Ben Gyadu v. Law Office of Eugene Melchionne et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On August 23, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the judgment as void (# 215) (motion to set aside).   Subsequently, on September 6, 2013, he filed a motion for order of immediate transfer of file to a neutral court location (# 216) (motion to transfer).

These motions are the most recent of a series of post-judgment motions filed by the plaintiff after the court's January 3, 2013 memorandum of decision (# 202.75), in which, based on collateral estoppel, the defendants' motions for summary judgment were granted.   See the court's previous rulings on the plaintiff's post-judgment motions (# # 204.10, 211, 212.10, 213.10, and 214.10).   As the court explained in its July 30, 2013 ruling (# 214.10) this matter is concluded.

I

In his motion to set aside, the plaintiff again seeks reconsideration by the court asserting that the court is depriving him of due process and equal protection, in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, based on fraudulent motions for summary judgment by the defendants.   Similar assertions are set forth in the motion to transfer.¹

General Statutes § 52–212a provides, in relevant part, “[u]nless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed.”  “A trial court has jurisdiction to open a judgment more than four months after it has been rendered, under its common law authority, when the judgment resulted from fraud, duress, accident or mutual mistake.   See Flater v. Grace, 291 Conn. 410, 424, 969 A.2d 157 (2009);  Carabetta v. Carabetta, 133 Conn.App. 732, 735, 38 A.3d 163 (2012).”  Warner v. Brochendorff, 136 Conn.App. 24, 33, 43 A.3d 785, cert. denied, 306 Conn. 902, 52 A.3d 728 (2012).

“There are three limitations on a court's ability to grant relief from a ․ judgment secured by fraud:  (1) there must have been no laches or unreasonable delay by the injured party after the fraud was discovered;  (2) there must be clear proof of the fraud;  and (3) there is a substantial likelihood that the result of the new trial will be different.”  Weinstein v. Weinstein, 275 Conn. 671, 685, 882 A.2d 53 (2005).

Here, no proof of fraud is presented.   Instead, the plaintiff sets forth conclusory assertions, terming the defendants' motions for summary judgment as being filed fraudulently, and in bad faith, in order to prejudice the court;  and terming as fraudulent the defendants' ejectment of the plaintiff from his home.   The plaintiff has not presented evidence of fraud.   Characterizing conduct as fraudulent is not evidence of fraud.   Mere conclusory assertions are not sufficient to support a claim of fraud.   See Columbia Air Services v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 356, 977 A.2d 636 (2009).

According to the General Statutes and appellate authority, by which this court must be guided, the court lacks the substantive authority to grant relief from the judgment entered in this matter.   The Supreme Court has stated that General Statutes § 52–212a is “a limitation on the trial court's general authority to grant relief from a judgment ․” Kim v. Magnotta, 249 Conn. 94, 102, 733 A.2d 809 (1999).  “[T]he substantive provisions of § 52–212a are fully enforceable as a limitation on the authority of the trial court to grant relief from a judgment after the passage of four months.   Thus construed, § 52–212a operates as a constraint, not on the trial court's jurisdictional authority, but on its substantive authority to adjudicate the merits of the case before it.”  Id., 104.   See Nelson v. Dettmer, 305 Conn. 654, 673, 681, 46 A.3d 916 (2012) (language of § 52–212a is mandatory;  four-month limitation is measured from the court's decision on motion for reconsideration).

The four-month limitation period provided in General Statutes § 52–212a, after the court denied the plaintiff's first motion for reconsideration on February 13, 2013, has elapsed.   See # 204.10. As to this case, the court has no continuing jurisdiction.   See Rocque v. Light Sources, Inc., 275 Conn. 420, 432–33, 881 A.2d 230 (2005).   There, the Supreme Court discussed continuing jurisdiction and “the court's authority to open and clarify a prior ruling by issuing a modification.”  Id., 432.  “The continuing jurisdiction exception to the four month rule is rooted in a court's interest in preserving the integrity of its judgments ․ [I]t is within the equitable powers of the trial court to fashion whatever orders [are] required to protect the integrity of [its original] judgment.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 433.

