IN RE: Emily B.1 (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON PETITIONER'S ORDER OF TEMPORARY CUSTODY AND NEGLECT PETITION

This matter comes to the court by way of a contested Order of Temporary Custody (OTC) and petition, each brought by the Department of Children and Families (DCF), alleging neglect of the five children of Deborah B. (mother) and Daniel B. (father), which, upon motion by DCF and granted by the court, was consolidated for trial with the adjudicatory phase of that petition pursuant to Practice Book § 33a–7(e).   The children are Emily, born 9–8–04, Grace, born 10–13–05, Lucas, born 2–2–07, Christopher, born 7–16–08, and Nicholas, born 12–14–10.   Both mother and father were present for each day of trial and were represented by separate counsel.   The original OTC, dated July 19, 2013, signed by this court, requested that “temporary care and custody of said child or youth shall be vested in:  father, Daniel B. pending a hearing as set forth below on the confirmation of this order.”   In signing the order on that date this court approved that provision and the children were placed with father where they remain to the date of this memorandum of decision.   The court in granting the ex parte order also marked on the OTC motion the sentence:  “Said child or youth is in immediate physical danger from surroundings.”

The contested consolidated trial lasted seven days beginning July 31, 2013 and concluding September 11, 2013.   Because of the length of the trial and the schedules of witnesses both expert and non-expert and the schedules of the attorneys, the court finds that there were compelling circumstances to forego the consecutive trial day requirement.²  Final argument was ordered by way of trial/factual briefs simultaneously due September 20, 2013.   The court heard thirteen witnesses, two of whom were recalled as rebuttal witnesses.   Twenty-seven documents were entered as full exhibits.

Father and mother separated in February 2012, and are in the process of getting a divorce.   That matter is currently pending in the Superior Court, Putnam, under docket number WWM–FA11–4012180–S.   At the time of the OTC all five children were living with mother while father had visitation once a week.   Mother was living in Uncasville, CT where she continues to live and father was living in Putnam, CT where he continues to live, now with the five children.

Section 1—The Order of Temporary Custody.

Finding of Facts:  The following facts are found by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

The court first addresses the OTC. The motion for order of temporary custody alleged that a child was in immediate physical danger from surroundings.   The accompanying affidavits provided a scenario of concern by DCF relating to mother's significant history of seeking to involve each child with medical intervention for aliments or specialized needs which in fact the child did not possess.   The ailments which were alleged but did not exist were sometimes extreme in nature, such as cancer and seizures.³  More about this and the work of Dr. Nina Livingston with the children will be addressed below in this section and in the neglect section of this memorandum of decision.

DCF was involved with mother for treatment services when on July 16, 2013, social worker (SW) Jeanne Murphy, DCF, assigned to the case, made a report to the DCF Careline that Nicholas had sustained an injury while in mother's care for which there was no adequate explanation.   Father, who, as noted above, is separated from mother and who while being so separated enjoyed weekly visitation ordered by the Superior Court, Family session, Putnam, CT, showed Ms. Murphy photographs of Nicholas' shoulder taken on July 12, 2013, on father's phone revealing what appears to be two burn marks on Nicholas' right shoulder.   The photographs attached to the affidavit seeking the OTC revealed a dramatic burn.   Father was unable to get an explanation from any of the children as to how this injury happened.   On July 16, 2013, Ms. Murphy, joined by investigative social worker (ISW) Amanda Parsons, visited mother and the children to learn more about the cause of the injury.   Nicholas reported it was a “sunburn.”   Emily reported it happened when Nicholas “pinched his arm in the stroller” and reported that he did not cry.   Grace reported that she did not know how it happened.⁴  Lucas reported it was a “sunburn.” ⁵

