State of Connecticut v. Sentinel Coach, Inc. aka Sentinel Limousine, Inc. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This is a motor vehicle matter in which the State of Connecticut (“State”) has charged the defendant, Sentinel Coach, Inc. a/k/a Sentinel Limousine, Inc. (“defendant”), with violations of General Statutes §§ 14–27(d) and 13b–103(a).   The following memorandum will discuss the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The defendant is a Rhode Island corporation in the business of operating motor vehicles in livery service.   In early 2012, David Demick, the logistics manager for the defendant, received a phone call from Carmelo D'Agostino asking if he could hire the defendant for a round trip excursion in a H2 Stretch Hummer (“Hummer”) limousine on May 11, 2012.   Specifically, Mr. D'Agostino wanted to hire the defendant to transport his daughter and her friends in the stretch Hummer from Rocky Hill, Connecticut to the Aqua Turf banquet facility in Plantsville, Connecticut for their prom and then return these individuals to Rocky Hill. Mr. Demick advised Mr. D'Agostino that the defendant could not be hired for that trip because the company did not do point-to-point trips within the State of Connecticut.

Later that day, Mr. D'Agostino contacted Mr. Demick and indicated that he wanted to hire the defendant for a different May 11, 2012 itinerary.   The new itinerary included a one-way transport of a woman named Fran Haley from Westerly, Rhode Island to Rocky Hill, Connecticut in the Hummer.   After the drop off of Ms. Haley, the defendant was to proceed with a round-trip transport of Mr. D'Agostino's daughter and her friends from Rocky Hill, Connecticut to Plantsville, Connecticut for the prom and then back to Rocky Hill. The defendant agreed to this itinerary.

The evidence presented shows that on May 11, 2012, the Hummer made several stops consistent with the agreed upon itinerary.   Among the stops made were stops at 378 Old Post Road in Westerly, Rhode Island, 92 Sandy Drive in Rocky Hill, Connecticut, 22 Whitewood Drive in Rocky Hill, Connecticut and 644 Mulberry Street in Plantsville, Connecticut.

The above itinerary was not completed.   On May 11, 2012, the Connecticut Department of Transportation and Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles were conducting a joint investigation into illegal operation of livery service vehicles in the State of Connecticut.   The Hummer operated by one of the defendant's employees arrived at the Aqua Turf banquet facility in Plantsville, Connecticut.   The officer observed that the Hummer had Rhode Island license plates.   The vehicle was stopped and inside the vehicle were several teenagers who were going to the Aqua Turf to celebrate their prom.   Other than the driver, there were no other adults in the vehicle.

The driver was questioned and it was later determined that the defendant's vehicle was not registered for livery service in the State of Connecticut.   The vehicle also had no Connecticut livery plates.   The defendant was subsequently charged with violations of General Statutes §§ 14–27(d) and 13b–103(a).

This matter was tried before a magistrate on November 5, 2012.   Following the magistrate's decision, the defendant filed a demand for a trial de novo in accordance with General Statutes § 51–193u and Practice Book § 44–30.   On May 15, 2013, this matter was tried to the court.

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION

The state has the burden of proving that the defendant is guilty of the offenses with which they are charged.   This means that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element necessary to constitute the offenses charged.

The applicable statutes in this matter are General Statutes §§ 13b–103(a) and 14–27(d).  Section § 13b–103(a)(1) provides, in relevant part:

No person, association, limited liability company or corporation shall operate a motor vehicle in livery service until such person, association, limited liability company or corporation has obtained a permit from the Department of Transportation, specifying the nature and extent of the service to be rendered and certifying that public convenience and necessity will be improved by the operation and conduct of such livery service.

Section § 14–27(d) provides, in relevant part:

Each motor vehicle in livery service shall carry number plates to be furnished by the commissioner, which number plates shall indicate that such vehicle is licensed for livery service.

The defendant does not dispute that on May 11, 2012, it did not have a State of Connecticut livery permit and that the Hummer was being used in livery service and did not have State of Connecticut livery plates.   Instead, the defendant argues that it cannot be found guilty of the above charges because the above-referenced statutes apply to livery service vehicles engaged in intrastate commerce and that at all relevant times, it was engaged in interstate commerce.   The defendant argues that because the Hummer was engaged in interstate travel, federal law, not state law, is controlling.   This court will construe the defendant's defense as an affirmative defense as it appears to justify or excuse the acts charged.  General Statutes § 53a–12(b) provides that “[w]hen a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.”

Several decisions have guided courts in the determination of what constitutes interstate and intrastate commerce.  “The question whether commerce is interstate or intrastate must be determined by the ‘essential character of the commerce’ ․ [G]oods ultimately destined for shipment to another state acquire the character of interstate commerce as soon as they begin their journey, even though there is a temporary break in transit in the state of origin ․ The character of a shipment is determined from evidential circumstances surrounding the movement ․ The facts of each case must be evaluated to determine the essential nature of the contested shipments and whether they are intrastate.”   (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Roberts, 344 N.W.2d 407, 409 (Minn.1984);  see also Century Indemnity Co. v. Carlson, 133 F.3d 591, 597 (8th Cir.1998).

