John D. Gwiazdowski et al. v. Town of Lisbon Planning and Zoning Commission (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

I.

Statement of the Appeal

By their complaint dated January 25, 2011, John D. Gwiazdowski and Marci Gwiazdowski (hereinafter “plaintiffs”) have appealed from the decision of the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Lisbon (hereinafter “the Commission”) to deny their application for a special permit to utilize their property as a for profit horse facility as contemplated by § 10.21.1 of the Lisbon Zoning Regulations.

II.

Jurisdiction

General Statutes § 8–8(b) governs appeals from decisions of zoning commissions to the Superior Court “A statutory right to appeal may be taken advantage of only by strict compliance with the statutory provisions by which it is created.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Cardoza v. Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 78, 82 (1989).

a.

Aggrievement

“[P]leading and proof of aggrievement are prerequisites to a trial court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of a plaintiff's appeal ․ [I]n order to have standing to bring an administrative appeal, a person must be aggrieved.”   (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Moutinho v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 278 Conn. 660, 664 (2006).  “Aggrievement presents a question of fact for the trial court and the party alleging aggrievement bears the burden of proving it.”  Bongiorno Supermarket, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 266 Conn. 531, 538–39 (2003).   A plaintiff may prove aggrievement by testimony at the time of trial;  Winchester Woods Associates v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 219 Conn. 303, 308 (1991);  or “by the production of the original documents or certified copies from the record” (internal quotation marks omitted).  Quarry Knoll II Corp v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 256 Conn. 674, 703 (2001).

“Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement exist, classical and statutory ․ Classical aggrievement requires a two-part showing.   First, a party must demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as opposed to a general interest that all members of the community share ․ Second, the party must also show that the agency's decision has specially and injuriously affected that specific personal or legal interest ․

“Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case.   In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Moutinho v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 278 Conn 665.   The standard for statutory aggrievement in zoning appeals is set forth in General Statutes § 8–8(a)(1), which provides in relevant part:  “In the case of a decision by a ․ planning and zoning commission ․ ‘aggrieved person’ includes any person owning land that abuts or is within a radius of one hundred feet of any portion of the land involved in the decision of the board.”

The evidence indicates that plaintiffs were the applicants for the special permit the denial of which is the basis of this appeal.   It is also found, that at all times relevant to this appeal, plaintiff, John D. Gwiazdowski, was the owner of the real property for which the special permit application was filed.   It is, therefore, found that plaintiffs are aggrieved and have standing to prosecute this appeal.

b.

Timeliness and Service of Process

Pursuant to General Statutes § 8–8(b), “An appeal shall be commenced by service of process in accordance with sections (f) and (g) of this section within 15 days from the date that notice of the decision was published as required by the General Statutes ․ Notice of the Commission's decision was published in the Norwich Bulletin on January 13, 2011.   This action was commenced by service of process on January 26, 2011.   It is found that service of process was properly made and the action was commenced within the time allowed by statute.

III

Scope of Review

In deciding the issues presented by this appeal, the court is limited in its scope of review by statute and applicable case law.   Review of the decisions of local zoning authorities is limited to a determination, principally on the record before the Commission, whether the Commission abused the discretion vested in it.  Beit Havurah v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 177 Conn. 440, 444 (1979);  Cybulski v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 43 Conn.App. 105, 110, cert. denied, 239 Conn 949 (1996).   This court can sustain the appeal only upon a determination that the action taken by the Commission was unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal.   It must not substitute its judgment for that of the local Commission and must not disturb the decision of the Commission as long as honest judgment has been reasonably and fairly exercised.  Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 233 Conn. 198, 206 (1995), Raczkowski v. Zoning Commission, 53 Conn.App. 636, 644, 45 (1999).   Conclusions reached by the Commission must be upheld by the court if they are reasonably supported by the record.  Christian Activities Council, Congregational v. Town Council, 249 Conn. 566, 583 (1999).   The question on review of the Commission's action is not whether the court would have reached the same conclusion, but whether the record before the Commission supports the decision reached.  Id. Although the factual and discretionary determinations of the Commission must be given considerable weight, it is for the court to expound and apply governing principles of law.  Domestic Violence Services of Greater New Haven, Inc. v. FOIC, 47 Conn.App. 466, 470 (1998).   Plaintiffs bear the burden of proof to demonstrate that the Commission acted improperly.  Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 233 Conn. 206;  Raczkowski v. Zoning Commission, supra, 53 Conn.App. 640.

