Thomas Chioccola v. Curtis Stakely (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (# 101)

The present case involves an alleged motor vehicle collision, where the plaintiff, Thomas Chioccola, was driving his motorcycle behind the vehicle of the defendant, Curtis Stakley, when the defendant suddenly performed a U-turn that caused a collision between the two vehicles.   The defendant filed this motion to strike on July 1, 2013, seeking to strike count two and count three of the plaintiff's complaint, on the ground that the allegations of those counts are insufficient to support the claims of statutory recklessness and common-law recklessness.   The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion on July 10, 2013, arguing that the claims are legally sufficient and the motion should be denied.   This matter was argued before the court on September 9, 2013.

In ruling on a motion to strike, the role of the court is to examine the complaint, construed in favor of the plaintiff, to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient cause of action.  Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 117, 19 A.3d 640 (2011).   The court takes “the facts to be those alleged in the complaint” and “construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 349, 63 A.3d 940 (2013).  “If any facts provable under the express and implied allegations in the plaintiff's complaint support a cause of action ․ the complaint is not vulnerable to a motion to strike.”  Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991).

As to count two, the parties' arguments represent two sides of a split of authority in the Superior Court regarding the requirements to plead a claim for statutory recklessness and request double or treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14–295.   The defendant relies on the minority position in support of his motion and the plaintiff advocates for this court to follow the majority position.   It is clear from the law on this split;  see Zwicker v. Sabetta, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–07–5008853–S (February 1, 2008, Skolnick, J.T.R.) (45 Conn. L. Rptr. 9, 10–11);  that count two would be legally sufficient under the majority view and not legally sufficient under the minority view.   The parties implicitly conceded this point, as well, in arguing for this court to adopt one particular view over the other.   This court has recently expressed its intention to follow the majority view.   See Golett v. Young, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV–13–6016366–S (September 26, 2013, Devine, J.);   see also Rosario v. Bergenty, Superior Court judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV–12–6014181–S (September 30, 2013, Devine, J.).   Under this more liberal standard, the plaintiff's allegations in count two are legally sufficient to state a cause of action for statutory recklessness, because they properly allege facts that mirror the language of § 14–295.

The plaintiff also argues that count three should be stricken, because it fails to allege facts sufficient to rise above negligence and reach the level necessary to support the plaintiff's claim of common-law recklessness.   The plaintiff's third count alleges, among other things, that the defendant's conduct was reckless because he suddenly and without warning performed an illegal U-turn that caused a collision with the plaintiff, and that the defendant was acting in an extremely dangerous manner by driving at a high rate of speed.   The plaintiff further alleges in count three that the defendant's operation of his vehicle amounted to “reckless and wanton misconduct” and that his traveling at an excessive speed occurred “[d]eliberately, or with conscious disregard for the safety of the plaintiff.”   It also can be reasonably inferred that the defendant deliberately performed the alleged illegal U-turn, since a U-turn is rarely an act performed inadvertently, mistakenly, or through mere thoughtlessness.

Recklessness “involv[es] an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger [is] apparent.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 835, 836 A.2d 394 (2003).   This court concludes that count three states a viable cause of action for recklessness when construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.   This conclusion is supported by Matthiessen v. Vanech, supra, 834–35, where the Supreme Court held that the intentional commission of a traffic offense—in that case, running a stop sign—was sufficient to amply support a jury's finding of recklessness when coupled with the fact that the defendant ran the stop sign blindly at a dangerous intersection while knowing she did not have the right-of-way.   See also Lindie v. Avino, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV–07–5004246–S (March 31, 2009, Devine, J.) (it was a question of fact for the jury as to whether the defendant's conduct constituted recklessness in causing a collision when he allegedly consciously pulled his vehicle out of a parking lot into oncoming traffic).   The present case shares notable similarities with Matthiessen, particularly the alleged deliberate commission of a traffic offense when the plaintiff had the right-of-way.   At this stage, then, it would not be appropriate for the court to conclude that a reasonable jury could only find the defendant's conduct negligent and not reckless.   Accordingly, the allegations of the plaintiff's third count, if proven, can support a cause of action for recklessness.   Count three, therefore, is legally sufficient.

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to strike (# 101) is hereby denied.

Devine, J.

Devine, James J., J.