Charice M. Darden v. Richard Jones, Jr. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This dissolution of marriage action was commenced by the plaintiff, Charice M. Darden, against the defendant, Richard Jones, Jr., by summons and complaint dated September 7, 2012, and made returnable to this court on October 16, 2012.   The case was tried before the court on June 10, 2013 and June 24, 2013.   The plaintiff was represented by Corrine A. BoniVendola, Esq. and Nicole R. Crocco, Esq. The defendant represented himself.   The interests of the parties' minor children were represented by Lisamaria T. Proscino, Esq., the Guardian ad litem (“GAL”).   The primary issues in dispute are alimony, custody and visitation, and distribution of personal and real property.¹  The court heard testimony from the plaintiff, the defendant and the GAL. Various exhibits were entered into evidence.

Upon careful consideration of the evidence presented and the pertinent statutory law, in particular General Statutes §§ 46b–82 (alimony), 46b–56 (custody, care, education, visitation and support of children), 46b–81 (assignment of the marital estate), and 46b–56c (educational support orders), and the relevant case law, and having observed the demeanor of the parties at time of trial, the court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

I

Jurisdiction

The plaintiff married the defendant on September 22, 2006, in Somers, Connecticut.   The plaintiff continuously resided in Connecticut for at least one year before this action was commenced.   All statutory stays have expired.   The court has jurisdiction over this matter.

II

Marital and Family History

The plaintiff and the defendant met when the plaintiff was twelve years old and the defendant was thirteen.   They dated sporadically throughout their teens then reunited when the plaintiff was nineteen.   The parties separated the following year when the plaintiff became pregnant with their first child, a daughter, Ryana, who was born on September 15, 1997.²  They reunited when Ryana was 3 or 4 months old and remained together for the next one to two years.   The parties separated again when the plaintiff became pregnant with the parties' second child, a son, Ryan, who was born on December 26, 2000.   Thereafter, they had an “off and on” relationship for the next year or so.

In June 2002, the defendant was involved in a serious car accident in which he was badly injured and his passenger, the defendant's best friend, was killed.   The defendant, who was operating the vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol when the accident occurred, was charged and convicted in connection with the incident.   He was sentenced to ten years in prison, suspended after seven years, and five years of probation.   The defendant was incarcerated from April 2003 until July 2009.   He was on probation at the time of trial.

The parties reunited once again following the defendant's accident and incarceration.   The plaintiff wished to be supportive of the defendant and would bring the parties' children to visit him in prison one to two times a week.   The plaintiff married the defendant in 2006 while he was incarcerated.

When the defendant was released from prison in July 2009, he went to live with the plaintiff and their children in a two-family home located at 69–71 Downing Street, New Haven.   The house was purchased by the plaintiff in 2007.   The mortgage and title to the property are held in the plaintiff's name only.   The defendant did not contribute to the purchase price of the home.   The defendant initially paid some utility bills and room and board at the rate of $50 per week.   As time went on, however, his financial contribution to the household expenses decreased and ultimately ceased.   The plaintiff has not received any financial support from the defendant since this action was filed.

The fair market value of the 69–71 Downing Street property as of May 29, 2013, is $85,000.   The outstanding balance due on the mortgage as of May 24, 2013, is $187,900.25.   The mortgage is current.   The first floor of the property is handicapped accessible and occupied by a Section 8 tenant paying rent in the amount of $1,000 a month.³  The parties occupied the second floor of the property with their minor children.   The parties separated in September 2012 after which time the defendant vacated the New Haven house and moved in with his mother in West Haven, Connecticut, where he currently resides.

The plaintiff is 36 years old and in good physical and mental health.   She holds an associate's degree, is employed full-time as a licensed practical nurse (LPN) and is taking classes to become a registered nurse (RN).  She has worked consistently throughout the parties' marriage.   The plaintiff attended marriage counseling with the defendant and some individual therapy thereafter.   She takes medication prescribed by her primary care physician for sleep and anxiety on an “as needed” basis.

The plaintiff grosses $1,062 per week, has a net weekly wage of $755, and a net weekly income of $986.   Her total weekly expenses are $1,280.   She has outstanding debts for oil, attorneys fees, medical expenses and credit cards totaling $13,252.   The plaintiff owns a 2008 Pontiac Grand Prix valued at $2,000, but the vehicle is encumbered by a $13,650 loan.   She has approximately $900 in various bank accounts, $22,000 in a 403(b) savings account with her employer, and $100 in a Roth IRA. The plaintiff will incur additional tuition expenses for the 2013–2014 academic year, but the amount of those expenses is presently unknown.   The parties purchased a time share together in 2010.   The time share presently has no value and the parties owe approximately $9,000 in connection with its purchase.