When Ms. Murphy first spoke with mother about the injury mother reported it was a sunburn.   Later she indicated that he had burned it on the stroller.   She said that while she had taken the children for a long walk a week or two ago Nicholas touched one of the metal parts of the stroller, but mother was unable to demonstrate how the injury happened.   She indicated that he only said, “Ow” and his arm was “a little red.”   She denied that he cried or complained about it at any time.⁶  She would later explain that “he did not express pain about it and she stated that was because he has had so many ear infections when he was a baby she feels he does not react to pain like other children.   Father shook his head at this statement.” ⁷  At the department's request mother took Nicholas to his pediatrician, Dr. Walia, who reported through his nurse that he believed the injury was a burn but at variance with mother's explanation to him.⁸  He testified at the trial that the injuries were burns, that the top one was a first degree burn and that the lower one was a second degree burn.   He had asked mother how it happened and mother replied that she did not know how it happened and did not think it was serious enough to get treated.   Dr. Walia testified that such an injury, especially the second degree burn, would be painful and would cause crying and upset.   He testified that had DCF not notified him of the injury he would have reported it to DCF, being a mandated reporter.   He felt the stroller explanation was “improbable” as a mechanism of injury.

Between July 6, 2013, and the date of the OTC (July 19, 2013) DCF was involved with a woman named Abby M. and her child ⁹ both of whom were living with mother and the five children.   On July 9, 2013, DCF removed Abby's child on an OTC. DCF set up a safety plan with mother on July 11, 2013, wherein Abby would not be taking care of mother's children.   DCF asked mother to have Abby leave the home because of concerns about her.   However, apparently Abby was still there in August because mother sought a restraining order from the Superior Court in Norwich on August 12, 2013, against Abby. In the “Statement of Conditions From Which You Seek Relief” portion of the affidavit, mother stated that on Friday, August 9, 2013, Abby disclosed to mother that while mother was outside with the other children on an undisclosed date and Nicholas napped in the house, Nicholas “woke up and went to brush his teeth and burned his arm on the crock pot.”   The next day, August 13, 2013, that affidavit seeking the restraining order was introduced into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit # 11.   Mother, of course, had signed a safety plan that she would not leave Abby in charge of her children or any of them.   Abby was not subpoenaed and did not testify as to this possible explanation of the cause of the burn on Nicholas' arm.   Mother called the DCF Careline on September 10, 2013, to advise that she had received a text message from Abby M.'s sister stating that father had paid Abby M. to burn Nicholas.¹⁰  The information was rejected by DCF after investigation.   The court, in fact, has no credible explanation as to how Nicholas was burned, but knows that it happened while in the care of mother.   Mother's credibility throughout the explanations of this injury was seriously tarnished.   Mother's credibility as to many issues in this case leaves much to be desired, as will be noted below.

The affidavits in support of the OTC refer to another issue raising serious concern about mother's credibility and about her care of the five children.   Those accompanying affidavits provided a scenario relating to mother's significant history of seeking to involve each child with medical intervention for ailments or specialized needs which in fact the various children did not possess.   On February 1, 2012, the children's pediatrician reported to DCF that mother was seeking unwarranted medical intervention for the children and claiming that they had serious illnesses with no medical evidence to support her claims.¹¹  In fact, mother has a significant history of alleging that the children have specialized needs and seeking treatment from multiple providers.¹²  This aspect of the case will also be discussed at length in Section 2 of this memorandum.

Based upon all of the above, some of which is amplified below as it relates to mother's abuse and attempted abuse of the medical system, and including the second degree burn on Nicholas, the court finds by a fair preponderance of the evidence that each child was in immediate physical danger from surroundings on July 19, 2013.   The court has the duty, obligation and authority to make and enforce such orders as it deems necessary or appropriate to secure the welfare, protection, proper care and suitable support of the children.¹³  The order of temporary custody is sustained as to each child.

Section 2—Neglect

Finding of Facts:  The following facts are found by a fair preponderance of the evidence, except for the acts of medical misrepresentation which are found by clear and convincing evidence.

