rosemary K. had received any of these services, she did not make that known to the department.

Cooperate with court-ordered evaluations or testing

Although this was one of Rosemary K's final specific steps, the court did not order any evaluations or testing in this case.

Sign releases allowing DCF to communicate with service providers to check on your attendance, cooperation and progress toward identified goals, and for use in future proceedings with this court.  Sign the release within 30 days.

Rosemary K. did not comply with this step prior to the adjudicatory date.   She has not signed any releases for the department since the commencement of this case.

Get and/or maintain adequate housing and a legal income.

Rosemary K. did not comply with this step prior to the adjudicatory date.   She was incarcerated until June 2012, her whereabouts were unknown to the department between June and December 2012, and she was incarcerated again in December 2012.   Rosemary K. has been transient and unemployed since the commencement of this case.

Immediately let DCF know about any changes in the make-up of the household to make sure that the change does not hurt the health and safety of the child(ren).

Rosemary K. did not comply with this step prior to the adjudicatory date.   Between her release from York Correctional in June 2012 and her re-incarceration in December 2012, her whereabouts, and the identity of those with whom she was residing, were unknown to the department.

Not get involved with the criminal justice system.  Cooperate with the Office of Adult Probation or parole officer and follow your conditions of probation or parole.

Rosemary K. did not comply with this step prior to the adjudicatory date.   Rosemary K. was arrested several times after her final specific steps were ordered and before the adjudicatory date.   Rosemary K. was arrested on September 24, 2012 and charged with larceny in the sixth degree, General Statutes § 53a–125b.   She failed to appear in court on December 18, 2012 with respect to the September 24, 2012 larceny in the sixth degree charge, and she was ordered rearrested and charged with failure to appear in the second degree, General Statutes § 53a–173.   She was arrested on these charges on March 1, 2013.   Rosemary K. was arrested on October 27, 2012, and she was again charged with larceny in the sixth degree, General Statutes § 53a–125b.   She missed her November 23, 2012 court date, and she was ordered rearrested and charged with failure to appear in the second degree, General Statutes § 53a–173.   Rosemary K. was arrested on these charges on December 19, 2012.   On February 13, 2013, Rosemary K. was arrested and charged with two counts of larceny in the sixth degree, General Statutes § 53a–125b, and one count of forgery in the third degree, General Statutes § 53a–140.   These offenses were alleged to have occurred on September 20, 2012.   On December 7, 2012, Rosemary K. was arrested for violating her probation, General Statutes § 53a–32.   She was on probation for charges arising from an October 15, 2011 arrest for risk of injury, General Statutes § 53a–21, and larceny in the sixth degree, General Statutes § 53a–125b.   Rosemary K. returned to York Correctional in December 2012.

Take care of the child(ren)'s physical, educational, medical, or emotional needs, including keeping the child(ren)'s appointments with his/her/their medical, psychological, psychiatric, or educational providers.   Although ordered by the court, this step has been inapplicable, because Rosemary K. has been incarcerated or her whereabouts have been unknown to the department, and Damian has been in foster care.

Make all necessary child-care arrangements to make sure the child(ren) is/are properly supervised and cared for by appropriate caretaker(s).

Although ordered by the court, this step has been inapplicable, because Rosemary K. has been incarcerated or her whereabouts have been unknown to the department, and Damian has been in foster care.

Keep the child(ren) in the State of Connecticut while this case is going on unless you get permission from the DCF or the court to take them out of state.  You must get permission first.

Although ordered by the court, this step has been inapplicable, because Rosemary K. has been incarcerated or her whereabouts have been unknown to the department, and Damian has been in foster care.

Visit the children as often as DCF permits.

Rosemary K. did not comply with this step prior to the adjudicatory date.   She has not visited Damian during the pendency of this child protection case.

Within thirty (30) days of this order, and at any time after that, tell DCF in writing the name, address, family relationship and birth date of any person(s) who you would like the department to investigate and consider as a placement resource for the child(ren).

Rosemary K. did not comply with this step prior to the adjudicatory date.   The department was already familiar with Rosemary K.'s paternal aunt, Debra K., because she is the guardian of Christian, Rosemary K.'s older child.   Rosemary K. did not provide the names of any other family members as potential placement resources for Damian.

