IN RE: Domenic M.1 (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON REVOCATION OF COMMITMENT

Tachelle J. is the mother of Domenic M., born August 30, 2010.   The child, Tachelle J., Domenic's father Robert M., and the Commissioner, department of children and families (DCF or the department) have long engaged in litigation concerning Domenic's status and the respondents' ability and/or willingness to serve as appropriate parenting resources for their son.   Domenic has been in DCF's custody since October 2010;  he was committed to DCF on January 21, 2011.

The court now addresses the issues raised through Tachelle J.'s Motion to Revoke Commitment, filed on June 15, 2012, and DCF's objection to that motion, filed on June 19, 2012.   Tachelle J. claims that cause for Domenic's commitment no longer exists, that revocation would be in the child's best interests, and that commitment should therefore be revoked.   The department argues that revocation must be denied as cause for commitment still exists.

After trial, the court finds insufficient legal or factual grounds to support either the claim that cause for commitment no longer exists, or that Domenic's best interests would be served by revocation.   Rather, the court finds that Tachelle J. remains affected by the unresolved issues that adversely impacted her parenting, caused Domenic's removal from her care, and led to his commitment.   The evidence cannot reasonably support a finding that Tachelle J.'s underlying mental health issues have been adequately controlled;  that she has a realistic understanding of her son's abilities and limitations;  that she possesses the capacity or willingness to acquire the parenting skills necessary to address Domenic's behavioral and/or developmental issues even with reasonable support services;  or that she can provide safe, effective parenting or housing for Domenic.

For these reasons, and as further discussed herein, the movant has failed to meet her burden of proof on the revocation issues.   Accordingly, Tachelle J.'s June 15, 2012 Motion to Revoke Commitment is DENIED, while DCF's Objection thereto is SUSTAINED.

I

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following procedural history is relevant to the court's analysis of the parties' claims, and explains the impact of this extended litigation upon Domenic and his family.²  See In re Paulo O., 141 Conn.App. 477, 480, 62 A.3d 637 (2013).

DCF executed a statutory hold for Domenic on October 20, 2010, when Domenic was almost two months old, one day after Tachelle J. was arrested for a larceny at which the child was allegedly present.   On October 22, 2010, the court (Eschuk, J.) granted the department's ex parte application for an Order of Temporary custody (OTC) and vested his custody with DCF. With the OTC, the court imposed specific steps for each respondent-parent that required, among other things:  their cooperation with DCF;  participation in parenting and individual counseling to learn appropriate parenting/childcare techniques;  compliance with the law and avoidance of domestic violence;  maintenance of adequate housing and legal income;  and visitation with Domenic.   Robert M. was ordered to engage in drug testing and treatment at the Morris Foundation, while Tachelle J. was ordered to comply with mental health treatment recommendations through the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services (DMHAS).

DCF also filed a neglect petition on October 22, 2010 alleging that while Domenic was in his mother's care, he was being denied proper care and attention, and/or was being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to his well-being.   The department claimed that Tachelle J. had unaddressed mental health issues;  had exposed Dominic to inappropriate caretakers;  was transient;  and had participated in criminal activities with the infant present.   The department further claimed that Robert M. had been violent in Domenic's presence, leading to his arrest and the issuance of protective orders, and that he lacked stable housing.

At the October 29, 2010 preliminary OTC hearing, Robert M. raised no contest OTC and indicated his intention to stand silent as to the neglect allegations.   At Tachelle J.'s request, a contested OTC hearing was scheduled for 9:00am on November 2, 2010.   When Tachelle J. failed to timely appear on that date, the court (Eschuk, J.) consolidated the OTC issues with the neglect petition and granted DCF's motion to default the respondent-mother.   When Tachelle J. appeared just before 10:00 am, the court granted her motion to open the default.   After hearing, the court adjudicated Domenic neglected on the ground of conditions injurious, maintained his temporary custody with DCF, and scheduled trial of the dispositional issues for 9:30 am on January 21, 2011.³

On that date, before trial, this court accepted the parties' agreement for Domenic's commitment to DCF. Tachelle J. was given final steps which, among other things, ordered her to:  continue to engage in individual group counseling and case management services through DHMAS;  comply with the law;  receive parenting counseling and coaching through the Connect–to–Kids and Family Reunification programs;  and participate in domestic violence prevention services through the Safe Haven–DOVE program.   The department was ordered to provide transportation so Tachelle J. could attend services, and to pay for a cognitive assessment of the respondent mother.   No new steps were issued for Robert M., so his OTC steps remained in effect by default.

On March 31, 2011, Tachelle J. filed her first motion to revoke Domenic's commitment.   DCF filed its objection on April 26, 2011 as it still required “more assessment” of the respondent-mother's cognitive limitations “in terms of her decision-making.”   The parties agreed to follow the service providers' recommendations regarding visits, and Tachelle J. withdrew this revocation motion on August 2, 2011.

On August 29, 2011, the department filed a motion for an individual, clinical and intellectual evaluation of Tachelle J., with an interactional evaluation, to be conducted by psychologist Bernard Barile.   At the September 7, 2011 hearing of this motion, Tachelle J. objected.   The court (Eschuk J.) denied DCF's motion, without prejudice.

On February 27, 2012, Tachelle J. moved for “overnight unsupervised visits” with Domenic;  DCF filed its objection on March 7, 2012.   On March 14, 2012, the court (Eschuk, J.) denied the motion, without prejudice, as avenues for administrative relief had not yet been exhausted.

On May 2, 2012, the court (Wahla, J.) granted the motion for appointment of a Guardian ad Litem (GAL) that had been filed by Domenic's attorney.

On April 18, 2012, Tachelle J. moved to transfer Domenic's guardianship to her own mother, Tasheaka J. DCF's objection, filed April 30, 2011, argued that:  the maternal grandmother had two investigation reports in the past six months;  a current open DCF investigation;  and that Tachelle J. was removed from but never returned to her care.   Domenic's attorney filed his objection on that same date, alleging, in part, that the maternal grandmother had a significant history with DCF and that the child had specialized behavioral needs that required a more qualified caregiver.   Trial of the respondent-mother's motion to transfer guardianship was set for July 9, 2012.   However, Tachelle J. withdrew her motion on June 11, 2012, before the hearing.

On June 15, 2012, Tachelle J. filed the pending motion to revoke commitment.   DCF filed its objection on June 19, 2012 arguing, inter alia, that the respondent-mother had not been fully compliant with her mental health counseling, and that she continued to have a relationship with Robert M., who had abused her in the past.

On August 8, 2012, while the revocation issues remained pending, DCF filed a permanency plan seeking termination of parental rights and adoption, to which the respondent-mother objected.   On that date, the plan was modified in court to include an agreed upon concurrent plan of reunification with either parent.   This court approved the amended plan was on the date it was filed.⁴

On August 13, 2012, Tachelle J. moved for increased visitation with Domenic.   DCF filed its objection to this motion on August 16, 2012, identifying the child's special needs as including “receptive and expressive language disorder and sensory regulation issues” and claiming that his Birth to Three Services and therapeutic day care programs would be disrupted if visits are tendered for more than six hours per week.   On August 29, 2012, the court (Eschuk, J.) overruled DCF's objection and granted the respondent-mother's motion.

The revocation trial commenced on September 14, 2012.   The parties stipulated as to the following causes for Domenic's January 21, 2011 commitment:  Tachelle's unresolved mental health issues;  her involvement with domestic violence;  her need to acquire parenting skills;  her lack of appropriate housing;  and her youth and inexperience as a mother.   December 3, 2012 was assigned as the second day of trial.

On November 13, 2012, prior to the next hearing date, through counsel, Domenic moved for an “individual, clinical and intellectual evaluation” to be conducted upon Tachelle J., to “yield more insight into the Respondent Mother's ability to meet the criteria for reunification and determine what is in the child's best interests.”

On November 29, 2012, just prior to the second day of the revocation trial, DCF filed a petition seeking termination of Tachelle J.'s and Robert M.'s parental rights (TPR) to Domenic.⁵  DCF alleged that it had made reasonable efforts to locate these parents and to reunify the child with the respondent-mother;  that Robert M. had abandoned his son and that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between them;  that neither Tachelle J. nor Robert M. had achieved statutory rehabilitation;  and that Domenic's best interests would be served by TPR.⁶

After hearing administrative issues related to the revocation issues on December 3, 2012, this court granted Domenic's motion for the evaluations, and further ordered a mother-child interactional assessment to be conducted by a psychologist designated by the court service officer.   Additional dates for the revocation trial were assigned.⁷

On December 19, 2012, the court (Eschuk, J.) found that Tachelle J. and Robert M. had failed to appear with regard to the duly served TPR petition.   The court defaulted Robert M., subject to proof of publication notice.   The court received testimony from a DCF social worker, found that the respondent-mother had been properly served, and defaulted Tachelle J. on the TPR petition, without prejudice.

On January 7, 2013, when Tachelle J. appeared for the continued trial of the revocation issues, this court granted her motion to open her TPR default.   The revocation trial continued on January 8, and another day of trial was scheduled for January 14, 2013.

Tachelle J. gave birth to a daughter, Amaira J., on January 12, 2013.⁸  With the agreement of counsel for Tachelle J., the revocation trial continued on January 14, 2013 in her absence.

Domenic's revocation trial was next heard on April 1;  evidence concluded on April 5, 2013.   Given the nature of the parties' closing argument, the court ordered briefs concerning the proper legal standard the court to employ when addressing a child's “best interests” in this revocation case.   On April 19, 2013, Tachelle J. filed her Memorandum of Law urging the court to utilize the criteria set forth by General Statutes § 46b–56(c) when addressing the best interests aspect of the revocation issues.   On May 7, 2013, DCF filed its responsive Memorandum of Law concurring that the court “is free to consider the factors” set forth in § 46b–56(c) when addressing the best interests issues in revocation proceedings.⁹

II

APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Read fairly, Tachelle J.'s motion presents a request for the relief authorized by General Statutes § 46b–129(m).¹⁰  Practice Book § 35a–14A implements the protocol for achieving this relief by providing, in relevant part:  “Where a child is committed to the custody of the commissioner of the department of children and families, a parent ․ may file a motion seeking revocation of commitment.   The judicial authority may revoke commitment if a cause for commitment no longer exists and it is in the best interests of the child ․ Whether to revoke the commitment is a dispositional question, based on the prior adjudication, and the judicial authority shall determine whether to revoke the commitment upon a fair preponderance of the evidence.   The party seeking revocation of commitment has the burden of proof that no cause for commitment exists.   If the burden is met, the party opposing the revocation has the burden of proof that the revocation would not be in the best interests of the child.”  (Emphasis added.)   See also In re Janazia S., 112 Conn.App. 69, 83, 961 A.2d 1036 (2009), citing In re Sarah S., 110 Conn.App. 576, 582, 955 A.2d 657 (2008).   As Tachelle J. has moved for revocation of commitment, she bears the burden of establishing the preliminary grounds for such relief.   In re Cameron C., 103 Conn.App. 746, 752, 930 A.2d 826 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 906, 942 A.2d 414 (2008).

It is well-acknowledged that “[t]he parent-child relationship presents an ongoing dynamic that cannot be frozen in time.”  In re Brianna F., 50 Conn.App. 805, 814, 719 A.2d 478 (1998) (considering parenting history in the context of a TPR proceeding).   See also In re Mia M., 127 Conn.App. 363, 373, 14 A.3d 1024 (2011);  In re Anna Lee M., 104 Conn.App. 121, 128, 931 A.2d 949, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 939, 937 A.2d 696 (2007) (in TPR case, historical perspective of respondent's child caring and parenting abilities is relevant).   Accordingly, the court has considered the entire picture of the relationship between Domenic and Tachelle J., and the roles attributable to Robert M. and baby Amaira, when resolving the pending revocation issues.

It is axiomatic that the testimony of professionals is given significant weight in child protection proceedings.  “ ‘It is well established that [i]n a case tried before a court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific testimony ․ The credibility and the weight of expert testimony is judged by the same standard, and the trial court is privileged to adopt whatever testimony [it] reasonably believes to be credible ․ It is the quintessential function of the fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence, and to believe or disbelieve any expert testimony ․ The trier may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of an expert offered by one party or the other.’  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 781–82, 740 A.2d 896 (1999).”  In re Jason R., 129 Conn.App. 746, 772–73, 23 A.3d 18 (2011).

In considering whether a cause for commitment still exists, and in determining Domenic's best interests in the revocation context, the court has also acknowledged the legal standard for measuring parental functions:  “The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes:  (1) express love and affection for the child;  (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child;  (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing and medical care;  (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile;  and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Lukas K., 120 Conn.App. 465, 487–88, 992 A.2d 1142 (2010), aff'd, 300 Conn. 463, 14 A.3d 990 (2011), quoting In re Angellica W., 49 Conn.App. 541, 551, 714 A.2d 1265 (1998).

In child protection proceedings, the court will apply the “best interests” language of § 46b–129(m) if the movant meets her burden of proving that cause for commitment no longer exists.  “[T]he determination of a child's best interest is generally a fact intensive inquiry.   See, e.g., Malave v. Ortiz, 114 Conn.App. 414, 421–22, 970 A.2d 743 (2009) (‘[t]he best interest standard ․ is inherently flexible and fact specific and gives the court discretion to consider all of the different and individualized factors that might affect a specific child's best interest’) ․ [F]requently, either the facts or the inferences to be drawn therefrom are disputed by the parties.   For these reasons, revocation hearings sometimes entail lengthy proceedings involving multiple witnesses.   See, e.g., In re Cameron C., [supra, 103 Conn.App.760], (revocation hearing conducted under § 46b–129[m] occurred over period of fifteen days and involved testimony of thirteen witnesses and ․ forty exhibits).”  In re Shanaira C., 297 Conn. 737, 760–61, 1 A.3d 5 (2010).

