State of Connecticut v. William Castillo (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO SUPPRESS CONFESSION

By motion dated August 29, 2013, the defendant moved to suppress his oral statements and admissions to police officers, and his accompanying written confession, and any fruits thereof, at his trial, scheduled to begin on October 1, 2013.   This matter came before the court and was heard on September 24, 2013.   The motion is denied.

At the hearing the court heard evidence from Torrington Police Detective Todd Fador and Torrington Police Officer Angel Rios. The court finds their testimony to be credible.   The court also heard testimony from Ms. Yocasta Monegro, the defendant's mother.¹

Based on the testimony of Detective Fador and Officer Rios, and relying in part on the testimony of Ms. Monegro, the court finds the following facts.   On April 13, 2012, Detective Todd Fador, accompanied by Torrington Detective Keith Dablain and Officer Angel Rios, went to the defendant's home at 330 Highland Avenue, Apt. 13C, in Torrington, Connecticut.   Detective Fador wished to interview the defendant.   Detective Fador had received information that the defendant was involved in a robbery and had attempted to interview the defendant prior to April 13, 2013, but when he first visited the defendant's home he learned that the defendant's parents were not available.   At that time, the defendant was sixteen years of age and the detective did not want to conduct the interview in the absence of the defendant's parents.   Detective Fador described the defendant's demeanor as “mellow” during the limited visit.   The defendant thereafter contacted his mother, advising her that the police had visited the home.

When the detectives and officer arrived around 5:00 pm on April 13, 2013, the defendant, his mother, his mother's boyfriend, and two younger children were present at the home.   Detective Fador had included Officer Rios in the group because Officer Rios was fluent in Spanish and the defendant had previously advised the detective that the defendant's mother, Ms. Monegro, did not speak English.   Detectives Fador and Dablaine were in plainclothes, each of them wearing a badge around his neck, and both detectives carried sidearms.   Officer Rios was in uniform.   When Ms. Monegro answered the door, Officer Rios explained to her, in Spanish, the purpose of the visit.   Officer Rios and Detective Fador testified that all of Officer Rios' exchanges with Ms. Monegro were in Spanish.   The defendant, however, speaks and understands English.

Officer Rios knew the defendant from a previous investigation, in which he spoke with the defendant in English.   On this occasion, when the defendant entered the room and Detective Fador explained juvenile and parental rights to the defendant and to his mother.   Officer Rios translated Detective Fador's comments into Spanish.

A juvenile waiver form, State's Exhibit (“SX”) 1, carries the defendant's initials, entered six times, opposite six separate paragraphs that advised him of his right to remain silent, to consult with an attorney, and to stop answering questions at any time, among other rights.   The waiver form also carries the defendant's signature.   A parental consent form, SX 2, is a similar advice of rights form initialed in six places by Ms. Monegro, and that document also carries her signature.   Officer Rios translated everything on that form to Ms. Monegro before she signed it.   Officer Rios described the defendant as having a calm, “whatever” attitude.

The six individuals present during the encounter all met in the defendant's living room.   The room held a sofa, a love seat, and a chair.   In addition to the entrance to the room, it had two other doors.   The evidence varies as to the exact seating of each individual, although it appears that Ms. Monegro was on the couch, and the defendant sat opposite Detective Fador.   Detective Dablain was closer to the entrance to the room.

After the waiver forms were signed, Detective Fador verbally advised the defendant that he was free to ask the officers to leave, that he was free to stop speaking to the officers, and that he did not have to speak to the officers at all.   Detective Fador testified that the defendant did not ask any questions about his rights, he did not appear to be confused, and he said that he understood his rights.

