Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Jamie Lamarco (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The defendant in the above matter has moved to dismiss the complaint, based on lack of personal jurisdiction due to insufficient service of process upon the defendant.   The defendant claims that plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of Connecticut General Statutes § 52–62 involving said service of process.

The above entitled case arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on December 7, 2010 in East Lyme, Connecticut when the defendant struck a CL & P utility pole.   The service of process was commenced by the plaintiff on or about December 7, 2012.   In compliance with Connecticut General Statutes § 52–62, the state marshal made service upon the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and then by certified mail to the defendant's last known address at 2160 Old Kings Highway, Wellfleet, Massachusetts.   On December 11, 2012 the defendant contends that the said Wellfleet address is not the defendant's last known address, and therefore insufficient service of process was made by the plaintiff.

The defendant relies upon two cases, Hartley v. Vitiello, 113 Conn. 74 (1931), and Barker v. Rosati, Superior Court Judicial District of New London, Docket No. CV08–5008708 (Peck, J., February 20, 2009) [47 Conn. L. Rptr. 285].   The underlying principles of the Hartley case and its interpretation of Connecticut General Statutes § 52–62 are reasonably clear and mandatory.   However, the ambiguity arises in the determination of whether a defendant's last known address is that address which is “readily ascertainable.”

The plaintiff's attorney based on his affidavit performed certain reasonable steps to ascertain the whereabouts of the defendant.   The fact that the defendant failed to change her legal address through the Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Department or with the local post office in Wellfleet would lead one to believe that her last known address was still the Old Kings Highway Wellfleet, Massachusetts address.   The Barker case can be distinguished from this particular case, and the Court is able to find that the defendant's Wellfleet address was legally sufficient to be recognized as her legal address that presumptively gave the defendant the reasonable probability of receiving proper notice of this action.

Therefore, personal jurisdiction over the defendant is recognized, and the defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby denied.

BY THE COURT

V. ROCHE, J.

Roche, Vincent E., J.