IN RE: Robert D.P. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On December 12, 2012, Joette Katz, the commissioner of the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”), filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Chelsea R. and Robert D. P., III, to their child Robert, IV., now eighteen months of age.   The mother has appeared and is represented by counsel.   The mother, now residing in Florida, was represented by her attorney and participated in the trial via telephone on July 30, 2013.   The child is represented by counsel.   Neither parent is believed to have Indian Tribal affiliation.   The court is aware of no other proceedings pending in any other court regarding the custody of the child.

At the inception of the termination proceedings, it was believed that Robert, III, was living with Chelsea in Florida.   Service of process was attempted to Robert by registered mail without success.   Thereafter constructive service was made by publishing in the Hartford Courant, a newspaper circulating in Willimantic CT, the last known address of Robert, III. That service was confirmed.   Thereafter, the department determined that Robert, III, was now back living in Willimantic, CT. Abode service was made upon the non-appearing father at his Willimantic address.   The court notes that Robert, III, was served with the initial petition for order of temporary custody and neglect, that he came to court and had an attorney appointed for him.   Robert, III, attended the contested order of temporary custody hearing and was represented by his attorney.   Thereafter he stopped communicating with his attorney and stopped attending court proceedings.   He has actual notice that his child is in the custody of DCF, that there are child protection proceedings pending and that he has had service of process designed to give him notice of the pendency of this case.   He did not attend the contested termination of parental rights proceeding.   The child was born in Connecticut and has, at all times relevant, lived in Connecticut.   This court has jurisdiction.

On July 30, 2013, all counsel and summoned witnesses appeared for trial.   The mother participated by telephone.   Since the father did not appear, he is defaulted for his failure to appear.²  The court reviewed the documents entered in to evidence (Exhibits A–W).  After considering all of the evidence presented the court makes the following findings of fact by clear and convincing evidence.

The Mother, Chelsea R.

Chelsea was born in January 1991.   She is presently twenty-two years of age.   Chelsea never really had much of a chance in life.   Her father was a heroin addict, her mother was a crack cocaine addict who prostituted herself to support her four children, each by a different paternity.   Like her mother, Chelsea has mental health issues and substantial substance abuse issue.

When Chelsea was sixteen she dropped out of high school, ran away from home and got pregnant.   She followed her mother's example:  she started using different illegal substances at age thirteen or fourteen.   By nineteen she was using almost all forms of illegal street drugs.   She prostituted herself for money to buy drugs.

Chelsea had her first child at age seventeen and her second child nine days after she turned nineteen.   Neither of these children are in Chelsea's care.   Both of these children are in the guardianship of the paternal grandmother.

This court terminated Chelsea's parental rights to her second child, Jaylin, on June 27, 2012 (Petitioner's Exhibit D).

The records reflect that in November 2010, DCF had been monitoring the mother and the child due to persistent reports of mother's inability to provide a safe and nourishing home for Jaylin.   There were allegations of inappropriate caretakers, drug use in the home, insufficient food for the child and inadequate supervision.

On November 7, 2010, the child's father, who was then living in Pennsylvania, called DCF to report that Chelsea was hanging around with older men who provided her with drugs and alcohol.   Dustin also told DCF that the child was being left with “anyone” while Chelsea was using drugs and drinking.   After days of investigations and contact with the child's paternal grandmother, DCF confirmed the mother's inappropriate associates, the use of drugs and alcohol, having sex with these men in front of the child and inadequate supervision of the child.   The mother was generally uncooperative with DCF, vulgar and belligerent.

Chelsea admitted she was shooting up heroin in the bathroom of the house with Jaylin at home.   The social workers arranged for Chelsea to go to Crossroads Amethyst House where a bed was available for her and Jaylin.   At Crossroads Chelsea could receive drug treatment with her child.   Chelsea declined the Amethyst House opportunity for treatment.

DCF continued to offer Chelsea various treatment options and Chelsea continued to ignore or unsuccessfully complete the various treatments.   Ultimately, her parental rights to Jaylin were terminated (Foley, J.T.R).  That child has since been adopted by the paternal grandmother.