Additionally, “[e]ven if a carrier's transportation does not cross state lines, the interstate commerce requirement is satisfied if the goods being transported ․ are involved in a ‘practical continuity of movement’ in the flow of interstate commerce.”  Bilyou v. Dutchess Beer Distributors, Inc., 300 F.3d 217, 223 (2d Cir.2002).  “A temporary pause in the transit [of goods] does not mean that they are no longer ‘in commerce’ ․ [I]f the halt in the movement of goods is a convenient intermediate step in the process of getting them to their final destinations, they remain ‘in commerce’ until they reach those points.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 224.

The case of State of Texas v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 92 F.2d 104 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 747, 58 S.Ct. 265, 82 L.Ed. 578 (1937), is illustrative of the above principles.   In that case, the plaintiff was a raw cotton dealer with headquarters in Houston, Texas.   The plaintiff would buy cotton from producers in Texas.   That cotton was transported from various points in Texas to Houston via railroads run by the defendant railway companies.   The cotton that was shipped from within Texas to Houston was ultimately shipped out of Texas to other states or foreign countries.   The court found that the shipments of the cotton were interstate in nature.   The court found that at the time the cotton was purchased, it was the plaintiff's intention that the cotton be ultimately be shipped to other states and foreign countries.   The court noted that “[i]f the shipment comes to rest within the state of origin and the goods are thereafter disposed of locally, the interstate character of the shipment is lost, but temporary stoppage within the state, made necessary in furtherance of the interstate carriage, does not change its character.”  Id., 107.   The interstate character of the shipments was not lost even though they stopped in Houston.   In support of this finding, the court noted that the bales of cotton from beginning to end were identical and that the stoppage in Houston was temporary and slight.  Id.

In Great Northern Railway Co. v. Thompson, 222 F.Sup. 573 (D.N.D.1963), the court faced a similar dilemma in determining the character of shipments of electrical cable manufactured in Texas and delivered to designated missile sites in North Dakota.   The cable was transported by rail from Texas to several rail-truck transloading points located in North Dakota.   Upon its arrival, the cable would be unloaded either directly onto flatbed trucks and delivered to the missile sites or unloaded and stored until such time as a truck was available to transport the cable to the missile sites.   Prior to its shipment from Texas, each reel had a coded designation stenciled on it which identified the exact missile site to which it was to be delivered.   The entire movement of the reels from Texas to the installation site was under the control of one carrier, the plaintiff.   In finding that the essential character of the shipment was interstate in nature, the court noted that the rail transportation and the movement by truck of the same cable reels “were connected parts of a continuing interstate movement.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 584.   The fact that there was a temporary delay at the railheads did not cause a delay in the continuity of transit of those identical goods.

The Second Circuit recently discussed the meaning of “interstate commerce” within the context of the federal Motor Carrier Act of 1980 (“Motor Carrier Act”) and § 18 of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C. § 31138 (“Bus Act”).   In Lyons v. Lancer Ins. Co., 681 F.3d 50 (2d Cir.2012) cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 1242, 185 L.Ed.2d 178 (2013), one of the plaintiffs was injured when a school bus driven by the insured's employee struck the plaintiff's vehicle during the course of an intrastate trip to transport students locally within the State of New York. The plaintiffs sued the insured's insurance company seeking a declaratory judgment declaring that the insured's insurance company was obligated to pay the plaintiffs the amount of the unpaid judgment that the plaintiffs secured in a state court negligence action against the insured bus company.   The basis of the claim was that at the time of the accident, the insured's bus was being used for hire as an interstate transporter and that the insurer was therefore obligated by the federally mandated Form MCS–90B endorsement ¹ in the insured's policy with the defendant to pay the negligence action judgment.

The plaintiffs argued that the interstate commerce requirement was satisfied in that the driver of the bus that was carrying school children was erroneously dispatched to the school and should have been on an interstate trip at the time of the accident.   The plaintiffs also argued in the alternative that the MCS–90B endorsement imposed federal liability in the defendant insurer even if the bus was on a purely intrastate trip.   The Second Circuit found neither of these arguments compelling, finding that the MCS90B endorsement did not apply to a trip that “neither did nor was intended to cross a state border.”  Id., 61.

