Linda Ferraro v. Todd Ferraro (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This dissolution of marriage action came before the court at New Britain, by return date of February 28, 2012.   Inasmuch as it was a fully contested matter, it was referred to the Regional Family Trial Docket, where the custodial issues settled prior to trial.   Therefore, the matter was tried as to financial issues only over three days.   Both parties were represented by counsel.

There were certain pendente lite motions outstanding at the time of trial.   The court denied the motion in limine and motion for sanctions (# 188) on the record while providing orders requiring further discovery compliance.   The defendant did not pursue a second motion in limine (# 189) because the plaintiff cured the documents and the court had not reviewed them.   The remaining notices claimed outstanding that the defendant pursued at hearing was a motion for contempt and exclusive possession, number 142, dated August 7, 2012, and a motion for contempt for violating automatic orders, number 158, dated October 15, 2012.

The court has carefully considered the statutory criteria for the granting of a dissolution of marriage, issues of custody, child support, health insurance and other child attendant issues, alimony, division of the marital estate, attorneys fees and guardian ad litem fees.   Based upon the credible evidence presented at trial, the court finds the following facts and makes the jurisdictional findings necessary in the matter.

The parties were married in Southington, Connecticut, on June 8, 1996.   They have both resided in the state of Connecticut for more than one year prior to bringing this action.   The plaintiff's birth name is Linda Levesque.   She has had three children born to her since the date of the marriage who are issue of the marriage:  Ryan, born February 10, 1998;  Meghan, born December 6, 1999;  and Cameron, born August 21, 2001.   No other children have born to the wife since the date of the marriage.   There are no other children born issue of the marriage.   The wife is not currently pregnant.   The wife has received financial assistance from the state of Connecticut, which was notified of these proceedings and made its claim for relief.   She received an indeterminate amount of cash assistance, HUSKY assistance and Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) food stamps.

The plaintiff wife is forty-three years old.   This is her second marriage.   She completed ninth grade in her formal education.   When she was thirty-one years old, during this marriage, she received her General Educational Development (GED).   In 2005, she achieved a certificate in dog grooming from the Connecticut School of Dog Grooming.   She has no other education or training.   The plaintiff suffers from ulcerative colitis, which she has had since 1993.   The illness causes discomfort in her bowels, cramping and diarrhea filled with blood and mucus.   It is a chronic disease;  the cramping is persistent.   At times it will flare up and on those occasions she may need to use the bathroom more than eight times a day.   During the pendency of this action she has also developed irritable bowel syndrome, which encourages the diarrhea and causes constant gas and bloating.   During this dissolution of marriage she has lost most of the hair on her head;  the condition is called telegen effluvium.   When the emotional stress that she is dealing with wears off, her hair is capable of regrowth.   Presently, she wears a wig.

The plaintiff's job history prior to the marriage had her earning $8.50 per hour, which is the same rate of pay she had as an electronics assembler at Dynalock, the company that she worked at when she met the defendant.   She was required to leave there after a year and then worked in a similar post at $7.50 per hour for another company.   She was unable to stay with that job because she was suffering from the ulcerative colitis;  it was during the pregnancy with the parties' first child in 1997.

From 1997 to 2006, the plaintiff did not have employment outside of the home.   She was a homemaker with the parties' three children.   This contribution to the marriage is recognized in Connecticut.  O'Neill v. O'Neill, 13 Conn.App. 300, 311, 536 A.2d 978, cert. denied, 207 Conn. 806, 540 A.2d 374 (1988).

The plaintiff is fond of animals and works well with them.   She expressed interest in a dog grooming business and the defendant supported the notion.   She went to dog grooming school for six months to acquire the certificate she received for it.   She was so successful that she was asked to stay on and assist with teaching until she was able to get her own business going.   The business she ultimately established was Nose to Toes, a mobile dog grooming business.   The van for the business was constructed and outfitted by the defendant over several months in the evening after work.   That van is currently worth $29,000.   It is fully outfitted for dog grooming, built with redundancies in water heating and overbuilt in other specifications to ensure the longevity of its use.   The van is not outfitted with a toilet, either portable or installed.

The plaintiff performed all of the dog grooming work in Nose to Toes. She started her business in 2006.   The bookkeeping was done by the defendant.   The customers of the business paid by both check and cash.   The Ferraro family unit gained the benefit of the plaintiff's income as a dog groomer.   Insufficient evidence was presented at trial to allow the court to make a finding as to the income, whether gross or net, for the business over its years of operation.   Nose to Toes was organized as an LLC, which remains in existence.   In July 2012, the plaintiff ceased her operation of the business.   She had utilized a trash can as a toilet on more than one occasion.   She found it increasingly difficult to keep appointments due to her colitis, which had flared up during the dissolution of marriage.   She missed many appointments and finally closed the business down.   The defendant claims she has done this so that she can make a better case against him for alimony.

The defendant asks the court to find an earning capacity in the plaintiff of $75,000 as a dog groomer.   He bases this on evidence that simply does not support the court reaching the same conclusion.   The testimony of another groomer, and the hearsay reporting of a third groomer as to their client base and earnings cannot lead the court to the conclusion that the plaintiff would succeed as they have.   The only evidence before the court of the plaintiff's work is her 2011 appointment book.

This appointment book was controversial at trial;  the court had two versions of the book before it.   One version was the copy of the book that the defendant made on his own.   The second version was the actual appointment book provided by the plaintiff through production.   The latter was missing certain appointments that had been erased.   The defendant asserted that this was misconduct by the plaintiff, as it was improper for her to alter evidence as she did.   However, that is in the nature of litigation misconduct and does not affect the actual issues arising out of the dissolution of marriage.

The court finds that the defendant was intimately involved in the plaintiff's business, notwithstanding his denial of the same.   That knowledge coupled with a copy of the original 2011 appointment book prevented actual harm to him in his presentation of his case.   Therefore, the misconduct did not result in damage to him.

The defendant established that all of the appointments of a customer, Ouelette, had been erased, as well as one appointment of another customer.   In reviewing the appointment book, the court found other appointments that had been erased.   The other notable difference between the two books was that in the plaintiff's appointment book, the plaintiff had written in the cost of each service prior to her deposition, because she anticipated that she would be asked about it during her deposition.   Notwithstanding these differences, the books, either together, or separately, do not provide a basis from which the court can find what the plaintiff's business income was in 2011.   There is no allegation that the plaintiff hid money.   Whatever the funds were, they were part of the marital venture.

In September 2012, the plaintiff applied for a car loan for a lease from Lia Hyundai, when she traded in a 2009 Yukon Denali SUV, whose payments she was in arrears on.   When she applied for the car loan, a credit application was completed.   The credit statement showed her employed as assistant manager of Nose to Tose [sic] Grooming at a monthly salary of $6,500.   The defendant asks the court to base the plaintiff's earning capacity on that statement.   The problem in doing so is that the statement is untrue.   Based on the testimony of both parties, it is clear that the plaintiff, in September 2012, was not working in the pet grooming business, having last worked in it two months before.

