LLC v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint in that the plaintiff has failed to conform to certain provisions within the subject fire insurance policy, namely, the submission of a statement proof of loss.   The defense claims that such a failure to submit prevents the court from having jurisdiction over the subject fire insurance policy, and/or any claims made thereunder.

The plaintiff has amended the complaint by alleging the correct date of loss as being February 18, 2011, not 2010.   The plaintiff has alleged in paragraph 7 of its amended complaint that it has met all the “terms conditions and requirements” of the policy and therefore the subject policy is within the jurisdiction of the court.   This language was in the plaintiff's amended complaint and appears to conform with the standard form of complaint prescribed by Connecticut civil practice form 304.24, Vol. 2 Connecticut Practice, 4th edition.

The issue becomes whether or not, there is any relief that the plaintiff can turn to that would ameliorate the strict interpretation of the statutory provisions of Connecticut General Statutes § 38a–307 and further language of the subject fire policy itself.   In the statutory reference in the paragraph entitled “Requirements in case loss occurs,” “the insured shall render to this company a proof of loss” within 60 days after the loss.

The court looks at certain cases that may provide some relief to the plaintiff based on whether or not the insurer was prejudiced or deceived in any material way.  Chauser v. Niagara Fire Insurance Co., 123 Conn. 423 (1937);  Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Murphy, 206 Conn 409, 410 (1988);  Arrowood Indemnity Co. v. King, 304 Conn. 179 (2012).

In the Aetna Casualty case, the court quotes Judge B. Cardozo in the celebrated case of Jacob and Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921), which discusses the interpretation of contracts in which Judge Cardozo is quoted.

This court finds, as did the Aetna Casualty court that “(S)tandardized contracts of insurance continue to be prime examples of contracts of adhesions, whose most salient feature is that they are not subject to the normal bargaining processes of ordinary contracts.”  Id. pg. 416.

The plaintiff has made the basic allegations that he is in conformity with the terms of the insurance contract, and therefore the court feels that further factual inquiry by way of discovery is necessary as to whether or not the plaintiff has complied with the contract in a material fashion.   The plaintiff's amended complaint is found to be sufficient without prejudice to the defendant.   Therefore, the defense motion to dismiss is denied.

BY THE COURT

V. ROCHE, J.

Roche, Vincent E., J.