PWH LLP v. Monica Fore et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Before the court is the defendants' motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  “A motion to dismiss ․ properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Bacon Construction Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 294 Conn. 695, 706, 987 A.2d 348 (2010).  “A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., 294 Conn. 206, 213, 982 A.2d 1053 (2009).

“It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Fequiere, 119 Conn.App. 570, 574–75, 989 A.2d 606, cert. denied, 295 Conn. 922, 991 A.2d 564 (2010).

The defendants argue that the court should grant their motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on several grounds.   First, the defendants argue that the court lacks jurisdiction because there is a “case pending in the Federal Court regarding the premises, leases, landlord, owners, etc.”   The federal action is a civil lawsuit brought by the defendants, and captioned Monica Fore et al. v. Connecticut Light & Power et al., U.S. District Court, District of Connecticut, 3:33–CV–00822–VLB.   Second, the defendants argue that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff did not serve a proper notice to quit.   Third, the defendants argue that the court has been deprived of subject matter jurisdiction by the operation of the doctrines of res judicata and stare decisis.   Finally, the defendants argue that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because this action is retaliatory in nature.

As far as the simultaneous proceeding in federal court, the defendants claim that by virtue of that lawsuit the federal court has exclusive jurisdiction over matters related to “the premises, leases, landlord, owners, etc.”   As authority for this proposition, the defendants cite the supremacy clause.   Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, “state laws that conflict with federal law are without effect.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76, 129 S.Ct. 538, 172 L.Ed.2d 398 (2008), a concept known as federal preemption.

The question of preemption is one of federal law arising under the supremacy clause of the United States constitution ․ Determining whether Congress has exercised its power to preempt state law is a question of legislative intent ․ The Supreme Court has limited preemption to three circumstances ․ First, state law is preempted when Congress has made its intent known through explicit statutory language ․ Second, a state law implicitly is preempted when it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the [f]ederal [g]overnment to occupy exclusively ․ The intent to occupy a particular field may be inferred from a scheme of federal regulation ․ so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the [s]tates to supplement it, or where an [a]ct of Congress touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject ․ Third, and finally, a state law may be preempted when it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal law ․ and where under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [the challenged state law] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress ․ What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects.  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Connecticut Siting Council, 286 Conn. 57, 69–71, 942 A.2d 345 (2008).

Having reviewed the relevant statutory authority and having examined the pleadings in this case and information submitted by the defendants regarding nature of the federal lawsuit, this court finds that the plaintiff's summary process claim is not precluded by the pendency of that federal litigation proceeding, and the plaintiff's motion to dismiss on that basis must be denied.

The defendants have also raised the issue of the sufficiency of the plaintiff's notice to quit.  “Before the [trial] court can entertain a summary process action and evict [an occupant], the owner of the land must previously have served the [occupant] with notice to quit ․ As a condition precedent to a summary process action, proper notice to quit [pursuant to § 47a–23] is a jurisdictional necessity.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 292 Conn. 381, 388, 973 A.2d 1229 (2009).

The defendants argue that the grounds recited in the notice to quit do not state a proper cause of action, and therefore the notice fails to comply with General Statutes § 47a–23.   In response the plaintiff asserts that in the wake of Judge Berger's April 19, 2013 decision in PWH, LLP v. Monica Fore, CV 12–4065630–S [56 Conn. L. Rptr. 24], the defendants were tenants at sufferance, subject to a month-to-month tenancy (see General Statutes § 47a–3b) and failed to make payment of rent for the months of May and June 2013.  “A tenancy at sufferance arises when a person who came into possession of land rightfully continues in possession wrongfully after his right thereto has terminated ․ After a notice to quit has been served ․ a tenant at sufferance no longer has a duty to pay rent.   He still, however, is obliged to pay a fair rental value in the form of use and occupancy for the dwelling unit.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Brewster Park, LLC v. Berger, 126 Conn.App. 630, 638, 14 A.3d 334 (2011).   The notice to quit was served for failure to pay rent under that new tenancy, in accordance with General Statutes § 47a–23 and not under the terms of any lease agreement.

The court finds that the notice to quit served in this case complies with the requirements of General Statutes § 47a–23, and therefore the defendants' motion on that ground must be denied.

The court has also closely analyzed the other issues raised by the defendant.   Although those questions may have some impact on the eventual outcome of this case, they do not remove or nullify the fundamental authority of this court “to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it.”   Olympus Healthcare Group, Inc. v. Muller, 88 Conn.App. 296, 300, 870 A.2d 1091 (2005).  “Once it is determined that a court has authority or competence to decide the class of cases to which the action belongs, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is resolved in favor of entertaining the action.”  Craig v. Benson, 202 Conn. 93, 101, 520 A.2d 155 (1987).

This court possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the plaintiff's summary process action.   Therefore the defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.

BY THE COURT,

Sheridan, J.

Sheridan, David M., J.