Larion Sayers v. 34 (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This is an appeal from the admission of the Will of Helen Sayers to probate by the Danbury Probate Court.   The plaintiff, Larion Sayers (Larion), is one of three children of the decedent.   The defendants Randall Sayers (Randy) and Spenser Jason Sayers (Jason) are the other two children.

Before turning to the parties' arguments, it is appropriate to set forth this court's role in this appeal.  “When entertaining an appeal from an order or decree of a Probate Court, the Superior Court takes the place of and sits as the court of probate.”  State v. Gordon, 45 Conn.App. 490, 494, 696 A.2d 1034 (1997).  “In the absence of a record of the underlying Probate Court proceedings, the court hear[s] the plaintiff's appeal de novo.”  In re Andrews' Appeal From Probate, 78 Conn.App. 429, 431, 826 A.2d 1260 (2003).   There is no record of the probate court proceeding on May 12, 2009.   Consequently, the court must decide this matter de novo, sitting as a court of probate.

The plaintiff, Larion Sayers, has appealed from the May 6, 2010 decision of the Danbury Probate Court to admit the Will. In his appeal from probate, Larion alleges that Helen (1) lacked the testamentary capacity to make a Will as a result of her medical conditions, including her mental state which was diminished at that time;  and (2) that his brothers, Randall and Spencer Sayers, exercised undue influence over his mother, the decedent, Helen Sayers, in an effort “to cajole her into executing a will that substantially favored them over the plaintiff.”   There is no claim in the plaintiff's appeal from the decision of the Danbury Probate Court that the will was not duly executed.   Based on the evidence set forth herein below, the court finds that the Will was duly executed pursuant to the provisions of General Statutes § 45a–251.

(1) AS TO TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY TO MAKE A WILL

Connecticut's statutory requirement for testamentary capacity is found in § 45a–250 of the General Statutes, wherein it is provided, “Any person eighteen years of age or older, and of sound mind, may dispose of his estate by will.”

“The question of capacity remains one of fact for the trier upon all evidence in the case.”  Nichols v. Wentz, 78 Conn. 429, 430, 62 A. 610 (1905).  “The fundamental test of capacity of the testator, to make the will in question, is whether this mind and memory were sound enough to enable him to know and understand the business in which he was engaged when he executed the instrument claimed to be his will.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id., 435.  “The fact that he was insane prior to 1869;  that he again became so ․ in 1902–3 ․ furnishes no legal reason why he might not have been found to have had sufficient capacity to make his will on the 11th of December 1890.”

The evidence and testimony elicited at trial permits the court to make the following findings of fact.

Helen H. Sayers (Helen) was the mother of three sons, Randall, Jason and Larion Sayers.   Helen Sayers died on June 2, 2008.   On January 31, 2006, and prior to her death, Helen executed a revocable trust agreement in which she, as the “Grantor,” conveyed certain assets, including five parcels of real property, in trust to herself as “Trustee.”

On that same date, January 31, 2006, Helen executed a Will in the law offices of Attorney Richard J. DiMarco.   Attorney DiMarco, who had drafted the Will according to Helen's wishes, conducted the execution of the will in the presence of two witnesses, Linda Roberts and Pamela Drucker.   The proceedings included an inquiry by Attorney DeMarco of Helen as to her familiarity with the contents of the Will, and also of her awareness of the nature and extent of her estate and as to the identity of the natural objects of her bounty, that is, her heirs, Randy, Jason and Larion.   He also inquired as to her willingness and intent to make said Will and asked her if the Will disposed of her property as she wished and whether she wanted Roberts and Drucker to act as witnesses to her execution of the Will. He testified that her responses were all accurate and appropriate and served the purpose for which they were intended, to give the two witnesses the ability to determine that she was of sound mind and memory and capable in every way to execute her Will. DiMarco testified that in his opinion she was competent to make a Will and that she did not appear to have been manipulated by anyone in regard to the preparation or execution of her Will.

Pamela Drucker testified that she and Linda Roberts had acted as the witnesses to Helen's execution of her Will. She further testified that she and Roberts had each signed an affidavit attached to the Will in which they swore that they witnessed the execution of the Will by Helen and that at the time of the execution of the Will Helen appeared to each of them to be of proper age and of sound and disposing mind, memory and judgment, and under no improper influence or restraint to the best of their knowledge and belief.   Her testimony at trial as to the competence of Helen to execute her Will was consistent with that affidavit.

It is the burden of the proponent of a will to prove that the testatrix had the requisite mental capacity to competently make the will.

The contestant, Larion Sayers, offered evidence at trial in the form of Helen's medical history and medical records to establish that she had been treated for cardiac issues, including two open heart surgeries and that she suffered from “syncope,” the medical term for fainting.   While the medical evidence may corroborate the health issues testified to by the plaintiff, there was no testimony by the plaintiff or by any other witness that Helen experienced any medical emergencies or even any symptoms of illness on January 31, 2006, the date she executed both the Will and the Revocable Trust.   The plaintiff offered no competent evidence or testimony that Helen suffered from any psychological impediment at the time of her execution of the Will, or at any other time for that matter.

As part of argument that Helen lacked the requisite mental capacity to properly make her Will, the plaintiff placed great emphasis on the fact that the Will and the Revocable Trust contained a number of typographical errors—most specifically, the repeated use in both documents of an incorrect middle initial of Randall Sayers.   He argued that in view of Helen's eye for detail, she would never have signed the Will unless (1) she had not read it or (2) she lacked the requisite capacity at that point in time to appreciate those errors.