In motions for custody modification heard at the juvenile court, such as the respondent mother's pending motion for revocation of commitment, our Appellate Court has made it abundantly clear that the “best interests” of the child at issue are not to be measured by terms of § 46b–56(c), which is applicable only to family court matters other than juvenile proceedings.¹¹  In re Cameron C., supra, was an appeal brought by a previously custodial grandmother after the juvenile court had reinstated the respondent-father's guardianship, and returned Cameron to his custody.  In re Cameron C., supra, 103 Conn.App. 747–48.   The grandmother claimed that the juvenile court erred in utilizing the provisions of § 46b–129(m) to resolve the custody dispute.  Id., 749.   “Specifically, she claim[ed] on the basis of the language used in § 46b–56, that the subsections of that statute apply to ‘any’ custody dispute and that the [juvenile] court's use of the rebuttable presumption found in General Statutes § 46b–56b, which provides that custody should be placed with a parent rather than a nonparent, was legally incorrect.”   The Appellate court disagreed, and concluded that by using the provisions of § 46b–129(m), “the [juvenile] court applied the correct legal standard to the father's motion for custody and guardianship ․” Id., 750.   In resolving the custody dispute over Cameron, the § 46b–56b presumption was “not directly applicable” to Cameron's litigation because the juvenile court case was pursued in accordance with Chapter 815t, not in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 815j, which is applicable to other family court cases, and in which the afore-referenced presumption appears.  Id. Nonetheless, in a revocation case, “after the natural parent establishes that the cause for commitment no longer exists, the guardian is saddled with the burden of establishing that placement with the natural parent is not in the child's best interest.   The natural parent, therefore, has the benefit of a presumption that revocation of commitment is in the child's best interest.”  Id., 755–56, citing In re Stacy G., 94 Conn.App. 348, 353 n.4, 892 A.2d 1034 (2006).  “As our Supreme Court has stated, ‘parents are entitled to the presumption, absent a continuing cause for commitment, that revocation will be in the child's best interests unless the [guardian] can prove otherwise.’  In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), [177 Conn. 648, 659, 420 A.2d 875 (1979) ].”  (Emphasis added.)  In re Cameron C., supra, 103 Conn.App. 756.

Notwithstanding the legal standard promoted in both Tachelle J's. and DCF's post-trial briefs, Cameron C. clearly holds that the best interests criteria contained within § 46b–56(c) are inapposite to juvenile court proceedings.   The court found no merit in the grandmother's argument that “the court should have applied the factors set forth in § 46b–56(c), rather than § 46b–129(m), to guide its determination of what was in the best interest of the child ․ on the basis of the broad language used in § 46b–56, that subsection (c) applies to ‘any’ custody dispute.”  In re Cameron C., supra, 103 Conn.App. 753.   The court reasoned:  “The plain meaning of § 46b–56, read within the context of related statutes within chapter 815j, makes clear that this provision is intended to apply only in dissolution of marriage, legal separation and annulment actions.   There is no authority for the respondent's argument that the use of the word ‘any’ in § 46b–56 encompasses circumstances outside of those clearly provided for in the chapter heading.   To extend the provisions of § 46b–56 beyond dissolution proceedings would have the impermissible consequence of undermining the statutory scheme of commitment proceedings.”  (Emphasis added;  footnote omitted.)  Id., 754.

III

FACTUAL FINDINGS

The court utilized applicable legal standards in considering the post-adjudicatory evidence.¹²  That evidence included testimony from numerous witnesses, each subject to cross examination:  DCF social workers Tanetra S. and Lisa H–W.;   Gladys R., a DMHAS case manager;  Huthanh L., a social worker from Casey Family Services (Casey);  Barbara K–G., a DMHAS nurse-clinician;  Karen B., a foster mother who had cared for Domenic;  psychologist Ralph Balducci;  Gary B., a domestic violence counselor;  and Atty. Isidro Rueda, Domenic's GAL.¹³ The exhibits included a report prepared by Dr. Balducci;  a medical center evaluation report for Domenic;  a record of the respondent-mother's attendance at the DOVE program;  a page from a 1998 psychological report for Tachelle J.;   a page reflecting a mental health physician's encounter with for her;  and a page from a report of her 2002 psychological evaluation.¹⁴

Accordingly, the court finds the following facts to have been proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence: ¹⁵

A

TACHELLE J., THE MOTHER

Tachelle J. was born on January 1, 1990.  (Ex. A.) “Ms. [J.] had been removed from her own mother's care by DCF at age six” as the result of a history of suspected sexual abuse by an uncle and physical abuse by her mother;  Tachelle J. admits having been beaten by Tasheaka J. after not performing a household chore as expected.  (Ex. A;  Court Ex. 3.) She was placed in a series of group residences, institutions and foster homes while under DCF's care;  “[a] series of hospital interventions were [pre]scribed (sic) for [Tachelle J.] as the result of suicidal ideation, aggression, and threats of self-harm from age six up until 2007.”  (Ex. A.) Tachelle J. engaged in drug use at approximately age 17;  entered a shelter;  and was placed by DCF in an out of state residential program due to her runaway behavior.   Even though she had proposed her own mother as a guardian for Domenic through her April 2012 motion, Tachelle J. has no viable relationship with Tasheaka J., whom she has described as being “bipolar as hell!”  (Ex. A.)

As an adolescent, Tachelle J. received special educational services.   Diagnosed with ADHD and PTSD, she was then reported to have a Full Scale IQ of 106.  (Court Ex. 3.) Tachelle J. left school while in the ninth or tenth grade because her “friends were either killing themselves or dying so that it was overwhelming for her and she ‘shut down and didn't care’ about further schooling.”  (Ex. A.) The respondent-mother exhibited suicidal threats, attempted overdoses, and engaged in self-mutilation from age fourteen to age twenty-one.   She started psychiatric medication but discontinued that treatment against medical advice, concluding that her short trial of medication had no beneficial effect and deciding that she would not repeat that means of attempting to stabilize her mood and impulsivity.  (Ex. A;  see also Tes. Barbara K–G.)

Never employed, Tachelle J. acknowledges “that she is set off by ‘little things' and so wants to better control that dynamic before getting a job ․” (Ex. A.) She lacks either a high school diploma or the ability to focus on work, and supports herself through “Social Security Disability entitlement due to a mood disorder” and other community benefits.   Tachelle J.'s only criminal history involves the October 2010 larceny arrest described in Part I.¹⁶

Domenic was born to Tachelle J. and Robert M. on August 30, 2010.¹⁷  (Ex. A.) During the first few months of his life, Domenic did not exhibit any of the aggressive behavior that he displayed as he became more mobile.  (Tes. Tanetra S.) DCF removed Domenic from Tachelle J.'s custody following the larceny referenced above, and upon a report that a toddler, left under her supervision, was found outside her apartment, walking in the street.   Tachelle J. accepts no responsibility for the circumstances that led to her son's entry into DCF care.  (Ex. A.)

After Domenic was born, DCF referred Tachelle J. and her son to the Catholic Families Enrichment Program (Catholic Families).   Although the provider came to the respondent-mother's home a few times in mid-September 2010, to assist with parent training and increase the likelihood that the infant could stay with his mother, Tachelle J. told the program's worker to stop coming, explaining that she had other things to do.   In October of 2010, DCF referred Tachelle J. to the New Opportunities Family Preservation Program (New Opportunities) as another effort to keep Domenic in his home.   However, when Tachelle J. was arrested and charged with Larceny in the sixth degree, she lost access to the New Opportunities program.  (Tes. Tanetra S.)

Since DCF's 2010 referral, Tachelle J. has had access to DMHAS support services.   After evaluation by a DMHAS psychiatrist, mental health treatment has been delivered through Barbara K–G., an advanced practice registered nurse at DMHAS.   DMHAS provides a case manager, Gladys R., who meets with Tachelle J. once a week and phones twice a week, helping her with entitlements, transporting her to do her laundry and to appointments, and assisting with household chores.   DMHAS also provides a “point person,” Bertha F., who spends time with the respondent-mother, takes her shopping, also assists with transportation to appointments and extends household help.   Other than DMHAS and DCF staff, Tachelle J. has neither friends nor family she can turn to for support.  (Tes. Gladys R., Barbara K–G., Tanetra S.)

On November 12, 2010, Tachelle J. was evaluated through the Western Connecticut Mental Health Network and was assigned Barbara K–G., a DMHAS advanced practice registered nurse, as her clinician.  (Ex. A, Court Ex. 2;  Tes. Barbara K–G.) At that evaluation, Tachelle J. recognized that she needed to control her moods to be an appropriate parent, and stated a desire for therapy to learn to appropriately express anger and frustration.  (Court Ex. 2.)

In April 2011, DCF referred Tachelle J. to the Connect–to–Kids program to guide her with parenting issues during supervised visits with Domenic.   Tachelle J. remained with this program for approximately 5 months, but achieved little improvement.   While she had positive interactions with her son, Tachelle J. was often distracted during visits, unable to focus upon the parent-coaching process or upon her son.  (Tes. Tanetra S.)

Tachelle J. and Robert M. have historically engaged in domestic violence.   She recognizes that he has anger issues, but still feels responsible for triggering his violence.   Although court protective orders had been put in place to protect her, Tachelle J. has, at times, allowed Robert M. to violate these orders by enabling contact with her.  (Ex. A.) To address her domestic violence issues, DCF referred Tachelle J. to an eight-week treatment program at DOVE–Safe Haven;  Tachelle J. took approximately 19 weeks to attend the course, commencing on October 18, 2011 and continuing through February 21, 2012.   (Court Ex. 1;  Tes. Gary B., Dr. Balducci.)   The DOVE program emphasizes that a victim of domestic violence should not have ongoing contact with the perpetrator.  (Tes. Gary B.) In November 2011, soon after commencing the DOVE program, Robert M. was observed exiting from Tachelle J.'s home;  Tachelle J. attempted to excuse the presence of her abuser, stating that he was merely there to pick up some things, or to move furniture, and that he would not be staying overnight.  (Tes. Huthanh L., Tanetra S.) On March 14, 2012, soon after attending her last DOVE session, Tachelle J. again allowed Robert M. to enter her home.   When DCF confronted the respondent-mother with the fact that she had again permitted herself to have contact with her abuser, Tachelle J. explained that he had come to retrieve personal belongings that for unspecified reasons still remained at her residence.¹⁸

Starting in late January 2012, before completing the DOVE program, Tachelle J. engaged in additional domestic violence counseling with Gary B. at Safe Haven.   Gary B. also educated the domestic violence victim to avoid contact with the abuser.   Tachelle J. rather consistently attended 32 out of the 40 weekly sessions with Gary B. that had been scheduled, although she inexplicably missed a number of appointments from mid-June through late July 2012.   Tachelle J. was still engaged in this counseling in September 2012, but the treatment ended on October 1, 2012 when Gary B. retired.  (Tes. Gary B., Tanetra S.)

Despite her counseling, Tachelle J. encountered Robert M. at a party sometime during the spring of 2012, intentionally had sexual relations with him, and became pregnant as a result.  (Ex. A.;   Tes. Barbara K–B., Tes. Tanetra S., Gary B., Lisa H–W.) “[The respondent-mother] termed conceiving [that] pregnancy as ‘a drunken moment’ when she was intoxicated and wanted to have sex and so preferred doing so with someone she knew [Robert M.] than someone else whom she might just be meeting ․” (Ex. A.) By December 2012, still pregnant with her second child by Robert M., Tachelle J. decided not to undergo further domestic violence counseling.  (Ex. A.)

Previously, the respondent-mother had been evicted from a one-bedroom apartment which had been well-cared for.  (Tes. Barbara K–G., Tanetra S.) Gladys R. had assisted Tachelle J. in moving out, and placing her furniture in storage.   In August 2012, Tachelle J. signed a lease with a person she identified “her sister,” and with the “sister's” two children.   This apartment had no room for Domenic or for the baby Tachelle J. was expecting.   Tachelle J. slept on a pull-out coach in the living area;  the “sister” and an unidentified male occupied one bedroom upstairs;  and the “sister's” two children occupied the other upstairs bedroom.  (Tes. Gladys R., Tanetra S.) Tachelle J. admitted that her “sister” was moving out, and that she could not afford housing on her own.  (Tes. Gladys R., Tanetra S., Barbara K–G.) Tachelle J. allowed Gladys R. to help her apply for an apartment of her own, but none were available as of the fall of 2012.  (Ex. A;  Tes. Gladys R.) At that time, again despite her counseling, Tachelle J. maintained an ongoing relationship with Robert M., insisting that they “are friends and have ‘every right to’ be ․” ¹⁹ (Ex. A.)