In this case, we are dealing primarily with the decision of the Commission to deny a special permit.   A special permit allows a property owner to put his property to a use which the regulations expressly permit under condition specified in the zoning regulations themselves.  A.P. & W. Holding Corporation v. Planning & Zoning Board, 167 Conn. 182, 185 (1974).

“The basic rationale for the special permit ․ is that while certain land uses may be generally compatible with the uses permitted as of right in a particular zoning district, their nature is such that their precise location and mode of operation must be individually regulated ․ T. Tondro, [Connecticut Land Use Regulation (2d Ed.1992) ], p. 175;  see also Barberino Realty & Development Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 222 Conn. 607, 612–13 (1992).   The requirements for a special permit are outlined in the zoning regulations of the Town of Lisbon, § 11, and the Commission may not impose additional conditions that are not within the regulations.   See T. Tondro, supra, pp. 178–79;  see also A. Aiudi & Sons, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 72 Conn.App. 502, 506, 806 A.2d 77 (although commission does not have discretion to deny special permit when proposal meets standards, it does have discretion to determine whether proposal meets standards in regulations), [aff'd.  267 Conn. 192, 837 A.2d 748 (2003) ].   As a matter of law, general considerations enumerated in the zoning regulations are an adequate basis for denying an application for a special permit ․ A. Aiudi & Sons, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 507.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Smith–Groh, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 78 Conn.App. 228–29.”  Yagermann v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 92 Conn.App. 355, 361–62 (2005).

“When considering an application for a special [permit], a zoning authority acts in an administrative capacity, and its function is to determine whether the proposed use is expressly permitted under the regulations, and whether the standards set forth in the regulations and statutes are satisfied ․ It has no discretion to deny the special [permit] if the regulations and statutes are satisfied ․” Quality Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 55 Conn.App. 533, 537 (1999).

“Where, as here, a zoning commission has not stated on the record the basis for its determination, a reviewing court must search the record to determine the basis for the Commission's decision.  Clifford v. Planning and Zoning Commission, 280 Conn. 434, 452 (2006).

IV.

Factual Background

Plaintiffs are the owners of real property located on the northeasterly side of Newent Road (Connecticut Route 138) in the Town of Lisbon.   The plaintiffs' single-family dwelling is located on the property which is divided into two zoning districts.   The westerly portion of the property, which is the subject of this appeal, lies within the R–40 residential zone.

In 2006, plaintiffs applied for a special permit to excavate and construct an indoor horse arena.   The application contemplated extensive regrading of the property to render it suitable for pasture areas, indoor and outdoor riding areas, a stable area and other facilities.   The application was approved with conditions.   One of the conditions restricted the use of the property as follows:

The use of the indoor horse arena shall be limited to personnel [sic] use the boarding of horse by others is not part of this application and is not allowed.   The use of the property for events is not permitted as part of this special permit.

After receiving this special permit, plaintiffs commenced excavation and construction on the property.   Buildings and other structures were erected including an 8,000 square foot indoor riding area.   The construction was not in complete compliance with the special permit granted.   Plaintiffs also engaged in commercial activities including the boarding of horses and offering riding lessons.   Such activities were not approved by any permit.

In 2009, plaintiffs submitted to the Commission a draft revision of the zoning regulations.   This proposed regulation would authorize commercial horse facilities within the Town of Lisbon.   The stated intention of the regulation was to preserve farms and open space within the town.   The amendment was approved by the Commission and became effective on August 14, 2009.   The amendment which became § 10.21.1 et seq. would allow a “Horse Facility” as defined by the regulations by special permit.   On June 25, 2010, plaintiffs submitted to the Commission an application for such a special permit under § 10–21.1. The proposed use described in the application was “—horse facility usage—grading and leveling of property to create pasture—as built to close existing special permit.”