Reunification efforts by the department:  In addition to case management services and administrative case reviews, the department provided Damian with Birth to Three and daycare services to facilitate his reunification with Rosemary K. The department was not able to make appropriate referrals for Rosemary K. because she was incarcerated until June 2012, her whereabouts were unknown to the department between June and December 2012, and she was incarcerated again in December 2012.   The court found that further reunification efforts were not appropriate on January 10, 2013.

III

LEGAL STANDARD

A proceeding for termination of parental rights is governed by General Statutes § 17a–112.  “In order to terminate a parent's parental rights under § 17a–112, the petitioner is required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that:  (1) the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify the family;  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1);  (2) termination is in the best interest of the child;  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(2);  and (3) there exists any one of the seven grounds for termination delineated in § 17a–112(j)(3).”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 148–49, 962 A.2d 81 (2009).

A hearing on a termination of parental rights petition proceeds in two phases—adjudication and disposition.   In the adjudicatory phase, the court must determine whether the department has proven by clear and convincing evidence that one of the statutory grounds for termination existed as of the date the petition was filed or last amended.  Practice Book § 32a–3(b);  Practice Book § 35a–7(a);  In re Keyashia C., 120 Conn.App. 452, 455, 991 A.2d 1113, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 909, 995 A.2d 637 (2010).   When a termination of parental rights is sought under General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B) on the ground of failure to rehabilitate, however, the court may consider events subsequent to the filing date when deciding whether the parent's rehabilitation “is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time.”  In re Jennifer W., 75 Conn.App. 485, 495, 816 A.2d 697, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 917, 821 A.2d 770 (2003).   The court need find that only one statutory ground for termination has been established to grant the petition.  In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466, 473, 816 A.2d 707 (2003).

If the court finds that the department has proven at least one statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence, the court then proceeds to the dispositional phase.  “In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of the child[ren] ․ In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent's parental rights is not in the best interest of the child[ren].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Sarah O., 128 Conn.App. 323, 340, 16 A.3d 1250, cert. denied, 301 Conn. 928, 22 A.3d 1275 (2011).  “In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a–112(k) ] ․” In re Jason B., 137 Conn.App. 408, 422–23, 48 A.3d 676 (2012).

Evidence as to adjudication and disposition may be heard in the same proceeding, but disposition may not be considered until the adjudicatory phase has concluded.  In re Alison M., 127 Conn.App. 197, 15 A.3d 194 (2011);  Practice Book § 35a–7(b).

IV

ADJUDICATIONA. Reasonable Efforts Finding

A reasonable efforts finding is a predicate for granting a petition for termination of parental rights.   The court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the department “made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a–111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to section 17a–111b, or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1).  “[Section 17a–112] imposes on the department the duty, inter alia, to make reasonable efforts to reunite the child or children with the parents.   The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof.   Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn ․ [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Jason R., 129 Conn.App. 746, 767–68, 23 A.3d 18 (2011), aff'd, 306 Conn. 438, 51 A.3d 334 (2012).  “Thus, the department must prove [by clear and convincing evidence] either that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts.   Section 17a–112(j) clearly provides that the department is not required to prove both circumstances.   Rather, either showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory element.”  (Emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Anvahnay S., 128 Conn.App. 186, 191, 16 A.3d 1244 (2011).

The department alleges that, as of the adjudicatory date, the department had made reasonable efforts to reunite Damian with Rosemary K. by providing case management services, administrative case reviews, Birth to Three services, and daycare for Damian.   The department was not able to make appropriate referrals for Rosemary K. because she was incarcerated until June 2012, her whereabouts were unknown to the department between June and December 2012, and she was incarcerated again in December 2012.   On January 10, 2013, the court found that further reunification efforts were not appropriate.   The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the department made reasonable efforts to reunite Damian with Rosemary K.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the department made reasonable efforts to locate the respondent putative father Andre Doe and to reunite Damian with Andre Doe by contacting Andre Doe, advising him of the pendency of the case, attempting to identify and locate him, and serving him by publication.   The department's social worker spoke with Andre Doe twice by telephone.   He refused to disclose his last name or other personal information.   He asked that the department not contact him again.   The department could not do more because Andre Doe never made himself available or his whereabouts known so that the department could provide him with reunification services.

The court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that Andre Doe was unable or unwilling to benefit from the department's reunification efforts.   Andre Doe refused to provide any personal information to the department, including his last name, and his whereabouts have been unknown.   His refusal to make himself available to the department demonstrated his unwillingness to benefit from the department's reunification efforts.