The petitioner alleges that each child is neglected for reasons other than being impoverished in that the child is being denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally and/or each child is being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to well-being.   As noted above, mother has a significant history of alleging that the children have specialized needs and sought treatment from multiple providers.   Because mother consistently denied this DCF sought to have a professional evaluation done to ascertain with more exactitude the medical condition of each child.   Connecticut is fortunate to have an extraordinary facility that accomplishes such evaluations.   It is attached to the Connecticut Children's Medical Center (CCMC) and is known as the SCAN program, standing for Suspected Child Neglect and Abuse.   DCF chose this facility for the evaluation.   Although she consistently denied these false claims to DCF, mother finally admitted some fabrications to social worker Laura Wilkinson just before she met with Dr. Nina Livingston, director of the SCAN program, for the first time.¹⁴  She then made the same admissions to Dr. Nina Livingston.   Mother also testified on August 14, 2013, that she had made some fabrications, although not to the extent found by Dr. Livingston.¹⁵  As stated above, Dr. Nina Livingston, M.D., of the Connecticut Children's Medical Center (CCMC) in Hartford, is the medical director of the program for suspected child abuse and neglect (SCAN).   She is board certified both in pediatrics and in child abuse pediatrics.   She is recognized by the court as an expert in the fields of pediatrics and the assessment and treatment of child abuse and neglect victims.   Dr. Livingston noted that this family had been referred to her to review for medical child abuse as opposed to medical neglect and it was in this context that she proceeded to conduct the evaluation, the results of which are contained in Petitioner's Exhibits # 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. These reports are meticulously prepared, thorough, thoughtful, and revealing of the enormity of mother's egregious behaviors.   The list of fabrications by mother is extensive.   The ailments Emily (age 9) is supposed to have suffered included submucous cleft palate, dyslexia, global developmental delays, pica (an abnormal appetite or craving for substances that are not fit to eat, as chalk or clay, common in malnutrition), recurrent epistaxis (nosebleed), and hearing loss.   Grace (age 7 years, 10 months) faired little better, allegedly suffering apraxia (a disorder of the nervous system, characterized by an inability to perform purposeful movements, but not accompanied by a loss of sensory function or paralysis), dyspraxia (inability to perform coordinated movements), global developmental delay, speech articulation, attention problems, behavior problems and strabismus (a disorder of vision due to a deviation from normal orientation of one or both eyes so that both cannot be directed at the same object at the same time).   Lucas (age 6 years, 7 months) allegedly suffered an ICU stay at birth, sugar metabolism problem, vitamin deficiency, sensory integration, heart murmur seen by a cardiologist, recurrent Acute Otitis Media (AOM) (a painful ear infection), and a submucous cleft palate.   Christopher (age 5) was alleged to have eczema, absence seizures, atomic seizures, recurrent OM (otitis media) as a baby, infantile spasms, cerebral palsy, apraxia of speech (underdevelopment of fine motor skills) and milk allergy.  (Apraxia is defined by a child's inability to copy shapes, letters, or symbols because he or she cannot control hand movements to produce the proper and necessary sequential movements.)   He was said to pass out when upset and to have staring spells.   Nicholas (age 2 years, 9 months) was alleged by mother to have follicular lymphoma and underwent brain surgery in Maine.   No proof was offered that this happened.   She also claimed he had milk protein allergy, recurrent fevers of unknown origin, motor delay, choking/difficulty swallowing on liquid feeds, grand mal seizures and absence seizures.

None of these so called diagnoses for any of the five children was in fact true.   Mother fabricated the entire scenario.   Not to be left out, she also fabricated that she herself had pancreatic cancer.   She announced it to the world by way of a letter to the editor of the Woodstock Villager newspaper.¹⁶  In fact, Emily was found by Dr. Livingston to need to wear glasses for distance and reading.   Grace was found to need glasses as well, and to continue in-school therapy for speech articulation issues.   Lucas was found to need glasses and it was recommended that he continue to receive therapy in school for speech articulation issues.   Christopher was found to need glasses full time and to continue speech articulation therapy.   He was also found to be lactose intolerant.   Dr. Livingston noted that Christopher has been especially vulnerable to mother's fabrications.

