P. Edward Lizauskas v. Mark Ryan (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR ORDER (TO REFER)

The plaintiff has filed a motion for contempt in this longstanding action, and is asserting the defendant has violated an order of the court, Trombley, J., limiting the disposition of liquidated funds derived from the sale of property held in trust, subject to disbursement by agreement of the parties or further court order.   The defendant opposes the motion for contempt and, in addition, seeks an order referring this matter to the original judge who issued the order upon which the plaintiff asserts a willful violation by the defendant.   The plaintiff opposes a referral to the original judge who issued the order based upon Practice Book § 1–19, which disqualifies a judge from hearing a nonsummary contempt of an order the judge previously issued.   Although this is a dispute between private litigants, ordinarily giving rise to a question of civil contempt, the plaintiff seeks both remedial orders as well as a finding of nonsummary criminal contempt.   Therefore, the motion to refer is denied.

Practice Book § 1–13A distinguishes between civil and criminal contempt, generally.   Criminal contempt relates to conduct directed against the dignity and authority of the court.  Practice Book § 1–14.¹  Criminal contempt is then further distinguished between summary and nonsummary contempt.   Summary contempt involves misconduct in the court's presence and may be summarily adjudicated.  Practice Book § 1–16.   Nonsummary contempt proceedings are criminal contempt proceedings and “․ shall be heard by a judicial authority other than the trial judge who had either issued the order which was later disobeyed or deferred criminal contempt proceedings under section 1–17.”   Practice book § 1–19.

Although the violation of any court order qualifies for criminal contempt sanctions, civil contempt proceedings are distinguishable from criminal contempt.  “Where ․ the dispute is between private litigants and the purpose for judicial intervention is remedial, then the contempt is civil, and any sanctions imposed by the judicial authority shall be coercive and non punitive ․” Practice Book § 1–21A. If characterized as a civil contempt, therefore, the disqualification provision of Practice Book § 1–19 is inapplicable.   But see MD Drilling and Blasting, Inc. v. MLS Const., LLC, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven, Docket No. CV 03 0483616, (Silbert, J., December 30, 2009).   However, where the violation of a court order renders the order unenforceable, the judicial authority should consider referral for nonsummary criminal contempt proceedings.”  Practice Book § 1–21A.

Under the pleadings presented, the plaintiff seeks remedies including punitive sanctions applicable upon a finding of nonsummary contempt, in the event there is a failure to return the funds distributed from the trust.  “In distinguishing between [civil and criminal contempt], much weight has been placed on the character and purpose of the punishment.   Sanctions for civil contempt may be either a fine or imprisonment;  the fine may be remedial or it may be the means of coercing compliance with the court's order and compensating the complainant for losses sustained ․ In criminal contempt the sanction is punitive in order to vindicate the authority of the court.”  (Citations omitted.)  Quaranta v. Cooley, 130 Conn.App. 835, 841–42, 26 A.3d 643 (2011).   Furthermore, “[a] finding of criminal contempt is usually levied for completed acts of disobedience to vindicate the authority of the court itself.”  Monsam v. Dearington, 82 Conn.App. 451, 456–57, 844 A.2d 927 (2004).

The allegations of contempt here involve the past payment of capital gains taxes, as well as loans from the trust to two parties.   As past acts of alleged disobedience, they may be found to be irreversible and beyond remediation.   In the court's view it is unlikely, for example, that the payment of taxes due for the sale of the property giving rise to the trust should result in a finding of nonsummary criminal contempt.   However, criminal contempt is nonetheless sought as a remedy and, therefore, a referral to the original judge in this matter might foreclose a full and proper consideration of the remedy sought by the plaintiff.

The defendant further asserts that the judge who originally issued the order in this case would be in the best position to interpret its meaning to determine whether there is willful noncompliance and, perhaps, to expand the order.   However logical this argument may be on its face, the court concludes that the language of the order must stand on its own as sufficiently clear and unambiguous to meet the threshold test of contempt.  In re Leah S., 284 Conn. 685, 693, 935 A.2d 1021 (2007).   Otherwise, a motion for contempt might become the platform for an untimely and inappropriate motion to reargue and expand an original order of the court, after a violation has occurred.   See Practice Book § 11–12.   To allow this would undermine the justifiable reliance of parties upon the language of court orders.

BY THE COURT

MARK H. TAYLOR, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. “Our case law classifies civil contempt as conduct directed against the rights of the opposing party;  Connolly v. Connolly, 191 Conn. 468, 482, 464 A.2d 837 (1983);  McTigue v. New London Education Assn., 164 Conn. 348, 352, 321 A.2d 462 (1973);  while criminal contempt consists of conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court.   McClain v. Robinson, 189 Conn. 663, 666, 457 A.2d 1072 (1983);  Moore v. State, supra, 186 Conn. at 258, 440 A.2d 969.”  Ullmann v. State, 230 Conn. 698, 707–08, 647 A.2d 324 (1994).   See DPF Financial Holdings, LLC v. Lyons, 129 Conn.App. 380, 385, 21 A.3d 834 (2011)..  FN1. “Our case law classifies civil contempt as conduct directed against the rights of the opposing party;  Connolly v. Connolly, 191 Conn. 468, 482, 464 A.2d 837 (1983);  McTigue v. New London Education Assn., 164 Conn. 348, 352, 321 A.2d 462 (1973);  while criminal contempt consists of conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court.   McClain v. Robinson, 189 Conn. 663, 666, 457 A.2d 1072 (1983);  Moore v. State, supra, 186 Conn. at 258, 440 A.2d 969.”  Ullmann v. State, 230 Conn. 698, 707–08, 647 A.2d 324 (1994).   See DPF Financial Holdings, LLC v. Lyons, 129 Conn.App. 380, 385, 21 A.3d 834 (2011).

Taylor, Mark H., J.