From September 2011 and continuing through August 2012, DCF provided Tachelle J. with parent coaching and supervised visitation through Casey's social worker, Huthanh L. Initial visits occurred in Tachelle J.'s home, when Domenic was nonverbal and non-ambulatory.   As Domenic grew and developed behavioral issues, Huthanh L. attempted to teach Tachelle J. to manage her son's pattern of temper tantrums, failure to follow directions, hitting people, and throwing food.   Tachelle J. was not fully successful in resolving these behaviors, which the Casey social worker considered to be consistent with the child's age and stage of development.   As Domenic neared his second birthday, he became very active, often running through his mother's house in an unsafe manner.   Huthanh L. attempted to teach Tachelle J. appropriate interventions to control her son's high level of activity by talking to him, rather than suddenly and physically stopping the running child, but achieved only modest success.   Although the respondent-mother was attentive to Domenic during the year that Huthanh L. worked with the family, despite her protestations that her number one priority in life was getting her son back into her care, she never learned to place her son first, and her own needs second.   In August of 2012, when Huthanh L. left Casey to pursue other employment, despite his assistance and the five months she had worked with the Connect–to–Kids program, Tachelle J. still did not exhibit the parenting skills or insight into her own needs that would enable her to make good judgments or to provide a safe home for Domenic, and she was not ready to engage in unsupervised visitation with her son.  (Tes. Huthanh L.;   see also Tes. Tanetra S.)

In September 2012, DCF began providing twice-weekly supervised visits for Domenic and his mother, with parent coaching through Lisa H–W., an experienced DCF social worker on Saturdays, and weekday visitation supervision by the family's assigned social worker.²⁰  Tachelle J. did not improve her ability or willingness to effectively parent Domenic during these visits.   Despite direct prompts from Lisa H–W., Tachelle J. most often failed to engage her son in activities, leaving him to entertain himself, she had minimal communication with him, only providing a greeting, a few words of conversation, and a goodbye.   During the later stages of her pregnancy with Amaira, Tachelle J. inadequately supervised Domenic during visits, raising safety issues by failing to protect him when he ran directly into walls or into other children in community play spaces.   For instance, during one fall 2012 visit, Tachelle J. took a toy train away from Domenic;  when he started biting himself in response, she was unable to successfully redirect the two and a half year old child;  became overwhelmed with the instructions provided by the social worker;  and could not effectively stop her son's self-injurious behavior.   (Tes. Lisa H–W.) Similarly, during a visit at the DCF office in December 2012, Tachelle J. allowed Domenic to run out of the meeting room, leaving him without supervision;  she was unable or unwilling to redirect him to return to her care.   On a December 2012 visit at a family restaurant, Tachelle J. left Domenic with the visitation social worker and did not reappear for approximately 20 minutes.   Instead of attending to her son's needs, Tachelle J. spoke to the social worker by phone, admitting her fears of having a new baby, that Robert M. would not come to the hospital, that he would not accept any responsibility for the baby, and that she would have to care for the new baby all by herself.  (Tes. Lisa H–W., Tanetra S.)

Tachelle J. did not demonstrate improved ability to parent Domenic after Amaira's birth in January 2013.   During a supervised visit in March 2013, when Domenic had a tantrum, flipping over a rocking chair, Tachelle J. focused only upon her infant;  she did not appropriately engage with her son;  did not redirect him;  and was unable or unwilling to calm him down or to take action to prevent him from harming himself or others.  (Tes. Tanetra S.) Similarly, during visits in the spring of 2013, Tachelle J. mostly interacted with the adult supervisors during visits, not with Domenic;  rather than drawing with, talking to or reading to her son, the respondent-mother used visitation time to discuss the status of this litigation.  (Tes. Lisa H–W.)

Medication management and individual clinical counseling sessions for treatment of Tachelle J.'s emotional lability, irritable mood, and impulsivity, have been available to Tachelle J. since November 2010 through Barbara K–G. at DMHAS.  (Ex. A, Court Ex. 2;  Tes. Barbara K–G., Gladys R., Tanetra S.) Tachelle J. presents with no cognitive deficits that would interfere with her treatment.²¹  (Tes. Barbara K–G., Dr. Balducci.)   The respondent-mother has not been consistently compliant with her treatment regimen and her level of engagement with the therapeutic process has varied.²²  Sometimes, Tachelle J. has been cooperative and demonstrated positive insight into her past experiences and conduct;  at other times, she has been defensive, lacking the ability or willingness to objectively assess her circumstances.²³  Although she has the capacity to communicate with her clinician when she is willing to do so, and on occasion, admitted feelings of depression and being overwhelmed, Tachelle J. was sometimes so withdrawn that her sessions with Barbara K–G. were not productive.   Although Tachelle J. was occasionally willing to discuss developing coping techniques, she was only able to make short-term plans and could not look at the future in a mature and long-term fashion.²⁴  (Tes. Barbara K–G., Dr. Balducci.)   Clinically, Tachelle J.'s underlying mental health issues her issues of irritable mood, depression, emotional lability, and impulsivity persisted and were inadequately resolved despite access to appropriate care.  (Tes. Barbara K–G.)

In general, the respondent-mother finds it difficult to accept any services willingly, even after two years of counseling with Barbara K–G. and all the other support services described above.   During the major part of DMHAS's treatment, Tachelle J. has been financially unstable, often lacking the ability even to obtain funds for security deposit on a new apartment and sometimes even unable to pay for food.²⁵  Her oppositional attitude and unwillingness or inability to accept assistance from those in a position to help her were abundantly apparent when she refused Barbara K–G.'s recommendation that she offer her DMHAS case manager another opportunity to help find her housing.   (Tes. Barbara K–G.) This pattern of oppositionality was equally evident prior to her involvement with DMHAS, as the respondent-mother did not attend any of the appointments that DCF had scheduled at the Family Intervention Center (FIC), where she could have received individual counseling was available to treat Tachelle J.'s mood disorder, post traumatic stress disorder, depression, and irritability.   Also, the safe, affordable housing DCF was able to locate for the respondent-mother did not meet Tachelle J.'s expectations, and she unreasonably refused to live there.   As referenced above, Tachelle refused to continue with domestic violence counseling at Safe Haven when Gary B. was no longer available.  (Tes. Dr. Balducci, Tanetra S.) Further indicating her inability or unwillingness to implement the teachings of her service providers, although both the DOVE program and Gary B., as well as Barbara K–G., had informed Tachelle J. that Robert M. was not a healthy partner for her, the respondent-mother nonetheless voluntarily engaged in another sexual encounter with her acknowledged abuser him, which led to another pregnancy.  (Exhibit A;  Tes. Barbara K–G, Dr. Balducci, Gary B.)

On December 20, 2012, Dr. Balducci conducted a “psychological assessment of [Tachelle J.'s] general social and emotional functioning” and a parent-child interaction evaluation with two-year-old Domenic (Ex. A).  Historically, Tachelle J. “was reported to have unaddressed mental health issues, including a bipolar mood disorder, and Domenic's father ․ was described as having been violent in the home toward [the respondent-mother] with Domenic present ․” (Ex. A.) Although she was unable or unwilling to provide Dr. Balducci with specific information concerning her past mental health treatment, Tachelle J. did recall having taken “Trileptal medication in the past as well as a medication to improve her focus, but could not recall the names of other medications ․ She similarly could not recall when or how many time she had been hospitalized or why she required such emergency care” although she remembered an admission for self-injurious behaviors.  (Ex. A;  Tes. Dr. Balducci.)

Dr. Balducci's administration of the highly reliable Child Abuse Potential Inventory revealed that Tachelle J. “is at high risk for committing physical abuse against children.   This does not necessarily mean that Ms. [J.] has committed physical child abuse or will definitely do so, but her responses on this test were highly consistent with those offered by persons who have committed physical abuse upon children ․ This outcome was achieved despite [responses to other questions] which suggested Ms. [J.] was attempting to present herself in an overly favorable way on this measure.”  (Emphasis in the original.)  (Ex. A;  see also Testimony Dr. Balducci.)   Other related aspects of Dr. Balducci's testing revealed Tachelle J.'s admission that “it is Slightly True that ‘Sometimes my temper explodes and I completely lose control.’ “ and that she becomes “angry with others at times and wanting to slap them so that she pictures doing so in her head, but does not actually hit them.”  (Ex. A;  see also Tes. Dr. Balducci.)

Notwithstanding her history of treatment, Tachelle J. remains profoundly affected by the unremediated experiential, mental health, and social factors that adversely impacted her ability to serve as a safe parent when Domenic was committed to DCF in 2011.   Psychologically, these factors are fixed in nature, “rather entrenched and not likely to be easily or quickly amenable to change.”  (Ex. A.) Tachelle J. “presents with various risk factors that might indicate her ability to be a proper and good enough parent to Domenic, including ․ minimal social support and extreme difficulties maintaining her in emotional equilibrium when faced with increased stress and adversity in her life.”  (Ex. A.) She “is afflicted with a bipolar mood type disturbance, which means her moods can range from depressed and extremely down to elevated and expensive.   Her emotional lability and instability often cause ․ her emotions to bias her thinking so that Ms. [J.] reacts impulsively and potentially explosively and may lose her composure and become easily overwhelmed by the challenges she faces.  [Tachelle J.] requires ongoing outpatient treatment to address her mood difficulties, including ongoing consideration as to whether psychotropic medication might be necessary to assist her with doing so.”  (Ex. A.)

Although Tachelle J. has been the victim of Robert M.'s domestic violence, she “tends to minimize and rationalize such as well as the impact upon her and her son and in part blames herself for that outcome since she feels she antagonized [Robert M.] despite knowing of his issues with anger.”  (Ex. A.) She has “such an extremely low bar for what she expects from [Robert M.] and too easily excuses ․ his history of violence toward her” instead feeling “pleased by his willingness to provide her money for Domenic as well as by his asking her about how he might now initiate visitation with his son,” a hopeful chimera on the part of the respondent-mother that is lamentably inconsistent with the respondent-father's failure to actively participate in his son's child protection litigation.  (Ex. A.) Tachelle J. remains “in need of specialized domestic violence services to educate her on what constitutes domestic violence and to ensure she is able to avoid people and circumstances that might result in such.”  (Ex. A.) Despite her past treatment, Tachelle J. still “requires continued outpatient counseling services and case management supports ․ programming for improving her understanding of domestic violence so as to set and maintain appropriate boundaries and limits with [Robert M.] as well as any other partner with whom she might seek a partnership in the future.”  (Ex. A.)

Tachelle J. “greatly desires to be a proper parent to Domenic ․” (Ex. A.) She was able and willing to appropriately interact with young Domenic when he was a young baby, before he exhibited highly disruptive behavior, in supervised visitation at her home.   Similarly, at Dr. Balducci's interactional evaluation, when Domenic demonstrated no significant behavioral issues, Tachelle J. was generally able to meet his needs for the limited observation period.  (Ex. A;  Tes. Dr. Balducci.)

B

DOMENIC M., THE CHILD

In DCF custody since October 2010, Domenic entered his third foster home in March of 2013.   During Casey's work with the family, a strong bond existed between the respondent-mother and her son.  (Tes. Huthanh L.) At Dr. Balducci's December 2012 evaluation, Domenic was happy to see his mother.  (Ex. A.) Now nearing his third birthday, Domenic knows Tachelle J., and is comfortable in albeit not notably affected by her presence.  (Ex. A;  Testimony of Dr. Balducci, Lisa H–W.)

In the home of his second foster mother, as further discussed below, Domenic long exhibited serious tantrums and uncontrollable behavior.²⁶  (Testimony of Karen B., Tanetra S.) As found above, during Huthanh L.'s work with the family, Domenic had become very active, and required adult guidance to keep things from injuring himself when he would run too fast.   On August 8, 2012, when he was nearly 2 years old and had undergone several months of Birth to Three services, Domenic was evaluated at Connecticut Children's Medical Center (CCMC).  (Court Ex. B;  Tes. Tanetra S.) The physician-examiner found that Domenic's “activity level [was] on the high side and punctuated by physical impulsiveness and a lack of awareness of physical safety.”  (Emphasis added.)   (Court Ex. B.) He was found to have deficits in play skills, social interaction/social skills, attention, and sensory integration.   He was also found to have receptive and expressive language deficits, reflected in his both speech delay and behavior issues.   Domenic scored very near the cutoff point required for a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder.   In response to these noted conditions, CCMC recommended an increase in “the frequency and intensity” of Domenic's Birth to Three services, including occupational therapy for sensory regulation and speech therapy for communication.  (Court Ex. B.) To develop a sense of independence and autonomy, given his noted behavioral and language issues, “․ [Domenic will] require consistency of schedule and much time with significant caretakers as well as stability and on and corrupted support from external sources” such as Birth to Three Services to address speech and language and possible sensory issues ․” prior to formal schooling.  (Ex. A.)

The court fully credits the testimony of Karen B., who was Domenic's foster mother from the age of four months until he was approximately two and a half years old.²⁷  Under the care of this experienced foster parent, consistent with the CCMC findings, the observations of Huthanh L. and Lisa H–W., and the prognosis of Dr. Balducci, Domenic exhibited an extraordinary need for constant supervision to avoid injury himself and those around him.   His temper tantrums, which commenced when he was approximately a year old, continued and were exhibited even in public locations such as the pediatrician's office, where a tantrum lasted five to six minutes.   He required a rigid, unvariable schedule to avoid conduct such as slapping adults or throwing things in anger.   Domenic's physical aggression was unpredictable and his assaults on persons and objects were severe and unprovoked.²⁸  The child's behaviors are such that he can never be left alone;  this need, and his conduct in general, creates tremendous stress for his caretakers.  (Tes. Dr. Balducci, Karen B.;   see also Tes. Lisa H–W.)