The record review shows that Christopher has received intensive multispecialty medical evaluation in care of his mother.   Review of the notes clearly demonstrates that mother provides history to medical providers that is highly variable/changing over time and that mother provided entirely false history to medical providers on many occasions.   As long as mother is directing his medical care Christopher is at high risk for unnecessary medical care.   Unnecessary medical care can cause significant harm.¹⁷

Dr. Livingston sums up Christopher's case as follows:

Review of Christopher's medical records shows clear evidence of maternal falsification of history (mother reporting events that did not occur, presenting symptom history that changes over time/is reported differently to different care providers, and reporting diagnoses that have not been made).   It is clear that given the intensity and frequency of many symptoms reported by mother, it is implausible that other care providers would never have noted them.   There is no evidence that mother fabricated or induced illness in Christopher.   The inaccurate history mother provided caused extensive unnecessary diagnostic evaluation, including many tests and procedures that caused discomfort to Christopher but were very unlikely to be harmful (e.g. blood tests, EEGs) and one inpatient admission to the hospital.   It does not appear that Christopher has been harmed/potentially harmed to a degree that constitutes medical child abuse.   That said, it is very concerning that mother has so extensively falsified his history, and Christopher is at high risk for unnecessary medical care.   Unnecessary medical care can be physically harmful, and there is also potential for psychological harm to children who are repeatedly presented for medical or developmental care under false pretexts.   The fact that DCF has alerted physicians that mother's history may be inaccurate appears to have been protective for Christopher over the past several months, with intensity of medical evaluation decreasing.   Christopher is at risk for harmful unnecessary medical care based on mother's observed pattern of care seeking an inaccurate provision of medical history.18

Dr. Livingston's findings apply to all the children as is noted in each exhibit relating to each child.¹⁹  They were all at risk while they were in her care.   While mother's lack of truthfulness is beyond question to the court, what is not beyond question is the state of mother's mental health, which may, in fact, be driving her compulsory misbehavior.   No evaluation report has yet been offered to the court and no evidence has been elicited that such an evaluation has been done.   There is evidence that Dr. James Connolly was prepared to do an evaluation of mother, but refused because there were redactions in the supporting documents from DCF who was not seeking the evaluation.   The evaluation was never done.   Based upon Dr. Livingston's findings and mother's testimony acknowledging at least some of her fabrications, mother, in her post-trial closing statement dated September 19, 2013, conceded that the allegations concerning falsified medical reports constitute neglect.   Dr. Livingston had concerns about the children long term if they remained with mother, stating that they would be at risk for unnecessary medical treatment.²⁰

Father did not know about the fabrications until he sought a clarification from the children's primary physician after they were separated and living apart.   Although father is alleged by mother to have been abusive to her and to the children, no evidence was offered that would establish that it was in any way true.   No credible evidence was offered to establish that the children are in danger in father's care, although mother maintains that is the case, asserting it without foundation as to how or why that is the case.²¹  There was evidence to suggest that mother tried to alienate the children from their father, but there is evidence that it did not work as the children are comfortable with father at this time and exhibit no fear of him whatsoever.²²  Family Relations Officer Eric Aleman of the Superior Court, Family Division, Putnam, while conducting a custody study for that court, became concerned about the issue of parental alienation by mother of father, particularly with Emily and Lucas.   SW Michelle Dwyer noted that in talking with Emily on May 16, 2013, Emily stated that she fears that if she visits her father she will not see her mother again and Ms. Dwyer noted that it appears mother has influenced Emily with regard to visitation with father so that Emily has not visited with him for several months.²³  Mr. Aleman felt that all the children, while in mother's care, knew too much about the family case (i.e. divorce case), that the children were coached by mother before they spoke to Mr. Aleman, that Lucas was prompted to record an almost hysterical cry that he was afraid of being kidnapped by father.²⁴  On June 7, 2013, mother sought a restraining order against father claiming that he had threatened her, seeking a full no contact order with mother and/or the five children which clearly would have interfered with father's efforts to maintain a relationship with his children.   On June 21, 2013, mother never went to court to testify on behalf of the order and it was dismissed.   Her stated reason for failure to testify was that father was no longer a threat to her.   Mother had alleged in that application for the restraining order that father “can make me disappear and no one will ever find my body.” ²⁵  She alleged that before that he had kicked her, pushed her, and mentally abused her.   Although she told SW Michelle Dwyer on June 24, 2013, that her marriage to father was abusive and she was physically hit on most days during the marriage, for which she never called the police and she never sought domestic violence counseling, she felt that the two weeks from the restraining order ex parte granting to the evidentiary hearing on it for which she did not show up was enough of a “cooling off period” for him to calm down and she no longer felt threatened by him.²⁶

