Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc. v. Miriam Sayegh (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS (111.00)

I. FACTS

The plaintiff, Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc., brings this action against the defendant, Miriam Sayegh, for unpaid charter bus fees that the defendant allegedly owes the plaintiff.   In the complaint, filed on October 2, 2012, the plaintiff alleged the following facts.   The plaintiff, a corporation licensed to do business in Connecticut, operates motor buses for hire.   The defendant, a Connecticut resident, served as the president of Adventure's Tours, Corp. (“Adventure”) up until to April 12, 2008.   In that time, the defendant owned all, or substantially all, of the stock in Adventure.   During 2007, and until April 2008, Adventure contracted numerous times with the plaintiff to have the plaintiff transport Adventure customers to and from various gambling destinations in Atlantic City, New Jersey.   In 2007, Adventure incurred $264,000 in charges to the plaintiff, $799 of which went unpaid.   In 2008, Adventure paid the plaintiff for its services rendered between January 1 and March 23, but failed to pay the plaintiff $6,5275 for seven tours rendered between March 23 and April 11.   In all, the plaintiff claims that Adventure failed to pay the plaintiff $7,074.   On April 12, 2008, the defendant sold all of her shares of stock in Adventure, and arranged the sale of all of Adventure's assets, for which the defendant was paid in excess of $7,074.   From the proceeds of the stock and assets sale, the defendant is obligated to pay the plaintiff the $7,074 that the plaintiff is owed, plus interest.   Despite the plaintiff having made a prior demand for such payment, the defendant has failed to pay the plaintiff.

On April 2, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.   On May 13, 2013, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant's motion accompanied by a memorandum of law.   On June 11, 2013, the defendant filed a reply memorandum, and on June 26, 2013, the defendant filed additional exhibits in support of the motion.   The matter was heard at the short calendar on June 24, 2013.

II. DISCUSSION

Practice Book § 10–31 provides in relevant part:  “(a) The motion to dismiss shall be used to assert [inter alia] (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter [and] (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person ․ This motion shall always be filed with a supporting memorandum of law, and where appropriate, with supporting affidavits as to facts not apparent on the record.”  “Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.”  Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 542, 590 A.2d 914 (1991).   “[I]t is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Keller v. Beckenstein, 305 Conn. 523, 531, 46 A.3d 102, 107 (2012).

The defendant argues that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking because the plaintiff is collaterally estopped from relitigating his present claims against the defendant.   Specifically, the defendant argues, Judge Domnarski previously determined that the Superior Court was precluded from exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss.   See Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc. v. Adventure's Tours Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV–09–6006178–S (December 5, 2011, Domnarski, J.).   The plaintiff counters that collateral estoppel does not apply because the defendant has improperly characterized Judge Domnarski's decision in that it addressed personal, rather than subject matter, jurisdiction.

“Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is that aspect of res judicata which prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action between the same parties upon a different claim ․ For an issue to be subject to collateral estoppel, it must have been fully and fairly litigated in the first action.   It also must have been actually decided and the decision must have been necessary to the judgment ․ Furthermore, to invoke collateral estoppel the issues sought to be litigated in the new proceeding must be identical to those considered in the prior proceeding.”  (Citation omitted;  emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Alexandru v. Strong, 81 Conn.App. 68, 76, 837 A.2d 875, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 906, 845 A.2d 406 (2004).

Applying these standards to the present case, collateral estoppel does not apply because the issue presented here is distinct from the issue that was previously litigated and determined by Judge Domnarski in the Hartford action.   Judge Karazin, in Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc. v. Sayegh., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV–12–6015656–S (January 17, 2013, Karazin, J.T.R.), discussed such a distinction in denying the defendant's previous motion to dismiss.  “Specifically, the plaintiff contends that, as found by Judge Domnarski in the Hartford action, this matter involves a foreign plaintiff, an alleged debt and a New York corporation where the transactions involved are exclusive to New York. Nevertheless, the present action is distinguishable from the Hartford action in that the plaintiff now brings suit solely against the defendant and not the corporation.  [That] the defendant was served at her abode in the town of Wilton ․ is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction upon the court over her.   See General Statutes § 52–57.   Therefore, it is immaterial for purposes of determining whether the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant that this case might involve a foreign plaintiff and allegations of an alleged debt and a New York corporation where the transactions involved are exclusive to New York.” Id.

This court shares Judge Karazin's view that, in contrast to the Hartford action, the present action represents a claim against an individual, rather than a corporation, for her actions carried out in her individual capacity.   The parties themselves seem to recognize the distinct nature of this action in their briefs.   For instance, the plaintiff states that “[t]he Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy alleged in the Complaint which involves a claim for money damages against a Connecticut resident.”   Furthermore, the defendant states that in the Hartford action, “[t]he defens[e] of ․ non-liability of corporate officers w[as] not considered and w[as] unnecessary to the dismissal of the matter against Miriam H Sayegh.”   In other words, the defendant acknowledges that in determining the court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant Sayegh in the Hartford action, the court did not consider whether theories of liability for corporate officers or veil piercing applied.   See Patel v. Flexo Converters U.S.A., Inc., 309 Conn. 52, 59 n.7 (2013) (setting forth Connecticut's tests for corporate veil piercing).   Accordingly, the issue of whether this court can exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant, Sayegh, is not “identical;” Alexandru v. Strong, supra, 81 Conn.App. 76;  to the issues litigated and determined by Judge Domnarski in the Hartford action.   Consequently, collateral estoppel does not apply.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the court denies the defendant's motion to dismiss.

TAGGART D. ADAMS

JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE

Adams, Taggart D., J.T.R.