The defendant is 37 years old and in good physical health.   He holds a high school degree, took classes at Gateway Community College and attended trade classes while incarcerated.   He currently does not have a driver's license.   The defendant claims he was diagnosed with post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).⁴  He suffers from substance abuse and mental health issues.   The defendant has participated in various inpatient and outpatient drug and alcohol treatment programs, but has had little success in maintaining sobriety.   He admits that he abuses alcohol and illegal drugs.   He claims that he last consumed alcohol “a few weeks ago” and has not used cocaine since October 2012.   The defendant meets sporadically with medical professionals at Yale–New Haven Psychiatric Hospital.   He was prescribed medication for depression, but he has not been consistent in taking his medications or attending follow-up treatment.

The defendant has a spotty work history.   From 2009 to the present, he held various odd jobs selling sneakers, working at a clothing store, a laundromat and a car wash, performing home repairs and collecting and selling scrap metal and other items discarded by others.   He was briefly employed by the contractors who renovated the first floor of the 69–71 Downing Street property to make it handicapped accessible.   He is currently self-employed as a “recycler” grossing and netting approximately $50 per week.   As described by the defendant, his current job entails salvaging items from the garbage and reselling those items.   The defendant receives public assistance benefits in the amount of $50 per week under the State–Administered General Assistance program (SAGA) and benefits in the amount of $50 per week under the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Program (TANF).   The defendant claims expenses of approximately $180 per week comprising $50 for rent, $25 for telephone, $25 for cable TV, $50 for food, $20 for clothing and $10 for public transportation.   According to his financial affidavit, the defendant owns no assets.   The defendant testified that he has not looked for other employment over the last six months because he has been working on his mental stability.   He has not filed income tax returns since 1998.

During the course of their marriage, the defendant gave the plaintiff an “antique” kitchen table set as a gift.⁵  The set had three chairs, two of which were broken.   After the defendant vacated the marital home in September 2012, the plaintiff discarded the broken kitchen table set and replaced it with a new set which she had placed on lay-away more than a year earlier and for which she had just finished making payments.   As reflected by his thorough cross examination of the plaintiff and his own testimony, the defendant is very dismayed that the plaintiff disposed of the kitchen table set without first consulting him or asking him to repair it.   The plaintiff also disposed of some of the defendant's property while preparing for a mandatory Section 8 housing inspection.   Boxes of various items salvaged or otherwise acquired by the defendant were stored in the basement.   The plaintiff discarded some items that were broken and placed other items on the curb or in the backyard.   The defendant is critical of the plaintiff's disposition of this property.   The value of the discarded items is not known.

While this action was pending, the plaintiff received an income tax refund in the amount of $7,030.   The defendant filed a motion seeking an award of alimony pendente lite and on March 14, 2013, the court (Burke, J.), ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant $1,000 in lump sum alimony to assist him with counseling or a job search.   The plaintiff made the payment as ordered.   The defendant used the money to help out his mother and purchase clothing for the minor children and himself;  he did not spend it on counseling or a job search.

The parties' relationship began to substantially erode in 2011.   They slept in separate bedrooms and argued frequently.   The defendant would leave the parties' home for short periods of time without any notice or indication as to where he was going or when he would return.   He failed to attend his daughter's graduation.   He was not contributing financially to the household.   The plaintiff's jewelry went missing from the home;  she suspects but has not proven that the defendant took it.   The defendant took his son's PlayStation 3 video game console and his daughter's laptop and unilaterally disposed of the items.   He claims he gave the laptop to his niece because it became a source of disagreement between the plaintiff and him.   He also claims he took the video console to a repair shop, the name of which he cannot recall, but claims it was not a pawn shop.   The court does not find credible the defendant's testimony regarding his disposition of the PlayStation 3 console.

The parties have a history of disputes which result in police intervention.   Seven incident reports involving the parties were filed by the New Haven police between February 25, 2011, and May 21, 2013.   Many reports involve allegations that the defendant took the plaintiff's property, such as her car, car keys or cell phone, and would not return them to her.   An incident which occurred on January 1, 2012, involved allegations that the defendant was intoxicated and out of control at a family gathering at the marital home.   He was arrested and on April 24, 2012, pled guilty to Disorderly Conduct, a class C Misdemeanor, for which he received a sentence of 90 days, execution fully suspended, and a one-year conditional discharge.   The plaintiff also admitted that she hit the defendant with her car on two occasions.   The defendant did not sustain serious injuries on either occasion and the incidents were not reported to the police.