Further, the plaintiff denies she provided that information and denies it is her handwriting on the credit application, notwithstanding the practice of Lia Hyundai to require the customer to fill it out personally.  “It is undisputed that where an issue is raised regarding the authenticity of a writing, proof of authenticity may be made by a comparison of the disputed writing with another writing, an exemplar, the authenticity of which has been established.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  American Heritage Agency, Inc. v. Gelinas, 62 Conn.App. 711, 720, 774 A.2d 220, cert. denied, 257 Conn. 903, 777 A.2d 192 (2001).   An examination of the disputed handwriting in comparison to all of the other samples of the plaintiff's handwriting that she uncontrovertibly acknowledged to be hers leads the court to the conclusion that the defendant has not successfully proven that the plaintiff wrote the disputed application.   Therefore, the self-assertion of that income is not proven and so it cannot be attributable to an earning capacity of such an income.

In November and December 2012, the plaintiff worked briefly for a competitor as a pet groomer at her store (where there was a toilet), having declined to work in the competitor's van because it did not have a toilet.   Her income, which was based upon one-half of all the grooming fees she collected, ranged from a low of $194.66 for a week to a high of $471.57 for a week.   The plaintiff left this job when other work in the grooming business became available.   However, while she was shadowing to learn the next job, she landed her current employment.

The plaintiff procured employment with the Compass Group in May 2013.   She was hired as a cashier.   She is permitted to leave her post when she needs to use a bathroom.   She is offered two meals a day as a job benefit, but because of her strict dietary needs, she does not utilize this benefit.   Currently she works four days per week.   She can work a fifth day, but in order to do so, the parties must reschedule the day of her parenting time, which has not yet occurred.   The plaintiff's hourly rate in this employment is $12.50 per hour.   After ninety days she will receive health insurance as an added benefit.   Currently, her health insurance is through the defendant, which will then be a Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) premium payable on dissolution of the parties' marriage.   Ultimately, if she were to dog groom, she would have to pay that premium and then find alternate health insurance.

The plaintiff also raised rabbits for a period of time.   Her rabbitry was known as Linda's Bunnetry.   The rabbits she raised were for her own enjoyment as well as for income.   Some of the rabbits were sold to a pet store and some were slaughtered and the meat was sold.   The income from this enterprise was not before the court, whether gross or net.

Notably, no tax returns, 1099s or W–2s were placed in evidence by the parties.   The plaintiff has not filed her 2011 or 2012 state and federal returns.   It is unknown whether the defendant has filed.

The court finds that the plaintiff's present earning capacity is as a five-day worker at her current job.   That income would be $505 per week, gross, and $416 per week, net (see attached guidelines worksheet).*

The defendant is forty-two years old.   This is his first marriage.   He has a college degree.   He described himself as an engineer.   During the parties' marriage, the defendant took one course a semester over seven years to achieve a Master's Degree in Business Administration (MBA), with a concentration in information technology, from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.   This degree was paid for by his employer, United Technologies Corporation (UTC), throughout the period.   He now is employed by Triumph Group, Inc., as a result of the sale of his work unit.   His job title is “Facilities Manager.”   He earns $97,000 per year.   Infrequently he receives a modest bonus;  in 2011, his bonus was $1,000.   He receives health insurance coverage (for which he pays a premium as shown on his financial affidavit) and presently covers the entire family.   He has earned some income on the side, constructing a couple of dog grooming vans, but currently has no such income.   He formed a Limited Liability Company (LLC) for that work:  “CT Custom Conversion, LLC.” The parties' children live with him full-time.   Based upon the evidence before the court and the representations of the guardian ad litem, and the failure of either party to contest the validity of the custody agreement, the court concludes that it represents the current best interest of the children.

The defendant's health is unknown and the court will find that there is nothing in evidence that would suggest his ability to work is interfered with by any health condition.

The plaintiff lives rent-free in the furnished basement of her parent's home.   The defendant lives in a home owned by his nuclear family, for which he pays rent.

The parties owned a home that was sold during the pendency of this action.   The proceeds of that sale are gone.   They were used to paying familial obligations, including the payment of the guardian ad litem.   The guardian is owed a small balance of approximately $300 at this time.   He will perform some ongoing work consistent with the provisions of the court-ordered custody agreement.

The most substantial remaining assets of the parties are the defendant's deferred compensation plans, the Stingray boat and the dog grooming van.   The boat has a trailer, inasmuch as it does not have a mooring.   While the entire family has enjoyed it, the boat has been cared for and run by the defendant.   Twice during the pendency of the action, the cover for the boat has been destroyed by the plaintiff, allowing it to be exposed to the elements.   There is no evidence before the court, however, as to any diminution in value resulting from this vandalism.

The defendant has an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) with Putnam that he asserts to be premarital.   It is valued at $5,684.   He also has a pension with Goodrich (which was purchased by UTC);  the court was not provided any evidence of a present value of that pension.   As of the time of this hearing, the pension would pay out $787 per month to the defendant, commencing at age sixty-five.   The court has no evidence as to whether this is joint/survivor or any other variation thereon.   Finally, the defendant has a UTC 401k;  its net value, after a loan, is between $130,000 and $140,000.   The loan, originally for $20,000, is now $18,000;  it is being paid down at the rate of $364 per month.

The court finds that the presumptive child support obligation of the plaintiff to the defendant based upon the guidelines worksheet attached hereto,* * which recognizes the parties' respective income as found herein (five days a week at $12.50 an hour for eight hours for the plaintiff, filing status “single”;  wages of $1,880 per week, filing status “head of household” for the defendant) is $103 per week.   The allocation under that same worksheet for health expenditures for the children not paid by insurance is 37 percent for the plaintiff and 63 percent for the defendant (see attached worksheet).* * *

The parties entered into an agreement for the disposition of their personal property which will be incorporated in these orders.

The balance of the parties' assets are as listed on their respective financial affidavits, with the values assigned thereto accepted by and found by the court.

The parties each have substantial debt, the largest amount of which, for each of them, is their respective attorneys fees for this action.   The plaintiff owes her attorneys $108,164.   She also owes a prior attorney $1,323, Dana Ouelette, $5,600, Diana Donnelly, $275, Bristol Hospital, $330, her parents, $15,000, Kohl's, $562, AAA Credit Card, $5,425, and David and Christine Ferraro, $600.   She also records her two Chase credit card debts as joint;  their balances are $2,463 and $3,539, respectively.

The defendant owes his attorney $90,456.61, TD BankNorth, $500, GE Mastercard, $2,500, GM Card, which he records as a joint debt, $4,800, and Discover Card, $9,500.   The latter card's debt was incurred through pre and post-separation charges.

