Annemarie Rivera v. Norwalk Public Schools (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (# 105)

I. INTRODUCTION

This case involves alleged employment discrimination against and eventual discharge of a special education teacher in Norwalk.   The defendant, Norwalk Public Schools, has filed the motion for summary judgment now pending before the court.   For the reasons that follow, the motion for summary judgment is denied.

II. FACTS

On January 30, 2012, the plaintiff, AnneMarie Rivera, filed a three-count revised complaint (complaint) against the defendant, Norwalk Public Schools.   Under Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General Statutes §§ 46a–60 et seq.,¹ the plaintiff alleges disability discrimination, failure to make a reasonable accommodation and retaliation against the defendant.

In her complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts.   The defendant employed the plaintiff a special education teacher from August 2006 through May 31, 2011.   On May 31, 2011, the defendant involuntarily terminated her.   Beginning in or before September 2007, she began suffering a severe reaction to the poor ventilation in the Silvermine Elementary School, where she was assigned.   As a direct result of her working conditions, the plaintiff developed chronic asthma, which affects her ability to carry out major life activities.   The plaintiff repeatedly complained about the working conditions, and requested a transfer to a different building.   The defendant refused this accommodation for a long time, and retaliated against the plaintiff due to her repeated complaints.   This retaliation included locking her out of her workplace, refusing to give her access to her possessions, and informing her union representative that she was being considered for nonrenewal.   The defendant repeatedly threatened the plaintiff with termination because of her complaints.

Due to the defendant's threats and other retaliation as a result of complaining about the lack of accommodation of her disability, the plaintiff developed fibromyalgia, another disabling medical condition.   The plaintiff informed the defendant of this condition and requested that she not be subjected to unreasonable or unnecessary stress.   In February 2010, the defendant transferred the plaintiff to Norwalk High School, which had adequate ventilation.   At Norwalk High School, however, the plaintiff was subjected to severe stress, retaliation, and a hostile work environment.   She was repeatedly threatened with termination or with nonrenewal of her teaching contract, even though she performed her job satisfactory or better.

The plaintiff alleges several specific incidents in her complaint.   First, she alleges that a human resources officer of the defendant, Fay T. Ruotolo, informed her that she would require medical clearance before being allowed to work for the 2010–2011 school year, and that the same human resources officer contacted the defendant's attorney and asked for assistance in terminating the plaintiff, but was advised there were no legal grounds for doing so.

Next, the plaintiff describes two alleged incidents in November 2010.   The plaintiff alleges that her department chair and the assistant principal returned, to the plaintiff's classroom, a severely emotionally disturbed student who threatened to hit the plaintiff four days after that student had been removed from the class, and against advisement from a planning and placement team that the student should be placed in another classroom.   Upon the student's return to the plaintiff's classroom, the student resumed her threats of physical violence against the plaintiff and placed her hands on the plaintiff.

The plaintiff also alleges that the principal of Norwalk High School conducted an observation of her classroom and observed the plaintiff using a smart board to conduct a reinforcement activity and the students interacting well and enjoying the lesson.   The plaintiff alleges that a week later, when she met with the principal for a post-observation meeting, the principal criticized the plaintiff for not using the smart board for purposes of reinforcement and claimed that the students had not interacted during the process.   When the plaintiff explained that these claims were untrue, the principal denied the events of the lesson.

The plaintiff alleges additionally that as a result of the foregoing events, she filed a formal written complaint of employment discrimination with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO) on November 19, 2010,² and that on March 24, 2011, in retaliation for filing the complaint, the defendant notified the plaintiff in writing that her teaching contract would not be renewed.   On May 31, 2011, the Norwalk Board of Education formally voted not to renew the plaintiff's teaching contract.   The plaintiff alleges that the defendant discriminated against her because of her disabilities, refused to provide the plaintiff with reasonable accommodations of her disabilities, and retaliated against the plaintiff for having complained about unlawful employment practices.   As a result, the plaintiff has suffered economic losses and emotional distress.

On April 22, 2013, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on various grounds as to all three counts of the plaintiff's complaint, along with a memorandum of law and evidence in support of its motion.   On May 15, 2013, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, along with evidence in support thereof.   The defendant filed a reply memorandum on May 24, 2013.   The plaintiff then replied to the defendant on May 29, 2013.   The parties' arguments were heard at short calendar on May 28, 2013.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

“Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ․ The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried.”  (Citations omitted.)  Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989).  “[T]he moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law ․ Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).