The application was received by the Commission on July 1, 2010.   A public hearing on the application was scheduled for August 3, 2010.   At the public hearing, plaintiffs requested waivers relating to the requirement for a professional landscape plan and lighting plan.   The public hearing was continued to September 7, 2010.

As above-noted, acting under the previously approved special permit, plaintiffs installed horse facilities and structures not authorized by the special permit.   At the September 7, 2012 meeting, plaintiffs' attorney requested that the Commission divide the pending application into two phases.   The first phase would involve approval of the existing conditions and legalize the uses and structures existing under the provisions of § 10.21.1 The second phase would involve approval of additional construction and facilities.   The public hearing was continued to October 5, 2010, to allow the Commission's staff to review the material submitted.

At the October 5, 2010 meeting, town Planner, James D. Rabbitt, presented a summary of the proceeding on the application.   Mr. Rabbitt noted, in detail, sixteen deficiencies which he found in the application.   Questions of screening and Department of Transportation approval were also discussed.   With the written permission of plaintiffs' attorney, the public hearing was continued to November 3, 2010.

At the November 3, 2010 public hearing, plaintiffs submitted an amended application describing the first phase which was presently under consideration.   Additional material was submitted.   Plaintiffs' attorney also addressed many of the discrepancies noted by the town planner at the October meeting.   After further input from the town planner, plaintiffs' attorney and the public, the public hearing was closed.

At its December 7, 2010 meeting, the Commission briefly discussed the amended application.   It was then voted to table the matter until the next meeting.

The next meeting of the Commission was held on January 4, 2011.   At this meeting, the amended application was discussed.   At the conclusion of the discussion, the Commission voted unanimously to deny the application without a formal statement of its reasons for doing so.

The Commission's decision was published in the Norwich Bulletin on January 13, 2011.   The present appeal followed this publication.

The case was returned to court on February 22, 2011.   Pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 8–8(i) and Practice book § 14–7B, the return of record was filed by defendant August 15, 2011.   The case was tried on October 16, 2012.

Upon review of the record, it became apparent to the court that certain items mentioned in the transcript were not included in the return of record.   In an attempt to resolve this problem, a letter was sent to counsel on October 18, 2012, and a hearing was held on December 7, 2012, at which the parties were heard.   Maps were submitted by both plaintiffs and defendant at the hearing.

On December 11, 2012, plaintiffs filed a motion for amendment to the return of record, reargument and sanctions.   Defendant filed an objection to these motions.   As hereinafter stated, plaintiffs' motion was granted in part.

For the court to decide this case, the court must review the record that was before the Commission.   A question existed as to what documents were before the Commission and upon which it based its decision.

Accordingly, the following items were returned to counsel for the defendant:  1) Item 27 on the return of record.   A copy of a portion of a map received at the public hearing held November 3, 2012;  2) Document entitled Site Plan Prepared for John Gwiazdowski, 180 Newent Road (Connecticut Route 138) Lisbon, Connecticut.   Consisting of four pages without certifications;  3) Document entitled Site Plan prepared for John Gwiazdowski, 180 Newent Road (Connecticut Route 138) Lisbon, Connecticut.   Consisting of five pages with stamp “Sep–7 2010” and certifications.

It was ordered that these items be submitted to the Planning and Zoning Commission for a determination, on the record, as to which of these documents, if any, were considered by it in reaching its decision of January 4, 2011, together with any other maps or documents not returned to court.   In compliance, a supplemental return of record was filed on March 2, 2013.

Plaintiffs moved to further supplement the record on March 27, 2013.   The motion was granted and a second supplement to the return of record was filed on July 9, 2013.   When it appeared that this was not complete, a corrected second supplement to the return of record was filed on July 25, 2013.¹

Additional facts will be stated as necessary.

V.