Mr. Aleman also learned on June 7, 2013, from the pediatrician's office manager that mother told the children's primary care pediatrician's office in “an angry and boisterous” way that they were not to give father any medical information about the children while they were in mother's care.   This is in direct contravention to a plan put together by Dr. Livingston to assure the safety of the children going forward, as both parents would be cognizant of any diagnosis and treatment of any child.   Mother, however, on June 24, 2013, “adamantly” denied making the call, alleging to Mr. Aleman that there is another person who goes about “pretending to be her” ²⁷ making such phone calls to other people.   The perpetrator was never named.   Mr. Aleman found nothing suspicious or unusual about his conversation with the pediatrician's office manager and no “other people” were identified by mother.   Mother alleged to Mr. Aleman that the children suffered injuries while in father's care many times in the past, including “one of the kids having their (sic) teeth knocked out,” another child receiving a black eye and bruises, but then went on to say that “I don't believe that Dan (father) is hurting them.” ²⁸

Adjudication

The court finds by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the children are neglected in that they were denied proper care and attention physically, educationally, emotionally or morally and that they were being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to their well-being.   The court finds by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the burn sustained by Nicholas was, at the very least, the result of a neglectful act whereby he was endangered and in fact suffered injury.   The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the children were neglected by being the subjects of false, misleading, and detrimental information provided by mother to the medical community and thereupon seeking medical attention or treatment they did not need.   The court finds by a fair preponderance of the evidence that mother's failure to carry out Dr. Livingston's plan as stated in the SCAN report to involve both parents in the medical conditions of the children was an act of neglect of the children.   The court finds by a fair preponderance of the evidence that mother intentionally sought to alienate the children from their father which is clearly not in their best interest and is in fact an act of neglect.   The state has prevailed in its burden and an adjudication of neglect as to each child is entered.

Disposition

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of each child to be out of mother's care and custody.   Continued presence of each child in mother's home is contrary to the welfare of each child.   The court finds no reason why father should not be the custodial parent other than the allegations against father by mother which the court finds unproven and is not believed.   The court finds father to be suitable and worthy.

It is of concern to the court that after the children were placed with father, mother went to their school on September 9, 2013, two days before the last day of this trial, and “jumped into the line (of students returning from recess] and grabbed Lucas ․ gave him a hug and said ‘I love you’ then jumped out and quickly got into a car.   The teacher reported this to the office immediately.” ²⁹  The same exhibit reveals that officials of the school found “Happy Birthday–Emily B” written in chalk all over the track around the school playground.   Photos of the writings are attached to the exhibit.   The exhibit notes:  “I will tell you that the grade 3 team had the ‘chills' when they saw this and when they thought that mom may actually be somewhere near.   They are in now.   They had the girls enter through the nurses' office just to be safe.   My superintendent has informed without legal guardianship she has no need to enter this building.   If she does it will be considered trespassing.” ³⁰  Exhibit 22 was authored by the principal of the school.   The children indicated to social worker Murphy that the chalk writing on the track was mother's doing.³¹

This occurred on Friday, September 6, 2013.   Mother was back on the school grounds on Monday, September 9, 2013, this time bringing food for Emily's birthday.  “Miss Williams [principal] said that the school is feeling like mother is stalking the children at the school.   They have seen her on school property almost daily and they are very concerned.” ³²  The school authorities were also concerned about the number of telephone calls mother was placing to the school nurse.   At one point mother wanted the children seen by the nurse because of marks on the children, now living with father.   The nurse, in fact, examined the children and found only normal bug bites and on one child a little poison ivy.   On two occasions mother called the school immediately as father was picking up a child at other than the regular time to ascertain why that child was being taken from school.   The principal had concerns shared with DCF that mother must be sitting outside the school watching the school and stalking the children as the calls came in immediately upon a child leaving with father.³³  Mother lives over forty miles from this school.   The court is concerned that without proper constraints the well being and best interests of each child may not be served.   Judge Pellegrino, in his dissent in In re Joseph W., 121 Conn.App. 605 (2010), states at page 630 et seq.

