IN RE: Christian C. et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

I. INTRODUCTION

Before this court are petitions for termination of parental rights filed on December 6, 2011 by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) in the interest of Christian (8/10/2001) and Ashley C. (DOB 7/8/2002).

DCF has alleged as to the birth mother, Mayra C., the adjudicatory ground of failure to rehabilitate pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i).   With respect to the biological father of the children, Jose C., the petitioner has alleged the grounds of abandonment and no ongoing parent-child relationship pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(A) and (D).  On December 11, 2011, service was confirmed as to the mother and on February 14, 2012, service by publication was confirmed as to the father.   Jose C., who was not present for trial, was defaulted for his failure to appear on that day.

This court presided over the trial in this case on April 10, and 11, 2013.   Mayra C. was present and represented by counsel throughout these proceedings.

These proceedings are governed by General Statutes § 17a–112, et seq.   In a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the petitioner must first prove by clear and convincing evidence, in the adjudicatory phase, a ground for termination alleged in the petition, as of the date of filing the petition or the last amendment.  In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63 (1991);  Conn. Practice Book §§ 32a–3(b) and 35a–7.   Only one ground need be established for the granting of the petition.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258 (1984);  In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. 234 (2000).

If a ground for termination is proven, the court must next consider the disposition stage.   Therein, the court must consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interest.   As is permitted under our law, the evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases was heard at the same trial.  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 688–89 (1999).

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

On April 10, 2013, this court took judicial notice of all orders and prior findings on these files.   Having heard testimony and reviewed documentary evidence, this court makes the following findings of fact by clear and convincing evidence and grants the petitions to terminate the parental rights of Mayra C. and Jose C.

DCF's involvement with Mayra C. as to Christian and Ashley C. began on June 28, 2007 when DCF filed neglect petitions on behalf of the children due to the mother's failure to follow through with recommendations for mental health treatment for Christian.   Christian, who was not yet six years old at the time, had been taken to the emergency room in January 2007 for threatening to kill himself and his siblings.   Upon his evaluation by a psychiatrist, Christian was recommended for Intensive Outpatient Treatment at Rushford.   The mother's failure to follow through with this recommendation as well as with DCF's attempts to schedule appointments for Christian led to the initial neglect petitions.   Following an adjudication of neglect on October 25, 2007, the children remained under protective supervision until April 3, 2009, when DCF procured an order of temporary custody (OTC) as to both children.   The OTC was vacated on April 21, 2009 and the children were again returned to the mother's care under an order of protective supervision.   On September 15, 2009, DCF filed a motion to open and modify disposition to commitment which was granted on December 15, 2009 to become effective on January 26, 2010 following the procurement of a therapeutic foster home for Christian and Ashley.   Said motion to modify disposition to commitment was the second motion filed on behalf of the children since February 27, 2008, in addition to four orders extending the period of protective supervision.

DCF's involvement over four and one-half years with the family prior to the filing of the termination petition revealed that the mother had a long history of domestic violence in her relationships with men.   Mayra C.'s first romantic relationship with Victor M. produced three children, Jennifer, Melissa and Bryan, who are the older half sibings to Christian and Ashley.   Mayra C. reported that Victor M. abused substances and hit her on a daily basis.   In one altercation, he broke her nose.   The children were witnesses to the abuse until the mother moved with her children to Puerto Rico in 1996 without their father.

In 1998, Mayra C. became romantically involved with Jose C., the father of Christian and Ashley.   This relationship was marked by substance abuse and violence as well.   Mayra C. and her daughter, Melissa, reported that Jose C. drank excessively and used cocaine on a daily basis.   At one point, DCF had secured mother's agreement that she not allow the father to return to the home until he had substance abuse treatment.   On the occasion leading to DCF's first removal of the children in April 2009, however, the father had returned to the home and hit her three times with his fist in addition to threatening to kill the family with a knife.

As early as 2008, Mayra C. has been diagnosed with severe major depression which was ultimately determined to be the primary factor impairing her ability to parent her children.   On November 8, 2009, the mother was admitted to Midstate Medical Center for suicide ideation.   According to Christian, the children's excessive absences from school prior to their placement in foster care were because “Mayra doesn't get out of bed to wake [him] up for school on time and [he] miss[es] the bus.”   In 2006–2007, Christian was absent 56 days from school and had to attend summer school.   Mayra C.'s probation officer reported that he found Ashley getting up from bed at 4:00 p.m. in the afternoon and, as a result, voiced his concern that the children had no structure.   Following her placement in foster care, Ashley indicated that one of her reasons for wanting to return to her mother's care is because she had no rules at home.