Analysis

Briefs were filed by the parties at interest.   The court is not bound to consider any claim of law not properly briefed.  Shaw v. Planning Commission, 5 Conn.App. 520, 525 (1998).

Plaintiffs have raised the following issues which must be considered by the court:

1) Did the defendant Commission, in denying the plaintiffs' special permit application, apply inappropriate commercial and industrial performance standards contained in the Lisbon Zoning Regulation to an agricultural use rather than the specific standards which it had recently promulgated for the permitting of a horse facility?

2) Did the plaintiffs' special permit application satisfy the applicable provisions of the Lisbon Zoning Regulations?

1.

Plaintiffs claim that in denying their application, the Commission applied inappropriate standards contained in the zoning regulations.   This claim arises out of a fundamental difference of opinion as to which standards should apply to the horse facility contemplated under § 10.21.1 et seq.   At the public hearing of October 5, 2010, the town planner stated that the application was incomplete in that the site plan was not in proper form, the abutters had not been notified and the application was in other ways deficient.   Plaintiffs' position is that the contemplated use is agricultural in nature and that only the performance standards contained in §§ 11.3 and 11.4 of the regulations are applicable.

It is agreed by all parties that the horse facility use contemplated under § 10.21.1 may be authorized only by special permit.   Section 11 of the zoning regulations contains the specific provisions under which special permits may be issued.   This section contains a number of subsections including 11.3 which covers appropriateness of use, and 11.4 which covers the impact of the use on adjacent residential areas.   Plaintiffs argue that since the horse facility is an agricultural use, their application must comply only with these sections.   Under this theory, § 11.5, General Procedures, would not be applicable.

“[Z]oning regulations are local legislative enactments ․ and, therefore, their interpretation is governed by the same principals that apply to the construction of statutes.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Alvord Investments, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 282 Conn. 393, 416 (2007).   When construing a regulation, the court's fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the body which enacted the regulation.   Parnoff v. Yuille, 139 Conn App. 147, 159 (2012).

Regulations must be viewed to form a cohesive body of law, and they “must be construed as a whole and in such a way as to reconcile all their provisions as far as possible.”  ․ This is true because “particular words or sections of the regulations, considered separately, may be lacking in precision of meaning to afford a standard sufficient to sustain them.”  “When more than one construction is possible, we adopt the one that renders the enactment effective and workable and reject any that might lead to unreasonable or bizarre results.”  ․”[W]e consider the statute as a whole with a view toward reconciling its parts in order to obtain a sensible and rational overall interpretation.”  ․ (Internal citations omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.)  Borrelli v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 106 Conn.App. 266, 270–71 (2008).

A review of the applicable sections of the zoning regulations fails to disclose any provision which indicates that the special permit, horse facility, should be treated any differently from any other special permit use.   Plaintiffs have not pointed out any such provision.   Section 10.21.1 was drafted by plaintiffs as a revision of the zoning regulations.   Certainly, if there was an intent that a horse facility should be treated differently from any other special permit use, it would have been set forth in the revision.   There is no such language in the revision and there is no language in § 11 which would exempt a horse facility from any of its requirements.

Section 11.2 provides in effect that any activity requiring a site plan permit shall not be used until the Commission grants a special use permit or amends a previously granted permit.   No exceptions are mentioned.

An interpretation of the regulations which makes all of the provisions of § 11 applicable to all special permits makes the regulation more effective and workable.   For example, § 11.1.1 requires that the special permit use be “in a manner which protects the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of Lisbon.”   Section 11.1.2 requires that the use be “in harmony with the neighborhood.”   Plaintiffs claim that only these sections are applicable to the proposed agricultural use.   The general provisions set forth in § 11.5 provide the submissions which allow the Commission to determine compliance with the requirements of §§ 11.1.2 and 11.5 and other regulations.   Section 11.5.1d requires the filing of a site plan.  “Site plan approval is directed to determining whether a particular plan conforms to existing requirements of the zoning regulations.”   R. Fuller, 9 Connecticut Practice Series.   Land Use Law and Practice (2nd Ed 1999 Section 5.5, p. 187).   The site plan “is used to determine whether the technical details of the plan conform to the specific requirements of the special permit and other zoning regulations.”  Id.