The final straw that triggered the plaintiff's filing of this divorce action occurred on September 4, 2012.   The defendant contacted the plaintiff at work, explained that he needed her car to attend to an emergency at his grandmother's house, and said that he would return that evening to pick up the plaintiff from work.   The plaintiff allowed the defendant to take her car, but he never returned with it.   The plaintiff arranged for a ride home from work.   The defendant was not at the house when the plaintiff returned home, nor did he contact the plaintiff that evening or the next morning.   Later that next day, still with no word from the defendant, the plaintiff was contacted by the New Haven police who advised that her car had been involved in an accident in front of the police station, that crack cocaine and marijuana had been found inside the vehicle, and that the defendant had been located down the street from the accident scene at nearby Union Station.   The defendant was not arrested in connection with the incident;  however, a second individual who was driving the vehicle was arrested.   The plaintiff's car sustained over $3,000 in damage and had to be towed from the accident site.   The plaintiff paid for the damage to her car, the cost to tow the vehicle, and the ticket that was issued in connection with the accident.

The defendant claims that after he attended to his grandmother's emergency, he returned home where he met up with a friend and offered to let the friend drive the plaintiff's vehicle.   The two went to the park, relaxed a bit, then went to a second friend's house in Fair Haven.   The first friend took the plaintiff's car to get cigarettes, and never returned.   The defendant was distraught, yet he did not call the plaintiff or the police.   He received a phone call from a third friend advising him that the plaintiff's car was smashed in front of the New Haven police department.   The defendant claims he was in Union Station when the police arrived.   The defendant did not explain how he got from his friend's house in Fair Haven to Union Station in New Haven, why he went to Union Station in the first place, or what he was doing there when the police found him.   The court finds that the defendant's version of the events that transpired is not credible.

The inevitable demise of the marriage was further hastened in October 2012 when the plaintiff discovered a check missing from her checkbook.   The plaintiff kept her checkbook in her bedroom, in a small box in the dresser.   She noticed a check was missing because the carbon copy was still in the checkbook, but nothing was copied onto it.   The check, which had been made payable to “Ryan Grant” in the amount of $400, was negotiated by someone on October 9, 2012.   The negotiated check caused the plaintiff's checking account to be overdrawn and several checks to bounce.   The plaintiff believes the defendant is responsible for the forgery;  she filed a larceny complaint against him on October 13, 2012.   The defendant disclaims any knowledge of or involvement with the forged check.   The court does not find the defendant's disclaimer credible.

The collective testimony of the parties reveals that the defendant has been an enormous emotional, mental and financial burden and drain on the plaintiff and their marriage.   The defendant does not appreciate the negative impact his behavior has had on his wife and children.   He believes he has been a supportive husband and a positive influence in the lives of his children, but the evidence in this case indicates otherwise.   The defendant continues to nurture his substance abuse problem, consuming alcohol and using illegal drugs despite being on probation for a felony offense and exposing himself to three additional years in prison.   The defendant seems bewildered by the fact that his wife is pursuing a divorce.   In contrast to the defendant, the plaintiff is very self-aware.   She has been supportive of the defendant and extraordinarily tolerant of his inappropriate and illegal behavior.   She exhibits a calm demeanor and appears resolute in her desire to end her relationship with the defendant and move forward with a less stressful life.   The plaintiff is a very credible witness, the defendant significantly less so.

As noted above, the parties and/or their children have received state assistance during the course of their six-year marriage.   The plaintiff is not currently pregnant.   She seeks dissolution of the marriage.   The court finds that the allegations of the complaint are proven and true.   The parties' marriage has broken down irretrievably and there is no hope of reconciliation.

The plaintiff is and always has been the primary caretaker of the parties' minor children.   The defendant provided some basic assistance with their care when the plaintiff was working, but he did not contribute meaningfully to their financial support.   As evidenced by the proposed orders submitted in this action by the State of Connecticut, there is an outstanding child support balance of $23,084.92 due and owing to the State from the defendant for the care of the minor children.

