Hector Castanada 1 et al. v.  1State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE THIRD–PARTY DEFENDANT, ADAM BUTKIEWICZ'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, # 130

The third-party defendant, Adam Butkiewicz, moves for summary judgment as to the complaint of the third-party plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., on the grounds that the applicable statute of limitations has passed.

I

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs, Hector Castanada and Fortunada Castanada, claim injuries arising out of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on October 27, 2008.   They originally filed an action against Adam Butkiewicz, Raymond Pinney, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., (State Farm) entitled Hector Castaneda et al. v. Raymond Pinney et al., Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. LLI CV 10–6003483.   That action was instituted by service of a writ and summons and complaint on Adam Butkiewicz, the third-party defendant in this action, on September 20, 2010, and against the defendant, State Farm, on September 22, 2010.   Due to the failure of the plaintiffs to return the matter to court in a timely manner, Butkiewicz filed a motion to dismiss.   On May 25, 2011, the court granted the motion to dismiss, and noted, “Raymond Pinney and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company are also named defendants but are not parties to the present motion to dismiss.”   Memorandum of Decision re:  Motion to Dismiss, Roche, J., n.1.²

In the present action, the summons and complaint were served on State Farm on June 15, 2011.   On January 30, 2012, State Farm commenced the third-party action against Butkiewicz, seeking equitable subrogation.³  In his answer, Butkiewicz filed a special defense asserting that the applicable statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52–584, had passed.   He now moves for summary judgment as to the third-party complaint due to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.   State Farm has filed an opposition to said motion, arguing that the statute of limitation is equitably tolled because it was impossible for State Farm to have commenced an action against Butkiewicz within the statute of limitations period.

II

DISCUSSION

“Practice Book § 17–49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Sherman v. Ronco, 294 Conn. 548, 553–54, 985 A.2d 1042 (2010).

“Summary judgment in favor of the defendant is properly granted if the defendant in its motion raises at least one legally sufficient defense that would bar the plaintiff's claim and involves no triable issue of fact.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Serrano v. Burns, 248 Conn. 419, 424, 727 A.2d 1276 (1999).  “Summary judgment may be granted where the claim is barred by the statute of limitations.”  Doty v. Mucci, 238 Conn. 800, 806, 679 A.2d 945 (1996).   Summary judgment is appropriate on statute of limitations grounds when the “material facts concerning the statute of limitations [are] not in dispute ․” Burns v. Hartford Hospital, 192 Conn. 451, 452, 472 A.2d 1257 (1984).  “[S]ummary judgment is proper where the affidavits do not set forth circumstances which would serve to avoid or impede the normal application of the particular limitations period.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   LaBow v. Rubin, 95 Conn.App. 454, 471, 897 A.2d 136, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 933, 909 A.2d 960 (2006).

Neither party disputes the facts as they relate to this motion for summary judgment.   The third-party complaint seeking equitable subrogation was served on Butkiewicz on January 30, 2012, more than two years after the underlying motor vehicle accident which occurred on October 27, 2008.   He argues that because the first-party plaintiffs are time-barred from pursuing their negligence claims directly against the third-party defendant, then State Farm is also barred.   State Farm opposes the motion for summary judgment contending that because the plaintiffs did not file suit against State Farm until after the two-year statute of limitations ran, they were prevented from bringing an equitable subrogation cause of action against Butkiewicz within the two years.   Therefore, State Farm argues that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies, and the motion for summary judgment should be denied.

“The object of [equitable] subrogation is the prevention of an injustice.   It is designed to promote and to accomplish justice, and is the mode which equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one who, in justice, equity and good conscience, should pay it ․ [T]he doctrine of ․ equitable subrogation is broad enough to include every instance in which one person, not acting as a mere volunteer or intruder, pays a debt for which another is primarily liable, and which is equity and good conscience should have been discharged by the latter ․

“Under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, a subrogee has no rights against a third person beyond what the subrogor had ․ Similarly, the insurer is subject to any defenses the third party would have had against the insured.”   (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Palumbo, 296 Conn. 253, 259, 60, 994 A.2d 174 (2010).  “ ․ [T]he insurer as subrogee ․ stands in the place of the insured and succeeds to whatever rights he may have in the matter.   Therefore, any defense which a wrongdoer has against the insured is good against the insurer subrogated to the rights of the insured.”  Wilkinson v. Boats Unlimited, 236 Conn. 78, 88, 670 A.2d 1296 (1996).   Thus, parties who raise equitable subrogation claims are subject to the same statutes of limitations as the party in whose place they stand.   If the first-party plaintiffs' action for negligence would have been barred by the statute of limitations, then the third-party plaintiff's claim would be similarly barred.