Mr. Christopher D'Amore–Chasse is the social worker from Community Residences, Inc. assigned to the therapeutic foster home where the children were first placed in January 2010.   He is responsible for providing therapeutic support for the children and their foster family in order to keep the children stable in their placement and to help manage the children's behaviors and mental health needs.   He testified that the children have endured a significant history of trauma, including witnessing domestic violence, physical neglect, poor supervision as well as the sexual abuse of Ashley.   Based on his work with the children, Mr. D'Amore–Chasse concluded that the children were accustomed to a very unstructured environment.

When the children came into care on January 27, 2010, Mr. D'Amore–Chasse identified significant behavioral issues.   The children were not receptive to structure, and were verbally, and in the case of Christian and his brother, Bryan, who was originally placed with the children but not the subject of a termination petition, physically aggressive.   The children refused to follow directions and did not respond to attempts to set appropriate limits on their behaviors.   They were very demanding and often lied.   The children took turns in behaving badly.   Bryan, in particular, had a negative influence on his younger siblings, instructing them not to follow the rules of the foster family and the therapists.

In 2010, Christian reported seeing Bryan pull down the pants of Ashley and being threatened by Bryan that he would kill Christian and Ashley if they told anyone about this.   Ashley subsequently disclosed that she had been digitally penetrated by Bryan over twenty times, although she could not give details as to when and where the abuse happened.   She has become highly defensive and has refused to process the abuse in therapy.

In addition to the sexual abuse allegations, Bryan was also very controlling, particularly in his conduct toward Ashley.   When Bryan was eventually removed, the siblings' behavior improved.   Nevertheless, problems persisted.   For example, when Bryan was removed on September 7, 2010, Christian eventually assumed the bullying role toward Ashley.   He provoked and belittled her and has called her fat and ugly.   In her court-ordered psychological evaluation dated May 11, 2012, Dr. Ines Schroeder noted that Christian “demands that [Ashley] do things for him and becomes upset if she refuses.   He also becomes angered if she excels in school more than he does.   He attempts to dominate her and seems to project an air of superiority over women.”   Although Christian's behavior toward Ashley had improved in the six months before Dr. Schroeder conducted her evaluation, at the time of trial, both children insisted that they be placed apart from each other.

Both children have reported hearing voices at times.   Ashley has reported that the voices in her head tell her she is going to hell.   In February 2011, according to DCF reports, Christian also reported hearing voices, and believed that “everything was haunted and related these to the scary movies he had watched while living with his mother.   He was fearful of showering and of others outside of his room.”

An ongoing problem from the beginning of placement has been the negative impact of visitation on the children's behavior.   In one visit on May 18, 2010, Christian stated that he wanted to kill his foster father and the mother said nothing, while the other children laughed.   Mayra C. began using profanities in front of the children in reference to the assigned social worker, who was nine months pregnant.   In that same visit, Mayra C. also said that if she saw the social worker outside of work, “she was going to punch her so hard in the stomach she would throw up her baby.”   As a result of mother's behavior, DCF called the police and eventually a warrant was issued for her arrest.   Although she has had no subsequent arrests, Mayra C. was sentenced in August 2010 to two years' non-reporting probation.

In the months leading up to the May 18, 2010 visit and afterward, Ashley exhibited extremely violent and conflicted behaviors.   In therapy sessions, Ashley revealed extreme stress and anxiety over the conflict she was experiencing over her loyalty to her mother and the bond and relationship she was forming with her foster mother.   In one therapy session with her foster mother, Ashley ran out of the building.   When she was returned to the session, Ashley was physically kicking doors and walls and throwing objects and swearing.   It took an hour for the staff to de-escalate Ashley.   In subsequent sessions, Ashley would shift from warm and positive feelings about her foster parents to extreme anger toward them and DCF, with the latter notably occurring after visits with her mother.   Behavioral problems in school also occurred after visitation with the mother.   Also in this timeframe, after Ashley had threatened to kill herself, the foster father found Ashley locked in her room with the heat to its highest setting.

As a result of these incidents, the visits were put on hold from June 2010 through September 2010, based on the strong recommendations of the children's therapist.   During that time, the children's behaviors stabilized.

