Mary Givens v. St. Adalbert Church et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANTS HARTFORD ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESAN CORPORATION AND ST. ADALBERT CHURCH'S MOTION TO DISMISS (# 125)

The Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation (hereinafter “HRCD”) and St. Adalbert Church Corporation (hereinafter “SACC”) have brought a motion to dismiss all counts of the complaint against them for the reason that the adjudication of the common law plaintiff's claims would result in “excessive entanglement” of the court in matters of religion and the internal governance and procedures of a religious institution, in violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article First, § 3 of the Connecticut Constitution.

In the alternative, the defendants suggest that if the plaintiffs causes of action can be adjudicated without violating the first amendment and Article First, § 3, the court should dismiss certain subject matters set forth in the complaint because they clearly infringe on matters of religious doctrine and church governance.

The defendant has, for the most part, adopted and incorporate the arguments made by co-defendant, The Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation (hereinafter “NRCD”), in its motion to dismiss (Docket Entry # 119).   This court has, of even date herewith, issued a memorandum of decision as to that motion to dismiss, and reference is made to that memorandum.   The facts, procedural background, legal standard of review and legal analysis relevant to the current motion have been fully set forth in that memorandum and, in the interests of expediting a decision on the pending motion, will not be repeated here.

To supplement the arguments made by NRCD, HRCD and SACC have also directed the court to a very recent decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington:  Erdman v. Chapel Hill Presbyterian Church, 286 P.2d 357 (2012).   In that case the Washington Supreme Court found, based in part on its analysis of Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 565 U.S. 132 S.Ct. 694, 181 L.Ed.2d 650 (2012), that civil court adjudication of a negligent supervision claim in that case would interfere with a religious institution's selection and supervision of its ministers, in violation of the First Amendment.

This court has closely reviewed the Erdman decision, including the concurrences of Justices Alexander, Fairhurst and Chambers.   This court agrees with the assessment of Justice Chambers succinctly rendered in his concurrence:

The lead opinion states that “a civil court violates both religion clauses when it allows claims of negligent retention and negligent supervision of ministers to go forward.”   Lead opinion at 27.   This statement is breathtaking:  it implies that no claim of negligent retention or supervision, no matter how appalling the conduct, could ever go forward against a church based on the misconduct of its clergy.   The case the lead opinion relies upon the most, Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch v. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, U.S. 132 S.Ct. 694 L.Ed.2d (2012), neither considers that proposition nor supports that conclusion.  Erdman v. Chapel Hill Presbyterian Church, 286 P.2d 357 (Chambers, concurring) (Oct. 4, 2012).

In Hosanna–Tabor, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly found that the ministerial exception applied solely in the context of an employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a minister and explicitly cautioned that it “express[ed] no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits ․” Id., 710.   The undersigned does not find the majority holding in Erdman either controlling or persuasive.   The court believes it may adjudicate these claims without violating First Amendment rights by using the issue-sensitive approach discussed in Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 301 Conn. 759, 769, 23 A.3d 1192 (2011).

In their motion to dismiss, HRCD and SACC suggest that, even if the court finds that it has the ability to adjudicate the plaintiff's claims stemming from sexual abuse, there other aspects of the plaintiff's claims which should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because they are unrelated to sexual misconduct and infringe upon matters of church doctrine and church governance.   The court agrees.

Therefore, the court grants the motion to dismiss as to the subject matter of the following specific paragraphs of the complaint which, because they would inevitably require the court to consider and decide disputed issues of religious doctrine and practice that are matters not within this court's jurisdiction to adjudicate:

Paragraph 4 of the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth Seventh and Eighth Counts, which alleges:

At all times relevant to this action, the defendant St. Adalbert, was subject to the constitution, canons, rules, regulations and discipline of the Roman Catholic Church as administered by and through the Hartford Diocese, its agents, servants and employees.

That portion of Paragraph 9 of the First Count, which alleges:

exploiting his position as a priest, educator, spiritual advisor, mentor, religious leader and agent, servant, or employee of St. Adalbert and/or Hartford Diocese ․

Paragraph 13 of the First Count, Paragraph 14 of the Second Count, Paragraph 13 of the Fourth and Fifth Counts, and Paragraph 14 of the Seventh and Eighth Counts, which alleges:

As a further result, the plaintiff, who was at the time of the events complained of, a practicing Catholic, has sustained spiritual damage.

Paragraph 9 of the Seventh Count, which alleges:

The defendant Hartford Diocese is, and was at all times material to this complaint, subject to the constitution, canons, rules, regulations and discipline of the Roman Catholic Church as administered by and through its Diocese, its agents, servants and employees.

Paragraph 9 of the Seventh Count, which alleges:

The defendant St. Adalbert is, and was at all times material to this complaint, subject to the constitution, canons, rules, regulations and discipline of the Roman Catholic Church as administered by and through its Diocese, its agents, servants and employees.

As to these areas of dispute, the plaintiff has not sustained her burden to show that the controversy in issue is outside the constitutional bar, such that secular court jurisdiction attaches.   See, Thibodeau v. American Baptist Churches of Connecticut, 120 Conn.App. 666, 674–75, 994 A.2d 212, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 901, 3 A.3d 74 (2010).

The Motion to Dismiss is therefore granted as to those portions of the complaint referenced herein.   In all other respects, the Motion to Dismiss is denied.

BY THE COURT,

Sheridan, J.

Sheridan, David M., J.