IN RE: Aiden N. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On April 16, 2013, Joette Katz, as she is the commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, (“DCF”), filed a petition pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a–112 et seq. to terminate the parental rights of Sarah B. and Robert N. to the minor child Aiden N. Both parents have been served and have appeared.   The parents are each represented by counsel.   Neither party claims American Indian Tribal affiliation.   The court is aware of no other proceedings pending in any other court regarding the custody of this child.   This court has jurisdiction.

At the commencement of this contested action, the mother has presented to the court properly executed forms consenting to the termination of her parental rights to Aiden.   Having canvassed the mother, this court finds that she has been represented by competent counsel who was present with her when she executed the consent form.   The court further finds that the consent has been knowingly and voluntarily entered with a full understanding of the legal consequences of her action.   The consent has been accepted by the court.   Thereafter the mother made a statement to the court stating her appropriate reasons for her consent.

The Department of Child and Families (DCF) through counsel has moved to amend the petition to withdraw the non-consensual grounds and to change the grounds to consent § 17a–112(I) of the mother.   Without objection, the motion was granted.   A motion for technical corrections was granted without objection.

The male biological parent of Aiden has previously had limited involvement in this case.   He appeared at the initial plea hearing and was advised of his rights (Dyer, J.).   He had full knowledge of the assignment of this case for a contested hearing.   He has recently indicated a willingness to consent.   He did not sign a consent nor did he appear for the contested hearing.

The court makes the following findings by clear and convincing evidence.   As statutory grounds for terminating the father's rights, the petition alleges failure to rehabilitate.  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3) provides in relevant part that termination is warranted if the trial court, in the adjudicative phase, finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child (1) has been found by the Superior Court ․ to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding ․ and (2) the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b–129 and (3) the parent has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706 (1999).

The record reflects an adjudication of neglect was made in the presence of both parents on February 29, 2012.   The evidence and the record reflect that Robert received Specific Steps to assist him in rehabilitating himself toward reunification with the child on April 19, 2013.  (Exhibit F.) Specific steps basically outline certain conduct and certain requirements that would lead to reunification if the parent participated and benefitted from the services prescribed.   Notably, they are generally designed to improve parenting skills, conquer addiction issues and address mental health issues.   Robert needed to address all three issues.

The court finds that appropriate, available and timely services were offered to Robert.   He has very long-standing mental health issues which have afflicted him since his early childhood.   He has participated in a court ordered psychological evaluation which confirms his many issues and limitations as a parent.  (Exhibit D.)

The social studies and other documentary evidence confirm that Robert is only marginally able to care for himself.   Indeed, he has a court appointed conservator to assist in the management of his funds received from Social Security.   He has never acted as the sole caretaker of his children.   He has historically attended about half of the visits offered to him.   He has not developed a bond with the child.   He does not engage the child during visits.   He has not attended his last five visits with Aiden.   Those close to him acknowledge that Robert could never provide financial or emotionally for Aiden.

In sum, he has demonstrated declining interest in the child and in ever being a parental resource for the child.

Aiden is two and a half years of age.   He was removed from his mother's protective supervision in July 2012.   He has been in his current pre-adoptive home since that date.   Aiden is fully bonded with his foster family.   He has a parent-child relationship with the foster family.   Aiden has identified developmental delays.   He needs extraordinary parenting skills and consistent physical monitoring.   Robert could never provide such care.   Aiden's mother, who did appear in court to consent to the termination of her rights expressed her belief that Aiden is receiving excellent care and is fully bonded in his present home.

The court finds that the Petitioner has proven the allegations of the petition by clear and convincing evidence.

Required Statutory Findings

In making the dispositional decision in a non-consensual case, “the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors” specified in General Statutes § 17a–112(k).  See, e.g., In re Tabitha P., 39 Conn.App. 353, 664 A.2d 1168 (1995).  “[T]hose ‘seven factors serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered ․ There is no requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence.’  “ In re Davonta V., 98 Conn.App. 46–47 (2009).   As required by the statute, the court has considered the statutory factors and makes the following written findings with regard to the department's petition to terminate the respondents' parental rights, and the court has considered these findings in determining that it is in Aiden's best interest to terminate the parental rights of the parents.  In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000).

i. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent— § 17a–112(k)(1).   As noted above, DCF offered appropriate and timely services to help the father address his mental health issues, to learn better parenting practices, and to assist him with his anger management issues.   Robert rejected participation in the offered services related to anger management and mental health counseling.   The social studies are replete with the offered services including, psychological evaluations, individual counseling, visitation, case management, and other services.

ii. Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended— § 17a–112(k)(2).   As noted above, DCF made reasonable efforts to reunite Aiden pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

iii. The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order— § 17a–112(k)(3).   The issues related to Specific Steps has been previously discussed.   DCF fulfilled its obligations.   Robert did not fully participate in needed services.

iv. The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardian of his person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties— § 17a–112(k)(4).   This has been previously addressed.

v. The ages of the children— § 17a–112 (k)(5).   Aiden was born on February 2, 2012.   He has been in foster care for the past fourteen months.

vi. The efforts the parent has made to adjust his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return him to her home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child— § 17a–112(k)(6).   Previously discussed and considered.

vii. The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent— § 17a–112(k)(7).   Robert was not prevented from maintaining a relationship, albeit limited, with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of any other person.   DCF engaged outside services to help facilitate visitation and to provide parental education.   His economic circumstances did not interfere with his ability to develop and maintain a relationship with the child.

DISPOSITION

With respect to the best interests of the child by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the evidence, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of the parents is in the best interest of the child.   In making this finding that termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in the child's best interest, the court has examined multiple relevant factors including the notion that permanency, consistency and stability are crucial for children.   Children's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of environment are equally important.   The length of stay in foster care;  the nature of the relationship of the child with the biological parents;  the degree of contact maintained with the biological parents;  and the genetic bond to respondents, all have been considered.  In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000);  In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000).

IV. ORDER

It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of Sarah B. upon her consent, are hereby terminated as to Aiden.   The parental rights of Robert are terminated upon a finding that he has failed to rehabilitate himself as defined by the statute.   The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent.

A case report shall be submitted within thirty days of this judgment, and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.

The Clerk of any court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of the child shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters 81 Columbia Ave., Willimantic, CT of the date when said adoption is finalized.

Judgment may enter accordingly.

Foley, J.T.R. # 465

Foley, Francis J., J.T.R.