State Farm argues that the statute of limitations is equitably tolled because it was impossible for State Farm to have commenced such an action against Butkiewicz within the statute of limitations period.   State Farm contends that its legal basis for commencing an equitable subrogation action against Butkiewicz did not arise until after the statute of limitations had expired, and therefore could not have filed an equitable subrogation claim against Butkiewicz.

State Farm cites Pedro v. Miller, 281 Conn. 112, 914 A.2d 524 (2007), as authority for its claim that the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply in this case.   However, Pedro is clearly distinguishable from the present action.   In Pedro, the Supreme Court allowed a defendant to bring an apportionment complaint against an apportionment defendant long after the 120–day time limitation had expired based on equitable reasons.   The plaintiff had brought a negligence action for injuries arising out of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on December 22, 2001, with a return date of February 18, 2003.   After the plaintiff filed her complaint, she began receiving treatment for her injuries with a physician.   On June 29, 2004, the plaintiff amended her complaint to add an allegation that she had suffered a cerebrospinal fluid leak during her treatment for her injuries resulting from the accident.   On October 6, 2004, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint.   On October 22, 2004, the defendant served an apportionment complaint against the plaintiff's doctor based upon the new allegations in her June 29, 2004, amended complaint.   The apportionment complaint was filed on November 16, 2004, long after the 120–day time limitation for service of apportionment complaints.   The Supreme Court held, that although the 120–day time limitation is mandatory, an exception may exist based on an equitable reason for excusing compliance, including waiver, consent, or other equitable justification.  Id. 118 “․ [T]he legal basis for the defendants to seek appointment against [the plaintiff's doctor] did not arise until after—indeed, long after—the 120 day limit already had passed.   Consequently, it was impossible for the defendants to serve the apportionment complaint claim upon [the plaintiff's doctor] with the 120 day limit established by [General Statutes] § 52–1029(b).  Such a circumstance presents a compelling equitable reason for excusing compliance with the limit set forth in that statute.”   Id. 119.

The plaintiffs brought the present action against State Farm, their insurer, as an uninsured motorist action, which permits suits for up to three years following the date of the accident as opposed to the two-year statute of limitations.   See General Statutes § 38a–336(g)(1).   State Farm argues that it had an equitable reason justifying excusal from compliance with the two-year statute of limitation due to the claims being brought after the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations.   However, unlike the defendant in Pedro who did not learn of the potential cause of action until long after the limitation period had run, State Farm was apprised of this action when it was served with the first complaint on September 22, 2010, and could have presumably acted within the time limit allowed.   Although the prior action was dismissed due to noncompliance with process requirements by the plaintiffs,⁴ State Farm was put on notice of the potential for an action prior to the two-year statute of limitations.   Therefore, State Farm is not excused from compliance with the applicable statute of limitations.

III

CONCLUSION

Under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, State Farm stands in the place of the plaintiffs, Hector and Fortunada Castanada.   Because the two-year statute of limitations would bar any action by the first-party plaintiffs against Adam Butkiewicz, State Farm is also barred from commencing an action against Butkiewicz.   There is no equitable exception for State Farm, which had notice of a legal basis for filing against the defendant, Butkiewicz, and could have timely asserted a third-party claim against Butkiewicz for contribution in the prior action.   Motion for summary judgment is granted.

Swienton, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN2. State Farm indicated in its memorandum in opposition that the action filed in the Litchfield Judicial District is still pending, however, the Edison docket shows the action as dismissed, even though the motion to dismiss was filed by the defendant, Butkiewicz, only.   The memorandum of decision indicates that the “motion to dismiss is granted,” but does not address whether the entire action has been dismissed as to all parties..  FN2. State Farm indicated in its memorandum in opposition that the action filed in the Litchfield Judicial District is still pending, however, the Edison docket shows the action as dismissed, even though the motion to dismiss was filed by the defendant, Butkiewicz, only.   The memorandum of decision indicates that the “motion to dismiss is granted,” but does not address whether the entire action has been dismissed as to all parties.

FN3. State Farm also filed suit against the third-party defendant, Raymond Pinney, who has not appeared in either actions..  FN3. State Farm also filed suit against the third-party defendant, Raymond Pinney, who has not appeared in either actions.

FN4. The court makes no determination as to whether the prior action was dismissed in full.   See, n.2..  FN4. The court makes no determination as to whether the prior action was dismissed in full.   See, n.2.

Swienton, Cynthia K., J.