The Father, Robert P., III

Robert P., III, is twenty-seven years old today.   DCF is unable to report much about this individual.   There is nothing to indicate his education, he has no military service, and his only known job following his release from prison was for a short period of time working for a company that provided roadside assistance.   The duration of that job is unknown although it is known that he left Connecticut and went to Florida for a period of time.   It is unknown if Robert has any actual vocational skills.

He has three children including Robert, IV, all by different women.   There is nothing to report about his active participation in hands-on parenting of any of his children.   It is known that he has spent two and a half years in prison.   He has a felony conviction for assaulting a pregnant woman.   He has other convictions for probation violations and violating protective orders.

Robert told DCF that he does not drink or use drugs, although he reports to having received treatment at New Perceptions for substance abuse.   He also has denied domestic violence, notwithstanding his felony conviction.   He has admitted to others that he has used alcohol and cocaine.   The DCF record indicates he was using marijuana at the time of the assault on his pregnant girlfriend.   His special parole officer reports that Robert has a history of assaultive behavior toward women and a history of alcohol abuse.

The child, Robert D.P., IV

The child was born in Willimantic, CT. on February 3, 2012.   Due to Chelsea's failure to follow through on substance abuse treatment as recently as the month before the child was born, her unaddressed mental health needs, her inability to delineate where she was going to live and how she was going to care for the child, DCF sought and obtained an immediate order of temporary custody on the day of the child's birth.  (Dyer, J.) Both parents contested the order and received a special hearing in the Middletown Child Protection Session on February 17, 2013 (Bentivegna, J.) The order was sustained with both parents present.   A finding of neglect or uncared for was made on the same day.   The biological parents each signed Specific Steps which indicated their responsibilities as well as those required by DCF. Neither parent complied with the Specific Steps.

So young Robert has never been in the care of the biological parents.   Chelsea's two other children are in the care of their paternal grandmother and her husband.   They have adopted one of the children.   These children are young Robert's maternal half-siblings.   DCF placed young Robert with these same foster parents.   Although not technically relative foster parents, they are the caretakers of Robert's siblings.   This placement is the least restrictive placement for Robert.   All of his needs are being met in the home.   He is part of the family.   There are no emotional, behavioral or developmental problems with Robert.   The foster parents have indicated a willingness to adopt Robert.

GROUNDS ALLEGED

The commissioner alleges that the child has been found in a prior proceeding on February 17, 2012, to have been neglected or uncared for and the mother and father have failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, they or either of them could assume a responsible position the life of the children. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(I).   The commissioner also alleges that the parents have abandoned Robert in that they have failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare. § 17a–112(j)(3)(A).³

Further findings are necessary.   Following the hearing on February 17, 2012, DCF reviewed the specific steps with Chelsea and set up visitation for her three times per week.   Robert occasionally attended with her.   The social worker recommended that Chelsea attend New Life Center on February 4, 2012, an inpatient center for motivating strategies to assist her in reunification.   Chelsea refused to go.   She reported that she was seeking treatment at Natchaug Hospital, Sachem House for substance abuse treatment.   She dropped out of Sachem House treatment on March 22, 2012.   Further efforts to get her back in treatment failed.   She declined transportation assistance saying DCF didn't need to know where she was living.   A complete listing of efforts to help Chelsea is set forth on pages 10 through 14 of Exhibit A.

DCF set up a substance abuse evaluation for Robert on March 12, 2012.   He attended the intake evaluation but failed to attend the recommended group therapy for educational and vocational therapy and relapse prevention.

Sometime in March or April 2012, it is likely that Chelsea determined that she was pregnant again.   Both parties stopped cooperating with DCF or informing them of their whereabouts.   In the beginning of May 2012, Chelsea and Robert stopped visiting with the infant and both parents moved to Florida.   They have not seen the child in the past fifteen months.

On September 14, 2012, a Florida social worker from the department of children and families notified Connecticut DCF that Chelsea was about twenty-four weeks pregnant.   On September 28, 2012, DCF was advised that Chelsea gave birth by emergency Cesarean section to an infant weighing little more than a pound in weight.   The child remained in the neo-natal unit of the Florida hospital until December 2012.

In summary, Chelsea has had significant mental health and substance abuse problems for all of her adult life.   She has been unable or unwilling to benefit from treatment.   She told her Connecticut lawyer that the reason she has not returned to Connecticut is that she is fearful that DCF would intervene with respect to Chelsea's most recent child.   Chelsea has made no identified progress in resolving her longstanding issues.