The court finds that the parties have both incurred indebtedness far beyond either of their present ability to pay.

The defendant points to certain behavior of the plaintiff to explain why his attorneys fees were so high, seeking an apportionment of some of them to the plaintiff.   He claims that the erasure of Ouelette from the 2011 appointment book was fraudulent and caused a lot of legal work.   The problem with that argument is that the plaintiff acknowledged the erasures and the defendant had copies of the original.   Therefore, no extra digging and hunting was required.

The defendant claims that the plaintiff's inaccurate listing of employment dates on her employment application is proof of her deception and that taxed him and caused extra legal work.   The plaintiff presented to the court is an individual that was poor with dates and had trouble retaining information in many avenues of her life.   The court does not find her deceptive in this area.   Further, the inaccuracies were irrelevant to this matter and the issues before the court.

The defendant seeks attorneys fees under the principles enunciated in Ramin v. Ramin, 281 Conn. 324, 915 A.2d 790 (2007).   In Ramin, the court held that “when a party has engaged in egregious litigation misconduct that has required the other party to expend significant amounts of money for attorneys fees, and where the court determines, in its discretion, that the misconduct has not been addressed adequately by other orders of the court, the court has discretion to award attorneys fees to compensate for the harm caused by that misconduct, irrespective of whether the other party has ample liquid assets and of whether the lack of such an award would undermine the court's other financial orders.”  Id., 357.   The defendant points to the failure of the plaintiff to respond to a “Request for Production” that was e-mailed to her counsel.   Counsel stated on the record as a commissioner of the Superior Court that he did not receive pleadings by e-mail.   His office never consented to service of pleadings by e-mail.   The request for production came to the attention of the plaintiff's counsel when a motion in limine was filed by the defendant shortly before the start of trial.   From then until trial there was partial compliance.   The plaintiff was ordered to bring to court on the last day of trial the balance of the items sought.   The court was not apprised of any noncompliance.   This is not the situation contemplated in Ramin.   In Ramin there were repeated examples of discovery abuse, repeated findings of contempt and repeated imposition of sanction.   Such flagrant and repeated behavior is absent in this case.   Attorneys fees will not be assessed under these circumstances.

Similarly, the defendant argued that a larger portion of the guardian ad litem's fees should be allocated to the plaintiff because, in his mind (which is not an evidentiary standard), it is her fault the custodial proceedings remained litigated to near the end.   This is not the standard in our law for the decision on the allocation of guardian ad litem fees.  “The order for payment of [guardian ad litem] fees under General Statutes § 46b–62 requires consideration of the financial resources of both parties and the criteria set forth in General Statutes § 46b–82.”  Merritt v. Merritt, 2 Conn.App. 425, 428, 479 A.2d 255 (1984).  “Section 46b–82 instructs the court to consider, inter alia, ‘the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties ․’ “ Lamacchia v. Chilinsky, 79 Conn.App. 372, 376, 830 A.2d 329 (2003).

Each party has sought to have the court find that the other is more at fault for the breakdown of their marriage than the other.   Given the conduct of the parties described to have occurred episodically over several years, the court cannot, based on the evidence presented, find that one coerced the other.   While it may be so, the evidence was not present.   Further, as a result of that conduct, the court finds that both parties lost the ability to expect that either of them would be held to more normative views of their marital vows upon a dissolution of their marriage.   The court does not find one party or the other as more responsible for the breakdown of the marriage.

The court does find that the defendant degraded the plaintiff by calling her stupid and referring to her as a “retard.”   This was humiliating for the plaintiff and made her feel sad and cry.   It made her angry at times as well.   It is therefore not surprising that she lashed out at him and told him she would make him pay and was aggressive in other behavior of hers described in this decision.   Notwithstanding these statements by the defendant, the plaintiff excelled in animal care and did receive the defendant's support of this interest.   Ultimately, however, it is up to the court to look at all of the factors in determining appropriate orders under General Statutes §§ 46b–81 and 46b–82, not just his insensitive statements.

The defendant knew the plaintiff had a limited education when he met her (he was her manager), and then dated and married her.   From observing the plaintiff and listening to her answers, while she has adequate verbal agility, it is clear that the more complicated issues she was asked about created processing problems for her.   She is now making more per hour than she has ever made in hourly work before.   The defendant knew she had ulcerative colitis as well.   It only gets worse with stress.   Whether the plaintiff will feel healthy enough again to go back to mobile pet grooming is unclear.   Requiring her to use a porta-potty that needs to be emptied several times a day, and to do so for an indeterminate amount of income, is beyond what the court can do in considering her ability to acquire a future income supporting dog grooming business sufficient that it would be worth abandoning an hourly job that provides health benefits.   The defendant, on the other hand, has steady employment and an MBA. Perhaps the most telling piece of the defendant's desperation to not be saddled with an alimony order in this case is when he testified with a straight face that he thought the plaintiff's dog grooming certificate had the same value as his MBA.

The orders entered below in the division of the deferred compensation will provide the plaintiff some buffer on her retirement for her support.   Until then, her paycheck alone will not support her.   There is no evidence of any particular event in the future or training that will lead the court to be able to conclude that the alimony should be time limited in this case.   Her dog grooming skills provide an opportunity for income, but there is nothing before the court to conclude that in that trade she can earn a sufficient amount to self-support.   While she could work at mobile grooming at times, it became too taxing on her physical needs as a result of her ulcerative colitis condition.   A disinterested witness testified credibly that the plaintiff declined to work in her mobile grooming van because of her constant need for toilet facilities.   The work the plaintiff did in the woman's store was not continual and did not on a consistent basis provide any more income than she makes now at a job that will offer health insurance.   It is still not enough money to live on.   She cannot support herself, and the evidence of the case did not provide any date, event or other milestone that will allow her to do so.   The court, then, cannot time limit her alimony, so long as the defendant has the ability to pay it.   See Ippolito v. Ippolito, 28 Conn.App. 745, 752, 612 A.2d 131, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 905, 615 A.2d 1047 (1992) (holding that there is no basis in the record to support the award of time limited alimony as having a rehabilitative purpose where there is no evidence in the record as to how an award of periodic alimony will assist the plaintiff to become employed so that she can support herself without assistance from the defendant).

The plaintiff must, and will, contribute child support.   The defendant must support the children.   That, however, does not excuse his obligations for spousal support under the facts of this case.   The plaintiff has a continuing need for alimony and the orders here reflect that.   However, the defendant needs some relief if he is able to earn additional income so that he can provide more for the children and himself.   The orders therefore include a safe harbor for him from an increase in alimony up to a certain point so that he can continue to increase his financial stability.   The orders also provide a safe harbor for the plaintiff so that she may have the hope to establish herself in independent housing and begin to achieve some financial stability.

