Peter Legnos v. David Jacinto Salazar (2013)

ORDER (# 103.01)

Presently before the court is the issue of whether the defendant, David Jacinto Salazar, is entitled to a hearing pursuant to Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 459 A.2d 503 (1983).   On March 7, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss and memorandum of law in support on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction.   The plaintiff, Peter Legnos, filed his memorandum of law in opposition on April 22, 2013, to which the defendant filed a reply memorandum on May 16, 2013.   The court heard oral argument on the motion to dismiss at short calendar on May 20, 2013.   The defendant indicated in his reply memorandum and at short calendar that he is only seeking a Standard Tallow hearing.

“If the defendant challenging the court's personal jurisdiction is a foreign corporation or a nonresident individual, it is the plaintiff's burden to prove the court's jurisdiction.”  Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 505, 515, 923 A.2d 638 (2007).  “When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss, the court must undertake a two part inquiry to determine the propriety of its exercising such jurisdiction over the defendant.   The trial court must first decide whether the applicable state long-arm statute authorizes the assertion of jurisdiction over the [defendant].   If the statutory requirements [are] met, its second obligation [is] then to decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the [defendant] would violate constitutional principles of due process.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Kenny v. Banks, 289 Conn. 529, 533, 958 A.2d 750 (2008).

“The relevant portions of [General Statutes] § 52–59b provide that jurisdiction may be exercised over a nonresident individual who transacts any business within the state;  General Statutes § 52–59b(a)(1);  or commits a tortious act within the state ․ General Statutes § 52–59b(a)(2).   In deciding whether the applicable long arm statute authorizes jurisdiction over the defendant, the court is generally limited to the allegations in the complaint;  however, [w]hen issues of fact are necessary to the determination of a court's jurisdiction, due process requires that a trial-like hearing be held, in which an opportunity is provided to present evidence and to cross-examine adverse witnesses.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Solano v. Calegari, 108 Conn.App. 731, 737, 949 A.2d 1257, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 943, 959 A.2d 1010 (2008).  “[T]he due process requirement of a hearing is required only when issues of facts are disputed.”  (Emphasis in original.)   Weihing v. Dodsworth, 100 Conn.App. 29, 38, 917 A.2d 53 (2007).

In the present case, the plaintiff alleges the following relevant facts:  the defendant operated a flatbed tractor trailer and delivered a water tank to Groton, Connecticut, on September 27, 2010;  the defendant provided a manifest that stated that the water tank weighed 5000 pounds and told Jay Williams that the tank weighed 3000 pounds;  the weight of the water tank was, however, two to three times the 5000–pound representation;  the plaintiff reasonably relied on the representation, which was false, and the plaintiff suffered injury when the forklift he was operating to remove the water tank from the truck bed was suddenly lifted off the ground.

The defendant argues that the court does not have personal jurisdiction over him because upon information and belief the North Carolina address to which the copy of the service served upon the Secretary of State was mailed is not the defendant's current address, and the plaintiff has not proven that the defendant engaged in the misrepresentations that the plaintiff alleges occurred in Groton.   The plaintiff counters, by providing evidence attached to his memorandum of law in opposition, that the North Carolina address used on the summons was given in response to an interrogatory in the companion case, it was the address given by the defendant in his statement, it appeared on the defendant's website, and it was the address used when the defendant registered with the FMCSA Motor Carrier.   The plaintiff also argues that the misrepresentations attributed to the defendant as well as the resulting injury occurred in Connecticut.   The plaintiff argues that there exists a clear connection between the representation regarding the weight of the tank, the plaintiff's reliance on the representation, and the plaintiff's injury that occurred minutes later.

The court record reveals that the plaintiff has established that the defendant is an out-of-state defendant and that the plaintiff sent a copy of the service to the defendant's last known address.   See General Statutes § 52–59b(c).  In addition, the plaintiff provided evidence that the defendant delivered the water tank to Groton, the representation regarding the weight occurred in Groton, and the plaintiff relied on the representation and suffered injury in Groton.   The defendant has not provided any evidence to dispute the plaintiff's evidence and relied on his argument that it is the plaintiff's burden to establish personal jurisdiction.   Accordingly, there is no disputed factual issue that requires an evidentiary hearing regarding personal jurisdiction pursuant to § 52–59b.   The defendant's motion for a Standard Tallow hearing is denied.

Devine, J.

Devine, James J., J.