“The existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counteraffidavits and concrete evidence.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gianetti v. Health Net of Connecticut, Inc., 116 Conn.App. 459, 465, 976 A.2d 23 (2009).  “In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact ․ but rather to determine whether any such issues exist.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  RMS Residential Properties, LLC v. Miller, 303 Conn. 224, 233, 32 A.3d 307 (2011).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Count Two 3

The defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because the facts establish that this claim is untimely and that the defendant provided each accommodation requested by the plaintiff.   The defendant asserts that the plaintiff's allegation that she was not timely provided a transfer as a reasonable accommodation for her asthma is time-barred, as the plaintiff's CHRO complaint was not filed within 180 days of the alleged provision of accommodation.   The defendant further asserts that the continuing violation doctrine does not save the plaintiff's claim, as the count is based upon a discrete discriminatory act, namely, the defendant's alleged refusal to timely provide a reasonable accommodation.   The defendant contends that even if the plaintiff's claim is not time-barred, the undisputed facts confirm that it provided the accommodation the plaintiff requested within a reasonable time.

The plaintiff counters that considering the history of her accommodation requests over a period of several years, the defendant's actions were inadequate and that there was a failure to ensure that she received the accommodations that her doctors recommended, even after she was transferred to Norwalk High School.   According to the plaintiff, “the defendant partially provided her with accommodations at Norwalk High School as of February 2010 ․ The Norwalk High School building was air conditioned, and [the plaintiff] was given a fan to use in only one of her classrooms, although she worked in a variety of locations at the high school.”

With respect to this count, the defendant has met its initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists.   In particular, the defendant has presented evidence to show that it had responded to the plaintiff's requests to accommodate her asthma, ultimately by moving her to the Norwalk High School in room with sufficient air conditioning.   Indeed, the plaintiff expressed some satisfaction with her placement at Norwalk High School in the air conditioned room.   The defendant also submitted evidence to show that it had engaged with the plaintiff to arrive at this reasonable accommodation.

The plaintiff, however, also has met her burden to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the defendant properly provided a reasonable accommodation.   Specifically, the plaintiff submitted evidence to show that when the defendant had assigned her to Norwalk High School, although she initially had been assigned to the air conditioned room, she routinely worked in multiple other classrooms, including a science room, resources room, English room and special education room.   See Plaintiff's Exhibit 12b, Plaintiff's deposition, Vol. 3 p.306. With the exception of the special education room, the plaintiff submitted evidence stating that there were no fans in any of the other rooms in which she had worked.  Id., 310.   The plaintiff submitted further evidence that when she requested that fans be placed in the rooms in which she worked, the defendant never provided any fans in those rooms.  Id. The defendant has not submitted evidence to show that providing fans in each of the rooms in which the plaintiff was required to work would have been an undue hardship.

The defendant's argument that the plaintiff should have submitted her CHRO complaint within 180 days of February 8, 2009 is unpersuasive.   On this date, the defendant transferred the plaintiff to Norwalk High School, which the defendant alleges was a reasonable and adequate accommodation.   According to the defendant, then, the 180–day time period under General Statutes § 46a–82(f) commences upon the making of an accommodation.   This interpretation is at odds with the statutory language.  “Any complaint filed pursuant to this section must be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged act of discrimination ․” (Emphasis added.)  General Statutes § 46a–82(f).

“The court must determine at the outset whether the defendant's complaint was brought within the 180 day limits of the individual allegations.”  (Emphasis added.)   Nelson v. Bridgeport, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV–065001428 S (September 27, 2012, Gilardi, J.).  “The operative statutory terms of ․ the charge filing provision, are ‘shall,’ ‘after ․ occurred,’ and ‘unlawful employment practice.’  ‘[S]hall’ makes the act of filing a charge within the specified time period mandatory.  ‘[O]ccurred’ means that the practice took place or happened in the past.   The requirement, therefore, that the charge be filed after the practice occurred means that a litigant has up to 180 days ․ after the unlawful practice happened to file.”  (Emphasis added;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Krahm v. Fairfield, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV–04400006 S (December 8, 2008, Doherty, J.).