On March 26, 2013, Domenic was moved into a placement where the foster father has been trained to deal with children who have specialized behavioral needs.   Even in this setting, however, Domenic's tantrums persist;  he repeatedly throws things, hits and kicks others, runs around taking objects in an attempt to destroy them, and refuses food.  (Tes. Lisa H–W., Tanetra S.) DCF now provides transportation for Tachelle J. to visit with Domenic.  (Tes. Tanetra S.)

IV

RESOLUTION OF THE REVOCATION CONTEST

In deciding the revocation issues, the court has remained well-aware of the tragic events that affected the respondent-mother's own childhood.   Here, however, the court must focus upon her present status and Domenic's needs, to determine whether commitment should be revoked.   Even viewed in the light most favorable to the movant, there is insufficient evidence from which the court could reasonably find that Tachelle J. has yet gained a meaningful degree of control over the issues related to her mental health, domestic violence, lack of housing, and limited parenting skills that caused her son's January 2011 commitment.   Despite the nearly three years that Domenic has spent in DCF's custody, but the respondent-mother is still unable or unwilling to provide a safe and secure home with appropriate parental guidance for him.   Although Tachelle J. loves her son, that love does not constitute proof that cause for the child's commitment no longer exists.   Accordingly, the movant has not met her predicate burden of proving that “no cause for commitment exists” and, as is further discussed herein, Domenic's best interests cannot be served by revocation. § 46b–129(m);  Practice Book § 35a–14A.

In addressing Domenic's best interests, the court has reviewed Tachelle J.'s and DCF's joint argument that the criteria in General Statutes § 46b–56(c) apply to this revocation proceeding.²⁹  As is discussed in Part II, the court declines to use this proffered measure, which was found inapplicable to child protection matters through In re Cameron C., supra, 103 Conn.App. 754.³⁰  As the natural mother in this case has moved to revoke commitment, the department is vested with the burden of establishing that revocation would not be in the child's best interests.   Here, DCF has met its burden of proof.   The totality of the evidence, including but not limited to that adduced through:  Dr. Balducci, Barbara K–G., Lisa H–W., and Karen B.;   the cross examination of Gary B. and Hunanth L.;   and the CCMC report;  clearly supports the conclusion that Domenic's well-being, stability, consistency in his environment, and opportunity for healthy growth and development, to wit, his best interests, will not be served if commitment is revoked.   See In re Stacy G., supra, 104 Conn.App. 353 n.4, citing In re Cesar G., 56 Conn.App. 289, 292–93, 742 A.2d 428 (2000);  see also In re Cameron C., supra, 103 Conn.App. 756.

Numerous features of the evidence require the conclusion that cause for commitment still exists in this case.   The evidence establishes the persistent existence of Tachelle J.'s domestic violence parental risk factors, apparent at the time of commitment.   Tachelle J. continued her relationship with Robert M. for a prolonged period of time, even though he has exposed her to domestic violence which is inimical not only to her own safety, but also to the safety and well-being of any child in her care.   All in all, the related evidence impels the determinations both that Tachelle J. was unable or unwilling to acquire sufficient benefit from her many months of domestic violence treatment and individual counseling, and also that, in the absence of any other social supports and by her own choice, she fully intends to remain connected to the father of her children.³¹  As found in Part III, during the spring of 2012, Tachelle J. selected Robert M. as the individual with whom she would have casual sexual relations;  she specifically chose to engage in intercourse with the male partner who had subjected her to domestic violence in the past, notwithstanding her relevant individual counseling and treatment.   By December 2012, when she was still pregnant with the child fathered by Robert M., Tachelle J. not only had decided to discontinue Safe Haven's domestic violence services, she admitted to maintaining a relationship with her abuser, informing Dr. Balducci that she and Robert M. “are friends and have ‘every right to be’ ․” (Ex. A.) Through this statement, Tachelle J. belied Gary B.'s opinion that when Tachelle J. ended her counseling with him in early fall 2012, she had already acquired all she needed to learn about avoiding domestic violence;  a tenet of Gary B.'s teaching is that the victim should not have contact with the abuser.  (Ex. A;  Testimony of Gary B.) This, in and of itself, is sufficient basis for finding that cause for Domenic's commitment still exists and that returning him to his mother's care is not in his best interest.

Viewed another way, the evidence supports the conclusion that Tachelle J. has achieved little or no benefit from the DOVE program and/or Gary B.'s Safe Haven counseling, or from Barbara K–G's relevant guidance.   Tachelle J. exhibited either unreasonably impulsive or very poor judgment in allowing herself to become intoxicated in the presence of the very individual who had abused her in the past, through her complicity in enabling intimate contact with Robert M. and allowing him to enter her home, and through her decision to forgo the opportunity to continuing work with Safe Haven to learn procedures for avoiding exposure to domestic violence in the future.  (Ex. A;  Tes. Dr. Balducci, Huthanh L., Tanetra S.) Tachelle J.'s unwillingness and/or inability to exercise good self-control, leading her to have continued contact with her domestic violence perpetrator, was and remains ostensibly based on an unfounded hope that he will provide her and her children with financial support.   This conduct is inconsistent with the fundamental elements of minimal parenting obligations, as thereby she demonstrated her inability or unwillingness to maintain a safe home for Domenic, to furnish appropriate guidance for her son with regard to her choice of romantic partners, or even to place the general well-being of her son above her own desire for social gratification.   See In re Lukas K., 120 Conn.App. 487–88.   Tachelle J.'s involvement with Robert M., her decision to forgo further domestic violence treatment, and the parenting risk factors identified by Dr. Balducci, as found in Part III, are abundant basis for the court's inference that it is more likely than not that if Domenic is placed in his mother's custody, he will more likely than not be exposed to an unreasonable likelihood of harm to his physical or emotional well-being, and/or be denied proper care and attention, and/or be permitted to live under adverse conditions, associations or circumstances due to domestic violence in his environment.³²  See In re Joseph W., 305 Conn. 633, 646, 46 A.3d 59 (2012) (to predict neglect, “the trial court must find that it is more likely than not that, if the child remained in the current situation, the child would be ‘denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally’;  General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 46b–120(8)(B);  or would be ‘permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to the well-being of the child or youth ․’ General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 46b–120(8)(C)”).  See also In re Michael D., 58 Conn.App. 119, 123, 752 A.2d 1135 (“[o]ur statutes clearly permit an adjudication of neglect based on a potential for harm or abuse to occur in the future”), cert. denied, 24 Conn. 911, 759 A.2d 505 (2000), cited in In re Iliana M., 134 Conn.App. 382, 387, 38 A.3d 130 (2012).   In this way, the evidence establishes both that cause for Domenic's commitment still exists, and that returning him to his mother's care is not in his best interest.

Further illustrating that cause for commitment still exists, and that Domenic's best interests require commitment, the evidence as a whole establishes that Tachelle J. has an underdeveloped, immature and inadequate understanding of Domenic's serious behavioral issues which have been clearly manifest and disruptive in his foster homes and at supervised visits.  (Tes. Karen B., Lisa H–W., Huthanh L.) Tachelle J. has not acquired the parenting skills necessary to safely or appropriately manage this child or to control his conduct on a sustained basis;  she lacks any perception of the degree of stress that more likely than not will affect any household in which he resides.   Moreover, the respondent-mother's lack of awareness concerning Domenic's behavioral issues makes it more likely than not that reunification with her son, through revocation of commitment, would, more likely than not, expose baby Amaira to abuse or neglect.³³

In reaching this conclusion, the court has fully credited the cogent, precise opinion tendered by Dr. Balducci, in his December 2012 report, which was based, in part, upon his observation of the respondent-mother's interaction with her son during a one-hour period in which the child did not display the agitated, aggressive behaviors exhibited elsewhere, but during which he “was largely quite well behaved and compliant.” ³⁴  (Ex. A;  see Tes. Karen B., Lisa H–W., Huthanh L.) This reported opinion was consistent with the psychologist's testimony at trial, clearly establishing that “[the respondent-mother] has quite limited understanding of Domenic's needs and minimal capacity to meet them.   She is extremely well intentioned and appears able to articulate how she hopes to parent Domenic, but she is at great risk for focusing more exclusively upon her own psychological needs rather than those of her son.  [Tachelle J.] is likely to hold expectations of her son that are not consistent with what should be expected developmentally of him and she is at risk for presuming a greater level of intention and volition for Domenic's behaviors that is likely to be the case with such a young child.   Various risk factors are likely to contribute to the likelihood of negative parenting by Ms. [J.] were she to be solely responsible for Domenic's care, including the prospects of emotional or physical or verbal abuse upon the child, abuse of power and control in the parent-child relationship, and tending to parenting a controlling/authoritarian matter in part to avoid increased stress in her life and exasperation or her bipolar illness.”  (Emphasis added.)  (Ex. A;  see also Tes. Dr. Balducci.)

Consistent with Dr. Balducci's portentous opinion, Tachelle J.'s negative parenting of Domenic has been evident since the child emerged from infancy.   As found in Part III, during the summer of 2012, when Huthanh L. was nearing the end of his work with the family, Tachelle J. was unable or unwilling, despite professional parent-coaching, to control her son's running behaviors so as to render him physically safe.  (Testimony of Huthanh L.) Inadequate parenting of Domenic was still apparent in the visits that occurred after the summer of 2012 when, as also found in Part III, Tachelle had scant positive interaction with her son, demonstrating her inability or unwillingness to engage him in conversation, to use appropriate behavior management techniques, to deter him from running between tables at public locations where visits took place, or to prevent him from leaving a visitation room.   After Amaira was born, Tachelle J. brought her to visits and, on occasion, invited Domenic to help feed the baby her bottle.   While, under other circumstances, this might seem to be a valid parenting effort, it was highly inappropriate given Domenic's unpredictable behavior, pattern of overt aggression, and the infant's total inability to protect herself from aggression or physical harm.   The respondent-mother's continuing denial that Domenic presents behavioral or safety issues was further apparent on another visit, in March of 2013, when Domenic began tantruming, kicking, and screaming;  Tachelle J. refused to intervene to control this behavior, and instead chose to pay attention only to her daughter, to the exclusion of her son.  (Tes. Lisa H–W.)

While Tachelle J. may vocalize a desire to parent her son, she cannot reasonably be charged with custody of a child whose significant behavioral-health issues she is unable or unwilling to acknowledge.³⁵  Although she has been dissatisfied with DCF's foster care placements, Tachelle J. has made only the most cursory inquiries concerning the status of Domenic's physical or mental health, his education or his general well-being.   Tachelle J. either remains fundamentally unaware, or refuses to acknowledge that, that reunification with Domenic will require her, as a parent, to address his maladaptive behaviors through a high level of cooperation with educators and third-party providers, and through adherence to a rigid schedule.   Tachelle J. either does not understand, or is unwilling to accept, the fact that Domenic requires constant, intensive surveillance and supervision to protect himself and others from his conduct:  there was no evidence indicating that Tachelle J. has either a plan to remediate his behaviors through her own parenting efforts, or the capacity to achieve that goal.   Neither her parenting skills nor this “entrenched” attitude, which avoids accepting the reality of her son's circumstances, have improved over time, and despite the availability of appropriate long-term services such as Connect–to–Kids and Casey, and DCF social worker visitation supervisors.  (Ex. A;  Tes. Dr. Balducci, Karen B., Lisa H–W., Barbara K–G.)

Despite years of services, the respondent-mother's conduct, taken as a whole, does not demonstrate even a minimum level of parenting competency sufficient to meet Domenic's needs.   See In re Lukas K., 120 Conn.App. 487–88.   Domenic's anger, aggressive behaviors, desire for immediate gratification and need for active physical supervision will more likely than not cause even more stress to his caretaker as he grows older and larger.   The evidence is insufficient to enable the court to find that, notwithstanding the passage of time, Tachelle J. can yet assume the role of the skilled, attentive and effective parent who is needed to meet this child's best interests, a parent who has the ability and the willingness to consistently and effectively moderate nearly three-year-old Domenic's conduct so as to enable him to safely proceed through his childhood, to avoid injury to himself or others, to achieve desired developmental norms, to develop appropriate socialization skills.³⁶

Again establishing that cause for commitment still exists and that Domenic's best interests will not be served by revocation, the mental health issues with which Tachelle J. was affected at the time of her son's commitment remain unresolved despite the considerable support and individual counseling she has received through Barbara K–G. and the DMHAS staff.   Because she has been unable or unwilling to achieve stable mental health while Domenic has been in the department's care, the respondent-mother remains so easily overwhelmed by environmental factors that she has been unable to finish her education, hold or even find a job.   Her lack of progress with individual counseling is in part due to inconsistent attendance, and in part to an insufficient commitment to the process of identifying and treating her mental health needs, as evidence by her decision to stop taking the medication that has been prescribed for her psychiatric symptoms, without medical advice.   Fundamentally, Tachelle J.'s “entrenched” and unremediated psychological conditions leave her unable to develop or to use internal regulators that could help her deal in a healthy manner with the stressful circumstances she would more likely than not face if she served as the custodial parent for Domenic now;  more likely than not, it would become increasingly difficult for her to avoid becoming overwhelmed, and to avoid overreaction, if she is faced with the more complex needs that would more likely than not be presented to Domenic's parent as he grows into an older and larger child with an even higher need for strict supervision and rigid scheduling to minimize disruptive conduct.  (Ex. A;  Tes. Dr. Balducci, Barbara K–G.)

