State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Company et al. v. Maya Rodriguez (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT # 107

On July 24, 2011, the plaintiffs, State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company (State Farm) and Abu Chowdhury, commenced this action against the defendant, Maya Rodriguez.   State Farm brings this action as subrogee of Chowdhury.   In the complaint, the plaintiffs allege that the defendant, who was at all relevant times Chowdhury's tenant, negligently caused a fire at 151 Crown Street, Meriden, Connecticut (the premises).   The complaint further alleges that, pursuant to its insurance policy with Chowdhury, State Farm paid Chowdhury for said damages.   As subrogee of Chowdhury, State Farm now seeks to recover said money damages and postjudgment interest from the defendant.   On April 5, 2013, the defendant moved for summary judgment ¹ on the ground that, pursuant to the contract entered into between the landlord and tenant, the defendant, as tenant, would not be responsible for damages resulting from a fire at the premises.   In the accompanying memorandum of law, the defendant argues that absent a provision in the contract specifically creating an express agreement obligating the tenant to be responsible for fire loss, the landlord's insurance company has no right of subrogation against the tenant.   On August 27, 2013, State Farm filed an objection to the defendant's motion wherein it argues that there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of her liability for damages that resulted from her negligence.   The matter was heard at short calendar on October 15, 2013.

“Practice Book § 17–49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Brooks v. Sweeney, 299 Conn. 196, 210, 9 A.3d 347 (2010).

“In DiLullo v. Joseph, [259 Conn. 847, 851–53, 792 A.2d 819 (2002) ], [the state Supreme Court] embraced the leading case for the proposition that there is no right of subrogation against a tenant by a landlord's insurer in the absence of a specific agreement to the contrary ․ The possibility that a lessor's insurer may proceed against a lessee almost certainly is not within the expectations of most landlords and tenants unless they have been forewarned by expert counseling.   When lease provisions are either silent or ambiguous in this regard—and especially when a lessor's insurance policy is also silent or ambiguous—courts should adopt a rule against allowing the lessor's insurer to proceed against the tenant.”  (Citation omitted;  emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. v. Vaszil, 279 Conn. 28, 37, 900 A.2d 513 (2006).

In support of her motion for summary judgment, the defendant submits as evidence the residential lease entered into between Chowdhury as landlord and the defendant as tenant.   Upon reading the provisions of this lease, this court is of the opinion that, as a matter of law, the defendant is not liable to State Farm for the damages that allegedly resulted from the fire.   Like the lease agreement involved in Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. v. Vaszil, supra, 279 Conn. 28, the lease in the present case makes no mention of subrogation and it does not remotely inform the defendant that she would be liable to her landlord's insurer for any casualty fire damages to the landlord's building.   Id., 37.   Paragraph twelve of the lease in the present case is entitled “Maintenance and Repair” and provides:  “Lessee will, at his sole expense, keep and maintain the leased premises and appurtenances in good ․ condition and repair during the term of this lease and any renewal thereof.   In particular, Lessee shall keep the fixtures in the house or on or about the leased premises in good order and repair;  keep the furnace clean;  keep the electric bells in order;  keep the walks free from dirt and debris;  and, at his sole expense, shall make all required repairs to the plumbing, range, heating, apparatus, and electric and gas fixtures whenever damage thereto shall have resulted from Lessee's misuse, waste, or neglect or that of his employee, family, agent or visitor.   Major maintenance and repair of the leased premises, not due to Lessee's misuse, waste, or neglect or that of his employee, family, agent, or visitor, shall be the responsibility of Lessor or his assignee.   Lessee agrees that no signs shall be placed or painting done on or about the leased premises by Lessee or at his direction without the prior written consent of Lessor.”   This provision simply does not suffice to create an express agreement rendering the tenant responsible for fire loss nor does this court view any other provision in the lease as creating one.  Id., 33 (“We agree with the defendants and the trial court in this case that ‘the provisions of the lease obligating the tenant not to cause damage to the apartment and to be responsible for repairing any such [damage] ․ do not rise to a level of creating an express agreement noticing and obligating the tenant to be responsible for the fire loss ․ [and] that no other provision of the lease creates such an obligation’ ”).   Based on the foregoing, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is hereby granted.

BY THE COURT

Jack W. Fischer, Judge

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Accompanying the motion for summary judgment was also a motion for permission to file summary judgment.   At short calendar on October 15, 2013, State Farm agreed to argue the merits of the motion for summary judgment and objection thereto and accordingly did not object to the court's grant of the defendant's motion for permission to file summary judgment..  FN1. Accompanying the motion for summary judgment was also a motion for permission to file summary judgment.   At short calendar on October 15, 2013, State Farm agreed to argue the merits of the motion for summary judgment and objection thereto and accordingly did not object to the court's grant of the defendant's motion for permission to file summary judgment.

Fischer, Jack W., J.