According to Mr. D'Amore–Chasse, Ashley, like Christian, experiences periods of relative stability, then becomes oppositional, disrespectful, emotional, and engages in lying and temper tantrums.   Prior to placement, Ashley had been referred to the Meriden Child Guidance Clinic but was discharged after Mayra C. missed multiple, consecutive appointments.   Following placement, Ashley was referred to the Waterbury Worth Program until the above-described incidents required that she transition to an intensive out-patient treatment program, where she received therapy five days a week from April 2010 through to November 2010.   In December 2010, Ashley transitioned to Family Support Team (FST) services involving twice weekly, in-home treatment services.   In July 2011, she received individual therapy as well.

Christian also received intensive therapeutic services, specifically extended day treatment from June 2010 through September 2010 in order to address extreme behavioral problems which he was having in the foster home.   He eventually transitioned to FST services as well in November 2010.   In March 2011, Christian transitioned to weekly, out-patient therapy which he continues to receive.

When DCF resumed visits with the mother in September 2010, DCF also made arrangements for therapeutic visits to begin with the mother as well.   Sharon Romero, of Community Residences, Inc., provided supervised visitation with a parenting training component between the mother and the children.   As a result of her work with the mother, Ms. Romero testified that the mother does not have the ability to manage the children's behaviors.   With the therapeutic supervised visitation program, Ms. Romero's role in the visits included offering support to the mother by guiding her around activities, interventions, limit-setting and engaging with the children.   Following each visit, Ms. Romero gives the mother feedback in order to improve her parenting skills and there is written documentation identifying both mother's strengths as well as those issues which continue to require improvement.   Unfortunately, notwithstanding Ms. Romero's support, the mother consistently failed to intervene when the children behaved poorly or worse, would say inappropriate things and/or reinforce the negative behavior.   At times, the children would talk more with Ms. Romero than with their mother and consistently, Ms. Romero would have to initiate conversation between the mother and the children.

For example, a recurring issue in the visits was Mayra C.'s lack of engagement with the children in which the supervising social workers, including Ms. Romero, would note “not much communication” between the mother and the children or that the mother “did not show interest to engage with children.”   In a visit at the mall, the mother walked in front of the children and did not check to make sure they were behind her.   On February 8, 2011, Mayra C., who was frequently late to visits, “kept sighing and showing lack of interest in the visit” when she did finally arrive.   In one of her two-hour visits with the children, the mother spent time cooking and failed to interact with the children.   On May 13, 2011 and June 10, 2011, when visits were at the maternal aunt's home where the mother was living at the time, the mother was supposed to have a two-hour visit.   In the first visit, Mayra C. emerged from her bedroom 15 minutes after the children had arrived and in the second visit, the children waited a half hour after their arrival before their mother emerged from her bedroom to begin the visit.   Ms. Romero testified that had she not initiated discussions between Mayra C. and the children, there would not have been much conversation, except between the children themselves.

Another issue that characterized visits between Mayra C. and the children is the mother's failure to intervene when the children were engaging in inappropriate behaviors.   On January 6, 2012, for example, the mother made clear that she did not like Ashley's haircut.   Ashley responded that she did not care what her mother thought because she liked it.   Christian then told Ashley that he too thought her hair was too short, that she should get a “Mohawk,” and that Mohawks were for “gay” and “retarded” people.   Mayra C. again did nothing even when Christian voiced his indifference after Ms. Romero told him that this was inappropriate and disrespectful.   Notwithstanding Ms. Romero's attempts to address his conduct, Christian continued to be bossy toward Ashley and mother continued to do nothing.   Also in this visit, Ashley grabbed her mother's phone and ignored Ms. Romero's instruction that she return the phone and spend time with her mother.   Instead, Ashley found sexually provocative photographs of her mother on the phone which she shared with Ms. Romero.   Rather than take the phone from Ashley, Mayra C. laughed and Ms. Romero had to take the phone from Ashley.