As explained there, continuing jurisdiction applies where the court acts to effectuate its prior judgment, by ordering compliance with a clear judgment or by interpreting an ambiguous judgment.   See id., 433.   Here, neither of these aspects of continuing jurisdiction applies.   No order is required to protect the integrity of the original judgment.   Rather, the plaintiff, unsatisfied with an adverse judgment, continuously seeks the court to reconsider it.

In addition, even if the court had continuing jurisdiction, the plaintiff's conclusory references to alleged constitutional deprivations would be unavailing.   In the absence of a due process analysis, a court need not consider a party's conclusory statements that the court's actions violated his due process rights.   See Bohonnon Law Firm, LLC v. Baxter, 131 Conn.App. 371, 382–83, 27 A.3d 384, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 902, 31 A.3d 1177 (2011).  “[W]e are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief ․ Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   State v. Carpenter, 275 Conn. 785, 826, 882 A.2d 604 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1025, 126 S.Ct. 1578, 164 L.Ed.2d 309 (2006).   See Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities ex rel. Arnold v. Forvil, 302 Conn. 263, 281, 25 A.3d 632 (2011) (bald assertion of denial of equal protection;  court considered claim inadequately briefed and declined to address it).

This matter is concluded.   The motion to set aside and the motion to transfer are denied.

II

In its January 3, 2013 memorandum of decision, pages 2–3, the court noted the defendants' assertions that the foreclosure action about which the plaintiff continues to complain “was long ago resolved adversely to the plaintiff by appeal;  and that the plaintiff has brought numerous actions, in state and federal court, about the same events, resulting in judgments against him, in findings that the plaintiff's continued claims are frivolous, and in orders from Connecticut's Appellate Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which bar the plaintiff from further filings.”

More than ten years ago, Judge Nevas, in Gyadu v. Bella Vista Condos, United States District Court, D.Conn., Civ. No. 3:02 CV 75(AHN) (March 31, 2003), stated that, “[s]ince July 12, 1994, Gyadu has filed at least twenty-one actions with this court.   He has also filed multiple suits in the Connecticut state courts.   In fact, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals currently bars him from filing any appeals without first obtaining permission from the circuit court.”

Therein, the court admonished the plaintiff as follows:  “further filing of frivolous lawsuits with this court may result in the imposition of sanctions.   Such a measure is appropriately applied to litigants, such as Gyadu, who have a clear pattern of abusing the litigation process by filing vexatious and frivolous complaints.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id. See Gyadu v. Hartford Insurance Co., 197 F.3d 590, 591 (2d Cir.1999) (finding appeal to be frivolous, “failing to contain even the hint of legal basis”).

Similarly, on April 11, 2001, the Supreme Court, sua sponte, issued an order in Bella Vista Condominium Association, Inc. v. Gyadu, Docket No. AC 19693, which stated that the plaintiff “is hereby prohibited from filing in this court any pleadings, including a motion for reconsideration of this order, related to Docket Number CV94–0120500 S (AC 19693).   The Clerk is instructed to return any future filings in this matter.”   See # 193 (Exhibits).

Since this matter is concluded, and in view of the plaintiff's history of frivolous pleadings, and the prior court orders, cited above, admonishing him and barring him from future filings, the plaintiff is hereby prohibited from filing in this court any future pleadings in this matter.   The Clerk is instructed to return any future filings in this matter.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above:

1. the plaintiff's motion to set aside and his motion to transfer are denied;  and

2. the plaintiff is hereby prohibited from filing in this court any future pleadings in this matter.   The Clerk is instructed to return any future filings in this matter.

It is so ordered.

BY THE COURT

ROBERT B. SHAPIRO

JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

FOOTNOTES

FN1. In the motion to transfer, the plaintiff asserts that, since the defendants filed no objection to his motion to set aside, they apparently have no objection to setting aside the judgment.   In view of the defendants' arguments in support of their motions for summary judgment and since this matter is concluded, the court declines to infer from the defendants' lack of response that they have no objection to the motion to set aside..  FN1. In the motion to transfer, the plaintiff asserts that, since the defendants filed no objection to his motion to set aside, they apparently have no objection to setting aside the judgment.   In view of the defendants' arguments in support of their motions for summary judgment and since this matter is concluded, the court declines to infer from the defendants' lack of response that they have no objection to the motion to set aside.

Shapiro, Robert B., J.