Chemeka Golett v. David Young (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (# 106)

The defendant, David Young, filed this motion to strike on May 9, 2013, seeking to strike portions of counts two and three of the second amended complaint of the plaintiff, Chemeka Golett, on the grounds that the allegations are legally insufficient to support a claim of recklessness and duplicative of the plaintiff's claim of negligence in count one.¹  The defendant submitted a memorandum of law in support of his motion.   The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion on May 30, 2013, arguing that the claims are legally sufficient and the motion should be denied.   This matter was argued before the court on June 3, 2013.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff commenced this action by serving the defendant with process on February 6, 2013.   The plaintiff's five-count second amended complaint, which is the operative complaint, was subsequently filed on July 19, 2013.   The plaintiff's action stems from the allegation that, on August 25, 2011, she was proceeding through the intersection of Hickory Street and Prospect Street in Norwich, Connecticut, when her vehicle was hit by a vehicle driven by the defendant.   The plaintiff further alleges that her lane of travel did not have a stop sign, but that the defendant did have a stop sign from the direction he was traveling.   In count one, the plaintiff alleges that the collision was caused by the negligence of the defendant, citing various grounds.   Count two sounds in statutory recklessness with a request for double or treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14–295, alleging that the collision was caused by the recklessness of the defendant, through the operation of his vehicle at an unreasonable rate of speed in violation of General Statutes § 14–218a and/or through operating his vehicle in a reckless and dangerous manner in violation of General Statutes § 14–222(a).   Count three sounds in common-law recklessness, alleging that the collision was caused by the defendant's recklessness, and citing grounds nearly identical to those relied on in count one, coupled with the added allegation that they were committed through a conscious choice of action with knowledge of the serious danger the conduct posed to other persons.

LAW RE MOTION TO STRIKE

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).  “The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 117, 19 A.3d 640 (2011).  “[I]t is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 116–17.   This court takes “the facts to be those alleged in the complaint” and “construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 349, 63 A.3d 940 (2013) “Moreover, [the court notes] that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged,” because “pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 252–53, 990 A.2d 206 (2010).  “If any facts provable under the express and implied allegations in the plaintiff's complaint support a cause of action ․ the complaint is not vulnerable to a motion to strike.”  Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991);  see also Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, supra, 349 (motion must be denied where provable facts support a cause of action).

ANALYSIS

The defendant's motion to strike relies on three arguments.   First, the defendant argues that subparagraph 8(a) of the second count alleging recklessness is merely duplicative of the allegation of negligence advanced in subparagraph 8(k) of count one.   Next, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's third count sounding in common-law recklessness is duplicative of allegations that are also made in counts one and two, and, in addition, those allegations are not legally sufficient to rise to the level of recklessness.   Lastly, the defendant contends that subparagraph 8(b) of the second count fails to sufficiently allege facts to support a claim for recklessness.   In response, the plaintiff objects on multiple grounds to each of these arguments.   For the reasons more fully set forth below, the court concludes that the defendant's motion to strike must be denied.

I

DUPLICATIVE ALLEGATIONS

The defendant's first argument is that the allegations set forth in subparagraph 8(a) of the second count and the allegations in the entirety of count three are duplicative of allegations made elsewhere in the complaint and, in particular, rely on the same facts used to support the claim of negligence in count one.   The plaintiff counters that duplicative allegations must be addressed through a request to revise rather than a motion to strike.   At oral argument, the defendant conceded the validity of the plaintiff's argument.   The court agrees and declines to strike any allegations from the complaint for being duplicative.   Compare Practice Book § 10–39 (a motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint), with Practice Book § 10–35 (a request to revise is the proper vehicle to request the deletion of repetitious allegations);  see also Vanstean–Holland v. LaVigne, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV–08–5007959–S (September 2, 2009, Martin, J.) (“a majority of the Superior Court decisions dealing with this dilemma have held that [a] request to revise, and not a motion to strike, is the proper procedural device for deletion of duplicative pleadings” [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