The court correctly noted that neither our rules of practice nor General Statutes § 46b–129 define the term custody or custodial parent but that our rules of practice and our statutes differentiate between the terms guardian and custody.   Part II of chapter 802h in title 45a of our General Statutes is entitled Guardians of the Person of a Minor.”  General Statutes § 45a–604 provides the applicable definitions used in General Statutes §§ 45a–603 to 45a–622.  Section 45a–604 provides in relevant part:  ․ (5) ‘Guardianship’ means guardianship of the person of a minor, and includes:  (A) The obligation of care and control;  (B) the authority to make major decisions affecting the minor's education and welfare, including, but not limited to, consent determinations regarding marriage, enlistment in the armed forces and major medical, psychiatric or surgical treatment:  ․ (6) ‘Guardian’ means one who has the authority and obligations of ‘guardianship’ as defined in subdivision (5) of this section ․ The word custody is not defined.

General Statutes § 45a–606 provides:  “The father and mother of every minor child are joint guardians of the person of the minor, and the powers, rights and duties of the father and the mother in regard to the minor shall be equal.   If either father or mother dies or is removed as guardian, the other parent of the minor shall become the sole guardian of the person of the minor.

By way of disposition a child's care, custody and guardianship may be vested in any licensed agency or worthy person, including one parent or any relative of the child by blood or marriage.³⁴  Protective supervision may also be part of an order of sole custody or transfer of guardianship.³⁵  Such vesting in a third party or parent gives that party custody and guardianship of the child and the Superior Court, and not the Probate Court, has jurisdiction over the modification of this guardianship.³⁶

The court finds that sole custody and sole guardianship of each child vested in father would be in the best interest of each child and it is hereby ORDERED:  that sole custody and sole guardianship of each child is hereby vested in father.   Protective supervision by DCF is hereby ordered over this matter for a period of twelve months from the date of this Memorandum of Decision.

Mother shall have visitation with the children once a week for a period of two hours, supervised by any individual or agency approved by DCF and at a location approved by DCF.

DCF shall provide services to the children or any one of them as DCF deems appropriate.

The court is very concerned about mother's attempts to interfere and meddle in the daily lives of each child and from past history notes that such has not been in their best interest.   Father's job of parenting and caring for each child will be difficult enough without the constant interference or intrusion by mother.   The court is concerned about possible mental health issues of mother and directs DCF to engage mother in a complete psychological evaluation to assist the court in future orders related to mother's involvement with the children.   The court will not consider any requests for modifications to the orders of visitation, custody or guardianship as they relate to mother without such an evaluation by an independent psychologist chosen by the Superior Court, Juvenile Matters from its approved panel.   Should mother be willing to engage in such an evaluation the cost shall be defrayed by DCF.

Mother is to have no contact, direct or indirect, with any of the school personnel of the children's school or schools and is not to go upon the school property while the children or any one of them are or should be upon the school property.

Father is to apprise mother, either directly or through DCF, of any significant event in the life of any of the children, be it medical, dental, educational, or social.

The Superior Court, Juvenile Matters, shall retain jurisdiction over this matter during the pendency of any order of protective supervision by DCF.

Mack JTR

FOOTNOTES

FN2. C.G.S. § 46B–129(F) and PB § 33a–7(d)..  FN2. C.G.S. § 46B–129(F) and PB § 33a–7(d).

FN3. Petitioner's Exhibit # 1, page 2..  FN3. Petitioner's Exhibit # 1, page 2.

FN4. Petitioner's Exhibit # 2, page 4..  FN4. Petitioner's Exhibit # 2, page 4.

FN5. Petitioner's Exhibit # 1, page 4..  FN5. Petitioner's Exhibit # 1, page 4.

FN6. Id., page 3..  FN6. Id., page 3.

FN7. Petitioner's Exhibit # 12, page 5 of 72..  FN7. Petitioner's Exhibit # 12, page 5 of 72.

FN8. Petitioner's Exhibit # 2, page 5..  FN8. Petitioner's Exhibit # 2, page 5.

FN9. FTR, 8–13–13 at 10:46:02, Testimony of DCF social worker Jeanne Murphy.  [FTR (For The Record) is the recording facility of the court reporter which digitally records the testimony of a witness while noting the time of the utterance by hour, minute and second during that day's trial and which can be replayed by the court in chambers at any time.].  FN9. FTR, 8–13–13 at 10:46:02, Testimony of DCF social worker Jeanne Murphy.  [FTR (For The Record) is the recording facility of the court reporter which digitally records the testimony of a witness while noting the time of the utterance by hour, minute and second during that day's trial and which can be replayed by the court in chambers at any time.]