Thus, the statute clearly states that the 180–day period commences upon the happening of the allegedly discriminatory acts.   The plaintiff's evidence indicates that a number of discriminatory acts took place after February 8, 2009.   There is no authority supporting the defendant's contention that the 180–day period commenced upon its response to the plaintiff's request by transferring the plaintiff to Norwalk High School.   Given this evidence, there still exists a question of material fact as to whether the defendant provided reasonable accommodations in accordance with the plaintiff's needs as of the date of her termination on May 31, 2011.   As such, it is ultimately up to the fact finder to determine if the defendant properly made a reasonable accommodation for the plaintiff in this case.

The defendant does put forth other arguments related to this count, however, this court follows the majority view that does not allow entry of summary judgment on one part or allegation of a cause of action when the ruling will not dispose of the entire claim, and therefore, will not allow entry of judgment on that claim.  Embry v. Hartford, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, docket No. CV–07–5014615–S (October 18, 2011, Domnarski, J.).   See also Baez v. New Britain, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. X09 CV–065005947 S (January 14, 2009, Shortall, J.) (“Although there is some conflict among the Superior Court judges on this issue, the majority rule, followed by this court, is that Connecticut procedure does not allow entry of summary judgment on one part or allegation of a cause of action when the ruling will not dispose of an entire claim, and therefore, will not allow entry of judgment on that claim ․”) (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   As such, the court need not address the defendant's other contentions.

B. Count one

The defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on this count as the acts the plaintiff identified in response to its interrogatories do not amount to actionable claims for disability discrimination.⁴

The plaintiff argues that under the continuing violation doctrine, although some of her discrimination claims appear to predate her CHRO complaint, she may bring an otherwise time-barred discrimination claim when the evidence shows that the defendant had an ongoing policy of discrimination.   She argues that she “has demonstrated a pattern of delay and noncompliance by the defendant which amounts to a continuing violation.”

The defendant responds that a failure to accommodate is a discrete act, and untimely discrete acts cannot be made timely through reliance upon the continuing violation doctrine.   It argues that the plaintiff's alleged inadequate accommodations in 2008 and 2009 were addressed adequately, when the defendant transferred the plaintiff to a suitable air conditioned building, Norwalk High School, on February 8, 2010.   Even so, the defendant argues the plaintiff's alleged failures to accommodate are time-barred.

“Claims alleging disability discrimination in violation of the [CFEPA] are subject to the burden-shifting analysis originally established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).”  McBride v. BIC Consumer Products Mfg. Co., Inc., 583 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir.2009).  “Under this analysis, the employee must first make a prima facie case of discrimination.   The employer may then rebut the prima facie case by stating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for the employment decision in question.   The employee then must demonstrate that the reason proffered by the employer is merely a pretext and that the decision actually was motivated by illegal discriminatory bias.”  Craine v. Trinity College, 259 Conn. 625, 637, 791 A.2d 518 (2002).  “In order to establish a prima facie case, the complainant must prove that:  (1) he [was] in the protected class;  (2) he was qualified for the position;  (3) he suffered an adverse employment action;  and (4) that the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 278 Conn. 692, 705–06, 900 A.2d 498 (2006).

In the present case, the defendant's main challenge goes towards the plaintiff's ability to show an adverse employment action and thus meet the third element of her prima facie case of disability discrimination.   The court finds that the defendant construes the concept of “adverse employment action” too narrowly in moving for summary judgment as to this count.   Although the plaintiff responded to the defendant's interrogatories with specific acts of discrimination, the plaintiff brings count one of her complaint because the defendant allegedly terminated her employment because of her alleged disabilities.

Indeed, the plaintiff alleges in count one of her complaint that “[she] was ․ employed by the defendant ․ continuously until her employment was involuntarily terminated by the defendant on May 31, 2011 ․ [O]n May 31, 2011, the Norwalk Board of Education formally voted not to renew the plaintiff's teaching contract.   In the manner described above, the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff because of her disabilities in violation of the [CFEPA].”  (Emphasis added.)   The plaintiff has clearly alleged and shown an adverse employment action, her involuntary discharge.  “Examples of materially adverse employment actions include termination of employment ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 152 (2d Cir.2004).   Moreover, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, a rational fact-finder could conclude that there was an ongoing policy of discrimination with at least some of the acts of discrimination occurring within 180 days of the plaintiff's CHRO complaint.