In a particularly difficult visit on March 2, 2012 which resulted in a major setback for Ashley, Mayra C. again failed to intervene when her older daughter, Jennifer, persisted in inappropriate and even cruel treatment of Ashley.   Prior to this visit, Ashley had been in favor of being adopted by the foster parents and had been making sustained progress in her behaviors at school and in the foster home.   In that visit, however, Jennifer belittled Ashley's clothing, appearance, her foster parents and cultural differences.   For example, Jennifer greeted Ashley by saying “Oh my God, Ashley, you got fat!” and then told her that the foster parents needed to get her new clothes because she was wearing “high waters.”   When Jennifer told the children, “You can tell you live with Indians or Moroccans,” the children attempted to defend their foster parents, saying they were “African” and “really nice” to them and bought them a video game.   Jennifer's response was to tell the children “So what, my son has a Wii” and Jennifer told Ashley that she was a “smarta* *.”   When Christian told Jennifer that he was learning how to rollerskate, Jennifer said that “he might as well be a ‘white boy’ and learn how to skateboard.”   Throughout the visit, Jennifer continually insulted Ashley with respect to her appearance and even suggested that Ashley had bi-polar disorder as an explanation for why Ashley acted badly.   She also called Christian “stupid.”   The visitation supervisor, Ms. Romero, repeatedly attempted to intervene and re-direct Jennifer, who ignored her.   Astoundingly, Mayra C. did nothing to intervene.   When Ashley finally burst out that she no longer wanted to be a foster child, Mayra C. turned to Ms. Romero and said in Spanish, “Look what DCF is doing to her,” even though Ms. Romero made clear that Jennifer was the source of Ashley's distress.   Following that visit, Ashley no longer wanted to be adopted and her behaviors in school and in the foster home precipitously declined.

On April 6, 2012, the social worker waited twenty-five minutes with the children in the car waiting for Mayra C. to show up for their visit.   When she failed to appear, Christian became very upset and said he needed to punch something.   In another visit on April 13, 2012, Mayra C. complimented Ashley on her new clothes but told her she was too fat.   In that same visit, Christian told the worker how much he enjoyed reading books in the foster home, to which Mayra C. suggested that Christian had something good in common with their biological father.   Ashley, however, said “why would he try to kill us if he was a little good” and Christian asked, “Why would he read, he was always drunk all the time.”   After this exchange, Christian continued to berate Ashley, calling her “stupid, fat and retarded” and once again, Mayra C. did not join Ms. Romero in her efforts to get Christian to end his behavior.

Other visits that did not go well include the visit on May 22, 2012 when Mayra C. arrived 40 minutes late and the visit on June 7, 2012 when she arrived 25 minutes late.   In the latter visit, Mayra C. was quiet and not engaged, and when the children asked her how she was doing, she told them she was tired and wanted to go to sleep.   On June 25, 2012, when Mayra C. arrived ten minutes late, the children told her that they almost left because they thought she would not show up.   When Mayra C. did not respond or react to this statement, Ashley rolled her eyes.   The persistent pattern of late visits is a significant issue for these children due to the anxiety they regularly experience as to whether or not the visit will happen at all.

Also on the June 25, 2012 visit, Mayra C. was quiet, did not respond to inappropriate comments, and Ms. Romero continued to need to initiate conversations with the children.   In a similar visit on June 27, 2012, the mother arrived late and while Christian attempted to make excuses for her, Ashley commented that their mom knew the rules and that she was just taking her time.   When the mother finally arrived, again the children told her they almost had to leave and again Mayra C. had no response, and Ashley again rolled her eyes.   In this visit, Mayra C. also persisted in using her phone, even though Ms. Romero told her she needed to put it away.   Christian noted that the person on the phone was someone with whom his mother often fought.   To this, Mayra C. smiled and said it was because the friend was annoying and that he used to steal things from them.

In another particularly disturbing visit on July 13, 2012, Christian had gotten into a dispute with Ms. Romero because he had had money to purchase a video game which turned out to be M-rated and for adults only.   Ms. Romero advised Mayra C. that she needed to tell him that he could not buy the game and that it was inappropriate.   Christian became extremely angry and upset, saying that his mother used to let him buy these games, then engaged into a tirade against DCF. He cried and voiced how much he hated DCF and that he wanted to kill his DCF social workers.   Rather than supporting Ms. Romero, Mayra C. agreed that it was DCF's fault and that she would have let him have the game but for DCF. When Ms. Romero told Mayra C. that she needed to stop talking about DCF in this way, Mayra C. said in Spanish “Let DCF decide what they are going to do with the kids so I could leave already and then they could shove the kids up someone else's a* *.”   On August 23, 2012, when the children asked Mayra C. why they had not seen or heard from her in one month, Mayra C. had no response.