As noted, Attorney DiMarco testified that the Will did, in fact, contain what he considered to be “typographical” errors and that while the errors were multiple, it was due to the fact that it was not discovered by anyone involved with the making or execution of the Will, including Helen, the testatrix, and, for that reason, was repeated several times.

DiMarco, as noted, testified that in the presence of the two witnesses he asked Helen if she had read the Will and if it did with her property as she wished and she answered both questions in the affirmative.   The witnesses swore that she appeared to them to be competent in every respect to make a Will and that they had no reason to believe otherwise.

The defendants argue that the existence of those errors do not warrant a finding by the court that the testatrix lacked the necessary testamentary capacity because she did not know who the beneficiaries were or that she made provisions in her Will for anyone other than her three sons.   The court agrees with the defendants and finds that those errors do not provide sufficient proof that Helen lacked the requisite mental capacity to make a valid Will.

Under Connecticut law, the claim of testamentary capacity, like the claim of lack of due execution, is on the proponent.   Based on the evidence and testimony presented at trial, the court finds that the defendants have met that burden of proof.   The court finds that the testatrix had the requisite capacity to execute her Will on January 31, 2006, pursuant to § 45a–250, Conn. General Statutes.

AS TO UNDUE INFLUENCE

The plaintiff also alleged that the beneficiaries of the Will, his brothers, Randall and Spencer, exercised undue influence over Helen “in an effort to cajole her into executing a will that substantially favored them over the Plaintiff.”

“[A] will properly executed by a person having testamentary capacity may ․ be rendered invalid by fraud or undue influence, which is a species of fraud ․ The opponents of the will maintain the affirmative of this issue ․ the obligation rests upon him who affirms the main proposition to satisfy [the court] by a clear preponderance of the whole evidence that his proposition is true, and if he fails to do this, he fails in his contention.”  Lockwood v. Lockwood, 80 Conn. 513, 521–22 (1908).

Undue influence is a matter in avoidance and the burden of proof rests with the contestant.   See Page v. Phelps, 108 Conn. 572 (1928).

“Any influence brought to bear upon a person ․ consenting to a disposal of property, which, having regard to the age and capacity of the party, the nature of the transaction, and all the circumstances of the case, appears to have been such as to preclude the exercise of free and deliberate judgment, is considered by the courts of equity to be undue influence, and is a ground for setting aside the act procured by its employment.”  Bucci v. Gleason, 137 Conn. 25, 30 (1950).

In support of his claim that Helen was the subject of undue influence by his brothers Randall and Spencer, Larion Sayers offered evidence and testimony that he had little or no contact with his mother, Helen, for many years due to the efforts of his two brothers to ostracize him from her and their relatives.   He offered his own testimony and that of witnesses to establish that but for their interference, he would have resolved a number of personal issues that kept him from realizing his place in the family.   He maintains that, consequently, Helen was less inclined to leave him his proper share of her inheritance and instead left it to them.   The evidence presented by the plaintiff, Larion, does not permit the court to find that either Randall or Spencer exerted sufficient control over their mother to cause her to make a Will that excluded Larion.

“The degree of influence necessary to be exerted over the mind of the Testator to render it improper, must from some cause or by some means be such as to induce him to act contrary to his wishes, and to make a different Will and disposition of his estate from that he would have done if left entirely to his own discretion and judgment.   That his free agency and independence must have been overcome, that he must, by some dominion or control exercised over his mind, have been constrained to do what was against his will, and what he was unable to refuse and too weak to resist.”  Lee v. Horrigan, 140 Conn. 232 (1949).

There was evidence present in the form of a letter from Helen to Larion (Defendants' Ex. E) dated November 9, 1992 wherein Helen indicates that she had expended considerable sums of money to maintain the residence at 110 Great Plain Road in Danbury which was owned by her but occupied by Larion with the expectation that he would be responsible for the costs associated with his living there.   It went on to note that Larion had not made any appreciable repayment to Helen and that she could no longer continue to be responsible for the bills.

The defendants also put into evidence a copy of a 2006 U.S. Gift Tax Return (Defendants' Ex. D) evidencing the conveyance by Helen to Larion of the title to the 110 Great Plain Road property as a gift from her to him on June 1, 2006.   They argued that said conveyance to Larion during her lifetime explains why, although he was mentioned as being her child in the Will, Larion was not the beneficiary of any bequest or devise in the Will.

Having considered the evidence and testimony elicited at trial, the court finds that the testatrix, Helen Sayers, did not lack the requisite capacity to make and execute her Last Will and Testament dated January 31, 2006 (Defendants' Ex. A) and that said Will was not the result of any undue influence on the part of the defendants, Randall Sayers and Spenser Sayers.

It should be noted that in their trial memoranda the defendants moved that, in the event it were to find that the Will failed for either lack of capacity or undue influence, the court should proceed to enter findings as to the validity of the Revocable Trust created by Helen Sayers on that same day, January 31, 2006.   As the court has not found that the Will has failed, the court has not made any findings as to the validity of the Revocable Trust.

Judgment is to enter for the defendants and against the plaintiff.

BY THE COURT,

JOSEPH W. DOHERTY, JUDGE

Doherty, Joseph W., J.