Moreover, even if the defendant's argument was properly directed at the legal sufficiency of the complaint, the court notes that each of the plaintiff's first three counts relies on a different cause of action and a plaintiff is permitted to use identical allegations in order to assert alternative theories of liability.   See Practice Book § 10–25;  see also Vidiaki, LLC v. Just Breakfast & Things!!!    LLC, 133 Conn.App. 1, 24, 33 A.3d 848 (2012) (“[u]nder our pleading practice, a plaintiff is permitted to advance alternative and even inconsistent theories of liability against one or more defendants in a single complaint” [internal quotation marks omitted] ).   Where a recklessness claim shares identical facts with a negligence claim, such circumstances are not fatal to either claim, as long as the language is explicit enough to inform the court that both negligent and reckless misconduct are being asserted.  Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 343, 813 A.2d 1003 (2003).   The facts relied on are not required to be different or distinct.   After all, “[i]t certainly would not be hard to imagine an allegation of negligence that simultaneously could describe a reckless conduct scenario, without change.”   Rendahl v. Peluso, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk, Docket No. CV–12–6012549–S (June 5, 2013, Povodator, J.) (citing, as an example, a scenario where a motorist speeds through a school zone at dismissal time without yielding to pedestrians in the crosswalk).  “[T]here is no reason why the plaintiff relying on the same set of facts in negligence counts, cannot set forth in separate counts, causes of action arising out of these same facts alleging recklessness ․ [S]imilarity cannot be the sole focus.   To so consider would often require a plaintiff to ratchet down the negligence claim in order to render more visible the conceptual space between the counts.   Focus must instead primarily rest on the recklessness sufficiency of that count ․ Rather than follow a mechanistic approach ․ it seems more appropriate to examine instead whether the facts that are alleged could, under any set of facts admissible under the pleadings, support a conclusion of recklessness.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Vanstean–Holland v. LaVigne, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV–08–5007959–S;  see also Craig v. Driscoll, supra, 343 (defendants were incorrectly “mired in the fact that, aside from the addition of the words ‘willful, wanton and/or reckless actions,’ the plaintiffs' allegations in their reckless counts mirror their assertions in the counts charging the defendants with negligence”).   Therefore, the court will not strike subparagraph 8(a) of count two or the entirety of count three just because of their reliance on facts similar, or even identical, to those used to support the negligence claim in count one.

II

COMMON–LAW RECKLESSNESS

The defendant also argues in his memorandum that count three of the plaintiff's complaint fails to allege facts that rise above negligence and meet the standard for common-law recklessness.   The plaintiff counters, inter alia, that she has alleged sufficient facts to support a claim for recklessness when her allegations are accepted as true and construed in her favor, as required on a motion to strike.   The court is satisfied that the plaintiff's claim is legally sufficient.

“To determine whether [a] complaint states a cause of action sounding in recklessness, we look first to the definitions of wilful, wanton and reckless behavior.   Recklessness is a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one's acts ․ It is more than negligence, more than gross negligence ․ The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct.   But, in order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them ․ Wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct ․ It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action ․ [W]illful, wanton, or reckless conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent ․ It is at least clear ․ that such aggravated negligence must be more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simply inattention.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Craig v. Driscoll, supra, 262 Conn. 342–43.   In order to properly plead recklessness, however, the plaintiff need not allege additional distinct and unique facts from her negligence claim—both claims can rely on identical conduct, as long as the alleged conduct meets the standard for recklessness.  Id., 343;  see also Part I, supra.

In the present case, count three of the plaintiff's complaint alleges that she was driving through the intersection of Prospect Street and Hickory Street when the defendant caused his vehicle to collide with the plaintiff's vehicle.   The plaintiff further alleges that she was traveling on Prospect Street through the intersection and did not have a stop sign, while the defendant was traveling on Hickory Street and did have a stop sign.   From these allegations, it can be reasonably inferred that the plaintiff is claiming that the defendant either ran the stop sign on his street or stopped but failed to yield the right-of-way, and thus caused the collision.   The plaintiff goes on to allege eleven ways in which the collision and the plaintiff's damages were proximately caused by the defendant's recklessness in that the defendant made a conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man.”  (Emphasis added.)   The eleven ways in which the defendant's “conscious choice[s]” were allegedly reckless include, among other things, that “he operated his vehicle at an improper rate of speed,” “he caused his vehicle to move without yielding the right of way to the plaintiff's vehicle,” “he failed to stop in obedience to a stop sign,” and “he operated his vehicle in a reckless and dangerous manner having due regard for the width, traffic and use of said highway and the weather conditions.”