Domenic requires a caregiver who has sufficient emotional regulation to enable her to meet the challenges of the child's behaviors as exhibited in his foster homes, as apparent at supervised visits, and as identified at CCMC. (Ex. B;  Tes. Karen B., Huthanh L., Lisa H–W.) Lacking personal emotional regulation, subject to her unresolved bipolar disorder and depression, Tachelle J. does not have the ability to manage Domenic by minimizing his disruptive conduct at the present.   Given Domenic's impulsivity, aggressive behavior, and communication limitations, and her own inability or unwillingness to manage her personal mental health needs, Tachelle J. cannot appropriately parent her son.   Even if she were not obligated to meet baby Amaira's primary needs for food, shelter, comfort, warmth and nurturing, if she was also Domenic's custodian, Tachelle J. would, more likely than not, become the over-aroused by his disruptive conduct, and react in a forceful manner to the detriment of her son.³⁷  (Ex. A, B;  Tes. Dr. Balducci, Karen B., Tanetra S., GAL.)

Further indicating that cause for commitment still exists, and that revocation would not be in Domenic's best interest, the evidence impels the conclusion that Tachelle J. still lacks adequate housing for her son.   The respondent mother's failure to improve her mental health status led her to reject opportunities to find or to accept appropriate a residence that would be safe and suitable for Domenic, as found in Part III. (Tes. Barbara K–G., Gladys R., Dr. Balducci.)

In deciding that the respondent-mother has not yet overcome her deficiencies in parenting skills, unstable mental health, issues of domestic violence and inadequate housing, all of which led to Domenic's commitment, the court has been guided by Dr. Balducci's fully credible opinion as to the impact Tachelle J.'s personality profile designated “risk factors” will have upon reunification with Domenic.³⁸  As previously noted, Tachelle J.'s psychological risk factors, which impact her parenting, “are rather an entrenched and are not likely to be easily or quickly amenable to change.”  (Emphasis added.)  (Ex. A.) Those risk factors are extant despite lengthy treatment, and include minimal social support, a limited understanding of the domestic violence to which she exposes herself and her family by maintaining a relationship with Robert M., lack of education, and unemployment leading to extremely limited financial resources.³⁹  (Ex. A;  Tes. Dr. Balducci;  see also Tes. Gary B., Barbara K–G.) Other continuing parental risk factors include Tachelle J.'s unresolved “mental illness and mood instability [which] are likely to cause her to overreact to minor stressors and to display the low nurturance and sensitivity toward Domenic as well as inattentiveness and the potential for resorting to harsh, hostile, or coercive parenting and evincing negative or angry parenting behaviors.”  (Ex. A.) Given her admissions to Dr. Balducci that it is even slightly true that “[s]ometimes my temper explodes and I, completely lose control,” if he is placed in her custody, the respondent-mother will more likely than not respond to Domenic's demanding and challenging behaviors, and need for constant supervision, by resorting to inappropriate and harmful physical acts against him.  (Ex. A;  see also Tes. Dr. Balducci, Karen B., Tanetra S., GAL.) The finding that these negative factors have not been improved to any measurable degree notwithstanding to the efforts made by Connect–to–Kids, DMHAS, Casey, Safe Haven, Gary B., Huthanh L. or any of the other providers with whom the respondent-mother has been willing to engage, including DCF, impels the court's conclusion that the respondent-mother cannot now serve as this child's custodian.   Under these circumstances, cause for commitment still exists and the child's best interests will not be served by revocation.

Even if the respondent mother has met her burden of proving that “no cause for commitment exists,” a conclusion this court has not reached, the evidence compels the determination that Domenic's child's best interests not be served by returning him to the care of Tachelle J., so that DCF has met its burden under General Statutes § 46b–129(m) and Practice Book § 35a–14A.   See In re Stacy G., supra, 104 Conn.App. 353 n.4;  see also In re Cameron C., supra, 103 Conn.App. 756.   This child's best interests will instead be met by continuing commitment, as thereby he can access the intensive remedial and residential support he requires so he can grow and develop in a healthy and safe manner.   As fully discussed in this decision, Tachelle J. is either unable or unwilling to accept the fact that her son's specialized needs require his parent-figure to provide him with a high level of skilled, focused care and consistent attention, with access to professional support.   Unless and until Tachelle J. acknowledges, accepts and understands Domenic's behavioral health issues, and unless and until she develops stable mental health with the resilience and flexibility to meet his personal limitations, his frustrating, challenging, and disruptive behaviors in a safe and satisfactory manner, she cannot appropriately or safely maintain him in her custody.⁴⁰

As found in Part III, Tachelle J. has, through the years, demonstrated a pattern of unreasonably selective willingness to engage in services which are objectively appropriate to meet her needs;  even when she has agreed to participate with providers, she has been unwilling or unable to achieve a sufficient degree of improvement her mental health, domestic violence, housing or parenting issues to enable revocation.   Tachelle J. rejected DCF's opportunity to work with the Catholic Families program;  her criminal conduct caused her to lose access the New Opportunities program;  she declined to return to Safe Haven for additional domestic violence counseling after Gary B. left the agency;  she dismissed DMHAS's proffered opportunity to have the case manager extend additional assistance to help her find housing and she declined to live in the location DCF had obtained for her.  (Tes. Barbara K–G., Gladys R., Tanetra S.) Notwithstanding her cooperation with Connect–to–Kids and Huthanh L., and notwithstanding DCF's regularly scheduled visitation supervised by separate social workers, she has not developed the ability to manage or control Domenic's behaviors.   She has not followed her domestic violence training to avoid contact with Robert M. She has only partly adhered to Barbara K–G.'s recommendations for mental health treatment, refusing to follow DMHAS's recommendations for medication and inconsistently attending to her sessions, leaving her underlying psychological conditions unsuccessfully treated, and rendering her still prone to poor judgment, impulsive behavior, mood disturbance, lack of self-control and the high degree of probability that she would, more likely than not, resort to physical abuse as a method of disciplining Domenic when faced with the stress that is likely to affect this child's parent-figure.  (Ex. A;  Tes. Dr. Balducci.)

Even though continued commitment would require Domenic to remain separated from his mother and his sister, this represents the least restrictive alternative available to meet his best interests.   Tachelle J. has conceded that her mother, Tasheaka J., is not suitable to care for her son, and no other family resources were made known to the court.⁴¹  Properly attended to by DCF during commitment, Domenic will be better able to access the residential placement with a therapeutically-skilled adult caretaker he requires, and to obtain enrollment in appropriately targeted rehabilitative services.   As she does not recognize her son's specialized behavioral needs, such assistance cannot be provided by Tachelle J., even with support.   Thus, continued commitment, not revocation, will serve Domenic's best interests.⁴²  (Tes.Dr. Balducci, GAL.)

Tachelle J. argues that she was thwarted in her efforts to overcome the causes of commitment because DCF failed to follow Casey's recommendations for timely reinstating visits at her apartment.   In-home visits could have been supervised by DCF, thus minimizing the potential for interference with the visitation/reunification process by Robert M. or other third parties.   Even so, there is insufficient evidence from which the court could reasonably find that DCF's decision to move the visits to a community location and to DCF offices, as found in Part III, had any impact at all insofar as the revocation issues are concerned.

Tachelle J. also argues that the evidence related to Casey's general work with the family supports her revocation motion;  however the credible evidence adduced through Huthanh L., consistent with that of the other witnesses, actually impels the contrary conclusion.   For instance, starting in April 2012, when Huthanh L. had worked with Tachelle J. for seven months, DCF decided to move the visits from Tachelle J.'s home to a Salvation Army playground facility.   DCF implemented this change because Robert M. was twice seen at the apartment, without provision of any reasonable explanation for his presence, and because the respondent-mother was attempting to keep DCF from knowing that other adults were secreted in the home when she was supposed to be focusing on Domenic.  (Tes. Tanetra S., Huthanh L.) While the Casey social worker had not noted any express safety concerns at Tachelle J.'s home prior to the implementation of community visits, he had developed and had expressed concerns to DCF about the respondent-mother's ability to place the needs of her child first and to care for herself without allowing other individuals to take advantage of her.⁴³  He had also developed and expressed concerns to DCF about Tachelle J.'s lack of appropriate judgment in allowing others to stay at her house overnight without recompense of any type, and about her inconsistency in attendance with other service providers, which inconsistency persisted even though Huthanh L. counseled the respondent-mother that such noncompliance would likely interfere with reunification.   Moreover, Huthanh L. had developed and expressed concerns to DCF about the respondent mother's vacillation concerning which adult she would choose to care for Domenic, as he found that her repeated change of mind boded poorly for the reunification process.  (Tes. Huthanh L.) Accordingly, issues related to the department's failure to reinstitute home visits carries no discernable weight in this case.

Tachelle J. further argues that revocation should be granted because DCF has engaged in misconduct, improperly characterizing the respondent-mother's status in reports it has filed with the court, and personally interfering with her services.   Again, this claim is unpersuasive.   Given the abundance of highly reliable testimony and other documents presented in this comprehensive trial, the content of DCF status reports or studies carried no appreciable weight.⁴⁴  The GAL's identification of a somewhat hostile relationship between Tachelle J. and her currently assigned DCF social worker, Tanetra S., is credible and consistent with the evidence as a whole.⁴⁵  However, as noted in throughout this decision, the highly probative evidence of the respondent-mother's rejection of the Catholic Families family-unification program opportunity and of DMHAS's proffer of housing assistance;  of her criminal conduct rendering her ineligible for another early family support service;  of her failure to achieve a reasonable degree of improvement in her parenting skills, domestic violence issues or mental health stability notwithstanding the involvement of independent agents such as Connect–to–Kids, Casey, DOVE–Safe Haven professionals, and DMHAS;  given the completely credible evidence of Domenic's behavioral concerns;  and given the opinions of Dr. Balducci, Karen K–G., and Domenic's GAL;  there is insufficient basis from which the court could reasonably conclude that a hostile relationship with the social worker had any measurable negative impact upon the revocation issues.⁴⁶

In addition to arguing that cause for commitment no longer exists, the respondent-mother has argued that continued commitment would not serve Domenic's best interests because he is currently in his third non-relative foster placement, and that the department lacks concern for him.   The abundant evidence of Domenic's developmental and behavioral status, which is markedly different from his circumstances as perceived by Tachelle J., and the highly persuasive evidence related to the respondent-mother's untreated mental health issues, compels the court to reject this claim, as well.   The court acknowledges the department's admission that Tachelle J. and Domenic have been served by at least five social workers during the child's nearly three-year stay with DCF. (Tes. Tanetra S.) This situation cannot have maximized the respondent-mother's ability to benefit from the department's reunification services.   Moreover, the court concurs with the GAL who opined that DCF should have instituted more timely, assertive diagnostic tools and training to help modulate Domenic's antisocial behaviors, and that a therapeutic foster home should have been procured for him long ago.   However, as found in Part III, the evidence clearly establishes that Tachelle J. had access to ample support services through Catholic Families program;  Connect–to–Kids;  Casey;  DMHAS's individual counseling and medication management, case manager and point person;  and through the DOVE and Safe Haven programs.   These services were timely implemented;  yet the respondent-mother has made insufficient progress in terms of acknowledging her son's needs, or in learning to manage her personal issues that led to his commitment.   Thus, despite Domenic's need for more focused care, Tachelle J. is not in a position to serve his best interests as a placement resource.

V

CONCLUSION

There is no evidence from which the court could reasonably conclude either that cause for Domenic's commitment no longer exists or that his best interests would be served by revocation within the meaning of General Statutes § 46b–129(m) and/or Practice Book § 35a–14A.   Tachelle J. has failed to meet the burden of proof she accepted when she filed her motion to revoke commitment.   See In re Janazia S., supra, 112 Conn.App. 83;  In re Sarah S., supra, 110 Conn.App. 582;  In re Cameron C., supra, 103 Conn.App. 752.   As asserted in DCF's objection, the evidence supports the conclusion that the respondent-mother is unwilling or unable to serve as an appropriate guardianship resource for this child.   Accordingly, Tachelle J. cannot prevail.

WHEREBY, Tachelle J.'s Motion to Revoke Commitment, filed June 15, 2012 is hereby DENIED, and the department's Objection to the Motion to Revoke filed June 19, 2012 is hereby SUSTAINED.

BY THE COURT,

N. Rubinow, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN2. On September 14, 2013, the parties stipulated that the court could take judicial notice of Domenic's child protection file.   On April 1, 2013, the parties stipulated that the court could take judicial notice of the file reflecting child protection litigation newly brought on behalf of Domenic's baby sister, Amaira J..  FN2. On September 14, 2013, the parties stipulated that the court could take judicial notice of Domenic's child protection file.   On April 1, 2013, the parties stipulated that the court could take judicial notice of the file reflecting child protection litigation newly brought on behalf of Domenic's baby sister, Amaira J.

FN3. On December 1, 2010, Tachelle J.'s attorney complained that Domenic had been adjudicated prior to the date scheduled for entry of Robert M.'s neglect plea.   Counsel for Robert M. countered that his client had been excused from the neglect proceedings, having expressed his intention to stand silent.   On that date, the court (Baldwin, J.) confirmed sufficient service of the neglect petition and reaffirmed the disposition trial date, but took no other action..  FN3. On December 1, 2010, Tachelle J.'s attorney complained that Domenic had been adjudicated prior to the date scheduled for entry of Robert M.'s neglect plea.   Counsel for Robert M. countered that his client had been excused from the neglect proceedings, having expressed his intention to stand silent.   On that date, the court (Baldwin, J.) confirmed sufficient service of the neglect petition and reaffirmed the disposition trial date, but took no other action.