Ms. Deanna Medina, the children's therapist, began her work with Christian in March 2011 and ended her work with him in October 2012.   Ms. Medina also began working with Ashley in July 2011.   Both children had anger issues, negative coping skills and poor self-esteem.   Both children have been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and are currently in individual therapy with different therapists who did not testify.   Consistent with the opinion of other providers who had worked with Ashley, Ms. Medina testified that Ashley had enjoyed a long period of stability until the visit in March 2012 which included Jennifer.   Specifically, Ms. Medina observed that Ashley had been doing well in school and in the foster home, and was able to ignore negative behaviors and taunts by Christian.   Both children had progressed to the point where they were not blaming DCF for everything and were bonding with and beginning to trust their foster parents.

Ms. Medina also testified that Christian was beginning to benefit from trauma-focused cognitive behavioral therapy (TFCBT), the goal of which is for the child to function and cope with trauma in more appropriate ways.   In order to do this, children must learn how trauma affects them, what their symptoms are, and how the symptoms relate to the trauma.   Children are given support to help them identify their feelings and thoughts regarding the trauma.   A component of the treatment includes developing a trauma narrative, in which the children identify the feelings and thoughts they had at the time of the trauma so they can move past the trauma.   In addition, children have to feel safe in order to begin the trauma narrative and then must share their narrative with someone they trust and with whom they are comfortable.   Significantly, Ms. Medina testified that Christian progressed to the point of choosing his foster father to share his trauma narrative.   When questioned, Ms. Medina made clear that it would not be appropriate to force Christian to choose his mother to engage in this process, because it was important for Christian to decide for himself whom he trusts for this aspect of his therapy.

In addition, Mayra C.'s lack of compliance with visits as well as the impact of visitation on the children resulted in the recommendation by Ms. Medina in the summer of 2012 that visits be decreased.   Significantly, the service providers for the family made clear that while Jennifer's participation in the visit last March seemed to trigger a severe downturn in Ashley's behaviors and functioning, the cumulative effect of the mother's inability to be positive, nurturing, and consistently appropriate was detrimental to the children.

Moreover, when angry, both children have difficulty expressing themselves appropriately.   Ms. Medina has worked with them on helping them to manage their moods, to develop coping skills for dealing with stress and to express their feelings appropriately.   Although Ashley has had a close relationship with the foster mother, when she is angry, she will curse and run out of the house and yell.   As noted earlier, both children cycle with regard to their behaviors;  when one is behaving well and is stable, the other is behaving badly and is very difficult.   Christian, who has made progress understanding his trauma and his behaviors, nevertheless has difficulty implementing what he has learned and effectively utilizing his coping skills.   Like Ms. Romero, Ms. Medina does not recommend reunification with the mother, given the pattern of regression in the children's behaviors after visits with their mother.

Although the petitioner elected to present the bulk of its evidence regarding services to those services dating back to January 2010, when the children were first committed, the evidence indicates that DCF first opened its case with the mother in 2000 because the mother was not addressing the medical and educational issues of the three oldest children, Melissa, Bryan and Jennifer.   The mother's current DCF case has been opened since 2005.   Eventually neglect petitions were filed in 2007 after Mayra C. failed to follow through with recommended treatment for Christian, who had been hospitalized for suicidal ideation and for threatening to kill his siblings.   Following an adjudication in October 2007, DCF extended protective supervision four times, had temporary custody briefly in April 2009 and filed motions to modify to commitment on two occasions.   In those early years, Mayra C. was offered in-home individual and family therapy on two occasions through Alternative Path Counseling in 2008 and then again in 2009, when she was discharged unsuccessfully for her failure to cooperate.

When the children were finally committed in 2010, DCF made a referral for mother in February 2010 to Rushford Center for Behavioral Health.   She failed to follow through with appointments and despite warnings that the program would close her case, Mayra C. was discharged in April 2010 for her failure to attend individual and group treatment programs.   In August 2010, Mayra C. was scheduled for intensive individual therapy and family therapy with the children through Community Mental Health Affiliates (CMHA).   Despite offers from DCF for bus passes and medical cabs which she refused, Mayra C. failed to attend appointments for therapy claiming problems with transportation and needing to travel too far.   In October 2010, Mayra C. began mental health services through CMHA and was eventually discharged due to her failure to attend regularly and consistently.   In December 2010, Mayra C. was referred to Rushford for group therapy and subsequently for individual therapy but her providers saw minimal improvement and benefit from either service.   In the year 2011, this pattern of being referred to treatment and then being ultimately discharged for her failure to consistently follow through with individual and/or group therapy persisted.   When Mayra C. has participated in treatment, she has reported to her providers that she feels fine and that she has no need to attend therapy sessions.   Mayra C.'s mental health providers, however, have all made clear that she requires intensive, long-term treatment.   As of the date of the filing of the termination petition on December 6, 2011, Mayra C. was not in treatment for her mental health issues.   By the time this matter was before the court for trial, Mayra C. was in individual therapy with Sara Nagat of Community Health Center who reported that the mother failed to show on numerous occasions and that the mother made clear that she felt fine and had no need to attend therapy.