Running a stop sign is not necessarily reckless, and likely is not reckless in most instances—but it can be under certain circumstances.   If a person was driving carefully but ran a stop sign because he inadvertently failed to notice it through an ordinary mistake, that alone would not meet the standard for recklessness set forth in Craig v. Driscoll, supra.   Here, though, the plaintiff has added the additional allegations that the defendant made the conscious choice to run the stop sign, at an excessive rate of speed, when the plaintiff was approaching the intersection from another direction with the right-of-way.   Under similar facts, the court in Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 834–35, 836 A.2d 394 (2003), held that a jury could reasonably find that such conduct amounts to recklessness.   In Matthiessen, the plaintiff was driving on a public road when she approached a “T intersection” with another road.   The intersecting road had a stop sign, at which a car was stopped, while the plaintiff's road did not have a stop sign, giving her the right-of-way.   The defendant was driving on the intersecting road and came up behind the car stopped at the stop sign.   Then, rather than wait, she drove around the stopped car and drove through the stop sign.   As a result, she caused a collision with the plaintiff's vehicle in the intersection.   Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict wherein they found the defendant's conduct to be reckless and awarded punitive damages, which the defendant challenged on appeal by arguing that such conduct only constituted negligence, not recklessness.   The Supreme Court concluded that “the evidence was more than sufficient to permit a finding that ․ [the defendant's] conduct was reckless.   Specifically, the evidence established that [the defendant] ran through a stop sign into a blind and dangerous intersection, despite her familiarity with the intersection and its hazard.   Her conduct was all the more egregious because, in order to run the stop sign, she first had to pull around another car that was stopped waiting to proceed onto Lakeside Drive.   Finally, [the defendant] was aware that cars proceeding northbound on Lakeside Drive had no stop light or stop sign and, consequently, that they, not she, had the right-of-way.   We conclude, therefore, that the evidence amply supported the jury's finding of recklessness ․” Id., 835.

It is true that a distinction exists between Matthiessen and the present case, in that the defendant in the present case did not pull around a stopped vehicle prior to allegedly running a stop sign.   Nevertheless, it is clear from Matthiessen 's language that it was not that fact alone that pushed the defendant's conduct into the territory of recklessness.   Rather, it can be inferred that the court would have reached the same conclusion even without that fact, especially considering the court's statement that the jury's finding of recklessness was “amply supported” and that driving around the stopped car made her actions “all the more egregious,” which implies that the court concluded that her act of running the stop sign was egregious in itself.   Furthermore, under lesser facts than Matthiessen and perhaps even lesser allegations than the present case, another trial court also recently reached the conclusion that allegations of a defendant causing an accident by knowingly and intentionally running a stop sign are legally sufficient to support a claim of common-law recklessness.   See Dubose v. Montoya, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–12–6034426–S (April 24, 2013, Wilson, J.).

The court recognizes that at least some Connecticut trial courts have reached the opposite conclusion and decided that alleging the act of running a stop sign is only legally sufficient to support a claim for negligence, not recklessness.   See, e.g., Poudrier v. Corpus, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV–05–4009016–S (March 23, 2006, Owens, J.T.R.);   Webster v. Bell, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV–06–5000865–S (September 22, 2006, Hurley, J.T.R.).   Nonetheless, in light of the holdings in Matthiessen v. Vanech, supra, 266 Conn. 834–35, and Dubose v. Montoya, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV–12–6034426–S, this court finds the conflicting cases to be unpersuasive, particularly considering the standard the court must adhere to on a motion to strike.   On a motion to strike, the court must accept all of the plaintiff's allegations as true—including the allegation that the defendant knowingly ran the stop sign at an excessive speed—and construe those allegations in favor of the plaintiff.   Whether a defendant's conduct constitutes reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights is usually a question of fact;  Frillici v. Westport, 264 Conn. 266, 277, 823 A.2d 1172 (2003);  and, therefore, it is not the role of the court on a motion to strike, to establish a line separating negligence from recklessness and decide if the defendant has crossed it.   The line distinguishing negligence from recklessness cannot be objectively set and instead requires a fact-specific analysis more appropriately left to the trier of fact, except in cases where the alleged facts could never support a finding of recklessness by a reasonable jury.   See, e.g., Grillo v. Bonauito, 123 Conn. 226, 193 A. 730 (1937) (evidence of defendant's conduct presented at trial only supported a claim for negligence, not recklessness, where defendant was driving at a reasonable speed and applied her brakes in advance of a stop sign at an intersection, but nonetheless accidentally skidded into oncoming traffic due to ice on the road);  Rendahl v. Peluso, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV–12–6012549–S (“the failure to signal a turn, due to a burned-out light bulb, would seem to be a situation difficult to characterize as anything beyond negligence without additional information/allegations, e.g. a claim of long-standing knowledge of the condition coupled with a known hazardous traffic pattern”).   When there is any doubt as to whether the conduct could reach the level required for recklessness, the claim should be permitted to survive a motion to strike.   Cf. Gonzalez v. Harte Subaru, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV–10–6011240–S (November 2, 2010, Sheldon, J.) (regarding claims for intentional infliction of emotion distress, “[i]n several Connecticut cases, the trial court has denied motions to strike because reasonable minds could differ as to whether the conduct that the defendant allegedly engaged in was extreme and outrageous, making a motion to strike inappropriate”).   Then the facts regarding the defendant's recklessness, or lack thereof, can be more fittingly addressed on the basis of the evidence adduced after discovery, either at trial or, if appropriate, on a motion for summary judgment.   See. e.g., Lindie v. Avino, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV07–5004246–S (March 31, 2009, Devine, J.) (whether the defendant's conduct was conscious and reckless when he pulled out of a parking lot and into oncoming traffic was not an appropriate issue to resolve on a motion for summary judgment, because “[a] jury should have the opportunity to hear from the plaintiff and defendant at trial” and decide on its own if pulling into traffic was done recklessly or only negligently).