The court now considers the two outstanding pendente lite motions before the court.   Both of these motions are motions for contempt filed by the defendant.  “Contempt is a disobedience to the rules and orders of a court which has power to punish for such an offense.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Bank of New York v. Bell, 142 Conn.App. 125, 131, 63 A.3d 1026 (2013).  “In a civil contempt proceeding, the movant has the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of a court order and noncompliance with that order.”  Statewide Grievance Committee v. Zadora, 62 Conn.App. 828, 832, 772 A.2d 681 (2001).  “To constitute contempt, a party's conduct must be wilful ․ Noncompliance alone will not support a judgment of contempt.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Traystman v. Traystman, 141 Conn.App. 789, 799, 62 A.3d 1149 (2013).

One is a motion for contempt for violation of the automatic orders (# 158).   The plaintiff sold the 2005 Yukon Denali and paid the loan off thereon.   She used the equity to buy down a lease on a Hyundai Elantra.   She did this without the approval of either the defendant or a court order.   She is charged with knowledge that this was a violation of the automatic orders:  she filed a motion for such permission but never pursued it in court.   She is in contempt of court.   No loss was sustained by the defendant as a result of her conduct.   He failed to prove that she sold it at a discounted price.   Therefore there is no need to make him whole in regard to this violation of the automatic orders.   However, such conduct should not be ignored because it would encourage further noncompliance with court orders.

The other outstanding motion (# 142) is a motion for contempt for violating the order of exclusive possession and control of the basement in the defendant.   The plaintiff removed the door on the defendant's exclusive space from the hinges to gain entry, and caused some damage doing so.   The defendant was required to purchase replacement hinges and rehang the door.   Besides the actual act, the conduct was troubling as not only a violation of a court order, but also a disregard for the privacy of the defendant.   The court finds that the court order at issue was clear and unambiguous and that the plaintiff willfully violated it.   She is found in contempt of court for the conduct.   At the same time, the conduct occurred over a year ago and the defendant did not pursue the issue until the trial.   The event was of such a nature that he wanted to use it to prove her bad conduct throughout the pendency of this action.   Her conduct as described throughout this decision has often been ill-advised, but it does not in and of itself lead the court to the kinds of conclusions the defendant urged upon the court in closing argument.   For instance, the defendant has insisted that the plaintiff is not to be trusted because she has committed welfare fraud by collecting assistance he claims she was not entitled to.   The Assistant Attorney General, who had an appearance in this matter, did not appear at the trial.   It would have been his burden to prosecute such a claim.   The court cannot conclude based upon the bald assertions that the benefits paid were ill-gotten.

It is ordered:

1. A dissolution of marriage.

2. The parties' custody agreement in the court file, dated July 26, 2013, is incorporated herein.

3. The parties' personal property agreement submitted to the court and attached hereto is incorporated herein.* * * *

4. The plaintiff shall pay child support to the defendant in the amount of $103 per week.   Said sum shall be paid by income withholding order, and, directly, when such withholding is insufficient to cover the order.   So long as the current child support and alimony orders are not modified, the defendant shall be entitled to all three children as dependency exemptions.

5. The parties shall pay the children's health expenditures not paid by insurance in accordance with the following percentages:  37 percent paid by the plaintiff and 63 percent paid by the defendant.   Health expenditures is broadly construed to include, but not be limited to, medical, dental, hospitalization, optical, orthodonture, mental health, prescribed pharmaceuticals, and doctor ordered other nonprescriptive care.   The defendant shall submit the sums due from the plaintiff through Our Family Wizard (as they have in the past) with proof of the same and the plaintiff shall pay the same within thirty (30) days.

6. The court retains jurisdiction over an educational support order finding the parties would have provided such support for their children in accordance with their means had they remained an intact family.

7. The defendant shall pay the plaintiff alimony in the amount of $430 per week, by income withholding order, and, directly, when such withholding is insufficient to cover the order.   The alimony shall end on the sooner event of the plaintiff's remarriage, or the death of either party, or the defendant's retirement from full-time employment at a normal retirement age.   The defendant may earn up to $20,000 additional gross income, from whatever source, before the plaintiff can seek an upward modification of her alimony order based upon that change of circumstances.   The plaintiff may earn up to $10,000 additional gross income, from whatever source, before the defendant can seek a downward modification of his alimony order based upon that change of circumstances.   The parties shall exchange W–2s and 1099s by February 15 of each year, so long as there is an outstanding child support or alimony order.

8. No alimony is ordered to the defendant.

9. Each party is to pay their own legal fees.

10. The allocation of the guardian ad litem's fees, as they have been paid, shall not be adjusted by and between the parties.   The balance of his fees owing and those due in the future shall be paid one-third (1/3) by the plaintiff and two-thirds (2/3) by the defendant, until those future fees are allocated by a court at that time.   See Lamacchia v. Chilinsky, supra, 79 Conn.App. 377–78.

11. The defendant shall maintain one-half (1/2) of his life insurance, as shown on his financial affidavit, for the benefit of the plaintiff so long as he has an alimony obligation.   He shall provide proof of the same by June 30 of each year.

12. The plaintiff is awarded by Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) one-half (1/2) of the defendant's Goodrich Pension, valued as of the date of dissolution of marriage, and one-half (1/2) of the defendant's UTC 401K's net (after the loan as of August 9, 2014) value, plus all gains and losses thereon until the date of transfer.   The QDRO(s) shall be accomplished by the plaintiff.   The defendant shall pay one-half (1/2) of the cost of the same, not to exceed $250 for his one-half.

13. The defendant is the sole owner of the Putnam IRA, free and clear of any claim of the plaintiff.

14. The plaintiff is solely responsible for the lease on her automobile.   The defendant is the sole owner of the 2009 Nissan Altima and solely responsible for the lease thereon.   The defendant is the sole owner of the 2001 Dodge Ram Pick-up, the Stingray boat (and boat trailer) and utility trailer, free and clear of any claim of the plaintiff.   The plaintiff shall be the sole owner of the Nose to Toes grooming van.   If she sells it within three years, she shall pay the defendant $5,000 from the sales proceeds.

15. Each party is solely responsible for those debts listed above that are in that party's name alone.   The court specifically declines to issue orders of indemnification of one party to the other regarding the payment of joint debts as described above.   Those joint debts shall be paid as follows:  the defendant shall pay all of the Discover Card, the GE MasterCard and the GM Card. The plaintiff shall pay all of the two Chase cards.

16. The defendant shall cooperate with the plaintiff in paperwork administration for her to maintain the COBRA health insurance benefit through his employment, at her cost.

17. The plaintiff is the sole owner of the Nose to Toes, LLC, and Linda's Bunnetry, free and clear of any claim of the defendant.   The defendant is the sole owner of the CT Custom Conversions, LLC, free and clear of any claim of the plaintiff.