The defendant agreed to give a statement, asking Fador to write it out.   Detective Fador did so, stopping every few sentences to give Officer Rios an opportunity to translate the defendant's statements to Ms. Monegro.   The defendant was cooperative and did not appear to be worried, although it was apparent that Ms. Monegro was growing increasingly upset as her son progressed with his statement.   Officer Rios described her as having a “worried parent” look.   After the defendant finished making his statement, he reviewed what Detective Fador had written and then signed the statement.   SX 3. The entire visit took between forty-five minutes and one hour.   At no time did anyone ask the officers to stop questioning the defendant or to leave the home.

The defendant established that none of the officers advised the defendant that his involvement in the robbery could ultimately lead to his deportation.   Officer Rios testified that when Ms. Monegro asked about the risk of deportation, Officer Rios replied that such an action is not within his jurisdiction but is, rather, an issue for the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.²  Ms. Monegro acknowledged that the officers told her that she could end the interrogation, but she never accepted that offer.   She testified that she wanted to get the interview over with so that the officers would then leave the house.

II

DISCUSSION

The question of whether the defendant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), before making a statement to law enforcement authorities turns, first, on the question of whether the defendant was in custody at the time he made the statement.   Under the circumstances of this case, the dispositive question is “whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would believe that he or she was in police custody of the degree associated with a formal arrest.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted;  citation omitted.)  State v. Edwards, 299 Conn. 419, 437, 11 A.3d 116 (2011).

Here, there is no question about the fact that the defendant was not in custody at the time he made his statement.   It is more frequent that this issue arises when a defendant is in unfamiliar, arguably intimidating surroundings, such as a police station.   See State v. Britton, 283 Conn. 598, 604, 929 A.2d 312 (2007).   In this case, the defendant was in his own home and in the presence of his mother.   He was not threatened with arrest, no handcuffs were displayed, and although the officers were armed, no weapons were drawn.   The defendant had had prior dealings with police, specifically, an encounter with Officer Rios. He was nearly seventeen years of age at the time he made the statement and he was repeatedly told, both orally and in writing, that he was free to end the questioning, to not answer any questions, and to ask the officers to leave.   No reasonable person would have believed, under the foregoing circumstances, that he was in custody at the time the defendant gave the statement.

“The defendant bears the burden of proving that he was in custody for Miranda purposes.”(Internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Kirby, 280 Conn. 361, 393, 908 A.2d 506 (2006).   The defendant has failed to meet his burden of proof.

Although, in view of the foregoing finding, it is not necessary to determine whether the defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to remain silent, the court has no hesitation in finding that his waiver was knowing, voluntary and intelligent.   This defendant was nearly seventeen years of age at the time he made his statement.   His mother was present while he met with the officers, and the events taking place were fully explained to her.   He was not separated from her during the questioning.   He had prior experience with Officer Rios, and he knew, from a prior visit, that Detective Fador would be returning at some point to speak with the defendant.   The court finds that the defendant's waiver of his rights was knowing, voluntary and intelligent.   State v. Ledbetter, 263 Conn. 1, 18, 818 A.2d 1 (2003).

The parental consent, in this case, was not required because the charges against the defendant will be used in a criminal, rather than a juvenile, court.  State v. Ledbetter, supra, 263 Conn. 11.   Even if parental consent was required, all of the foregoing circumstances and findings mandate the conclusion that Ms. Monegro knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently consented to the interview of her son.

Finally, the defendant has failed to establish his due process claim that the officers coerced the defendant into making his statement.   The latter finding is also based upon the findings previously set forth in this opinion.   See State v. Pinder, 250 Conn. 385, 408, 736 A.2d 857 (1999).

III

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to suppress his oral statements and admissions to police officers, and his accompanying written confession, is denied.

So ordered.

John A. Danaher III

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Ms. Monegro, who is primarily Spanish-speaking, testified with the aid of interpreters..  FN1. Ms. Monegro, who is primarily Spanish-speaking, testified with the aid of interpreters.

FN2. Officer Rios referred to that Bureau by its well-known acronym, “ICE.”.  FN2. Officer Rios referred to that Bureau by its well-known acronym, “ICE.”

Danaher, John A., J.