In the present case, the plaintiff has pleaded the requisite elements for a claim of common-law recklessness and the alleged conduct is sufficient to create a factual issue as to whether it qualifies as reckless.   Thus, construing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff for the purposes of this motion, they set forth a valid claim for common-law recklessness.   Accordingly, the plaintiff's allegations in count three are legally sufficient to survive a motion to strike.²

III

STATUTORY RECKLESSNESS

The court now turns to the defendant's final argument, which asserts that the plaintiff's allegations in count two at subparagraph 8(b) are insufficient to support a claim for recklessness.   Count two of the plaintiff's complaint sounds in statutory recklessness.   First, in paragraphs one through seven of count two, the plaintiff realleges paragraphs one through seven of the negligence claim in count one.   Those paragraphs set forth the allegations related to the collision occurring between the parties' vehicles and it being caused by the defendant.   Next, subparagraph 8(a) of count two alleges that the plaintiff deliberately or with reckless disregard operated his motor vehicle at an unreasonable rate of speed in violation of General Statutes § 14–218a.   Then, in subparagraph 8(b), which is the only part of count two challenged by the defendant for its legal sufficiency, the plaintiff alleges:  “[The defendant] operated his vehicle in a reckless and dangerous manner having due regard for the width, traffic and use of said highway and the weather conditions, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 14–222(a).” ³  In the paragraphs that follow, the plaintiff alleges that she suffered various injuries from the accident, which were caused by the defendant's misconduct.   Count two concludes with the plaintiff's claim that, as a result, she is entitled to double or treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14–295.⁴  In response to the defendant's challenge of subparagraph 8(b) of this count, the plaintiff contends that her allegations properly sets forth a legally cognizable claim for statutory recklessness pursuant to General Statutes § 14–295.

The parties' arguments represent two sides of a split of authority in the Superior Court, with the defendant relying on the minority position to support his motion to strike and the plaintiff contending that this court should follow the majority position.  “Section 14–295 permits an award of double or treble damages in any civil action seeking damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property when the fact finder has determined that the tortfeasor [deliberately or with reckless disregard] violated one or more of the enumerated provisions of our motor vehicle laws, including General Statutes §§ 14–215a and 14–222, and that the statutory violation was a substantial factor in causing the injury, death or property damage.”   Matthiessen v. Vanech, supra, 266 Conn. 827 n.6. “While Connecticut's appellate courts have yet to delineate the specific standard required for pleading recklessness under § 14–295, Connecticut's trial courts have been confronted with this issue numerous times.   Currently there is a split of authority at the trial court level regarding the requirements for a plaintiff to sufficiently plead statutoiy recklessness;  however, a substantial trend has emerged in recent cases.   The majority view maintains that a plaintiff, in addition to pleading facts constituting negligence, need only make the general allegations mentioned in § 14–295:  that the defendant has deliberately or with reckless disregard violated one of the enumerated statutes, and that the violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries ․ Conversely, a minority of the trial courts have held that a plaintiff is required to plead specific factual allegations that rise above and beyond the facts that need to be pleaded in a negligence case;  that such plaintiffs must set out the conduct that is claimed to be reckless in their complaint, so as to satisfy both the language of § 14–295, as well as the common-law recklessness requirements.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Zwicker v. Sabetta, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–07–5008853–S (February 1, 2008, Skolnick, J.T.R.) (45 Conn. L. Rptr. 9, 10–11).