B. Statutory Grounds for Termination of Parental Rights

The department alleges three statutory grounds in the petition for termination of the parental rights of Rosemary K. with respect to Damian:  abandonment, General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(A) (Ground A), failure to rehabilitate after adjudication, General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i) (Ground B–1), and no on-going parent-child relationship, General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(D) (Ground D).  The department also alleges two statutory grounds for terminating the parental rights of the respondent putative father Andre Doe:  abandonment, General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(A) (Ground A), and no on-going parent-child relationship, General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(D) (Ground D).

Abandonment of Damian by the respondent mother Rosemary K. (Ground A).

The first statutory ground alleged for termination of Rosemary K.'s parental rights with respect to Damian is that set forth in General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(A):  “The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (3)(A) the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(A).   Abandonment focuses on the conduct of the parent.  In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 17, 632 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993).  General Statutes § 45a–717(g) defines “abandonment” as “the fail[ure] to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of a child ․ General Statutes § 45a–717(g).  The statute “does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child.   A parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child.   Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern ․” In re Ashley E., 62 Conn.App. 307, 314–15, 771 A.2d 160, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 910, 772 A.2d 601 (2001).  “Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child ․” Id.

Rosemary K. has not seen Damian in nearly two years.   Since she left Damian with her friend Loida B. in December 2011, Rosemary K. has shown little interest in Damian's health or well-being.   She has not inquired about the Birth to Three services that he is receiving or his developmental progress.   She has not asked about the treatment for his asthma.   She has not provided him with any financial, emotional or moral support.   She has not called him or sent any cards, gifts or letters to him.   She did not acknowledge his birthday.   She has spent much of Damian's life in prison, and she is a stranger to him.   Rosemary K. has chosen not to participate in Damian's life.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Damian has been abandoned by Rosemary K. in the sense that Rosemary K. has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to Damian's welfare.   The department has met its burden of proving the first statutory ground alleged for termination of Rosemary K.'s parental rights with respect to Damian, that set forth in General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(A), by clear and convincing evidence.

Failure of the respondent mother Rosemary K to rehabilitate after adjudication (Ground B–1).

The second statutory ground alleged for termination of the parental rights of Rosemary K. is that set forth in General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i)—failure to rehabilitate after adjudication.  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i) provides:  “The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (3) ․ (B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding ․ and the parent of such child ․ has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i).

“Personal rehabilitation as used in the statute refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ․ In conducting this inquiry, the trial court must analyze the respondent's rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child ․ The trial court must also determine whether the prospects for rehabilitation can be realized within a reasonable time given the age and needs of the child ․” In re Destiny R., 134 Conn.App. 625, 646, 39 A.3d 727, cert. denied, 304 Conn. 932, 43 A.3d 660 (2012).  “The statute does not require [a parent] to prove precisely when she will be able to assume a responsible position in her child's life.   Nor does it require her to prove that she will be able to assume full responsibility for her child, unaided by available support systems.   It requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation she has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date she can assume a responsible position in her child's life.”  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–3), 1 Conn.App. 463, 477, 473 A.2d 795, cert. denied, 193 Conn. 802, 474 A.2d 1259 (1984).  “Although the standard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must show more than any rehabilitation ․ Successful completion of the petitioner's expressly articulated expectations is not sufficient to defeat the petitioner's claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Destiny R., supra, 134 Conn.App. at 646–47.

As of the May 17, 2012 adjudication of Damian as a neglected child, Rosemary K.'s presenting problems were her continued involvement with the criminal justice system, her unaddressed mental health and substance abuse issues, her transient lifestyle and inadequate housing, her unemployment, her lack of parenting skills, and her neglect of Damian.   In the eighteen months since the neglect adjudication, Rosemary K. has failed to demonstrate sufficient rehabilitation to meet Damian's needs, now or within a reasonable period of time.