18. Having been found in contempt of court regarding motions # 158 and # 142, the plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendant $700 in attorneys fees within forty-five (45) days of this order.

19. Each party shall, upon presentation of the same, execute all documents presented by the other party necessary for the effectuation of these orders.

MUNRO, JUDGE

CUSTODY/PARENTING AGREEMENT AND STIPULATION

THIS AGREEMENT, made this 26th day of July 2013, by and between LINDA A. FERRARO, of Bristol, Connecticut hereinafter referred to as “Mother,” and TODD FERRARO, of Bristol, Connecticut hereinafter referred to as “Father”:

WITNESSETH

WHEREAS, the Father and Mother, whose maiden name was Linda A. Levesque, were married on June 8, 1996, at Southington, Connecticut, and

WHEREAS, the marriage of the parties has broken down irretrievably and there is no likelihood of reconciliation of said marriage, and

WHEREAS, it is the intention of the parties to enter into an agreement concerning their respective property rights and liabilities and thereby to settle all of the claims and demands which each may have against the other, including claims for support, maintenance, alimony and any and all other claims which either may have, or claims upon or against the property and estate of the other, and with respect to any other matter whatsoever arising out of their marital relationship, and

WHEREAS, the Mother is represented by Attorney C. Michael Budlong, the Father is represented by Attorney Mark Ferraro, and Attorney Robert D. Zaslow is the Guardian Ad Litem for the minor children, and

WHEREAS, the parties have reviewed the contents of this Agreement and Stipulation, and

WHEREAS, each of the parties has read and fully understands the terms, conditions, and provisions of this Agreement and Stipulation (hereinafter “Agreement”) and the parties believe the Agreement to be fair, just, and reasonable and consistent with their best interests and with the best interests and welfare of the minor children and accordingly accept such provisions freely and voluntarily.

Filed at RFTD on 8–8–13

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and other good and valuable consideration herein expressed, the sufficiency of which consideration is hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows:

I. SEPARATE WAYS

A. It shall be lawful for each of the parties at all times hereafter to live separate and apart from the other party at such place or places as he or she may from time to time choose or deem advisable.

B. Each party shall be free from interference, authority or control, direct or indirect, by the other.

C. Neither the Mother nor the Father shall molest the other or compel or endeavor to compel the other to cohabit with him or with her by any legal proceeding, or otherwise.

II. JOINT CUSTODY

A. The parties shall have joint legal custody of the minor children, Ryan Ferraro, born February 10, 1998, Megan Ferraro, born December 6, 1999, and Cameron Ferraro, born August 21, 2001.   Primary residence of the children shall be with the Father.

B. While it is understood and acknowledged that the parties shall both have the obligations that joint custody mandates, as noted below, Father shall have final decision making authority for the children's health care related issues, issues of religious upbringing and other decisions of the wellbeing of the children.   Issues regarding the children's education shall not be considered issues for which Father has final decision-making authority.   This paragraph is to be read and carried out with the following caveats and understandings:

1.  The parties shall not unreasonably withhold their agreement to courses of action/recommendations given by the children's pediatricians, health care providers, specialists, teachers, and education professionals.

2. Even with the designation of final decision-making authority for health care-related issues, issues of religious upbringing and other decisions of the wellbeing of the children, Father shall be permitted to make the decision only after good faith efforts by both parties to resolve the impasse.

C. It is the intention of the parties, that each of them continues to have a role in providing a sound moral, social, economic, and educational environment for the minor children.   The parties shall exert their best efforts to work cooperatively in developing future plans consistent with the best interests of said children in amicably resolving such disputes as may arise.

D. When exercising parenting time, each parent shall ensure that the minor children get to school, complete homework and/or school projects, extracurricular activities, or any other obligation on time.

E. The children's scholastic, extracurricular, and other events/commitments shall trump both parents' parenting time.  (E.g., if child has an art class, parent must ensure the child(ren) attends the class).   It is understood and acknowledged that all of the children's activities shall be discussed well in advance before they are signed up for the activity.   While both parents shall make reasonable efforts to avoid scheduling appointments and extra-curricular activities on the other party's parenting time—many activities such as Little League, art classes, etc., will necessarily overlap both parties' time with the children.   Nonetheless, It is understood and agreed that it is in the children's best interests that they participate in such activities.

F. Both parents agree to keep the other reasonably informed of the whereabouts of said children at all times.   The parties further agree that if either of them has knowledge of an accident or illness or other circumstances that seriously affect the health or welfare of said children, the Father or Mother, as the case may be, shall promptly notify the other, and both parents shall have unlimited access privileges, consistent with the circumstances for as long as the situation pertains.

G. Both parents shall have access to all school and medical records of the children and no third party shall deny access to said records to either parent as a result of the parenting plan agreement between the parties.

H. Both parents shall in the utmost good faith encourage and foster the maximum relations of love, affection, and respect between the minor children and the other parent.   Neither parent shall, in any way, impede, obstruct, or otherwise interfere with the other parent's right of companionship with the minor children.   Neither parent shall engage in making disparaging remarks or criticize the other parent, nor allow anybody else to do so in the presence of the children.   Neither parent shall act in a manner that undermines the role of the other parent.

I. Both parents shall have equal and independent authority to confer with the child(ren)'s school, daycare, health care providers and other programs with regard to the child(ren)'s educational, emotional, and social progress.

J. All communications regarding the child(ren) shall be between the parents.   The parents shall not use the child(ren) as messengers to convey information between the parents, ask questions for the parents, or set up scheduling changes.   Neither parent shall quiz the children about their time with the other parent.

K. Both parents shall keep their respective contact information current.

L. In the event either party intends to relocate more than ten (10) miles from their present residence, he/she will provide the other party with at least sixty (60) day advance written notice of the intent to do so.

III. PARENTING PLAN

A. Mother's parenting time with the minor children shall be tiered, such that the expectation is to increase time pursuant to the plan laid out below.

B. As a condition to access, Mother shall not consume alcohol twelve (12) hours before, or during, her parenting time with the children.   It is understood that this condition must be adhered to at all times or Mother's parenting time will be reduced.

C. However, if there are facts that are successfully demonstrated to the conflict manager or a court of competent jurisdiction indicating that there are continued concerns regarding the Mother's inappropriate behavior with the children, the tiered increase of time may be modified to prevent an increase of time, and depending on the severity of the inappropriate behavior, may be modified to reduce Mother's parenting time.   The conflict manager shall have the final say as to whether Mother is in therapeutic compliance to allow for increased access to occur as defined herein, after consultation with Mother's and the Children's therapists.

1. It is understood that therapeutic compliance includes compliance with recommendations from the conflict manager about parental behavior.

D Presently, Mother shall continue to have parenting time such that she has every Tuesday from after school (or if no school, 3:30 p.m.) until 7:30 p.m. This is anticipated to increase, per the terms and conditions below.