This court has not previously had the occasion to consider which side of the split it intends to follow.   After reviewing § 14–295 and the case law interpreting it, this court agrees with the majority approach, because it “is supported by a review of the legislative history of § 14–295 as well as the language of the statute itself.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Snurkowski v. Zmachinski, Superior Court. judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV–10–6006487 (April 12, 2011, Cosgrove, J.);   see also Smith v. Maynard, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV–10–6005802–S (May 19, 2011, Martin, J.) (51 Conn. L. Rptr. 910).

In the present case, a review of count two of the complaint shows that the plaintiff relies on the same factual scenario set forth in the negligence count—which in itself is not fatal to the claim of recklessness, as discussed in Part I, supra —and makes the additional allegation in subparagraph 8(b) that the defendant's conduct was a violation of General Statutes § 14–222 committed deliberately or with reckless disregard.  Section 14–222 is one of the enumerated statutes under which a plaintiff can seek double or treble damages pursuant to § 14–295.   Additionally, in paragraph 9, the plaintiff adds that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries.   Therefore, construing the claim most favorably to sustaining its legal sufficiency, the plaintiff has complied with the aforementioned pleading requirements for statutory recklessness and for requesting double and treble damages under § 14–295.   As a result, the defendant's motion to strike subparagraph 8(b) of count two must be denied.⁵

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to strike is hereby denied.

Devine, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The present motion to strike was directed at the plaintiff's three-count amended complaint, rather than the subsequently-filed second amended complaint, which is now the operative complaint.   The second amended complaint adds counts four and five against two additional defendants, Robert Bailey and KFB & Associates Consulting, Inc., but does not in any way alter the counts currently being challenged by the defendant David Young.   Therefore, the court will treat this motion to strike as being properly directed at the second amended complaint.   See Practice Book § 10–61.   Furthermore, because the present motion does not pertain to the defendants Robert Bailey and KFB & Associates Consulting, Inc., all further references to “the defendant” shall refer solely to David Young..  FN1. The present motion to strike was directed at the plaintiff's three-count amended complaint, rather than the subsequently-filed second amended complaint, which is now the operative complaint.   The second amended complaint adds counts four and five against two additional defendants, Robert Bailey and KFB & Associates Consulting, Inc., but does not in any way alter the counts currently being challenged by the defendant David Young.   Therefore, the court will treat this motion to strike as being properly directed at the second amended complaint.   See Practice Book § 10–61.   Furthermore, because the present motion does not pertain to the defendants Robert Bailey and KFB & Associates Consulting, Inc., all further references to “the defendant” shall refer solely to David Young.

FN2. Because the court concludes that the claim for common-law recklessness is supported by the allegations that the defendant knowingly drove through a stop sign, without stopping, at an excessive rate of speed when the plaintiff had the right-of-way, the court need not individually analyze whether each of the plaintiff's eleven alleged bases for recklessness in count three is independently sufficient to support or contribute to the claim.   See Aurio v. Allstate Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV–02–0175465–S (November 26, 2003, Gallagher, J.) (36 Conn. L. Rptr. 39, 40) (“[i]f a motion to strike attacks an entire count, but any part of the plaintiff's claims therein are legally sufficient, the motion will fail” [internal quotation marks omitted] );  see also Farago v. Pfizer, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 524911 (May 18, 1993, Teller, J.) (“if part of a count is viable, it is not subject to a motion to strike”)..  FN2. Because the court concludes that the claim for common-law recklessness is supported by the allegations that the defendant knowingly drove through a stop sign, without stopping, at an excessive rate of speed when the plaintiff had the right-of-way, the court need not individually analyze whether each of the plaintiff's eleven alleged bases for recklessness in count three is independently sufficient to support or contribute to the claim.   See Aurio v. Allstate Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV–02–0175465–S (November 26, 2003, Gallagher, J.) (36 Conn. L. Rptr. 39, 40) (“[i]f a motion to strike attacks an entire count, but any part of the plaintiff's claims therein are legally sufficient, the motion will fail” [internal quotation marks omitted] );  see also Farago v. Pfizer, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 524911 (May 18, 1993, Teller, J.) (“if part of a count is viable, it is not subject to a motion to strike”).