Robert, III, is similarly situated.   As soon as his special parole ended, he stopped any rehabilitative programs, stopped visiting the infant and left for Florida.   It appears he has since returned to Connecticut but has made no efforts to visit the child or inquire about his welfare.

Based upon the foregoing facts, the court finds that the mother and father have failed to achieve rehabilitation since the removal of the child in February 2012.   There is nothing in the conduct of the mother or father that suggests that rehabilitation can be realized within a reasonable time given the age and needs of young Robert.   The court further finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify the parents with the child but the parents are unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.

The court further finds that the parents have both abandoned the child in Connecticut while fleeing to Florida to avoid child protection concerns.   Abandonment under the General Statutes requires proof of failure to maintain interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child.   Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are some indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child.   Where a parent fails to visit a child, fails to display any love or affection for the child, has no personal interaction with the child, and no concern for the child's welfare, statutory abandonment has occurred.

The parents have done none of those things that are generally associated with meeting parental responsibilities (1) express love and affection for the child;  (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child;  (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing, and medical care;  (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile;  and (5) the duty to furnish social and spiritual guidance.   These parents have left the care of their child to others without showing any more than mere sporadic interest which is not enough.⁴  General Statutes does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child.   A parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child.  “Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   In re Drew R., 47 Conn.App. 124, 129–30 (1997).   The court finds that neither parent maintained a reasonable degree of interest in Robert's welfare.

Therefore the court concludes that the petitioner has met her burden as to failure to rehabilitate and abandonment by the parents.

MANDATORY CONSIDERATIONS General Statutes § 17a–112(k)

a. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent— § 17a–112(k)(1).   The documents in evidence reflect that available, accessible and appropriate services were made in this case.   See in particular Petitioner's Exhibit A. It is further noted that it is unnecessary for the agency to provide reasonable efforts at reunification to parents who have been found to have abandoned the child. § 17a–111b(b).

b. Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended— § 17a–112(k)(2).   The records reflect that reasonable efforts were made before and after the birth of Robert.   See in particular Petitioner's Exhibit A.

c. The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order— § 17a–112(k)(3).

The court issued Specific Steps Those orders were as follows:

(1) Keep all appointments set by or with DCF. Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the child(ren)'s court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem.

(2) Keep whereabouts known to DCF and your attorney.

(3) Visit child(ren) as often as DCF permits and demonstrate appropriate parent/child interaction during visits

(4) Participate in parenting and individual counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals.

(5) Accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF and make progress toward treatment goals.

(6) Do not use illegal drugs or abuse alcohol;  submit to random drug testing;  submit to substance abuse evaluation and follow treatment recommendations.

(7) Cooperate with recommended service providers recommended for parenting/individual/family counseling, in-home support services, and/or substance abuse treatment and sign releases allowing DCF to communicate with the providers.

(8) Cooperate with court-ordered evaluations.

(9) Secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income.

(10) Identify changes in household composition.

(11) No further involvement in the criminal justice system.

(12) Cooperate with child's therapy.

(13) Supply names and addresses of grandparents and of persons the parent would like DCF to consider as a placement resource.

d. The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardian of his person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties— § 17a–112(k)(4).

The child has lived exclusively with the licensed foster family since birth.   Robert's older sisters are also placed in this home.   It is unlikely that the child has any emotional ties to the biological parents.

e. The age of the child — § 17a–112(k)(5).   The child is twenty-nine months old.

f. The efforts the parent has made to adjust his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return him to his home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child— § 17a–112(k)(6).   The parents have not maintained contact with the child and it is unlikely the child knows them at all.   The parents have done nothing to improve their ability to parent Robert.

g. The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent — § 17a–112(k)(7).   No unreasonable acts or conduct is noted.