Both children are in therapy.   The parties' daughter appears to have succeeded at home and school despite the familial conflict and stress she has experienced and witnessed.   The parties' son has not been as resilient.   He has exhibited serious behavioral problems resulting in his suspension from school.   He is defiant and disrespectful, with such behaviors worsening since the divorce proceedings were filed.   Just prior to the commencement of trial, the plaintiff, upon consultation with a therapist, placed the parties' son in a fourteen-day residential respite care program.   The plaintiff testified credibly that she believed she was acting in her son's best interest when placing him in respite care.   The defendant questions her decision and believes she should have sought advice and assistance from his extended family before taking such action.   The GAL supports the plaintiff's actions and testified that she has been very impressed by the plaintiff's ability to utilize programs and resources available to her and the children.

The minor children seem to have a good relationship with their father, and it is clear that both parents love their children and care deeply about their well-being and future success.   Due to the defendant's ongoing substance abuse and mental health issues, however, the plaintiff is understandably concerned with the defendant having unsupervised visitation time with their children.   The GAL shares the plaintiff's concern.

On October 12, 2012, the court (Burke, J.) entered temporary orders pendente lite regarding custody of the minor children and awarded sole legal custody of both children to the plaintiff.   Thereafter, on March 15, 2013, the court (Burke, J.), upon the agreement of the parties, awarded the defendant, pendente lite, weekly Sunday visitation with the minor children.   The defendant has not been consistent in exercising his parenting time with the children or arranging for their transportation.   The GAL opined that the parties cannot parent together.   She advocates that the plaintiff have sole legal and physical custody of the minor children and that the defendant have supervised visitation with them.   Given the defendant's criminal history, drug abuse and mental health issues, the GAL is concerned for the children's safety when they are with their father.   The GAL recommends that the defendant's visitation with the children remain supervised until such time as the defendant successfully completes drug and alcohol and anger management counseling.

The plaintiff has completed the parenting education program.   There is no documentation in the court's file or evidence adduced at trial indicating that the defendant has completed the parenting education program.

III

DiscussionAAlimony

The plaintiff proposes that neither party receive alimony.   The defendant proposes that the plaintiff pay him alimony in the amount of $150 per week for four years.

In determining whether to award alimony and the duration and amount of the award, the court “shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the ․ dissolution of the marriage ․ the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to section 46b–81, and, in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor children has been awarded, the desirability of such parent's securing employment.”  Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46b–82.  “There is no absolute right to alimony ․ Awards of alimony incident to a marital dissolution rest in the sound discretion of the trial court.”  (Citations omitted.)  Weinstein v. Weinstein, 18 Conn.App. 622, 637, 561 A.2d 443 (1989).

The court finds that the defendant, through his conduct described above, has caused the irretrievable breakdown of the parties' six-year marriage.   The plaintiff has been the primary source of financial support throughout the parties' marriage;  the defendant's financial contributions have been minimal.   The plaintiff's current income exceeds the defendant's current income;  however, the defendant is clearly underemployed.   The plaintiff's current net income is consumed entirely by mortgage and utility payments, food and clothing for the minor children and her, transportation, insurance premiums and child-related expenses.   The plaintiff's debts far exceed her assets.   She is saddled with a sizeable mortgage debt;  the mortgage on the marital home exceeds its fair market value by more than $100,000.   She also owes more than $13,000 on a car worth $2,000.   The plaintiff simply has no ability to financially support the defendant while supporting herself and the parties' minor children.   The defendant has the ability to support himself financially;  he has chosen not to seek gainful employment.

B

Custody and Visitation

The plaintiff proposes that she have sole legal and physical custody of the minor children and that the defendant have supervised visitation upon proof of completion of drug and alcohol counseling.   The defendant proposes that the parties have joint legal custody of the minor children, with primary physical custody with the mother.   The GAL opines that it is in her wards' best interest that the plaintiff have sole legal and physical custody and that the defendant's visitation with the children remain supervised until such time as the defendant successfully completes drug and alcohol and anger management counseling.

“It is statutorily incumbent upon a court entering orders concerning custody or visitation ․ to be guided by the best interests of the child.”  Wilson v. Wilson, 38 Conn.App. 263, 269, 661 A.2d 621 (1995);  Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46b–56(b).  In determining issues of custody and visitation, the court may consider many factors, including those specifically enumerated in General Statutes § 46b–56(c), and while “the rights, wishes and desires of the parents must be considered, it is nevertheless the ultimate welfare of the child which must control the decision of the court.”  (Citation omitted.)  Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, 180 Conn. 533, 541, 429 A.2d 801 (1980).   The court is also mindful that “[v]isitation rights are not wholly unrelated to the welfare of the children of divorced parents.   Minor children are entitled to the love and companionship of both parents.   For the good of the child, unless a parent is completely unfit, a decree should allow a parent deprived of custody to visit or communicated with the children under such restrictions as the circumstances warrant.”  (Citations omitted.)  Raymond v. Raymond, 165 Conn. 735, 741, 345 A.2d 48 (1974).   The court also has the authority to order a parent to participate in counseling and drug or alcohol screening, provided such participation is in the best interest of the child.  Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46b–56(i).