FN4. During proceedings held on September 7, 2011, the court (Eschuk, J.) ordered DCF to file its written permanency plan on or before June 6, 2012, so as to provide the respondent parents and the child a reasonable opportunity to object, and assigned the August 8, 2012 permanency plan hearing date.   See General Statutes § 46b–129(k)(1);  Practice Book 35a–14(c)..  FN4. During proceedings held on September 7, 2011, the court (Eschuk, J.) ordered DCF to file its written permanency plan on or before June 6, 2012, so as to provide the respondent parents and the child a reasonable opportunity to object, and assigned the August 8, 2012 permanency plan hearing date.   See General Statutes § 46b–129(k)(1);  Practice Book 35a–14(c).

FN5. Relevant to the court's August 8, 2012 approval of DCF's concurrent permanency plan, the court acknowledges that General Statutes § 46b–129(k)(4) requires that “[i]f the court approves the permanency plan of adoption:  (A) The Commissioner of Children and Families shall file a petition for termination of parental rights not later than sixty days after such approval .. .” (Emphasis added.).  FN5. Relevant to the court's August 8, 2012 approval of DCF's concurrent permanency plan, the court acknowledges that General Statutes § 46b–129(k)(4) requires that “[i]f the court approves the permanency plan of adoption:  (A) The Commissioner of Children and Families shall file a petition for termination of parental rights not later than sixty days after such approval .. .” (Emphasis added.)

FN6. On January 23, 2012, the court (Epstein, J.) granted DCF's motion to amend the TPR petition to further allege that it had made reasonable efforts to reunify Domenic with his father, and that Robert M. was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts..  FN6. On January 23, 2012, the court (Epstein, J.) granted DCF's motion to amend the TPR petition to further allege that it had made reasonable efforts to reunify Domenic with his father, and that Robert M. was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.

FN7. On November 20, 2012, just before the TPR petition was filed, DCF had moved to delay the revocation trial because Tanetra S., the DCF social worker assigned to the family, would not be available on December 3, 2012 due to unspecified medical circumstances.   The department's motion did not state whether Tachelle J. had consented to this continuance request.   This court denied the motion, acknowledging the length of time that Domenic had been in foster care, the absence of agreement between the parties, and the lack of details regarding the claimed medical condition.   However, the department effectively achieved the relief it requested when the psychological evaluations were ordered..  FN7. On November 20, 2012, just before the TPR petition was filed, DCF had moved to delay the revocation trial because Tanetra S., the DCF social worker assigned to the family, would not be available on December 3, 2012 due to unspecified medical circumstances.   The department's motion did not state whether Tachelle J. had consented to this continuance request.   This court denied the motion, acknowledging the length of time that Domenic had been in foster care, the absence of agreement between the parties, and the lack of details regarding the claimed medical condition.   However, the department effectively achieved the relief it requested when the psychological evaluations were ordered.

FN8. On March 12, 2013, DCF filed a neglect petition on behalf of Amaira alleging that in Tachelle J.'s care, she was denied proper care and attention, and was exposed to conditions injurious to her well-being.   Trial of Amaira's neglect petition has been consolidated with Domenic's TPR petition;  both matters are scheduled to commence trial on October 28, 2013..  FN8. On March 12, 2013, DCF filed a neglect petition on behalf of Amaira alleging that in Tachelle J.'s care, she was denied proper care and attention, and was exposed to conditions injurious to her well-being.   Trial of Amaira's neglect petition has been consolidated with Domenic's TPR petition;  both matters are scheduled to commence trial on October 28, 2013.

FN9. The court had established a deadline of May 3, 2013, for the submission of any brief in response to the respondent-mother's memorandum;  however, no party objected to the department's late filing.   Although this court has considered the legal claims and the arguments raised in DCF's Memorandum of Law, which references the statutes cited by Tachelle J. and cites to a single family custody and financial support case;  Watrous v. Watrous, 108 Conn.App. 813, 825, 949 A.2d 557 (2008);  for the reasons described below, the court finds that opinion to have no bearing on the case at hand..  FN9. The court had established a deadline of May 3, 2013, for the submission of any brief in response to the respondent-mother's memorandum;  however, no party objected to the department's late filing.   Although this court has considered the legal claims and the arguments raised in DCF's Memorandum of Law, which references the statutes cited by Tachelle J. and cites to a single family custody and financial support case;  Watrous v. Watrous, 108 Conn.App. 813, 825, 949 A.2d 557 (2008);  for the reasons described below, the court finds that opinion to have no bearing on the case at hand.

FN10. Tachelle J.'s identifies General Statutes § 46b–129(b) authority for her revocation motion.   Instead, the court has applied the provisions of General Statutes § 46b–129(m), as amended, which tracks the language of the respondent-mother's Motion to Revoke Commitment, and the corollary Practice Book § 35a–14A, effective January 1, 2012.  General Statutes § 46b–129(m) provides, in pertinent part:  “․ [A] parent ․ may file a motion to revoke a commitment, and, upon finding that cause for commitment no longer exists, and that such revocation is in the best interests of such child or youth, the court may revoke the commitment ․” (Emphasis added.)  “General Statutes § 46b–129(m) sets forth the procedure by which a commitment may be challenged and vests primary authority for revocation of commitment with the trial court.  Section 46b–129(m) provides that a parent may file a motion to revoke a commitment, and, upon a finding that no cause for commitment exists, and that such revocation is in the best interest of the child, the court may revoke the commitment ․ The court's analysis in In re Stacy G., 94 Conn.App. 348, 892 A.2d 1034 (2006), provides guidance on applying § 46b–129(m).  ‘[A] natural parent, whose child has been committed to the custody of a third party, is entitled to a hearing to demonstrate that no cause for commitment still exists ․ The initial burden is placed on the persons applying for the revocation of commitment to allege and prove that cause for commitment no longer exists ․ If the party challenging the commitment meets that initial burden, the commitment to the third party may then be modified if such change is in the best interest of the child ․ The burden falls on the persons vested with guardianship to prove that it would not be in the best interests of the child to be returned to her or her natural parents.’  ․ Id., 352 n.4.” In re Cameron C., 103 Conn.App. 746, 752, 930 A.2d 826 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 906, 942 A.2d 414 (2008).  (Emphasis added.).  FN10. Tachelle J.'s identifies General Statutes § 46b–129(b) authority for her revocation motion.   Instead, the court has applied the provisions of General Statutes § 46b–129(m), as amended, which tracks the language of the respondent-mother's Motion to Revoke Commitment, and the corollary Practice Book § 35a–14A, effective January 1, 2012.  General Statutes § 46b–129(m) provides, in pertinent part:  “․ [A] parent ․ may file a motion to revoke a commitment, and, upon finding that cause for commitment no longer exists, and that such revocation is in the best interests of such child or youth, the court may revoke the commitment ․” (Emphasis added.)  “General Statutes § 46b–129(m) sets forth the procedure by which a commitment may be challenged and vests primary authority for revocation of commitment with the trial court.  Section 46b–129(m) provides that a parent may file a motion to revoke a commitment, and, upon a finding that no cause for commitment exists, and that such revocation is in the best interest of the child, the court may revoke the commitment ․ The court's analysis in In re Stacy G., 94 Conn.App. 348, 892 A.2d 1034 (2006), provides guidance on applying § 46b–129(m).  ‘[A] natural parent, whose child has been committed to the custody of a third party, is entitled to a hearing to demonstrate that no cause for commitment still exists ․ The initial burden is placed on the persons applying for the revocation of commitment to allege and prove that cause for commitment no longer exists ․ If the party challenging the commitment meets that initial burden, the commitment to the third party may then be modified if such change is in the best interest of the child ․ The burden falls on the persons vested with guardianship to prove that it would not be in the best interests of the child to be returned to her or her natural parents.’  ․ Id., 352 n.4.” In re Cameron C., 103 Conn.App. 746, 752, 930 A.2d 826 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 906, 942 A.2d 414 (2008).  (Emphasis added.)

FN11. General Statutes § 46b–56(c) provides:  “(c) In making or modifying any order as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the court shall consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of the following factors:  (1) The temperament and developmental needs of the child;  (2) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the needs of the child;  (3) any relevant and material information obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of the child;  (4) the wishes of the child's parents as to custody;  (5) the past and current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the child's siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the best interests of the child;  (6) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders;  (7) any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents' dispute;  (8) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child;  (9) the child's adjustment to his or her home, school and community environments;  (10) the length of time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child's family home pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household;  (11) the stability of the child's existing or proposed residences, or both;  (12) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child;  (13) the child's cultural background;  (14) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another individual or the child;  (15) whether the child or a sibling of the child has been abused or neglected, as defined respectively in section 46b–120;  and (16) whether the party satisfactorily completed participation in a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b–69b.   The court is not required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers.”.  FN11. General Statutes § 46b–56(c) provides:  “(c) In making or modifying any order as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the court shall consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of the following factors:  (1) The temperament and developmental needs of the child;  (2) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the needs of the child;  (3) any relevant and material information obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of the child;  (4) the wishes of the child's parents as to custody;  (5) the past and current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the child's siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the best interests of the child;  (6) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders;  (7) any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents' dispute;  (8) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child;  (9) the child's adjustment to his or her home, school and community environments;  (10) the length of time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child's family home pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household;  (11) the stability of the child's existing or proposed residences, or both;  (12) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child;  (13) the child's cultural background;  (14) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another individual or the child;  (15) whether the child or a sibling of the child has been abused or neglected, as defined respectively in section 46b–120;  and (16) whether the party satisfactorily completed participation in a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b–69b.   The court is not required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers.”

FN12. “ ‘It is well established that [i]n a case tried before a court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific testimony ․ It is the quintessential function of the fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence, and to believe or disbelieve any ․ testimony ․’ (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 781–82, 740 A.2d 896 (1999).”  In re Rafael S., 125 Conn.App. 605, 611–12, 9 A.3d 417 (2010).  “As the finder of fact and the arbiter of credibility, the court was free to believe all, some or none of the respondent's testimony.   See In re Jaime S., 120 Conn.App. 712, 729, 994 A.2d 233, cert. granted on other grounds, 297 Conn. 915, 995 A.2d 954 (2010).”  In re Katia M., 124 Conn.App. 650, 663, 6 A.3d 86, cert. denied, 299 Conn. 920, 20 A.3d 1051 (2010).   Moreover, “ ‘[i]t is the right and the duty of the [trier of fact] to draw reasonable and logical inferences from the evidence.’   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Russell v. Russell, 91 Conn.App. 619, 642, 882 A.2d 98, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 924, 925, 888 A.2d 92 (2005).”  Welsch v. Groat, 95 Conn.App. 658, 666–67, 897 A.2d 710 (2006)..  FN12. “ ‘It is well established that [i]n a case tried before a court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific testimony ․ It is the quintessential function of the fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence, and to believe or disbelieve any ․ testimony ․’ (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 781–82, 740 A.2d 896 (1999).”  In re Rafael S., 125 Conn.App. 605, 611–12, 9 A.3d 417 (2010).  “As the finder of fact and the arbiter of credibility, the court was free to believe all, some or none of the respondent's testimony.   See In re Jaime S., 120 Conn.App. 712, 729, 994 A.2d 233, cert. granted on other grounds, 297 Conn. 915, 995 A.2d 954 (2010).”  In re Katia M., 124 Conn.App. 650, 663, 6 A.3d 86, cert. denied, 299 Conn. 920, 20 A.3d 1051 (2010).   Moreover, “ ‘[i]t is the right and the duty of the [trier of fact] to draw reasonable and logical inferences from the evidence.’   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Russell v. Russell, 91 Conn.App. 619, 642, 882 A.2d 98, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 924, 925, 888 A.2d 92 (2005).”  Welsch v. Groat, 95 Conn.App. 658, 666–67, 897 A.2d 710 (2006).

FN13. Although the respondent-mother did not testify;  no party requested that an adverse-inference be drawn therefrom, and the court has not utilized the absence of Tachelle J.'s testimony in any respect.   See Practice Book § 35a–7A (“If a party requests that the judicial authority draw an adverse inference from a parent's ․ failure to testify or the judicial authority intends to draw an adverse inference, ․ the judicial authority shall notify the parents or guardian that an adverse inference may be drawn from their failure to testify.”  (Emphasis added.).  FN13. Although the respondent-mother did not testify;  no party requested that an adverse-inference be drawn therefrom, and the court has not utilized the absence of Tachelle J.'s testimony in any respect.   See Practice Book § 35a–7A (“If a party requests that the judicial authority draw an adverse inference from a parent's ․ failure to testify or the judicial authority intends to draw an adverse inference, ․ the judicial authority shall notify the parents or guardian that an adverse inference may be drawn from their failure to testify.”  (Emphasis added.)

FN14. The court fully credits the written report and testimony provided through Dr. Balducci.   The psychologist's opinions were based upon:  his considerable skill, training, education, and experience;  his personal meetings with the respondent-mother and Domenic which took place over a reasonable period of time;  the reliable testing he performed upon Tachelle J.;   and his cogent analysis of multiple collateral resources made available to him through the court service officer.   Thoroughly tested by the vigorous cross examination of counsel for Tachelle J., Dr. Balducci's opinions remained independent of bias for or against any party, were well-founded, supported by objective data, consistent, detailed, thorough, highly relevant to and persuasive concerning the revocation issues before the court.   See In re Jason R., supra, 129 Conn.App. 772–73..  FN14. The court fully credits the written report and testimony provided through Dr. Balducci.   The psychologist's opinions were based upon:  his considerable skill, training, education, and experience;  his personal meetings with the respondent-mother and Domenic which took place over a reasonable period of time;  the reliable testing he performed upon Tachelle J.;   and his cogent analysis of multiple collateral resources made available to him through the court service officer.   Thoroughly tested by the vigorous cross examination of counsel for Tachelle J., Dr. Balducci's opinions remained independent of bias for or against any party, were well-founded, supported by objective data, consistent, detailed, thorough, highly relevant to and persuasive concerning the revocation issues before the court.   See In re Jason R., supra, 129 Conn.App. 772–73.