E. Absent any modifications, the tiered increase of time shall be, as follows:

1.  Tier One. Commencing after Mother attends six (6) consecutive weekly therapy sessions with her therapist and has followed the protocol outlined by her own therapist as well as children's therapists, Mother's access shall expand, such that:

a.  Every Tuesday from after school (or if no school, 3:30 p.m.) until 7:30 p.m.;   and

b. Every other Friday from after school (or if no school, 3:30 p.m.) until Saturday at 5:00 p.m.

2.  Tier Two. Commencing after an additional eight (8) weeks whereby the Mother has continued therapy sessions with her therapist and has followed the protocol outlined by her own therapist as well as children's therapists, Mother's access shall expand, such that:

a.  Every Tuesday from after school (or if no school, 3:30 p.m.) until 7:30 p.m.;   and

b. Every Friday from after school (or if no school, 3:30 p.m.) until Saturday at 5:00 p.m.

c. If Father has plans with the children on a given weekend during this timeframe, he must notify the Mother with at least two weeks notice via Our Family Wizard.   Father shall be allowed one weekend per month during this period of Mother's parenting schedule.   Prior to Father's weekend, Mother's Tuesday shall be an overnight until Wednesday morning, drop off at school (or if no school, 8:00 a.m.), and Mother will also have Thursday from after school (or if no school, 3:30 p.m.) until 7:30 p.m.

3.  Tier Three.   Commencing after an additional sixteen (16) weeks whereby the Mother has continued therapy sessions with her therapist and has followed the protocol outlined by her own therapist as well as children's therapists, Mother's access shall expand, such that:

a.  Every Tuesday from after school (or if no school, 3:30 p.m.) until 7:30 p.m.;   and

b. Every other weekend from Friday at after school (or if no school, 3:30 p.m.) until Sunday at 5:00 p.m.

4.  Tier Four. Commencing after an additional sixteen (16) weeks whereby the Mother has continued therapy sessions with her therapist and has followed the protocol outlined by her own therapist as well as children's therapists, Mother's access shall expand, such that:

a.  Every Wednesday from after school (or if no school, 3:30 p.m.) until Thursday drop off at school (or if no school, 8:00 a.m.);   and

b. Every other weekend from Friday after school (or if no school, 3:30 p.m.) until drop off at school Monday morning (or if no school, 8:00 a.m.).

5. Mother's access shall not be increased as herein before outlined unless she complies with the therapeutic requirements and attendance as outlined herein.

F. Holiday/Vacation Time.

1. Holiday/vacation time as detailed in this Agreement shall supersede the routine parenting schedule.

2. Vacation 2013.

a. Father may elect to take one (1) week of vacation in the summer when the children are off from school.   To effectuate this, Father shall provide a minimum thirty (30)-day advance written notice (Our Family Wizard) of the week block he seeks to take.   Father's week shall encompass only one Friday.

b. Due to the parenting plan and its gradual increase of time, it is not contemplated that Mother will have vacation time blocks in 2013.   It is contemplated;  however, that prior to the commencement of summer 2014, the parties will have discussions between themselves and/or with the therapeutic team to outline a modified vacation schedule for both parties.

3. Holidays.

HOLIDAY SCHEDULE

Even Odd Every

Holidays Years Years Year Begin/End Time

Mother's Birthday N/A N/A Mother 9:00 a.m./7:30 p.m.

Father's Birthday N/A N/A Father 9:00 a.m./7:30 p.m.

Mother's Day N/A N/A Mother 9:00 a.m./7:30 p.m.

Father's day N/A N/A Father 9:00 a.m./7:30 p.m.

Easter Mother Father N/A 9:00 a.m./7:30 p.m.

Memorial Day Weekend Mother Father N/A Fri 3 p.m.-Mon 7:30 p.m.

4th of July Mother Father N/A 9:00 a.m./11:00 p.m.

Labor Day Weekend Mother Father N/A Fri 3 p.m.-Mon 7:30 p.m.

Columbus Day Weekend Mother Father N/A Fri 3 p.m.-Mon 7:30 p.m.

Halloween Father Mother N/A 3:00 p.m./10:00 p.m.

Thanksgiving Mother Father N/A Wed 3 p.m.-Sun 7:30 p.m.

Child(ren)'s Birthdays Father Mother N/A noon/7:30 p.m.

Christmas Eve Father Mother N/A noon /11:00 p.m.

Christmas Day Mother Father N/A 9:00 am./11:00 p.m.

New Year's Eve Father Mother N/A 12/31 noon–1/l 7:30 p.m.

Holiday time-sharing shall be in accordance with the above schedule when Mother's visitation is at Tier Three (3) or Tier Four (4) levels.   The Holiday schedule will take priority over the regular weekday, weekend, and summer schedules.

When Mother is in Tier One (1) or Tier Two (2) Dr. Connolly has full authority to determine the parameters of the holiday time if there are any concerns.

When the parents are using an alternating weekend plan and the holiday schedule would result in one parent having the child(ren) for three weekends in a row, the parents will exchange the following weekend, so that each has two weekends in a row before the regular alternating weekend pattern resumes.

IV. COMMUNICATION

A. Both parents understand that cooperation and communication is essential for the best interests of the minor children, and the following is understood by the parties:

1.  The minor children shall have the unfettered ability to call/text the parent who is not exercising parenting time.   However, absent emergency, the Mother when not exercising parenting time and receives a call/text message from the children she may not respond by any means.   Responses shall be done at the evening phone call.   If it is determined that Mother is contacting the children in any manner (even sending messages through other people) the increase of parenting time may be modified to prevent an increase of time, and depending on the severity of the inappropriate behavior, may be modified to reduce Mother's parenting time.   The conflict manager shall have the final say.

2. The parent not exercising parenting time may call the children each day at 7:00 p.m. At that time, the parent may respond to the communications from the children.   All calls to the children must be age-appropriate in content, duration and mother is not allowed to use this call to quiz the children on their whereabouts nor what their father is doing.   If the call is made to the other party's residence/cell phone, the parent receiving the call shall not unreasonably delay, hinder or thwart the telephone communication between the calling parent and the children.

3. If a call is made at 7:00 p.m. and a message is left for the children, the parent exercising patenting time shall ensure the children return the call the same evening (if possible) or as soon as is practicable.

4. The parties shall provide the other with contact telephone numbers, email addresses, and mail delivery addresses within 24 hr. of the change.

5. All references in this agreement to “e-mail” shall mean electronic communication through OurFamilyWizard.com.

B. The parties shall continue to utilize OurFamilyWizard.com (OFW) for communication between the parties.   The parties shall utilize OFW to e-mail each other a minimum of once per week to discuss children's issues (school, homework, behavior, etc.)   The parent receiving the e-mail shall respond within 24 hours, unless away from their homes on vacation, business, etc.   The parents shall contact each other via telephone or text for emergency purposes only.