The court finds that it is in the best interest of the minor children for the plaintiff to have sole legal and physical custody of the minor children and for the defendant to have supervised visitation with them.   The court finds further that it is in the best interest of the minor children for the defendant's visitation to remain supervised until such time as the defendant successfully completes the parenting education program, drug and alcohol counseling and anger management counseling.

C

Assignment of the Marital Estate

The plaintiff proposes that she be awarded the marital residence free and clear of any claim by the defendant.   The defendant proposes that the plaintiff keep the marital residence, but that she pay to him $25,000 upon the refinance of the house.   The plaintiff proposes, and the defendant agrees, that the plaintiff should be awarded the 2008 Pontiac Grand Prix, free and clear from any claim by the defendant.   The plaintiff also proposes that she should be awarded the bank, retirement and investment accounts listed on her financial affidavit, that the parties divide their personal property to their mutual satisfaction, and that each party be held responsible for their individual debts.   The defendant proposes that the funds held in the accounts listed on the plaintiff's financial affidavit and all personal property be split 60/40 in the plaintiff's favor.   The defendant also seeks an award of a lump sum payment in the amount of $2,500 for destroyed property.   With respect to the RCI timeshare, the plaintiff proposes that she relinquish all rights to the timeshare and that the defendant cooperate in signing all documentation necessary to relinquish such rights.   The defendant's proposed orders do not address the timeshare.

“[T]he assignment of property in a marital dissolution rests in the sound discretion of the court.”  (Citation omitted.)  Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, 180 Conn. 544.  “In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court ․ shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the ․ dissolution of the marriage ․ the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income.   The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.”  Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46b–81(c).

The court finds that the defendant's request that he be awarded $25,000 upon a refinancing of the marital home is wholly unrealistic.   There is no equity in the marital home;  the property is more than $100,000 underwater.   The plaintiff is the sole purchaser and owner of the marital home, the defendant did not contribute financially to the acquisition of the home, and there is no possibility that the mortgage can be refinanced under the current circumstances.   The court finds further that the defendant has not contributed to the sums held by the plaintiff in the bank, retirement and investment accounts listed on her financial affidavit.   As detailed in this decision, the defendant's egregious behavior throughout the marriage militates against him sharing in the parties' limited marital assets.   As for the property allegedly destroyed by the plaintiff, there is no evidence before the court as to the monetary value of such property.   The court is therefore unable to fashion appropriate orders with respect to such property.

D

Educational Support Orders

Pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–56c, the court finds, and the parties stipulate, that it is more likely than not that the plaintiff and the defendant would have provided post-majority educational support to their minor children if the family had remained intact.

IV

Findings and Orders

1. Dissolution:  The marriage of the parties is dissolved on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown.   The parties are declared single and unmarried.

2. Alimony:  Neither party shall pay alimony to the other.

3. Custody and Visitation:

a.  The plaintiff shall have sole legal and physical custody of the minor children.

b. The defendant shall have supervised visitation with the minor children every Sunday from after church until 6:00 pm, and at such other times as may be agreed by the plaintiff in her sole discretion.   The visitation shall be supervised by the plaintiff or any other individual(s) as may be approved by the plaintiff.   The plaintiff shall provide transportation for the minor children.   The defendant shall not operate a motor vehicle with the children as passengers.   The defendant shall not consume alcohol or use illegal drugs during his visitation with the minor children or during the twelve-hour period immediately preceding such visitation time.

c. The defendant's visitation with the minor children shall remain supervised at least until such time as the defendant successfully completes the parenting education program, drug and alcohol counseling and anger management counseling.

4. Child Support:  The court refers any issues of child support to the Family Support Magistrate file, Docket No. FA98–04080665.

5. Parenting Education Program:  The defendant is ordered to complete the parenting education program within sixty (60) days of the date of this decision and to submit to the court proof of completion of such program with ninety (90) days of the date of this decision.