Plaintiffs have taken the inconsistent position of applying for a special permit under § 11, while at the same time claiming that the regulations for a special permit do not apply to their application.

As plaintiffs claim, the horse facility is an agricultural use and as such may not be as intrusive as a purely commercial use.   It, however, may involve commercial activities, exhibitions, increases in traffic and other activities not regularly permitted in the R–40 Zone. The Horse Facility appears to be the type of activity which would normally be allowed only by special permit.   Barberino Realty & Development Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 222 Conn. 612.

It must then be concluded that under the Lisbon Zoning Regulations a horse facility may be allowed by special permit under § 10.21.1 et seq.   Such special permit use must comply with all regulations applicable to special permits including § 11.

2.

Having concluded that the provisions of § 11 are applicable to plaintiffs' appeal, the record must be examined to determine if the application is in compliance with the zoning regulations.

Section 11.5.1d requires that the application for a special permit include “A site plan per Section 12 of the regulations.”   Site plan requirements are set forth in § 12.  Section 12.1 of the regulations sets forth the intent of the site plan requirements.

12.1 Intent. A site plan is intended to provide the Commission with information necessary to determine that the proposed activity is in compliance with all applicable requirements of these Regulations.   It is also intended to provide the Commission with information that will enable it to determine that the proposed buildings and uses shall be arranged in a manner that enhances the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of Lisbon and shall be of such character as to harmonize with the neighborhood, to accomplish a transition in character between the areas of unlike character, to protect property values in the neighborhood, to preserve and protect natural resources and the appearance and beauty of the community and to avoid undue traffic congestion.

The regulations stress the importance of the site plan and site plan was essential to depict what plaintiffs intended for their horse facility.

A question arose concerning the site plan.   On November 1, 2010, plaintiffs submitted to the Commission a set of plans constituting the revised proposed site plan.   This set of plans was reviewed by the town planner.   The planner filed a report with the Commission dated January 4, 2011 based upon his examination of the plans as submitted.   It was this set of plans and the input of the town planner which the Commission considered in making its decision to deny the special permit application.

At the public hearing on November 3, 2010, plaintiffs submitted another set of plans.   The new site plan was basically identical to the November 1, 2010 filing with certain important differences.

Section 12.4.1 of the Regulations requires that a site plan involving grading must be prepared by a Connecticut professional engineer or surveyor.   Section 12.42.1 requires the signature of a soil scientist on the plan indicating that he has identified the wetlands and watercourses.   The site plan filed November 1, 2010, has signature lines for these professionals but the actual signatures were lacking.   This discrepancy was noted by the planner in his report and was considered by the Commission in making its decision.   The site plan filed November 4, 2010, did, however, contain the signatures required of the engineer and the soil scientist.   In this respect, it must be found that the site plan is in compliance with the regulations.   Since the two plans are substantially identical except for the signatures, it must be determined if they are in compliance with the regulations.

a.

Section 12.4.21 requires that the site plan include the names and addresses of current owners of property within 500 feet of the property which is the subject of the application.   There is no requirement that these property owners be notified of the application.   Section 11.5.3 requires that the applicant for a special permit notify, by certified mail, all owners of abutting property not less than thirty days before the public hearing.   Plaintiffs claim that a problem exists in these two regulations and that they are in conflict.

There is, however, no conflict between the two sections.   Section 11.5.3 places the burden on an applicant for a special permit to notify abutting property owners and file confirmation of such notice as a part of the application.   This must be done thirty days prior to the public hearing.

Section 12.4.21 requires that the names of the owners of property within 500 feet of the parcel for which the special permit is sought to be listed on the site plan.   It does not require these parties to be notified.   Plaintiffs sought to comply with § 12.4.21 by filing with the Commission a list of persons owning property within 500 feet on November 3, 2012.