FN3. General Statutes § 14–222 is the criminal statute for reckless driving.  Section 14–222(a) provides in relevant part:  “No person shall operate any motor vehicle upon any public highway ․ recklessly, having regard to the width, traffic and use of such highway ․ the intersection of streets and the weather conditions.   The operation of a motor vehicle ․ at such a rate of speed as to endanger the life of any person ․ or the operation knowingly of a motor vehicle with defective mechanism, shall constitute a violation of the provisions of this section.”.  FN3. General Statutes § 14–222 is the criminal statute for reckless driving.  Section 14–222(a) provides in relevant part:  “No person shall operate any motor vehicle upon any public highway ․ recklessly, having regard to the width, traffic and use of such highway ․ the intersection of streets and the weather conditions.   The operation of a motor vehicle ․ at such a rate of speed as to endanger the life of any person ․ or the operation knowingly of a motor vehicle with defective mechanism, shall constitute a violation of the provisions of this section.”

FN4. General Statutes § 14–295 provides:  “In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14–218a, 14–219, 14–222, 14–227a, 14–230, 14–234, 14–237, 14–239 or 14–240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property.   The owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle shall not be responsible for such damages unless the damages arose from such owner's operation of the motor vehicle.”.  FN4. General Statutes § 14–295 provides:  “In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14–218a, 14–219, 14–222, 14–227a, 14–230, 14–234, 14–237, 14–239 or 14–240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property.   The owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle shall not be responsible for such damages unless the damages arose from such owner's operation of the motor vehicle.”

FN5. In his opposition memorandum, the plaintiff also argues that the court cannot grant the defendant's motion to strike subparagraph 8(b) of count two because that subparagraph does not embody its own cause of action.   This court agrees and, if the defendant's motion had possessed merit, the court would have been required to deny it anyway on this procedural ground.   Generally, only an entire count can be subject to a motion to strike, and the only exception is that paragraphs of a count can be individually stricken when they embody an entire cause of action.   Vanstean–Holland v. LaVigne, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV–08–5007959 (September 2, 2009, Martin, J.).  “A cause of action is defined as a ‘single group of facts which is claimed to have brought about an unlawful injury to the plaintiff and which entitles the plaintiff to relief.’  “ Id. The cause of action pleaded in count two of the plaintiff's complaint is statutory recklessness, and the violation of § 14–222 alleged in subparagraph 8(b) is but one factual allegation with which the plaintiff can prove the statutory recklessness claim.   In subparagraph 8(a), the plaintiff also alleges that the defendant caused the accident by driving unreasonably fast in violation of § 14–218a.   Therefore, because the plaintiff relies on two allegations to prove this single cause of action, her allegation in subparagraph 8(b) does not embody its own cause of action and cannot be individually stricken.   See, e.g., Moscariello v. Savo, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 111735 (January 11, 1994, Sylvester, J.);   Stevens v. Dilieto, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 515353 (January 24, 1992, Hendel, J.)..  FN5. In his opposition memorandum, the plaintiff also argues that the court cannot grant the defendant's motion to strike subparagraph 8(b) of count two because that subparagraph does not embody its own cause of action.   This court agrees and, if the defendant's motion had possessed merit, the court would have been required to deny it anyway on this procedural ground.   Generally, only an entire count can be subject to a motion to strike, and the only exception is that paragraphs of a count can be individually stricken when they embody an entire cause of action.   Vanstean–Holland v. LaVigne, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV–08–5007959 (September 2, 2009, Martin, J.).  “A cause of action is defined as a ‘single group of facts which is claimed to have brought about an unlawful injury to the plaintiff and which entitles the plaintiff to relief.’  “ Id. The cause of action pleaded in count two of the plaintiff's complaint is statutory recklessness, and the violation of § 14–222 alleged in subparagraph 8(b) is but one factual allegation with which the plaintiff can prove the statutory recklessness claim.   In subparagraph 8(a), the plaintiff also alleges that the defendant caused the accident by driving unreasonably fast in violation of § 14–218a.   Therefore, because the plaintiff relies on two allegations to prove this single cause of action, her allegation in subparagraph 8(b) does not embody its own cause of action and cannot be individually stricken.   See, e.g., Moscariello v. Savo, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 111735 (January 11, 1994, Sylvester, J.);   Stevens v. Dilieto, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 515353 (January 24, 1992, Hendel, J.).

Devine, James J., J.