David Chapman v. Carol Chapdelaine et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANTS' MOTION # 106

On February 26, 2013, the plaintiff, David Chapman, filed an amended one-count complaint against Carol Chapdelaine, Captain Murray and Heidi Palliardi.¹  In the amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts in support of his claim for retaliation in violation of his constitutional rights.   The plaintiff was an inmate housed at Osborn Correctional Institution in Somers, Connecticut.   On June 25, 2012, the plaintiff wrote Warden Carol Chapdelaine a letter requesting a hardship transfer to Cheshire Correctional Institution.   When his transfer request was denied, the plaintiff filed a grievance which was denied as well.   On September 7, 2012, the defendants retaliated against the plaintiff by transferring him to the Carl Robinson Correctional Institution in Enfield, Connecticut.   The plaintiff later filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and filed suit against the defendants.   On November 9, 2012, the defendants retaliated against the plaintiff again by transferring him to Enfield Correctional Institution.   In his prayer for relief, the plaintiff claims $25,000 in punitive damages and $25,000 in compensatory damages against each defendant in their individual capacities.   There is no claim for injunctive or declaratory relief.

On May 15, 2013, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.   The defendants have submitted a memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss.   The plaintiff has submitted an objection to the defendants' motion.   The motion was heard before the court on July 10, 2013.  “A motion to dismiss ․ property attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011).   “A motion to dismiss is the proper procedural vehicle to raise a claim that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action.”  Bellman v. West Hartford, 96 Conn.App. 387, 392, 900 A.2d 82 (2006).

In the present case, the defendants argue that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action because (1) the plaintiff lacks standing to bring suit against the defendants, (2) sovereign immunity bars the plaintiff's claim against the defendants in their official capacities, and (3) qualified immunity bars the plaintiff's claim against the defendants in their individual capacities.   The plaintiff argues, inter alia, that the amended complaint sufficiently alleges facts in support of his claim of retaliation and that qualified immunity does not bar the plaintiff's claim because his claim alleges a constitutional violation.

“[B]ecause the issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction, it may be a proper basis for granting a motion to dismiss.”  Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 303 Conn. 402, 413, 35 A.3d 188 (2012).   If the plaintiff's standing does not adequately appear from the record, the complaint must be dismissed.  Burton v. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 300 Conn. 542, 550, 23 A.3d 1176 (2011).

“Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring suit or is classically aggrieved.”  Steeneck v. University of Bridgeport, 235 Conn. 572, 579, 668 A.2d 688 (1995).   In order to establish aggrievement, the plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a specific, personal and legal interest in the challenged action and (2) that the specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the challenged action.  Id. The determination of aggrievement is a question of fact for the trial court.  Id., 580.

The Supreme Court has held that “a prisoner's transfer from one place of confinement to another does not infringe or implicate a constitutionally protected liberty interest.”  Asherman v. Meachum, 213 Conn. 38, 47, 566 A.2d 663 (1989).   Prisoners do not have a constitutionally protected right to be confined in any particular correctional facility or housing unit.  Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 248, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983);  see also General Statutes § 18–86 (“The commissioner may transfer any inmate of any of the institutions or facilities of the department to any other such institution or facility ․ when it appears to the commissioner that the best interests of the inmate or the other inmates will be served by such action”).

In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants retaliated against him on two occasions by transferring him to different correctional facilities.   The plaintiff has not alleged any cognizable legal interest that has been affected by the defendants' actions.   Because the Supreme Court has clearly held that inmates do not have a constitutional right to be confined in any particular facility or unit, the plaintiff does not have standing to challenge the defendants' action.

The doctrines of sovereign immunity and federal qualified immunity also implicate the court's subject matter jurisdiction.  Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011);  Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn.App. 745, 747, 763, 878 A.2d 384, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 920, 883 A.2d 1252 (2005).  Title 42 of the United States Code, § 1983, provides in relevant part:  “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ․ subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law ․” The United States Supreme Court has held that § 1983 authorizes actions against state officers for damages arising from official acts, if they are sued in their individual capacities.  Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 23, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991) (“state officials sued in their individual capacities are ‘persons' for purposes of § 1983”).   Conversely, state officials sued for money damages in their official capacities are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983 because the action against them is essentially one against the state itself.  Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 Conn. 128, 141, 913 A.2d 415 (2007).

When a plaintiff is suing the defendants in their individual capacities, the court must determine if it has lost its jurisdiction to hear the case under the doctrine of federal qualified immunity.  “Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Carrubba v. Moskowitz, 81 Conn.App. 382, 395, 840 A.2d 557 (2004), aff'd, 274 Conn. 533, 877 A.2d 773 (2005).   The dispositive question under qualified immunity is whether it is objectively reasonable to conclude that the defendants' respective conduct violated the plaintiff's federal rights and that the defendants should have known that their respective actions were unconstitutional.

Because there is no constitutional or statutory right to be confined at any particular prison, the plaintiff has failed to allege a violation of a protected constitutional or statutory right and his claim against each defendant, individually, is barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

At oral argument, the plaintiff represented to the court that he was, in fact, also suing the defendants in their official capacities, but his complaint and brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss each indicate that he is suing them only in their individual capacities.   Even assuming arguendo that the plaintiff is suing the defendants in their official capacities, sovereign immunity bars his claim because the defendants, as state officials, are not subject to liability under § 1983.   Further, his failure to obtain permission to sue the state from the Claims Commissioner, as required under General Statutes § 4–147, deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction over such a claim.

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint is granted.

James Graham

Superior Court Judge

FOOTNOTES

FN1. All three defendants have entered appearances and are parties to this motion.   They will be referred to collectively as “the defendants.”.  FN1. All three defendants have entered appearances and are parties to this motion.   They will be referred to collectively as “the defendants.”

Graham, James T., J.