Accordingly, the evidence establishes that the plaintiff was involuntarily discharged and her employment ended when her contract of employment was not renewed by a vote of the Norwalk Board of Education on May 31, 2011.   (Defendant's Exh. 27, Board of Education Decision Letter, p. 1.) As the court deems resolution of this issue dispositive, it declines to address the parties' other arguments as to this count.

C. Count three

In this count, the plaintiff alleges retaliation.  “In adjudicating retaliation claims, courts follow the burden-shifting approach of McDonnell Douglas ․ “ (Citation omitted.)   Marasco v. Connecticut Regional Vocational–Technical School System, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV–09–5014324–S (October 15, 2012, Dooley, J.) [54 Conn. L. Rptr. 812].  “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show four elements:  (1) that he participated in a protected activity; ⁵  (2) that the defendant knew of the protected activity;  (3) an adverse employment action against him;  and (4) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.”  Ayantola v. Board of Trustees of Technical Colleges, 116 Conn.App. 531, 536, 976 A.2d 784 (2009).   “The burden of establishing a prima facie case is a burden of production, not a burden of proof, and therefore involves no credibility assessment by the fact finder ․ The level of proof required to establish a prima facie case is minimal and need not reach the level required to support a jury verdict in the plaintiff's favor.”  (Citation omitted.)  Craine v. Trinity College, supra, 259 Conn. 638.  “Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination, a presumption of discrimination is created.”  Levy v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, supra, 236 Conn. 108.

“Once the [plaintiff] establishes a prima facie case, the employer then must produce legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its adverse employment action ․ This burden is one of production, not persuasion;  it can involve no credibility assessment ․ After the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, and the defendant has produced evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action, [t]he plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion.  [The plaintiff] now must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the [defendant's] proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.   This burden now merges with the [plaintiff's] ultimate burden of persuading the court that [the plaintiff] has been the victim of intentional discrimination.  [The plaintiff] may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”  (Citation omitted;  emphasis omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Jacobs v. General Electric Co., 275 Conn. 395, 400–01, 880 A.2d 151 (2005).

“To prove discrimination, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's stated nondiscriminatory reason for its decision was in fact a pretext for an unlawful motive ․ A plaintiff must be allowed the opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination ․ Although the presumption created by the prima facie case disappears, the plaintiff may rely upon the evidence used in establishing the prima facie case to prove the ultimate issue of ․ discrimination.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Craine v. Trinity College, supra, 259 Conn. 643–44.

“A trial court must be cautious about granting summary judgment to an employer when ․ its intent is at issue ․ Because writings directly supporting a claim of intentional discrimination are rarely, if ever, found among an employer's corporate papers, affidavits and depositions must be carefully scrutinized for circumstantial proof which, if believed, would show discrimination.”  (Citations omitted.)  Gallo v. Prudential Residential Services, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2nd Cir.1994).  “[S]ummary judgment is ordinarily inappropriate where an individual's intent and state of mind are implicated ․ The summary judgment rule would be rendered sterile, however, if the mere incantation of intent or state of mind would operate as a talisman to defeat an otherwise valid motion ․ [E]ven with respect to questions of motive, intent and good faith, the party opposing summary judgment must present a factual predicate for his argument in order to raise a genuine issue of fact.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gagnon v. Housatonic Valley Tourism District Commission, 92 Conn.App. 835, 842, 888 A.2d 104 (2006).  “Courts have held that, while a plaintiff does not have to demonstrate conclusive proof of discrimination to withstand summary judgment, a plaintiff must at least produce some definite facts that a jury could infer discrimination from.”  Johnson v. C. White & Son, Inc., 772 F.Sup.2d 408, 416 (D.Conn.2011).

In the present case, the plaintiff has produced evidence to meet her minimal burden and establish her prima facie case.   It is undisputed that filing a CHRO complaint is a protected activity under the CFEPA retaliation provision, § 46a–60(a)(4).   The plaintiff submits evidence that the defendant knew that the plaintiff filed a CHRO complaint, at least by March 23, 2011, when the city of Norwalk's deputy corporation counsel was noticed on a CHRO merit assessment review of the plaintiff's claim that the complaint would be retained for full investigation.  (Plaintiff's Exh. 10, Merit Assessment Review, p. 4.) The defendant also took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff when it did not renew her contract.   The plaintiff filed her CHRO complaint on November 22, 2010, and was subsequently not renewed on May 31, 2011.   While these events occurred a little over six months apart from each other, the circumstances of this case support a casual connection between the two.