FN10. Petitioner's Exhibit # 23..  FN10. Petitioner's Exhibit # 23.

FN11. Petitioner's Exhibit # 2, page 2..  FN11. Petitioner's Exhibit # 2, page 2.

FN12. Petitioner's Exhibit # 12, page 1 of 2..  FN12. Petitioner's Exhibit # 12, page 1 of 2.

FN13. C.G.S. § 46b–121(b)(1)..  FN13. C.G.S. § 46b–121(b)(1).

FN14. FTR, 8–2–13 at 11:25:42, Testimony of SW Laura Wilkinson..  FN14. FTR, 8–2–13 at 11:25:42, Testimony of SW Laura Wilkinson.

FN15. FTR, 8–14–13 at 12:24:07, Testimony of Deborah B..  FN15. FTR, 8–14–13 at 12:24:07, Testimony of Deborah B.

FN16. Petitioner's Exhibit # 18..  FN16. Petitioner's Exhibit # 18.

FN17. Petitioner's Exhibit # 3, page 10..  FN17. Petitioner's Exhibit # 3, page 10.

FN18. Petitioner's Exhibit # 3, page 21..  FN18. Petitioner's Exhibit # 3, page 21.

FN19. Petitioner's Exhibits # 3, 4, 5, 6, & 7..  FN19. Petitioner's Exhibits # 3, 4, 5, 6, & 7.

FN20. Petitioner's Exhibit it 12, page 6 of 72..  FN20. Petitioner's Exhibit it 12, page 6 of 72.

FN21. Petitioner's Exhibit # 10..  FN21. Petitioner's Exhibit # 10.

FN22. FTR, 8–15–13 at 12:40:06.   Testimony of SW Jeanne Murphy, DCF..  FN22. FTR, 8–15–13 at 12:40:06.   Testimony of SW Jeanne Murphy, DCF.

FN23. Petitioner's Exhibit # 15..  FN23. Petitioner's Exhibit # 15.

FN24. FTR, 8–1–13 at 2:14:43 et seq.   Testimony of FRO Eric Aleman..  FN24. FTR, 8–1–13 at 2:14:43 et seq.   Testimony of FRO Eric Aleman.

FN25. FTR, 8–1–13 at2:50:10, Testimony of FRO Eric Aleman..  FN25. FTR, 8–1–13 at2:50:10, Testimony of FRO Eric Aleman.

FN26. Petitioner's Exhibit # 14..  FN26. Petitioner's Exhibit # 14.

FN27. FTR, 8–1–13 at 2:47:22, Testimony of FRO Eric Aleman..  FN27. FTR, 8–1–13 at 2:47:22, Testimony of FRO Eric Aleman.

FN28. Id. at 2:52:51..  FN28. Id. at 2:52:51.

FN29. Petitioner's Exhibit # 22..  FN29. Petitioner's Exhibit # 22.

FN30. Id..  FN30. Id.

FN31. FTR, 9–11–13 at 10:46:37, Testimony of SW Murphy..  FN31. FTR, 9–11–13 at 10:46:37, Testimony of SW Murphy.

FN32. Id. at 11:01:12, Testimony of SW Murphy..  FN32. Id. at 11:01:12, Testimony of SW Murphy.

FN33. FTR, 9–11–13 at 11:04:18, Testimony of SW Murphy..  FN33. FTR, 9–11–13 at 11:04:18, Testimony of SW Murphy.

FN34. C.G.S. § 46b–129(j)(2)(B)..  FN34. C.G.S. § 46b–129(j)(2)(B).

FN35. Practice Book rule § 35a–12A took effect 1–1–12..  FN35. Practice Book rule § 35a–12A took effect 1–1–12.

FN36. See In re Juvenile Appeal (85–BC), 195 Conn 344 (1985)..  FN36. See In re Juvenile Appeal (85–BC), 195 Conn 344 (1985).

Mack, Michael A., J.T.R.