FN15. Additional facts will be found as required..  FN15. Additional facts will be found as required.

FN16. See footnote 4..  FN16. See footnote 4.

FN17. There is no evidence from which the court could reasonably conclude that Robert M. has ever functioned in a parental role for Domenic..  FN17. There is no evidence from which the court could reasonably conclude that Robert M. has ever functioned in a parental role for Domenic.

FN18. On two occasions before the DOVE–Safe Haven treatment started, once in late 2010 and again in early 2011 Robert M. had been arrested and charged with violating protective orders that had been put in place to protect Tachelle J. However, no order prohibiting Robert M. from having contact with Tachelle J. or her residence was in place in March 2012.   (Tes. Tanetra S.).  FN18. On two occasions before the DOVE–Safe Haven treatment started, once in late 2010 and again in early 2011 Robert M. had been arrested and charged with violating protective orders that had been put in place to protect Tachelle J. However, no order prohibiting Robert M. from having contact with Tachelle J. or her residence was in place in March 2012.   (Tes. Tanetra S.)

FN19. Ominously, Gary B., called as a witness by the respondent mother, credibly testified that even with domestic violence counseling, it takes an abuse victim seven to nine incidents before the victim can lead the relationship and the abuser.  (Tes. Gary B.) Crediting that evidence, and acknowledging both the respondent-mother's election to have unprotected sexual relations with Robert M. and her determination that there was no reason why she should not have contact with Robert M., the court concludes that Tachelle J. will, in the future, continue to expose herself, and in the children in her care, to this perpetrator.  (Ex. A;  Tes. Gary B., Dr. Balducci.).  FN19. Ominously, Gary B., called as a witness by the respondent mother, credibly testified that even with domestic violence counseling, it takes an abuse victim seven to nine incidents before the victim can lead the relationship and the abuser.  (Tes. Gary B.) Crediting that evidence, and acknowledging both the respondent-mother's election to have unprotected sexual relations with Robert M. and her determination that there was no reason why she should not have contact with Robert M., the court concludes that Tachelle J. will, in the future, continue to expose herself, and in the children in her care, to this perpetrator.  (Ex. A;  Tes. Gary B., Dr. Balducci.)

FN20. Tachelle J. may argue that DCF was obligated to replace Huthanh L.'s services with another independent parenting coach or visitation supervisor.   This claim lacks merit under the circumstances of this case.   By January 2013, Tachelle J. was visiting Domenic, under DCF supervision, at the same approximate schedule and frequency that had been used when Casey was involved with the family:  visits took place three hours at a time, twice per week, once in the community and once DCF's offices.  (Ex. A;  Tes. Tanetra S.) Whatever the source of supervision or location of visits after August 2012, Tachelle J. only minimally interacted with her son during visits, choosing instead to engage in conversation with DCF staff members, using her cell phone, or focusing on Amaira after the baby was born.  (Tes. Tanetra S.) Taken as a whole, and as discussed throughout this decision, the evidence impels the conclusion that the value of any parenting coaching or prompting had minimal effect, if any, upon Tachelle J..  FN20. Tachelle J. may argue that DCF was obligated to replace Huthanh L.'s services with another independent parenting coach or visitation supervisor.   This claim lacks merit under the circumstances of this case.   By January 2013, Tachelle J. was visiting Domenic, under DCF supervision, at the same approximate schedule and frequency that had been used when Casey was involved with the family:  visits took place three hours at a time, twice per week, once in the community and once DCF's offices.  (Ex. A;  Tes. Tanetra S.) Whatever the source of supervision or location of visits after August 2012, Tachelle J. only minimally interacted with her son during visits, choosing instead to engage in conversation with DCF staff members, using her cell phone, or focusing on Amaira after the baby was born.  (Tes. Tanetra S.) Taken as a whole, and as discussed throughout this decision, the evidence impels the conclusion that the value of any parenting coaching or prompting had minimal effect, if any, upon Tachelle J.

FN21. “Prior cognitive testing of [Tachelle J.] by Dr. Bruce Freedman, Ph.D. had found a Full Scale IQ of 71 for [the respondent-mother], which is considered in the Borderline range just above the cutoff mark for mild mental retardation.”  (Ex. A.) However, renewed testing by Dr. Balducci was aware that during his December 2012 evaluation, discussed below, revealed that Tachelle J. was able to read “at the twelfth (12.2) grade level,” rendering her well able to complete the written portions of Dr. Balducci testing.(Emphasis in the original.)  (Ex. A.).  FN21. “Prior cognitive testing of [Tachelle J.] by Dr. Bruce Freedman, Ph.D. had found a Full Scale IQ of 71 for [the respondent-mother], which is considered in the Borderline range just above the cutoff mark for mild mental retardation.”  (Ex. A.) However, renewed testing by Dr. Balducci was aware that during his December 2012 evaluation, discussed below, revealed that Tachelle J. was able to read “at the twelfth (12.2) grade level,” rendering her well able to complete the written portions of Dr. Balducci testing.(Emphasis in the original.)  (Ex. A.)

FN22. In the spring of 2012, when she had no children in her care, Tachelle J. missed appointments with Barbara K–G. on:  March 27 and 29;  April 3, 10, 16, 17, 23 and 30;  May 8 and 28.  (Tes. Barbara K–G., Tanetra S.) Tachelle J. unilaterally discontinued taking the medication that Barbara K–G. had prescribed to address the respondent-mother's mental health symptoms;  as a result, DMHAS was unable to assess whether this medication management was adequate, or whether other pharmacotherapy was needed.  (Tes. Barbara K–G.).  FN22. In the spring of 2012, when she had no children in her care, Tachelle J. missed appointments with Barbara K–G. on:  March 27 and 29;  April 3, 10, 16, 17, 23 and 30;  May 8 and 28.  (Tes. Barbara K–G., Tanetra S.) Tachelle J. unilaterally discontinued taking the medication that Barbara K–G. had prescribed to address the respondent-mother's mental health symptoms;  as a result, DMHAS was unable to assess whether this medication management was adequate, or whether other pharmacotherapy was needed.  (Tes. Barbara K–G.)

FN23. Tachelle J. may argue that DMHAS has not provided her with specialized trauma therapy or attention to issues of self-mutilation that she needs in view of her past experiences.   Instead, the court fully credits the opinion of Barbara K–G., a skilled, highly educated and experienced clinician who knows the respondent-mother well, and concludes that appropriate treatment services have been extended by the respondent-mother.  (Tes. Barbara K–G.).  FN23. Tachelle J. may argue that DMHAS has not provided her with specialized trauma therapy or attention to issues of self-mutilation that she needs in view of her past experiences.   Instead, the court fully credits the opinion of Barbara K–G., a skilled, highly educated and experienced clinician who knows the respondent-mother well, and concludes that appropriate treatment services have been extended by the respondent-mother.  (Tes. Barbara K–G.)

FN24. For instance, Tachelle J. enrolled in a GED program, but became overwhelmed when the test was offered for her:  this represents a goal the respondent mother can set, but not achieve.   Similarly, Tachelle J. selected Tasheaka J. to serve as Domenic's guardian, but could not find a way for this plan to succeed.  (Tes. Barbara K–G.).  FN24. For instance, Tachelle J. enrolled in a GED program, but became overwhelmed when the test was offered for her:  this represents a goal the respondent mother can set, but not achieve.   Similarly, Tachelle J. selected Tasheaka J. to serve as Domenic's guardian, but could not find a way for this plan to succeed.  (Tes. Barbara K–G.)

FN25. On one occasion, DMHAS assisted Tachelle J. with your security deposit;  on other occasions, DCF has provided this help.  (Tes. Barbara K–G.).  FN25. On one occasion, DMHAS assisted Tachelle J. with your security deposit;  on other occasions, DCF has provided this help.  (Tes. Barbara K–G.)

FN26. It was not until June of 2012 that DCF had begun thinking about placing Domenic in a therapeutic foster home.  (Tes. Tanetra S.).  FN26. It was not until June of 2012 that DCF had begun thinking about placing Domenic in a therapeutic foster home.  (Tes. Tanetra S.)

FN27. Karen B. has over 25 years of experience as a foster mother, and has provided foster care for nearly thirty children.   In deciding to credit her testimony in full, the court acknowledges this witness's candid admission that did not keep two separate appointments that had been made to see whether Domenic could be placed in a therapeutic day care program.  (Tes. Karen B.).  FN27. Karen B. has over 25 years of experience as a foster mother, and has provided foster care for nearly thirty children.   In deciding to credit her testimony in full, the court acknowledges this witness's candid admission that did not keep two separate appointments that had been made to see whether Domenic could be placed in a therapeutic day care program.  (Tes. Karen B.)

FN28. Prior to his removal from her home, Domenic had bitten his long-term foster mother, breaking the skin;  he had thrown shoes at her while she was driving;  and he had banged items into her legs until she cried out in pain.   He pinched and kicked;  he did not like to have a shirt going over his head so he was difficult to dress;  he pulled off his dirty diapers;  and he voluntarily put his fingers and cutlery down his throat to cause him to gag.   He knocked down a 17–month–old child, and hit another baby on the head, indicating the danger he creates for other children.  (Tes. Karen B.;   see also Tes. Lisa H–W.) Domenic also threw objects at a DCF social worker and tried to strike her with a toy.  (Tes. Tanetra S.).  FN28. Prior to his removal from her home, Domenic had bitten his long-term foster mother, breaking the skin;  he had thrown shoes at her while she was driving;  and he had banged items into her legs until she cried out in pain.   He pinched and kicked;  he did not like to have a shirt going over his head so he was difficult to dress;  he pulled off his dirty diapers;  and he voluntarily put his fingers and cutlery down his throat to cause him to gag.   He knocked down a 17–month–old child, and hit another baby on the head, indicating the danger he creates for other children.  (Tes. Karen B.;   see also Tes. Lisa H–W.) Domenic also threw objects at a DCF social worker and tried to strike her with a toy.  (Tes. Tanetra S.)

FN29. Other than a general reference to General Statutes § 46b–56(c) and General Statutes § 46b–129(k)(3), which addresses permanency plan hearings, the respondent-mother provided no authority for the proposition set forth in her memorandum of law.   The department cited a family court case, which the court finds inapposite to the instant litigation..  FN29. Other than a general reference to General Statutes § 46b–56(c) and General Statutes § 46b–129(k)(3), which addresses permanency plan hearings, the respondent-mother provided no authority for the proposition set forth in her memorandum of law.   The department cited a family court case, which the court finds inapposite to the instant litigation.

FN30. Even if § 46b–56(c) does establish valid criteria for use in this case, the evidence is more than sufficient to establish that Domenic's best interests cannot be served by revocation of commitment.   As is fully discussed in other parts of this decision, although Tachelle J. desires to serve as Domenic's parent, and although he is fond of her, the respondent-mother has long remained unable, without the capacity and/or unwilling to understand and effectively address Domenic's temperament and developmental needs;  she has not served as his custodian for him since he was an infant.  General Statutes § 46b–56(c)(1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (12).   Domenic's uncontrolled and unpredictable physical behaviors create a cognizable risk to objects and living beings, including baby Amaira, who will more likely than not come within the zone of his demonstrated aggression if he lives in Tachelle J.'s home with his sister;  Domenic will not be helped by allowing him to reside in an environment in which his conduct causes harm to others or their property.  General Statutes § 46b–56(c)(5), (12).   Tachelle J.'s own mental health issues remain unresolved, still requiring a significant commitment to treatment that the respondent-mother has not yet demonstrated, leaving her unable to be actively involved in Domenic's life.  General Statutes § 46b–56(c)(8), (12).   Domenic has previously been adjudicated neglected, and has had multiple foster placements without yet adjusting to his educational, home, or community environments;  his behavior issues are apparent when he is with Tachelle J., as well.  General Statutes § 46b–56(c)(9), (10), (11).   The respondent-mother's interest in Robert M., the father of both her children, will more likely than not create a negative impact on the family and will more likely than not expose her and the children to a home that is at best unstable if Domenic is returned to his mother's care.   General Statutes § 46b–56(c)(11), (14), (15).   The court has received insufficient evidence from which it could conclude that any of the services in which Tachelle J. has engaged constituted “a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b–69b”;  if so, as previously found, while she may have attended program sessions, she has not satisfactorily benefitted therefrom.  General Statutes § 46b–56(c)(16).   The court has also received insufficient evidence from which any conclusions concerning the role that could reasonably be played by consideration of Domenic's “cultural background” in the revocation context.  General Statutes § 46b–56(c)(13)..  FN30. Even if § 46b–56(c) does establish valid criteria for use in this case, the evidence is more than sufficient to establish that Domenic's best interests cannot be served by revocation of commitment.   As is fully discussed in other parts of this decision, although Tachelle J. desires to serve as Domenic's parent, and although he is fond of her, the respondent-mother has long remained unable, without the capacity and/or unwilling to understand and effectively address Domenic's temperament and developmental needs;  she has not served as his custodian for him since he was an infant.  General Statutes § 46b–56(c)(1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (12).   Domenic's uncontrolled and unpredictable physical behaviors create a cognizable risk to objects and living beings, including baby Amaira, who will more likely than not come within the zone of his demonstrated aggression if he lives in Tachelle J.'s home with his sister;  Domenic will not be helped by allowing him to reside in an environment in which his conduct causes harm to others or their property.  General Statutes § 46b–56(c)(5), (12).   Tachelle J.'s own mental health issues remain unresolved, still requiring a significant commitment to treatment that the respondent-mother has not yet demonstrated, leaving her unable to be actively involved in Domenic's life.  General Statutes § 46b–56(c)(8), (12).   Domenic has previously been adjudicated neglected, and has had multiple foster placements without yet adjusting to his educational, home, or community environments;  his behavior issues are apparent when he is with Tachelle J., as well.  General Statutes § 46b–56(c)(9), (10), (11).   The respondent-mother's interest in Robert M., the father of both her children, will more likely than not create a negative impact on the family and will more likely than not expose her and the children to a home that is at best unstable if Domenic is returned to his mother's care.   General Statutes § 46b–56(c)(11), (14), (15).   The court has received insufficient evidence from which it could conclude that any of the services in which Tachelle J. has engaged constituted “a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b–69b”;  if so, as previously found, while she may have attended program sessions, she has not satisfactorily benefitted therefrom.  General Statutes § 46b–56(c)(16).   The court has also received insufficient evidence from which any conclusions concerning the role that could reasonably be played by consideration of Domenic's “cultural background” in the revocation context.  General Statutes § 46b–56(c)(13).

