Wilfredo Garcia v. Yale New Haven Hospital (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (# 106)

STATEMENT OF CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The plaintiff commenced this action against Yale New Haven Hospital.   The plaintiff alleged in count one of his two-count complaint medical negligence, and in count two discrimination claims in connection with his hospitalization in February and March 2011, at Yale New Haven Hospital.   In his medical malpractice claim, the plaintiff alleged that he acquired pressure sores during his hospitalization which were not properly treated and ultimately required surgical debridement.   In count two, the plaintiff alleged that the bathrooms were not fully accessible to him as a paralyzed patient.   The plaintiff seeks money damages in the amount of $5,000,000 as a result of the alleged medical negligence and discrimination.

On April 24, 2013, the defendant moved to dismiss the medical malpractice claim in count one on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant because the plaintiff failed to comply with General Statutes § 52–190a.   The defendant also moved to dismiss the discrimination claim insofar as it was brought under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA) on ground that no private cause of action for discrimination in public accommodations exists under the statute.   The defendant argued that even if such cause of action did exist, count two should still be dismissed because the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

On July 8, 2013, the court (Blue, J.) granted the defendant's motion to dismiss count one because the complaint did not contain a certificate of good faith.   In denying the defendant's motion to dismiss count two, the court stated that “[t]he court's asserted inability to give money damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act does not deprive the court of jurisdiction over this count.”   Court Order, July 8, 2013, Docket Entry No. 101.10.

The defendant has now moved to strike count two of the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the plaintiff fails to state a claim for discrimination in public accommodations pursuant to Title III of the American With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) because Title III of the ADA does not provide for money damages.

The plaintiff did not file an objection to the motion to strike.   The court heard oral argument on the motion on September 3, 2013.

DISCUSSION

“The purpose and scope of a motion to strike are identical to those of a demurrer under the old rules of practice.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Brennan v. Fairfield, 255 Conn. 693, 699 n.4, 768 A.2d 433 (2001).  “[A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  New London County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Nantes, 303 Conn. 737, 747, 36 A.3d 224 (2012).  “Practice Book ․ § 10–39, allows for a claim for relief to be stricken only if the relief sought could not be legally awarded.”  Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 325, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998).

“It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 116–17, 19 A.3d 640 (2011).   A motion to strike, however, “does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).   This court takes “the facts to be those alleged in the complaint ․ and ․ construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  New London County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Nantes, 303 Conn. 737, 747, 36 A.3d 224 (2012).

Title III of the ADA proscribes discrimination against the disabled in public accommodations.  42 U.S.C. § 12182.   Title III provides in relevant part:  “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”  42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).   A hospital expressly is among the “private entities” that are considered “public accommodations” for purposes of Title III of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).

“Monetary relief ․ is not available to private individuals under Title III of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (same remedies available under Title III of ADA as under Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964).   A private individual may only obtain injunctive relief for violations of a right granted under Title III;  he cannot recover damages.   See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968) (only injunctive relief available as remedy for violation of Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964).”   Powell v. National Bd. Of Medical Examiners, 364 F.3d 79 (2nd Cir.2004).

When viewing the plaintiff's complaint in a light most favorable to him, his complaint alleges only monetary relief in the amount of $5,000,000.   Although the plaintiff at oral argument stated that the monetary damages requested go to his medical negligence claim, he seeks only monetary damages and does not claim injunctive relief.   Thus, since money damages are not available under Title III of the ADA, and the plaintiff in his complaint seeks only monetary damages in the amount of $5,000,000, he has failed to state claim upon which relief can be granted and therefore the defendant's motion to strike count two of the complaint is granted.

The defendant raised in a footnote in its memorandum of law in support of the motion to strike that if the court construes the plaintiff's complaint as a claim brought under General Statutes § 46a–64(a), which is the state equivalent to Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12188, count two should still be stricken because that statute does not provide for a private cause of action.  General Statutes § 46a–64(a) provides in relevant part:  “It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section:  (1) To deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation ․ because of ․ physical disability ․ (2) to discriminate, segregate or separate on account of ․ physical disability ․” Section 46a–63(1) defines “[p]lace of public accommodation ․” to mean “any establishment which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public, including, but not limited to, any commercial property or building lot, on which it is intended that a commercial building will be constructed or offered for sale or rent ․” The defendant hospital in the present case would fall under this definition.

However, although the allegations of count two of the plaintiff's complaint could be construed to include him “within the class of individuals that this statute is supposed to benefit, he is unable to state a claim under § 46a–64(a)(1) and (2).   As emphasized by many Superior Court judges, § 46a–64(a)(1) and (2) have [only] been found to be penal in nature and not to afford a private cause of action ․ The legislature has in many instances provided express language creating a private cause of action.   See Brewer v. Wilcox Trucking, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford/New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. 479546 (September 26, 1997) (Stengel, J.) (‘[p]rivate causes of action under our anti-discrimination statutes are provided in only limited circumstances such as General Statutes 46a–98 ․ 46a–99 ․ 46a–100’).   The statutes that the plaintiff alleges do not contain such express terms and should not be expanded by the court.  (Citation omitted.)   McPhail v. Milford, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia–Milford, Docket No. 054506 (February 25, 1999, Thompson, J.);   see also Wright v. Hartford, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford–New Britain, Docket No. CV 97 0570863 (February 13, 1998, Devlin, J.) (no statutory authorization for private cause of action under § 46a–64(a)(1) and (2)).”   Smith v. New Horizon Computer, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV08 402 61 34 S (Mar. 10, 2009, Bellis, J.) [47 Conn. L. Rptr. 311].

The court in the present case is persuaded by these Superior Court opinions because the plain language of § 46a–64(a)(1) and (2) indicates that the statute was meant only to be enforced through fines or imprisonment.   Thus, even if the court were to construe the allegations of count two to fall within § 46a–64(a)(1) and (2) of the statute, the defendant's motion to strike count two is still granted, as Connecticut's public accommodation statute does not provide for either an express, or implied, private cause of action under § 46a–64(a)(1) and (2).   Accordingly, the defendant's motion to strike count two is granted on the grounds that Title III of 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) does not allow a claim for money damages, and to the extent that count two alleges a claim pursuant to § 46a–64(a)(1) and (2), there is no private cause of action under that statute.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to strike count two of the plaintiff's complaint is granted.

Wilson, J.

Wilson, Robin L., J.