“[A] finding of rehabilitation is not based on a mechanistic tabulation of whether a parent has undertaken specific steps ordered.   The ultimate issue the court must evaluate is whether the parent has gained the insight and ability to care for his or her child given the age and needs of the child within a reasonable time.”  (Citation omitted.)  In re Destiny R., supra, 134 Conn.App. at 627.   As of March 6, 2013, the date the termination of parental rights petition was filed, the department had been working with Rosemary K. for more than a year with respect to Damian.   During this time, Rosemary K. made little, if any, progress in addressing her mental health, substance abuse, and parenting issues.   She did not comply with her final specific steps.   She failed to demonstrate any ability to refrain from criminal activity during the six months following her June 2012 release into the community.   She did not make herself available to receive referrals for mental health counseling or substance abuse treatment.   The department was unable to invite her to participate in Damian's Birth to Three services or to attend his medical appointments.   After trading a handful of voicemail messages with Ms. Hurdle, the department's social worker, in July 2012, she ceased contact with the department voluntarily rather than avail herself of recommended services and obtain visitation with Damian.   She failed to take responsibility for her actions and her inaction, continuing to blame a personality clash with Ms. Hurdle instead.   Rosemary K. did not obtain adequate housing, she remained unemployed, she continued to engage in criminal conduct, she did not visit with her child, and she showed little interest in improving her parenting, attending only a third of the Saint Joseph parenting program's sessions.   Only recently, while she has been incarcerated once again at York Correctional, has Rosemary K. begun to focus her attention on some of these issues.   Her eleventh-hour attempt at rehabilitation is simply too late, particularly where this is not her first involvement with the department in a child protection case.⁴

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Rosemary K. has failed to achieve a level of rehabilitation that would support a belief that she will assume a responsible position in Damian's life within a reasonable period of time.   The department has met its burden of proving the second statutory ground alleged for termination of Rosemary K.'s parental rights with respect to Damian, that set forth in General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B–1), by clear and convincing evidence.

No on-going parent-child relationship between the respondent mother Rosemary K and Damian (Ground D).

The third statutory ground alleged for termination of the parental rights of Rosemary K. with respect to Damian—no on-going parent-child relationship—is set forth in General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(D):  “The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (3) ․ (D) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(D).  To grant a petition for termination of parental rights under General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(D), the court must make two findings:  “[f]irst, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop ․” In re Christian P., 98 Conn.App. 264, 269, 907 A.2d 1261 (2006).

No parent-child relationship exists between Rosemary K. and Damian.   She has not seen him for nearly two years.   During that time, she has not provided him with any financial, emotional or moral support.   She has shown little interest in his health or welfare.   She has not called him or sent any cards, gifts or letters to him.   She did not acknowledge his birthday.

Rosemary K. is a stranger to Damian.   He does not mention her.   He does not demonstrate any positive memories of her, having last seen her when he was six months old.   Damian regards his foster mother as his mother, because she has provided consistent care and a nurturing environment for him since he was placed in her home in February 2012.

To allow further time for the establishment of a parent-child relationship between Damian and Rosemary K. would be detrimental to Damian's best interests.   Rosemary K. will not be able to rehabilitate herself sufficiently to where she will be able to have a responsible role in Damian's life within a reasonable period of time.   She cannot meet Damian's basic physical, emotional, moral or educational needs.   Damian is bonded to his pre-adoptive foster mother, not to Rosemary K., and disrupting that bond in the hope that a relationship with Rosemary K. would develop in the future would not serve Damian's need for stability and permanence.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that no on-going parent-child relationship exists between Rosemary K. and Damian.   The department has met its burden of proving the third statutory ground alleged for termination of Rosemary K.'s parental rights with respect to Damian, that set forth in General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(D), by clear and convincing evidence.

Abandonment of Damian by the respondent putative father Andre Doe (Ground A).

The first statutory ground alleged for termination of the parental rights of Andre Doe with respect to Damian is abandonment, as set forth in General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(A).   As discussed above with respect to Rosemary K., abandonment focuses on the conduct of the parent.  In re Kezia M., supra, 33 Conn.App. at 17.

Andre Doe has shown no interest in Damian or concern for his well-being.   He has made no attempt to contact Damian.   He has not called him or sent him any letters, cards or gifts.   He has not provided him with any financial, emotional or moral support.   He denied that he was Damian's father, and he asked that the department not contact him again.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Damian has been abandoned by Andre Doe in the sense that Andre Doe has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to Damian's welfare.   The department has met its burden of proving the first statutory ground alleged for termination of Andre Doe's parental rights with respect to Damian, that set forth in General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(A), by clear and convincing evidence.

No on-going parent-child relationship between the respondent putative father Andre Doe and Damian (Ground D).

The second statutory ground alleged for termination of the parental rights of Andre Doe with respect to Damian is the lack of a parent-child relationship, as set forth in General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(D).  No parent-child relationship exists between Andre Doe and Damian.   Andre Doe does not know Damian.   He has not visited Damian or attempted to visit him.   He has never inquired about Damian or expressed any interest in his well-being.   He has never indicated that he can meet Damian's physical, emotional, moral or educational needs or offer him any stability.   Damian has never met Andre Doe. He has no positive memories of him.   He does not recognize Andre Doe as his father.   Andre Doe is a stranger to Damian.