Plaintiffs have not complied with § 12.4.21 in that the names and addresses of property owners within 500 feet of the subject property do not appear on the site plan.   Plaintiffs have attempted to comply with this section by submitting separately a list of such property owners on November 3, 2012.   This separate list, however, does not render the site plan in conformance with the regulations.

The transcripts of the meetings do not indicate that confirmation of the notice requirements of § 11.5.3 have been filed with the Commission.   The planner, in his report of January 4, 2011, stated that the notice requirements of § 11.5.3 had not been complied with.   Plaintiffs do not claim that they have complied with this section.   Plaintiffs argue that even if the notice required to abutting property owners was not given, it would have no substantial procedural effect.   They correctly point out that the failure to give such notice as required by § 11.5.3 does not render the matter void.  Schwartz v. Hamden, 168 Conn. 8, 15 (1975).   It is not a matter of subject matter jurisdiction.  Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 455, 465 (1991).   In an attempt to appeal a decision, the failure to give the required notice may be raised only by the party to whom the notice was to have been sent.  Delfino v. Planning and Zoning Commission, 30 Conn.App. 454, 458 (1993).

The situation here differs from that in Lauer and Defino.   In those cases, a third party was appealing to court the decision of a zoning authority claiming that another agency did not receive notice.   The case at bar involves a question as to whether or not the notice requirements for a special permit have been complied with.

b.

In his report to the Commission dated January 4, 2011, the town planner pointed out other areas in which the site plan does not comply with the regulations.   Although the site plan considered by the town planner was the plan filed November 1, 2010, and not the later version filed November 4, 2011, except for the lacking signatures as noted, the plans are identical.

Some of the more obvious discrepancies in the site plan requirements of § 12.4 mentioned in the planners report are:

1) Lack of the rendering required by subsection f for the horse shelter, hay storage canopy and horse barn.

2) Details of sewage disposal facility and test pit as required by subsection g. Subsection h requires a drainage plan with necessary calculations.   The driveway has been located in a different location from the original approved in the 2006 permit.   Post and predevelopment calculations were not submitted with the alternative location.   The 2006 approval required a paved driveway.   A dirt driveway is shown contrary to the 2006 approval.

3) A landscape plan was not provided as required by subsection j. The Commission may have waived the requirement that the plan be required by a professional landscape architect but a plan is still required.

The turn out spaces for horses, as shown on the site plan, are not in conformance with § 10.21.5 of the Regulations which requires a 30 x 50 foot space.   The spaces provided are 32 x 48.   Although the total area of the turn out spaces exceeds that which would be provided under the regulations, the dimensions are not in accordance with the regulations.

The location of water supply and sewage disposal facilities including test pit areas required by § 12.4.2g were not provided.

Section 12.6.5 provides that no site plan shall be approved which possesses a significant risk of degradation of surface or ground water supplies arising from the proposed activity.   The section requires that certain information be submitted as a part of the application.   Plaintiffs did not present testimony or evidence so as to comply with the requirements of this section.

Section 12.7 states that as a condition of site plan or special permit approval, the Commission may require the applicant to submit a performance bond.   Section 12.7.2 requires the applicant to submit to the Commission with the application for special permit an estimate of the cost of the project.   This estimate would be necessary if a bond were to be set.   Plaintiffs failed to submit the required estimate.

VI

Conclusion

Plaintiffs have failed to comply with all of the requirements for a special permit for a Horse Facility under Section 10.21.1 of the regulations.   There are numerous discrepancies and omitions in the site plan submitted.   The standards set forth in the regulations for special permit requirements have not been satisfied.   In denying plaintiffs' application, the Commission did not abuse its discretion or act arbitrarily or illegally.

Accordingly, plaintiffs' appeal is dismissed.

Joseph J. Purtill, JTR

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The filing of the supplemental returns of record was necessary for a well-reasoned decision in this matter.  Santos v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 144 Conn.App. 62, 66 (2013)..  FN1. The filing of the supplemental returns of record was necessary for a well-reasoned decision in this matter.  Santos v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 144 Conn.App. 62, 66 (2013).

Purtill, Joseph J., J.T.R.