6. Income Tax Issues:

a.  Exemption:  The plaintiff shall claim the minor children for state and federal income tax purposes.

b. Liability:  The defendant shall be solely responsible for all federal and state income taxes, interest and penalties arising from his failure to file tax returns from the period 1998 to the present and shall hold the plaintiff harmless for same and shall indemnify her for any liability arising therefrom.

7. Educational Support Order:  The court reserves jurisdiction pursuant to Gen.Stat. § 46b–56c to determine whether to enter an educational support order and the terms of that order.

8. Health Insurance:  Each party shall be responsible for his or her own health and dental insurance and unreimbursed medical expenses.   The minor children shall continue to receive insurance coverage under HUSKY, provided, however, that either party shall provide health insurance for the benefit of the minor children if such insurance becomes available to them at a reasonable cost.   The plaintiff shall be responsible for the minor children's unreimbursed medical expenses.

9. Marital Residence:  The plaintiff shall retain sole ownership and have exclusive possession of the marital residence located at 69–71 Downing Street, New Haven, Connecticut.   The plaintiff shall be solely responsible for the mortgage, taxes, insurance, utilities, maintenance and upkeep of the property and shall hold the defendant harmless for same and shall indemnify him for any liability arising therefrom.

10. Automobiles:  The plaintiff shall retain all right, title and interest in the 2008 Pontiac Grand Prix and shall be solely responsible for all costs associated therewith and shall hold the defendant harmless for same and shall indemnify him for any liability arising therefrom.

11. Bank, Retirement and Investment Accounts:  The plaintiff shall retain all right, title and interest in the bank, retirement and investment accounts listed on her financial affidavit, free and clear of any claim by the defendant.

12. Personal Property:

a. RCI Timeshare:  The plaintiff and the defendant shall cooperate with one another to terminate their interest in the RCI timeshare, if possible.   If the interest cannot be terminated, the defendant shall convey to the plaintiff all of his right, title and interest in and to the RCI timeshare.   The plaintiff shall thereafter retain sole ownership and have exclusive use of the RCI timeshare, be solely responsible for all costs associated therewith, and hold the defendant harmless for same and indemnify him for any liability arising therefrom.

b. Other Personal Property:  The plaintiff shall identify all personal property owned by the defendant and thereafter notify the defendant that such property is available for pickup by him at a designated time and location.   If the defendant fails to retrieve said personal property within thirty (30) days from the date designated for pickup by the plaintiff, the plaintiff may dispose of said personal property as she sees fit and without any liability to the defendant therefor.   All personal property not identified by the plaintiff as being owned by the defendant shall belong to the plaintiff.

13. Liabilities:  Each party shall be liable for his or her individual debts as listed on the parties' respective financial affidavits.   The plaintiff shall be liable for her own legal fees.

Morgan, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. There is an existing Family Support Magistrate file, Docket No NNH FA98–0408066 S, addressing the defendant's child support obligations and arrearages.   The State of Connecticut, with the agreement of the plaintiff, requests that the court refer issues of child support to the existing Family Support Magistrate file..  FN1. There is an existing Family Support Magistrate file, Docket No NNH FA98–0408066 S, addressing the defendant's child support obligations and arrearages.   The State of Connecticut, with the agreement of the plaintiff, requests that the court refer issues of child support to the existing Family Support Magistrate file.

FN2. By this time, the defendant had fathered two other children:  the first when he was thirteen years old and the second when he was nineteen..  FN2. By this time, the defendant had fathered two other children:  the first when he was thirteen years old and the second when he was nineteen.

FN3. “Section 8” refers to Section 8 of the Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f, as amended, which authorizes payment by the federal government of rental housing assistance to private landlords on behalf of low-income households..  FN3. “Section 8” refers to Section 8 of the Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f, as amended, which authorizes payment by the federal government of rental housing assistance to private landlords on behalf of low-income households.

FN4. There was no evidence of this diagnosis at trial other than the defendant's own testimony..  FN4. There was no evidence of this diagnosis at trial other than the defendant's own testimony.

FN5. The defendant describes the kitchen table set as an “antique” but the photograph of the set introduced into evidence reflects that it is an ordinary conventional kitchen table set which may be old, but not necessarily antique and therefore valuable..  FN5. The defendant describes the kitchen table set as an “antique” but the photograph of the set introduced into evidence reflects that it is an ordinary conventional kitchen table set which may be old, but not necessarily antique and therefore valuable.

Morgan, Lisa K., J.