In various contexts relating to the transport of property, the question of whether transportation is of an interstate nature is determined by looking to the intent of the goods' seller or shipper with respect to the goods' destination.  Klitzke v. Steiner Corp., 110 F.3d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir.1997) ( “[W]hether transportation is interstate or intrastate is determined by the essential character of the commerce, manifested by shipper's fixed and persisting transportation intent at the time of the shipment ․”) (internal quotation marks omitted);  Foxworthy v. Hiland Dairy Co., 997 F.2d 670, 672 (10th Cir.1993) (“[C]rucial to a determination of the essential character of a shipment is the shipper's fixed and persisting intent at the time of shipment”) (internal quotation marks omitted).   In Lyons, the court noted that the shipper is the entity that purchases the transportation services of the carrier.  Lyons v. Lancer Ins. Co., supra, 681 F.3d at 59.   The court further noted that “the term ‘shipper’ is not normally associated with passenger travel ․ See generally S. Sorkin, Goods in Transit § 3.03 (2011) ( ‘It has been held that the destination intended by the passenger or shipper at the commencement of the journey or shipment and known to the carrier determines the character of the commerce’).”  (Citations omitted;  emphasis omitted;  italics omitted.)  Id. The court found that the “shippers” of the students to and from the school were the parents of the students and the school, not the bus company.   In granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court found that “no rational juror could find that the parents or the school intended that the school bus, in transporting the students between the school and the specified drop-off locations [on the date of the accident], would travel through a State other than New York.” Id.

The aforementioned cases are helpful to this court's findings in the present case.   The evidence establishes that Carmelo D'Agostino, the “shipper,” hired the defendant for two, separate trips on May 11, 2012, one interstate and one intrastate.   The trip involving Fran Haley was an interstate trip in that it was intended to begin in Rhode Island and end in Connecticut.   The trip involving Mr. D'Agostino's daughter and her friends, an entirely different group of “goods,” was an intrastate trip in that it was intended to begin and end within the State of Connecticut.   These findings are supported by the evidence which indicates that Ms. Haley was not present when the defendant's vehicle was stopped at the Aqua Turf. The defendant's trip log also showed that there was at least one stop in Rocky Hill before the pickup of Mr. D'Agostino's daughter and her friends which would be consistent with the one-way itinerary that Mr. D'Agostino intended for Ms. Haley.   Unlike the Anderson, Clayton & Co. and Great Northern Railway cases, where the transported goods were identical from point-to-point, the people transported from point-to-point in this case are different.   There is, therefore, no continuity of movement in the “goods” being transported.   Accordingly, the court finds that at the time the defendant's vehicle was stopped, it was engaged in intrastate activity and that Connecticut law applies.

III. CONCLUSION

The court finds that the State has established beyond a reasonable doubt that on May 11, 2012, the defendant violated General Statutes §§ 14–27(d) and 13b–103(a).   There are no defenses to preclude findings of guilty on these two counts.   Accordingly, the following sentences are imposed:

On the charge pursuant to General Statutes § 14–27(d), the court finds the defendant GUILTY.   The sentence is a $50 fine plus fees and costs.

On the charge pursuant to General Statutes § 13b–103(a), the court finds the defendant GUILTY.   The sentence is a $250 fine plus costs and fees.

SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT

LAURA F. BALDINI

JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

FOOTNOTES

FN1. In the Lyons case, the court noted that federal law required that “a motor carrier for hire engaging in the interstate transportation of passengers, e.g., transportation between a place in a State and a place in another State or between two places in the same State but passing through another State, provide evidence of financial responsibility.”  Lyons v. Lancer Ins. Co., supra, 681 F.3d 52–53.  “Such financial responsibility could be established by evidence of insurance ․ reflected in an insurance policy endorsement on ‘Form MCS–90B,’ 49 C.F.R. § 387.31(d)(1).   That form stated that the insurer agreed to pay, within the limits of the policy to which the endorsement was attached, ‘any final judgment recovered against the insured for public liability resulting from negligence in the operation, maintenance or use of motor vehicles subject to the financial responsibility requirements of Section 18 of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, regardless of ․ whether or not such negligence occurs on any route or in any territory authorized to be served by the insured or elsewhere.’  “ (Citation omitted;  emphasis omitted.)  Id., 53..  FN1. In the Lyons case, the court noted that federal law required that “a motor carrier for hire engaging in the interstate transportation of passengers, e.g., transportation between a place in a State and a place in another State or between two places in the same State but passing through another State, provide evidence of financial responsibility.”  Lyons v. Lancer Ins. Co., supra, 681 F.3d 52–53.  “Such financial responsibility could be established by evidence of insurance ․ reflected in an insurance policy endorsement on ‘Form MCS–90B,’ 49 C.F.R. § 387.31(d)(1).   That form stated that the insurer agreed to pay, within the limits of the policy to which the endorsement was attached, ‘any final judgment recovered against the insured for public liability resulting from negligence in the operation, maintenance or use of motor vehicles subject to the financial responsibility requirements of Section 18 of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, regardless of ․ whether or not such negligence occurs on any route or in any territory authorized to be served by the insured or elsewhere.’  “ (Citation omitted;  emphasis omitted.)  Id., 53.

Baldini, Laura F., J.