BEST INTEREST FINDIING:  § 17a–112(j)(2)

The final element of the termination of the parental rights statute, § 17a–112(j), requires that, before granting a petition for such termination, the court must find “by clear and convincing evidence ․ (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child ․” The best interest standard is inherently flexible and fact-specific to each child, giving the court broad discretion to consider all the different and individualized factors that might affect a specific child's welfare.   In determining whether terminating the parental rights of these parents. would be in the child's best interest the court has considered:  the child's interest “in sustained growth, development, well-being, and in the continuity and stability of his environment”;  the age and needs of the child;  the length and nature of his stay in foster care;  the contact maintained with his birth parents and the potential benefit or detriment to the child of retaining a connection with his biological parents;  the genetic bond to the birth parents;  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999);  and the seven statutory factors and the court's findings thereon.

In this particular case the parents have not made strides to make themselves available as placement resources.   The child has been out of their care for all of his life.   He is fortunate to be comfortably placed with his older siblings in a nurturing and caring placement.   Based upon these considerations, the court finds that termination of parental rights and adoption is in the child's best interests.

ORDERS

It is ordered that the parental rights of the biological parents are terminated.   The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is appointed the statutory parent.   A case plan shall be submitted within thirty days and such other reports as are required by law shall be filed in a timely fashion.

The Clerk of any court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of the child shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at 81 Columbia Avenue, Willimantic CT 06226 of the date when said adoption is finalized.

Judgment may enter accordingly.

Foley, Judge Trial Referee # 460

FOOTNOTES

FN2. Practice Book § 32a–2(a) provides that child protection proceedings, including petitions for termination of parental rights, are civil matters.   See also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 634, 842 A.2d 1124 (2004);  In re Shonna K., 77 Conn.App. 246, 253, 822 A.2d 1009 (2003).   As in other civil matters, “[t]he entry of a default constitutes an admission by the defendant of the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint”;  DeBlasio v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 186 Conn. 398, 400, 441 A.2d 838 (1982);  and thereby conclusively establishes that the petitioner has prevailed on each of the elements at issue in the adjudicatory phase of this proceeding.  Commissioner of Social Services v. Smith, 265 Conn. 723, 732–33, 830 A.2d 228 (2003) (respondent in child support proceeding who fails to respond to pleadings “is deemed to have judicially admitted the underlying facts of the support petition”);  see also Bank of America, FSB v. Franco, 57 Conn.App. 688, 693, 751 A.2d 394 (2000).   Under Practice Book § 35a–8, when a party is defaulted for failing to appear in a TPR proceeding, the court may then take evidence and render judgment.   In view of the gravity of the TPR issues at hand, however, the court has considered the petitioner's evidence on the specific adjudicatory grounds alleged to terminate father's parental rights to the child, in this case abandonment and failure to rehabilitate..  FN2. Practice Book § 32a–2(a) provides that child protection proceedings, including petitions for termination of parental rights, are civil matters.   See also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 634, 842 A.2d 1124 (2004);  In re Shonna K., 77 Conn.App. 246, 253, 822 A.2d 1009 (2003).   As in other civil matters, “[t]he entry of a default constitutes an admission by the defendant of the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint”;  DeBlasio v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 186 Conn. 398, 400, 441 A.2d 838 (1982);  and thereby conclusively establishes that the petitioner has prevailed on each of the elements at issue in the adjudicatory phase of this proceeding.  Commissioner of Social Services v. Smith, 265 Conn. 723, 732–33, 830 A.2d 228 (2003) (respondent in child support proceeding who fails to respond to pleadings “is deemed to have judicially admitted the underlying facts of the support petition”);  see also Bank of America, FSB v. Franco, 57 Conn.App. 688, 693, 751 A.2d 394 (2000).   Under Practice Book § 35a–8, when a party is defaulted for failing to appear in a TPR proceeding, the court may then take evidence and render judgment.   In view of the gravity of the TPR issues at hand, however, the court has considered the petitioner's evidence on the specific adjudicatory grounds alleged to terminate father's parental rights to the child, in this case abandonment and failure to rehabilitate.

FN3. The commissioner also alleges other grounds.   It is unnecessary to address them since a finding of one ground is sufficient..  FN3. The commissioner also alleges other grounds.   It is unnecessary to address them since a finding of one ground is sufficient.

FN4. There was some evidence that Chelsea has called the foster mother to inquire about Robert..  FN4. There was some evidence that Chelsea has called the foster mother to inquire about Robert.

Foley, Francis J., J.T.R.