C. If there should come a time when either parent wishes to raise issues of concern with the other parent that communication must be done via OFW. Said communication shall be non-accusatory and made in a business-like manner.   A reply shall be made within 24 hours, unless the parent receiving the OFW communication is away from their home on vacation, business, etc.   If the problem cannot be resolved via OFW communication, then the issue shall be raised with Dr. Kevin Connolly.

D. Neither parent may abuse the communication called for herein.

E. The communication between the parents must be made and followed through in a rational, business-like manner.   Neither parent may use communication designed to discuss children's issues to air grievances, or in any other way discuss personal problems.

F. Neither party shall file frivolous or unsubstantiated motions with the court.   Any party found to have done so by the Court shall pay the attorneys fees of the other.

V. THERAPEUTIC INVOLVEMENT

A. The parties shall continue their individual counseling with their respective therapists.   Said counseling shall continue as recommended by the therapist(s) regarding frequency, utilization of pharmaceuticals prescribed, etc.   Neither party may unreasonably withhold cooperation with the recommendations made by their respective therapist(s).

B. Ryan and Cameron shall continue to counsel with Dr. Bruce Freedman.

C. Megan shall continue to counsel with Dr. Barbara Tarkin.

D. The parties shall utilize the therapeutic services of Dr. Kevin Connolly to render family counseling, arbitrate parenting dilemmas, and to coordinate the various therapeutic courses of care within the family.   Dr. Connolly shall serve as a “conflict manager,” to address issues within the family as they arise.   To enable Dr. Connolly to manage the care of the family and to have full understandings of all issues for the parties and children, the parties shall execute full releases to enable Dr. Connolly to have free and open access and communication with Mother's mental health professional(s), Father's mental health professional, Dr. Freedman, and Dr. Tarkin as well as any other mental health professional that may later come to assist with any member of the family.

E. All communications to/with Dr. Connolly as conflict manager herein shall not be considered privileged, and therefore it is understood that Dr. Connolly may be called to testify, if necessary, regarding the therapeutic involvement for all family members.

F. The parties shall, within seven (7) days from the date of Judgment, execute authorizations to allow their respective therapists, the children's therapists, and the conflict manager to speak to each other in any combination necessary.   Both parties believe this is in the children's best interests.

G. Neither party may delay, hinder, thwart or otherwise frustrate the counseling for the children.

H. if either party is found to have unreasonably refused/ignored the recommendations of their respective mental health professional(s), or if either party is found to have unreasonably delayed, hindered, thwarted or otherwise frustrated the children's counseling, said fact shall be considered a substantial change in circumstances and the aggrieved party may seek a reduction in the other party's parenting time with the children.   Said potential modification is in addition to the penalties noted and contemplated in § VIII, below.

I. At all times, the parties shall ensure that the Guardian Ad Litem has executed releases to have free and open communication with the children's therapists as well as with Dr. Connolly.

VI. COLLEGE EDUCATION

A. The parties each acknowledge notice and discussion concerning Connecticut General Statute § 46b–56c, which allows for education support orders subject to various provisions and conditions.

B. The parties presently intend that their minor children, if they are qualified to do so, shall complete a four-year undergraduate education by the age of twenty-three (23) years.

C. The parties agree that this Court shall continue to have jurisdiction over this issue pursuant to § 46b–56c, unless it is repealed, to enter orders regarding the parties' respective obligations for college education pursuant to the provisions of said Statute in the event that the parties are unable to agree in the future.

VII. COUNSEL FEES AND MEDICAL EXPENSES

A Counsel Fees and Medical Expenses will be determined in the final Dissolution Agreement.

VIII. BREACH

A. If it shall be determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction that either party shall have breached any of the provisions of this Agreement or of any Court decree incorporating this Agreement in full or in part, the offending party shall pay to the other party reasonable counsel fees, Court costs, and other expenses incurred in the enforcement of the provisions of this Agreement or of any such Court decree.

IX. DECREE AND BINDING EFFECT

A. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be construed to prevent either party from instituting suit for or from obtaining a decree of the dissolution of their marriage.   Either party shall have the right to submit this Agreement to any Court having jurisdiction of any such action for approval and for incorporation of the substantive provisions herein in any decree of dissolution entered by such Court.   The parties agree, however, that in any such action, neither will ask for any different or greater rights of relief than specified herein, and that they will abide with and be bound by the provisions of this Agreement, whether or not incorporated in such decree.   This Agreement shall not be merged in any such decree or judgment, but shall survive the same and shall be forever binding and conclusive upon the parties, except as it may pertain to the children.

B. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be modified or altered except by:  (1) mutual consent;  (2) fully expressed in a written accord;  and (3) approved by a court of competent jurisdiction.

X. DOCUMENT EXECUTION

A. The Mother and the Father agree to execute from time to time, upon the request of the other, any and all further instruments in writing that are or may become necessary or reasonably required by the other party to carry this Agreement into effect according to its spirit and intent.

XI. GOVERNING LAW

A. This Agreement has been made and shall be performed in accordance with the laws of the State of Connecticut.   The laws of the State of Connecticut shall govern all instruments executed pursuant to the terms hereof.

XII. ENTIRE AGREEMENT

A. This Agreement sets forth the entire understanding of the parties.   The parties each declare that each has thoroughly read and understands each provision of this Agreement and that no promises, warranties, or representations of any character or of any nature have been made to induce either party to enter into this Agreement.   Each party hereto has been fully informed of his or her legal rights and obligations and of the legal and practical effect of this Agreement by counsel of his or her own selection.

B. Each party makes this Agreement of his or her own free will and no coercion, force, pressure, or undue influence has been used against either party in the making of this Agreement either by any party hereto or by any other person or persons.

XIII. EFFECTIVE DATE

A. This Agreement and all its terms and conditions shall become effective and binding immediately upon its approval by a Judge of the Superior Court.

XIV. CLAUSE INVALIDITY

A. If any provision of this Agreement is held to be invalid or unenforceable at any time after its execution, all other provisions shall nevertheless continue in full force and effect.

Do not sign this agreement unless you have read it carefully and understand every part of it.   Do not sign this agreement unless it accurately describes your agreement and unless you are completely satisfied with it.   This agreement waives certain important rights and establishes certain important rights in your favor.   Do not sign this agreement if you have been subjected to any duress.

Sign it only under your own free will.   If you are entirely satisfied with this agreement, signify your full approval by signing your name.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands and seals this 26th day of July 2013.