To allow further time for the establishment of a parent-child relationship between Damian and Andre Doe would be detrimental to Damian's best interests, particularly where Andre Doe has not shown any interest in the child—despite being contacted by the department—and has not demonstrated any ability to meet Damian's basic physical, emotional, moral or educational needs.   Damian is bonded to his pre-adoptive foster mother.   Disrupting that bond for a relationship to develop with Andre Doe in the future would not serve Damian's need for stability and permanence.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that no on-going parent-child relationship exists between Andre Doe and Damian.   The department has met its burden of proving the second statutory ground alleged for termination of Andre Doe's parental rights with respect to Damian, that set forth in General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(D), by clear and convincing evidence.

V

DISPOSITION

Having found by clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds exist to terminate the parental rights of Rosemary K. and Andre Doe with respect to Damian, the court must next determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child.  “The best interests of the child include the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of its environment.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000).

In determining whether the department has established by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parental rights of Rosemary K. and Andre Doe is in the best interests of Damian, the court must consider the seven factors set forth in General Statutes § 17a–112(k) and make written findings concerning those factors.  “The seven factors serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered ․ There is no requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Jason B., 137 Conn.App. 408, 422–23, 48 A.3d 676 (2012).   The court makes the following written findings with respect to each of the seven factors:

1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.

The department provided case management services, administrative case reviews, Birth to Three services, and daycare to facilitate the reunion of Damian with Rosemary K. The department was not able to offer or provide services to Rosemary K. because she was incarcerated until June 2012, her whereabouts were unknown between June and December 2012, and she was incarcerated again in December 2012.   The respondent putative father Andre Doe has been unavailable or unwilling to have the department offer or provide any services to him.   He refused to provide any personal information to the department, including his last name, and his whereabouts have been unknown.

2. Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

The department made reasonable efforts to reunite Damian with Rosemary K. pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, by providing case management services, administrative case reviews, Birth to Three services, and daycare for Damian.   The department was not able to offer or provide services to Rosemary K. because she was incarcerated until June 2012, her whereabouts were unknown between June and December 2012, and she was incarcerated again in December 2012.   The department made reasonable efforts to reunite Damian and the respondent putative father Andre Doe by contacting Andre Doe, advising him of the pendency of the case, attempting to identify and locate him, and serving him by publication.   Andre Doe refused to provide any personal information to the department, including his last name, and his whereabouts have been unknown.

3. The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order.

The court ordered final specific steps for Rosemary K. on May 17, 2012.   The terms of the final specific steps ordered by the court and Rosemary K.'s failure to comply with the specific steps are discussed in detail in part II of this decision.   Rosemary K. did not comply with her obligations under the specific steps.   The department fulfilled its obligations under the specific steps and other court orders.   No specific steps were ordered for the respondent putative father Andre Doe. He was defaulted for his failure to appear in this proceeding on April 4, 2013.

4. The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to such child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.

Damian does not appear to have any feelings or emotional ties with respect to Rosemary K. Damian has no feelings or emotional ties with respect to the respondent putative father Andre Doe, having never met the man.   Damian has resided in the same foster home since February 22, 2012, and he has feelings and emotional ties with his pre-adoptive foster mother.   He is bonded with her, and he considers her to be his mother.

5. The age of the child.

Damian was born on June 20, 2011.   He is two years and four months old.

6. The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child.

Rosemary K. did not make the effort required to adjust her circumstances, conduct or conditions so that it would be in the best interest of Damian to return to her care.   She has not seen Damian since sometime prior to her incarceration in December 2011.   She did not comply with her final specific steps.   She showed little, if any, interest in addressing her mental health, substance abuse, and parenting issues.   She did not refrain from criminal activity during the six months following her June 2012 release into the community.   She voluntarily ceased contact with the department, rather than making herself available to receive recommended services and obtain visitation with Damian.   She did not obtain adequate housing, and she remained unemployed.   The respondent putative father Andre Doe did not make the effort required to adjust his circumstances, conduct or conditions so that it would be in the best interest of Damian to be in his care and custody.