FN31. The fact that Tachelle J. has chosen to keep her residential address sealed in the juvenile court files does not persuade the court that she wants to end her relationship with Robert M..  FN31. The fact that Tachelle J. has chosen to keep her residential address sealed in the juvenile court files does not persuade the court that she wants to end her relationship with Robert M.

FN32. See General Statutes § 17a–106b(a) which provides, in pertinent part:  “The state of Connecticut finds that family violence can result in abuse and neglect of the children living in the household where such violence occurs ․”.  FN32. See General Statutes § 17a–106b(a) which provides, in pertinent part:  “The state of Connecticut finds that family violence can result in abuse and neglect of the children living in the household where such violence occurs ․”

FN33. Although Amaira's neglect petition remains pending, the baby remains in Tachelle J.'s care and custody.   DMHAS provided a thrice-weekly Douala to assist Tachelle J. with her infant.  (Tes. Tanetra S.) However, if Domenic's commitment were revoked, Tachelle J. would be responsible for the care of both children..  FN33. Although Amaira's neglect petition remains pending, the baby remains in Tachelle J.'s care and custody.   DMHAS provided a thrice-weekly Douala to assist Tachelle J. with her infant.  (Tes. Tanetra S.) However, if Domenic's commitment were revoked, Tachelle J. would be responsible for the care of both children.

FN34. The court's conclusion is supported by the fully credited, thoughtful, and highly analytical opinion reached by Dr. Balducci, who opined in December of 2012, consistent with his testimony at trial, that Tachelle J.'s entrenched and “[v]arious risk factors, including [her] own experiences abuse, maltreatment, and neglect, minimal social support, lack of education and employment and extremely limited financial resources, poor relationship choices, and mental illness raised concern regarding Ms. [J.' s] capacity to be a good enough parent and consistently carry out even basic parenting in less highly structured and more complicated and challenging circumstances” than those presented in the course of the interactional evaluation, a highly structured setting with psychological supervision.  (Ex. A.).  FN34. The court's conclusion is supported by the fully credited, thoughtful, and highly analytical opinion reached by Dr. Balducci, who opined in December of 2012, consistent with his testimony at trial, that Tachelle J.'s entrenched and “[v]arious risk factors, including [her] own experiences abuse, maltreatment, and neglect, minimal social support, lack of education and employment and extremely limited financial resources, poor relationship choices, and mental illness raised concern regarding Ms. [J.' s] capacity to be a good enough parent and consistently carry out even basic parenting in less highly structured and more complicated and challenging circumstances” than those presented in the course of the interactional evaluation, a highly structured setting with psychological supervision.  (Ex. A.)

FN35. Tachelle J. has generally informed DCF that she does not believe that her son has any specific behavioral needs;  she feels that DCF and Domenic's second foster mother are exaggerating their description of his behaviors, even though these behaviors have continued in his third placement.  (Tes. Lisa H–W., Tanetra S.).  FN35. Tachelle J. has generally informed DCF that she does not believe that her son has any specific behavioral needs;  she feels that DCF and Domenic's second foster mother are exaggerating their description of his behaviors, even though these behaviors have continued in his third placement.  (Tes. Lisa H–W., Tanetra S.)

FN36. In his December 2012 report, and again in his January and April 2013 testimony, Dr. Balducci stated his opinion that Tachelle J. was not then able to serve as a residential resource for Domenic, and that she would not acquire this ability in the foreseeable future.  (Ex. A;  Tes. Dr. Balducci.)   This opinion is fully consistent with the opinion of Casey's skilled, experienced and knowledgeable social worker, Huthanh L., who concluded that as of August 2012, after working with Tachelle J. and the child for nearly a year, the respondent-mother had not yet become able to serve as Domenic's primary caretaker or even to have unsupervised overnight visits with her son.  (Tes. Huthanh L.).  FN36. In his December 2012 report, and again in his January and April 2013 testimony, Dr. Balducci stated his opinion that Tachelle J. was not then able to serve as a residential resource for Domenic, and that she would not acquire this ability in the foreseeable future.  (Ex. A;  Tes. Dr. Balducci.)   This opinion is fully consistent with the opinion of Casey's skilled, experienced and knowledgeable social worker, Huthanh L., who concluded that as of August 2012, after working with Tachelle J. and the child for nearly a year, the respondent-mother had not yet become able to serve as Domenic's primary caretaker or even to have unsupervised overnight visits with her son.  (Tes. Huthanh L.)

FN37. In the context of Tachelle J.'s lack of minimal parenting skills insofar as her son is concerned, perhaps most alarming is her lack of a plan for protecting baby Amaira from Domenic's ingrained pattern of oppositional behaviors and aggression.   Although Tachelle J. states a desire to learn how to be a proper parent for Domenic, she remains in a position where she cannot do so.   Consistent with Dr. Balducci's cogent analysis, the court finds that if Domenic is returned to her care, the respondent-mother will, more likely than not, become “easily ․ overwhelmed by the responsibilities of parenting, especially with a child with any specialized needs [and ]with an infant where the paramount responsibilities are for physical survival needs (e.g., food, water, sleep, warmth, comfort, exercise, etc.).”  (Ex. A;  see also Tes. Dr. Balducci.).  FN37. In the context of Tachelle J.'s lack of minimal parenting skills insofar as her son is concerned, perhaps most alarming is her lack of a plan for protecting baby Amaira from Domenic's ingrained pattern of oppositional behaviors and aggression.   Although Tachelle J. states a desire to learn how to be a proper parent for Domenic, she remains in a position where she cannot do so.   Consistent with Dr. Balducci's cogent analysis, the court finds that if Domenic is returned to her care, the respondent-mother will, more likely than not, become “easily ․ overwhelmed by the responsibilities of parenting, especially with a child with any specialized needs [and ]with an infant where the paramount responsibilities are for physical survival needs (e.g., food, water, sleep, warmth, comfort, exercise, etc.).”  (Ex. A;  see also Tes. Dr. Balducci.)

FN38. The court's conclusion is supported by the fully credited, thoughtful, and highly analytical opinion reached by Dr. Balducci, who opined in December of 2012, consistent with his testimony at trial, that Tachelle J.'s entrenched and “[v]arious risk factors, including [her] own experiences abuse, maltreatment, and neglect, minimal social support, lack of education and employment and extremely limited financial resources, poor relationship choices, and mental illness raised concern regarding Ms. [J.' s] capacity to be a good enough parent and consistently carry out even basic parenting in less highly structured and more complicated and challenging circumstances” than those presented in the course of the interactional evaluation, a highly structured setting with psychological supervision.  (Ex. A.).  FN38. The court's conclusion is supported by the fully credited, thoughtful, and highly analytical opinion reached by Dr. Balducci, who opined in December of 2012, consistent with his testimony at trial, that Tachelle J.'s entrenched and “[v]arious risk factors, including [her] own experiences abuse, maltreatment, and neglect, minimal social support, lack of education and employment and extremely limited financial resources, poor relationship choices, and mental illness raised concern regarding Ms. [J.' s] capacity to be a good enough parent and consistently carry out even basic parenting in less highly structured and more complicated and challenging circumstances” than those presented in the course of the interactional evaluation, a highly structured setting with psychological supervision.  (Ex. A.)

FN39. Poignantly, despite DMHAS's assistance, Tachelle J. remains so unable to budget her resources that while she can sometimes bring appropriate snacks to visits, there are times when she cannot purchase food to bring to Domenic.  (Tes. Tanetra S.).  FN39. Poignantly, despite DMHAS's assistance, Tachelle J. remains so unable to budget her resources that while she can sometimes bring appropriate snacks to visits, there are times when she cannot purchase food to bring to Domenic.  (Tes. Tanetra S.)

FN40. The fact that Amaira, a very young baby with no noted specialized needs, remains in Tachelle J.'s care cannot serve as the basis for concluding that it would be Domenic's best interests to be returned to the respondent-mother's custody..  FN40. The fact that Amaira, a very young baby with no noted specialized needs, remains in Tachelle J.'s care cannot serve as the basis for concluding that it would be Domenic's best interests to be returned to the respondent-mother's custody.

FN41. Domenic's maternal grandmother Tasheaka J. presents with a child protection history that likely precludes her from assignment as his legal guardian.   Tachelle J.'s own foster mother has declined to accept Domenic into her home.   Tachelle J.'s maternal great-grandmother's health limitations render her unable to care for the child.  (Tes. Tanetra S.).  FN41. Domenic's maternal grandmother Tasheaka J. presents with a child protection history that likely precludes her from assignment as his legal guardian.   Tachelle J.'s own foster mother has declined to accept Domenic into her home.   Tachelle J.'s maternal great-grandmother's health limitations render her unable to care for the child.  (Tes. Tanetra S.)

FN42. The court's conclusions are consistent with those reached by Domenic's GAL, who opined that Tachelle J.'s limitations remain insufficiently improved, and are inadequate to meet the child's needs for a highly structured home environment free from violence or the threat of violence.   Domenic reacts aggressively when he doesn't get what he wants.   (Tes.GAL.) Thus, he who would benefit from a home environment in which he does not have to share parental attention with a sibling, such as his baby sister..  FN42. The court's conclusions are consistent with those reached by Domenic's GAL, who opined that Tachelle J.'s limitations remain insufficiently improved, and are inadequate to meet the child's needs for a highly structured home environment free from violence or the threat of violence.   Domenic reacts aggressively when he doesn't get what he wants.   (Tes.GAL.) Thus, he who would benefit from a home environment in which he does not have to share parental attention with a sibling, such as his baby sister.

FN43. This aspect of the Casey social worker's testimony was fully consistent with that provided by Tachelle J.'s DMHAS therapist, doing the respondent-mother has admitted that her roommates often ate food she had purchased for herself.  (Tes. Barbara K–G.).  FN43. This aspect of the Casey social worker's testimony was fully consistent with that provided by Tachelle J.'s DMHAS therapist, doing the respondent-mother has admitted that her roommates often ate food she had purchased for herself.  (Tes. Barbara K–G.)

FN44. Tachelle J. did not identify any specific written reference to errors or misrepresentations in the department's filings that could reasonably have outweighed the overwhelming effect of the other evidence produced at trial..  FN44. Tachelle J. did not identify any specific written reference to errors or misrepresentations in the department's filings that could reasonably have outweighed the overwhelming effect of the other evidence produced at trial.

FN45. Notwithstanding this conclusion, the court does not condone the department's decision to keep Tachelle J. and Domenic under the supervision of a social worker who attempted to unduly influence the respondent-mother's Safe Haven domestic violence counselor, or whose own health concerns interfered with consistent attention to this family.  (Tes. Gary B., GAL, Tanetra S.).  FN45. Notwithstanding this conclusion, the court does not condone the department's decision to keep Tachelle J. and Domenic under the supervision of a social worker who attempted to unduly influence the respondent-mother's Safe Haven domestic violence counselor, or whose own health concerns interfered with consistent attention to this family.  (Tes. Gary B., GAL, Tanetra S.)

FN46. While reporting to DCF, each of the resources with which Tachelle J. elected to engage operated independently from DCF, and were not susceptible to pressure from the department's representatives.  (Tes. Gary B., Barbara K–G., Gladys R.) Thus, there is insufficient evidence from which the court could reasonably conclude that the unavailability of DCF staff members at any particular time, or the assignment of particular DCF personnel to Tachelle J. and her children had any particular impact upon the revocation issues..  FN46. While reporting to DCF, each of the resources with which Tachelle J. elected to engage operated independently from DCF, and were not susceptible to pressure from the department's representatives.  (Tes. Gary B., Barbara K–G., Gladys R.) Thus, there is insufficient evidence from which the court could reasonably conclude that the unavailability of DCF staff members at any particular time, or the assignment of particular DCF personnel to Tachelle J. and her children had any particular impact upon the revocation issues.

Rubinow, Nicola E., J.