Daniel Fiamengo v. Susan Paquette (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (# 107)

The defendant, Susan Paquette, moves to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff, Daniel Fiamengo.   She asserts she is entitled to a dismissal of any negligence claims against her based upon sovereign immunity as provided by Connecticut General Statutes § 4–165 and, further, there are a complete lack of factual allegations that would be sufficient to qualify the claims asserted as intentional torts that would be exempt from the sovereign immunity defense.

The plaintiff, Daniel Fiamengo, objects to the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the defendant is being sued personally as opposed to being sued in her capacity as an employee of the State of Connecticut.

A.

To determine whether the claims against the defendant are barred by sovereign or statutory immunity, it is necessary to understand the difference between the two protections.  “It is well settled that the defense of sovereign immunity can be raised for claims brought directly against the state or against state employees acting in their official capacities.   Likewise, the defense of statutory immunity can be raised for claims brought against state employees acting in their individual capacities ․ Because an action against state employees in their official capacities is, in effect, an action against the state ․ the only immunity that can apply is the immunity claimed by the state itself—sovereign immunity ․ In an official—capacity action, [individual capacity] defenses are unavailable ․ Section 4–165 applies only to state officers and employees sued in their personal capacities ․” (Citations omitted.)  Mercer v. Strange, 96 Conn.App. 123, 128, 899 A.2d 683 (2006).   Thus, to assess whether the present action is barred by sovereign or statutory immunity, the preliminary inquiry must be whether the plaintiff brings his claims against the defendant in his individual or official capacity.

“[The Connecticut Supreme Court has] identified the following criteria for determining whether an action against an individual is, in effect, against the state and barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity:  (1) a state official has been sued;  (2) the suit concerns some matter in which that official represents the state;  (3) the state is the real party against whom relief is sought;  and (4) the judgment, though nominally against the official, will operate to control the activities of the state or subject it to liability.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gordon v. H.N.S. Management Co., 272 Conn. 81, 93–94, 861 A.2d 1160 (2004).

“[T]he identities of the parties are determined by their description in the summons.”  Hultman v. Blumenthal, 67 Conn.App. 613, 620, 787 A.2d 666, cert. denied, 259 Conn. 929, 793 A.2d 253 (2002).   Additionally, the court may look to the complaint and the plaintiff's arguments to determine whether the claims are against the defendant in his individual or official capacity.   Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 308–09, 828 A.2d 549 (2003).  “If the plaintiff's complaint reasonably may be construed to bring claims against the defendants in their individual capacities, then sovereign immunity would not bar those claims.”  Id., 307.

With this jurisprudential guidance the court turns to the specifics of this case.   The summons initiating this action identifies the address for service of the defendant as the address of the 986 Norwich–NL Turnpike Uncasville, Ct. This is the street address for the Corrigan Correctional Institute.   It is the same address used by the plaintiff, who identifies himself as an inmate at this correctional institute.   From this information the court finds that the defendant is a state employee at this location.

The plaintiff's complaint consists of six counts.   The first count sounds in negligence, the second count sounds in “abuse,” the third count sounds in recklessness, the fourth count sounds in harassment, the fifth count sounds in “premeditated and criminal conspiracy from the wrongful use of data” and the sixth count is a claim of liability as against the defendant for “unturn allegations and the misused data information.”   After each count the plaintiff claims a relief an award of compensatory and punitive damages, an award of attorneys fees and such other relief as the court deems fair and equitable.

The facts alleged in the complaint are sparse and difficult to parse.   The complaint is replete with legal conclusions as opposed to allegations of fact.   The court understands from the complaint that the plaintiff complains that the defendant improperly used state computers by managing or entering information regarding the plaintiff's criminal record (Docket No. CR 90–0068736).   The plaintiff claims as a result of this conduct that the plaintiff lost a job.

In his opposition to this motion the plaintiff references Chapter 949g of the General Statutes which relates to computer crimes.   He also references certain sections of the Connecticut Penal Code, Title 53a of the General Statutes that relates to computer crimes.   These sections of the General Statutes are not plead in his complaint.

The court finds that the plaintiff has sued the defendant Susan Paquette in her capacity as an agent or employee of the state responsible for managing or entering computer data.   The State has an interest in maintaining criminal records in a computer format and is the real party in interest in this case and the relief the plaintiff seeks would operate to control the activities of the State or subject to liability.

Although the plaintiff claims to have sued the plaintiff in her individual capacity he cannot prevail on this position.   As such, pursuant to statute the defendant has statutory immunity from the negligence claims made against her.   Further the plaintiff has not plead nor offered evidence to the court that the State has consented to this suit or that the Claims Commissioner has authorized the maintenance of this action.   Finally the allegations of the complaint cannot be reasonably to allege intentional conduct or wanton, reckless or malicious conduct on the part of the defendant so as fall into the statutory exception for liability.

The defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint is granted.

Cosgrove, J.

Cosgrove, Emmet L., J.