Brianna McNally et al. v. Andrea Scarapelli et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE (# 108)

This is an action by the plaintiffs, Brianna McNally and Meighan McNally, against the defendants, Andrea Scarapelli and Patricia Cetina, for damages allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of a motor vehicle collision.

In Count Three and Count Four of their complaint, the plaintiffs allege a cause of action in statutory recklessness pursuant to § 14–295, C.G.S. The defendants have moved the court to strike Count Three and Count Four and the relief sought for the reason that they are legally insufficient.   Specifically, they argue that the plaintiffs in that they have merely alleged the same facts as in Count One and Count Two, sounding in negligence, have failed to allege sufficient facts to support a claim of recklessness.

The plaintiffs have filed an objection to the motion to strike noting that, as pled, Counts Three and Four contain the required degree of specificity necessary to allege a cause of action in negligence under § 14–295 C.G.S.

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaints ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  Peter–Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates, 244 Conn. 269, 270–71, 709 A.2d 558 (1999).  “A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded;  it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.”  Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).  “The court must construe the facts in the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff.”  Id., 580.  “[I]t does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.”   Id., 588.  “If facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.”  (Emphasis added.)  Peter–Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates, supra, 270–71.

In this case, both sides concede that there is a split of authority among the decisions of the Superior Court in regard to this issue.   The majority view distinguishes between pleading common-law negligence and statutory pleading and holds that a plaintiff merely has to plead the language in § 14–295 C.G.S.

The minority view requires that the plaintiff further plead facts that would support a common-law claim of negligence—that is, allege specific facts that inform the defendant and the court what conduct is relied upon.   As long as the general requirements of the statute have been met, such pleading is enough to survive a motion to strike and to state a cause of action under § 14–295.

This court relies upon the holding of Judge James Higgins in a 1993 case wherein he held, “General Statutes 14–295 ․ states explicitly that ‘the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of certain statutory sections.   This statute does not require the same specificity of pleading which is required to support a cause of action predicated on recklessness.  ‘When the language used by the legislature is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction by the courts and the statute will be applied as its words direct.’  (Citations omitted.)  Warkentin v. Burns, 223 Conn. 14, 22 (1992).   The statute here could not be any more plain or unambiguous about what a plaintiff must plead and should accordingly be applied as its words direct.”   Spencer v. King, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex at Middletown, Docket No. CV–93–0069530 (September 16, 1993, Higgins, J.) [10 Conn. L. Rptr. 48].

General Statutes § 14–295 requires a plaintiff to plead that another party violated certain statutes with reckless disregard in order for the trier of fact to consider awarding multiple damages.   The plaintiff here has pled that the defendant, with reckless disregard, operated her motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes §§ 14–218a and 14–222, two of the sections enumerated in § 14–295.

The court finds that the plaintiffs have sufficiently pled their cause of action sounding in negligence under General Statutes § 14–295 and, therefore, the motion to strike Count Three and Count Four and the prayer for relief is denied.

BY THE COURT,

JOSEPH W. DOHERTY, JUDGE

Doherty, Joseph W., J.