ORDER

The forgoing, having been presented, is hereby ORDERED:

Judge, Clerk/Assistant Clerk

ZASLOW & SANDLER, LLC

July 23, 2013

LETTER SENT VIA FACSIMILE ONLY

C. Michael Budlong, Esq. 860–278–8109

Budlong & Barrett, LLC

93 Oak Street

Hartford, CT 06106

Mark Ferraro, Esq. 860–521–4500

Lewis, Lewis and Ferraro, LLC

28 North Main Street

West Harttford, CT 06107

Re:  Ferraro

Dear Counsel:

I write as the matter is to appear on tomorrow's short calendar docket, and I will be away with family for vacation.   With that, there are a few items that I feel need to be stated.

First, the latest version of a custody agreement has been circulated for some time now.   I understand that there might be some frustrations on the part of Mrs. Ferraro as she had signed a number of versions prior to, and during, our time at the Regional Docket.   Now, we have the latest version that has been signed by Mr. Ferraro.   If there are questions or concerns that Mrs. Ferraro has (or counsel, for that matter) please let me know.   While I certainly understand and appreciate the emotional aspect of a divorce, the custody issue should be a non-issue by now.   The terms have been set, and what few changes were done for this last version were semantics only.   The children are all pulling their hair out that this continues to go on—I spoke with them a week or so ago.   So while I understand that there may be some new wrinkles in the financial aspect of the case, can we please have a resolution to the custody component?

If there is agreement, please put it on as an agreement in my absence.   If one of you would please read the following into the record for me, that would be most appreciated:

Ferraro–Ferraro

July 23, 2013

Page 2

Your Honor:  It is my understanding that the parties have finally signed a custody agreement.   I have seen and reviewed this agreement before leaving for vacation.   This case has gone through a tortuous history and fact pattern, and I am tremendously appreciative of both parents for compromising and coming to a middle ground.   Their children have been through a tremendous upheaval during the past few years, and I believe that—while this nor any other agreement is perfect—this will serve the best interests of the children, give them certainty and will allow them to be removed from the tug of war that has been this custody case for the past few years.   The agreement has my endorsement, and I thank the parties and their counsel for helping us get to this point.

As to the motions that will appear on tomorrow's docket, there is one that speaks to a potential significant other for Mrs. Ferraro.   I understand that there was a “disturbance” caused by/participated in by this gentleman.   I have heard that there may be other issues with this gentleman, though I do not know for sure.   Part and parcel with concerns from the mental health professionals, I would support the relief sought in the motion such that the children not be with this gentleman until we have an idea about his background.   Especially in light of the fact that her time is limited, I would hope that the time Mrs. Ferraro does have with the kids is spent one-on-one or along with family.   I don't want this to be the deal-breaker here, and I will look into the background of this gentleman upon my return from vacation—I trust that this will, too, be a non-issue.

Thank you both for your work on this file, and I hope that when I return from vacation, I can look forward to learning that the custody matter went to Judgment.

Truly yours,

Robert D. Zaslow

RDZ:msw

ZASLOW & SANDLER, LLC

July 26, 2013

Letter sent via e-mail only

Mark Ferraro, Esq.

Lewis, Lewis & Ferraro

28 North Main Street

West Hartford, CT 06107

Felicia Hunt, Esq.

Budlong & Barrett

93 Oak Street

Hartford, CT 06106

Re:  Ferraro v. Ferraro;

Final steps for resolution

Dear Mark & Felicia:

I had a very good discussion with Felicia this morning to get to a final resolution for the custody aspect of the Ferraro matter.   We have all been through much in this file over a very long time, and it is/has been high time to put this matter to bed.   After speaking with Felicia, there are only two items that need to be addressed in the stipulation:

Christmas. To get to an agreement, Linda has requested that the parties annually alternate Christmas Eve and Christmas Day. While I fully understand traditions, going forward this request is completely reasonable.   New traditions need to begin, and quite frankly, I would be surprised if this one request could not be effectuated.   I support the request.

Holiday “permission.”  In the custody agreement, there is a provision that before each and any holiday that Linda would have with the kids, she would need to ask “permission” from Dr. Connolly.   I agree with Felicia that this is a bit onerous and cumbersome.   That said, I also understand the reasoning behind the provision.   I would suggest that the wording be modified to shift the focus but retain the need filled by the provision.   Instead of having Mother ask for permission each and every holiday that she would have with the kids, I would have wording that Dr. Connolly have the authority to determine the parameters of the holiday time if there are concerns.   So, Linda would be presumed to have the holiday(s) designated unless Dr. Connolly—the gatekeeper per the agreement—determines that there are issues present that would require a shorter time, or some other remedial means.   If, for example, Dr. Connolly does not have verification that Linda has attended her counseling, then he can indicate if/how a holiday should be exercised.   I believe that this is more in line with the spirit of the agreement—that we have a gatekeeper for a reason, and that we are presuming and looking forward to progress.

These are the only two items that need to be addressed in the agreement's writing.   Again, it is my expectation that these two items are not and will not be deal breakers.

As for the balance of my discussion with Felicia, there was much ground that was covered.   A few items that I feel need to be shared:

Linda has, again, signed authorizations for her therapist and psychiatrist.   I appreciate that, and I am sure it will help facilitate progress going forward.

I will be speaking with Dr.s Freedman and Tarkin to be sure that the frequency and dynamics of the counseling is what it should be.   I want to be sure that we maximize the impact that counseling can have with the kids—especially with the upcoming finalization of the parties' parenting plan and the kids' reaction to it.

As for the communication provisions of the agreement, we all understand that parents' communication with the kids is restricted to certain days and times.   As the kids have already played one parent against the other on several occasions during my tenure with this family, I have a particular concern.   If the kids call/text Linda, for example, and say that there is an emergency, she will respond immediately (as any parent would) as allowed in the agreement.   If the “emergency” isn't an emergency at all, I don't want there to be a rush to judgment by either parent that the other was causing problems.   I don't know of a magic solution here, but I just want everyone to realize that there most likely will be times when a child exaggerates or uses the “emergency” card to get an immediate response.

Mark, please let me know by e-mail if the two points raised at the beginning of the letter are acceptable to Todd. I am checking my email nightly (as I am on vacation presently).   Again, the two items noted on the first page are the only items to amend in the present stipulation.

Thank you both for all of your assistance.   I fully appreciate how entrenched both parties can become after such a lengthy process with many emotional bumps having gone over.   The goal is in sight, and I look forward to having a stipulation to sign and present to the court.

Truly yours,

Robert D. Zaslow

RDZ:  msw

*Editor's Note:  The referenced guidelines worksheet, pg. 7, par. 4 has not been reproduced.

* *Editor's Note:  The referenced guidelines worksheet pg. 9, par. 2 has not been reproduced.

* * *Editor's Note:  The referenced guidelines worksheet pg. 9, par. 2 has not been reproduced.

* * * *Editor's Note:  The referenced personal property agreement pg. 16, par. # 3 has not been reproduced.

Munro, Lynda B., J.