Specifically, between the time when the plaintiff filed her CHRO complaint and when she was not renewed, she received a midyear evaluation document for appraisal and directed professional growth, on December 7, 2010, with varying scores of “basic” and “proficient.”  (Plaintiff's Exh. 13(f), Midyear Evaluation Document.)   This document recommended the plaintiff for nonrenewal.  Id., 5. The plaintiff's principal officially recommended the plaintiff for nonrenewal on December 10, 2010.  (Plaintiff's Exh. 8, Human Resources Memorandum, p. 2.) The plaintiff was also subject to a disciplinary inquiry and placed on administrative leave on March 18, 2011, for not stopping an inappropriate conversation amongst students.  (Defendant's Exh. 28, Administrative Leave Letter, p. 1.) On March 24, 2011, the superintendent informed the plaintiff that she decided not to renew the plaintiff's contract of employment.  (Plaintiff's Exh. 14, Letter of Nonrenewal, p. 1.) This occurred on the day after the Norwalk deputy corporation counsel was noticed on the CHRO merit assessment review.  (Plaintiff's Exh. 10, Merit Assessment Review, p. 4.) After an appellate process, the Board of Education officially voted, on May 31, 2011, not to renew the plaintiff's contract for the following school year.  (Defendant's Exh. 27, Board of Education Decision Letter, p. 1.) This evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff's filing of her CHRO complaint is connected to the ultimate decision not to renew her employment contract.

Next, the defendant has met its burden of stating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's termination.   The defendant's stated reasons were:  (1) her poor performance, indicated by the in-classroom observations that the defendant submits as evidence;  and (2) the lack of stopping an inappropriate conversation with students on March 15, 2011, that led to a disciplinary inquiry, and which the defendant states “calls into question [the plaintiff's] judgment and abilities.”  (Defendant's Exh. 25, Statement of Reasons for Nonrenewal, p. 1.)

The court finds, however, that the plaintiff has met her burden of offering evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant's stated reasons for the plaintiff's termination were a pretext for masking its retaliation for filing her CHRO claim.   Importantly, the court is guided by its duty to “not ․ decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Maltas v. Maltas, supra, 298 Conn. 365.   While the plaintiff may have been getting poor performance reviews before she filed her CHRO complaint, it is for the finder of fact to determine what role, if any, the plaintiff's CHRO complaint played in the subsequent midyear evaluation completed on December 7, 2010, in which the plaintiff was recommended for nonrenewal.   (Plaintiff's Exh. 13(f), Midyear Evaluation Document.)

What is significant, for purposes of this motion, is that the superintendent and the defendant ultimately acted on the principal's recommendation for nonrenewal at some point after the plaintiff filed her CHRO complaint.   (Defendant's Exh. 27, Board of Education Decision Letter, p. 1.) While the only evidence before the court suggests that the defendant knew of the CHRO complaint after March 23, 2011, this date was still before the date upon which the defendant made the final decision to not renew the plaintiff's contract on May 31, 2011, effectively discharging her from employment with the Norwalk school system.  (Plaintiff's Exhibit 10, Merit Assessment Review, p. 4;  Defendant's Exh. 27, Board of Education Decision Letter, p. 1.)

The plaintiff is ultimately challenging her discharge as retaliatory, and the final decision to discharge her was made following the filing of her CHRO complaint, and after the defendant was put on notice that she had made such complaint.   Accordingly, given the evidence before the court, a rational finder of fact may infer that the defendant's employment decision was motivated by retaliation.   It is thus for the finder of fact to sort through these factual issues at trial and not appropriate for disposition at this stage of the proceedings.

This is especially so because the time line of events, as substantiated by the evidence before the court, puts into question the defendant's intent and when and if it actually knew about the plaintiff's CHRO complaint.   On a motion for summary judgment, “the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent [of the motion].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., supra, 285 Conn. 11.   There is thus a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff's act of filing a CHRO complaint played a role in the decision to effectively discharge her by not renewing her contract for the following school year.

The court declines to address the other arguments raised by the parties as to this count, as it deems the existence of genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendant retaliated against the plaintiff for filing a CHRO complaint by terminating the plaintiff dispositive.   The court finds the defendant's arguments as to untimeliness irrelevant for purposes of resolution of the motion for summary judgment as to this count.

V. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment is denied.

Mullins, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. General Statutes § 46a–60(a)(1) provides:  “It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section:  For an employer, by the employer or the employer's agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual's race, color, religious creed, age, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, national origin, ancestry, present or past history of mental disability, intellectual disability, learning disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness.”General Statutes § 46a–60(a)(4) provides:  “It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section:  For any person, employer, labor organization or employment agency to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because such person has opposed any discriminatory employment practice or because such person has filed a complaint or testified or assisted in any proceeding under section 46a–82, 46a–83 or 46a–84.”.  FN1. General Statutes § 46a–60(a)(1) provides:  “It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section:  For an employer, by the employer or the employer's agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual's race, color, religious creed, age, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, national origin, ancestry, present or past history of mental disability, intellectual disability, learning disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness.”General Statutes § 46a–60(a)(4) provides:  “It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section:  For any person, employer, labor organization or employment agency to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because such person has opposed any discriminatory employment practice or because such person has filed a complaint or testified or assisted in any proceeding under section 46a–82, 46a–83 or 46a–84.”

FN2. The CHRO released jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims on September 6, 2011.   The plaintiff's CHRO affidavit is dated November 19, 2010, however, it is date-stamped as received by the CHRO on November 22, 2010.   The court will therefore treat the plaintiff's CHRO complaint as being filed on November 22, 2010.   See (Plaintiff's Exhibit (Exh.) 9, Plaintiff's CHRO Affidavit of Illegal Discriminatory Practice, p. 1.).  FN2. The CHRO released jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims on September 6, 2011.   The plaintiff's CHRO affidavit is dated November 19, 2010, however, it is date-stamped as received by the CHRO on November 22, 2010.   The court will therefore treat the plaintiff's CHRO complaint as being filed on November 22, 2010.   See (Plaintiff's Exhibit (Exh.) 9, Plaintiff's CHRO Affidavit of Illegal Discriminatory Practice, p. 1.)

FN3. The court addresses the claims in the same order in which the defendant presented them in its memorandum of law on the motion for summary judgment..  FN3. The court addresses the claims in the same order in which the defendant presented them in its memorandum of law on the motion for summary judgment.

FN4. These acts are:  “(1) The plaintiff was forced to sit in isolation, for [seven] hours per day, without work to do, at the [c]entral [o]ffice for over a month[;] (2) The defendant also refused the plaintiff[']s several requests for accommodation and was reprimanded for making said requests[;] (3) The defendant also continues to give negative comments to potential employers of the plaintiff.”  (Defendant's Exh. 34, Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production, pp. 4–5.).  FN4. These acts are:  “(1) The plaintiff was forced to sit in isolation, for [seven] hours per day, without work to do, at the [c]entral [o]ffice for over a month[;] (2) The defendant also refused the plaintiff[']s several requests for accommodation and was reprimanded for making said requests[;] (3) The defendant also continues to give negative comments to potential employers of the plaintiff.”  (Defendant's Exh. 34, Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production, pp. 4–5.)

FN5. “A protected activity is an action taken to protect or oppose statutorily prohibited discrimination.   These actions can include the filing of formal charges of discrimination, as well as, informal protests of discriminatory employment practices, including complaints to management, writing critical letters to customers, protecting against discrimination by industry and expressing support of co-workers who have filed formal charges ․ The objective is to forbid employers from retaliating against employees because of employees' opposition to unlawful employment practices.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Setkoski v. University of Connecticut Health Center, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV–10–6012794–S (May 10, 2012, Domnarski, J.) (54 Conn. L. Rptr. 67, 70)..  FN5. “A protected activity is an action taken to protect or oppose statutorily prohibited discrimination.   These actions can include the filing of formal charges of discrimination, as well as, informal protests of discriminatory employment practices, including complaints to management, writing critical letters to customers, protecting against discrimination by industry and expressing support of co-workers who have filed formal charges ․ The objective is to forbid employers from retaliating against employees because of employees' opposition to unlawful employment practices.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Setkoski v. University of Connecticut Health Center, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV–10–6012794–S (May 10, 2012, Domnarski, J.) (54 Conn. L. Rptr. 67, 70).

Mullins, Raheem, J.