7. The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.

Rosemary K. has not been prevented by anyone, including the putative father Andre Doe, from maintaining a meaningful relationship with Damian.   Her economic circumstances have not prevented Rosemary K. from having a meaningful relationship with the child.   Andre Doe has not been prevented by Rosemary K., by any other person, or by his economic circumstances from maintaining a meaningful relationship with Damian.

The court has considered the best interests of Damian, including his health, safety and need for permanency.  “It is undisputed that children require secure, stable, long-term, continuous relationships with their parents or foster parents.   There is little that can be as detrimental to a child's sound development as uncertainty ․” Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513, 102 S.Ct. 3231, 73 L.Ed.2d 928 (1982).   Damian is a medically complex child, due to his asthma.   When he came into care, his socialization skills were lacking, and his fine and gross motor skills were developmentally delayed.   He required stability and permanence, with a caregiver who could meet his specialized needs.   Damian is thriving in the home of his pre-adoptive foster mother, where he has lived since February 2012.   He is bonded to his foster mother and her biological son.   They, and his foster mother's parents, are the only family he has known.   They are providing him with a stable and nurturing environment.   His foster mother is willing to adopt him if he becomes free for adoption.   Based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parental rights of Rosemary K. and Andre Doe is in the best interests of Damian.⁵

VI

CONCLUSION

ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ordered as follows:

The objection of Rosemary K. to the permanency plan for Damian is overruled;

The petition for termination of the parental rights of Rosemary K. and Andre Doe with respect to Damian is granted, and the commissioner of the department of children and families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for Damian so that Damian may be placed for adoption.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(o), the statutory parent shall report to the court within thirty days of this judgment on the case plan for Damian and shall timely present such further reports to the court as required by law.

The department shall file a petition for the adoption of Damian with the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Stamford pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–129b, or the clerk of the Probate Court that has jurisdiction over the adoption of Damian shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Stamford when and if any such adoption is finalized.

Judgment shall enter accordingly.

BY THE COURT

HELLER, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. In accordance with General Statutes § 46b–124 and Practice Book § 32a–7, the names of the parties are not disclosed, and the records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest in the matter and only upon order of the court..  FN1. In accordance with General Statutes § 46b–124 and Practice Book § 32a–7, the names of the parties are not disclosed, and the records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest in the matter and only upon order of the court.

FN2. Ms. Hurdle testified that she called Andre Doe after the May 17, 2012 neglect adjudication, but the court file indicates that Rosemary K. identified Andre Doe as Damian's putative father on January 10, 2013, the date on which the court approved the permanency plan for Damian..  FN2. Ms. Hurdle testified that she called Andre Doe after the May 17, 2012 neglect adjudication, but the court file indicates that Rosemary K. identified Andre Doe as Damian's putative father on January 10, 2013, the date on which the court approved the permanency plan for Damian.

FN3. Ms. Hurdle explained that Damian's first placement was a short-term placement after the department took custody of Damian on a ninety-six-hour hold.   It was not intended to be a long-term placement..  FN3. Ms. Hurdle explained that Damian's first placement was a short-term placement after the department took custody of Damian on a ninety-six-hour hold.   It was not intended to be a long-term placement.

FN4. Rosemary K. appears to have been was more engaged in recommended services and more compliant with her specific steps during the neglect case relating to her first child, Christian, than she has been in this child protection proceeding..  FN4. Rosemary K. appears to have been was more engaged in recommended services and more compliant with her specific steps during the neglect case relating to her first child, Christian, than she has been in this child protection proceeding.

FN5. In determining the issue of the best interests of Damian, the court has considered the adjudicatory and dispositional evidence in its entirety, and the court has concluded by clear and convincing evidence that there is no permanency plan that could have secured the best interests of Damian that is less restrictive than termination of the parental rights at issue.   See In re Azareon Y., 139 Conn.App. 457, 60 A.3d 742 (2012), aff'd, 309 Conn. 626, 72 A.3d 1074 (2013);  In re Julianna B., 141 Conn.App. 163, 61 A.3d 606 (2013)..  FN5. In determining the issue of the best interests of Damian, the court has considered the adjudicatory and dispositional evidence in its entirety, and the court has concluded by clear and convincing evidence that there is no permanency plan that could have secured the best interests of Damian that is less restrictive than termination of the parental rights at issue.   See In re Azareon Y., 139 Conn.App. 457, 60 A.3d 742 (2012), aff'd, 309 Conn. 626, 72 A.3d 1074 (2013);  In re Julianna B., 141 Conn.App. 163, 61 A.3d 606 (2013).

Heller, Donna Nelson, J.