Mayra C. has also had a long history of unstable housing.   When the children were first returned to her care, DCF paid $5,000 to cover delinquent rent unpaid by Jose C. When she was ultimately evicted for non-payment of rent, DCF made referrals for Supportive Housing for Families;  however, Mayra C. failed to comply with Supportive Housing's precondition that she cooperate with mental health treatment.   As a result, the mother was deemed ineligible for their services in 2007 and again in 2010.   Mayra C. did not establish stable housing and employment until July 2011.   As of the date of the termination petition, she was living in a two-bedroom apartment in Meriden.   Having achieved some measure of stability with respect to her housing and employment, however, Mayra C.'s inability to parent her children effectively remained virtually unchanged despite several years of mental health and parenting services.

Dr. Schroeder testified that she could not recommend continued reunification efforts between Mayra C. and the children.   She based her opinion on her interviews and observations of the family, individually and together, as well as on her communications with various service providers of therapy to the children and therapeutic visitation for the mother and children.   Dr. Schroeder found that the children's behavioral difficulties clearly reflect the parenting they received while in the mother's care.   Due to the chaotic environment of their biological home, in which they also witnessed severe domestic violence and ongoing substance abuse by Jose C., the children have had difficulty dealing with stress, modulating their mood, and addressing their anxieties appropriately.

Compounding these problems is Mayra C.'s failure to understand the children's psychological needs along with her failure to address her depression and mental health issues generally.   Dr. Schroeder also described in detail Mayra C.'s failure to appreciate the impact on her children of living in a chaotic and unstructured environment.   Dr. Schroeder described these children as having significant difficulties with respect to their ability to listen, follow directions and react appropriately.   She made clear that parenting these children would be very stressful and difficult for any parent to address.   In light of Mayra C.'s admission that the more she is stressed the more depressed she becomes, Dr. Schroeder opined that it is highly unlikely that Mayra C. could competently parent her own children.   These challenges were clearly apparent in the interaction which Dr. Schroeder observed between the mother and the children.   In light of mother's mental health issues and her longstanding failure to recognize her own need for mental health treatment, as well as her inability to accept and understand her children's behaviors, Dr. Schroeder strongly believed that the return of these children to their mother's care would result in volatility and inevitably cause further disruption for the children.

Dr. Schroeder's opinion factored in the length of time the children had been in foster care at the time of her evaluation, which was already two years, and also the many years of DCF involvement prior to placement.   Mayra C.'s failure to address her issues over such a protracted period of time does not support any hope that she will make adequate rehabilitative progress in the foreseeable future.   Dr. Schroeder also elaborated on how the children's behavioral difficulties are exacerbated by their lack of permanency.   The children endure significant additional stress because of their inability to know where they are going to live.   In order to master the coping skills they require, the children require consistency, routine and the stability of their home.   Dr. Schroeder testified that the children's natural loyalty toward their mother interferes with their ability to connect with other present and future caregivers and providers.   In fact, Dr. Schroeder noted that the more the mother is involved with the children, the more difficulty the children have in complying with the rules in the foster home.   Termination of the mother's parental rights is essential in order to begin to overcome these fundamental obstacles to the children's well-being.

The children have also vacillated with respect to adoption.   There is no dispute that both children have had positive relationships with their foster parents, so much so that Christian had chosen his foster father as the person with whom he wanted to share his trauma narrative.   On the other hand, the evidence indicates that when they have been angry or unhappy at the foster home, it is when they resist the rules of the foster home.   Unfortunately, the foster parents, who had provided excellent care for the children, are no longer able to be considered as adoptive parents due to the foster father's diagnosis of Parkinson's disease, the foster mother's need to continue to work for medical insurance benefits, as well as the ongoing challenge of the children's behaviors.   At the time of trial, the children had been in their current foster home for over three years.

Moreover, Dr. Schroeder observed that the abusive behavior between Ashley and Christian could not be adequately described as typical sibling rivalry, given the intense chaos and abuse in their family of origin.   She noted that “Christian undermines Ashley and degrades her.   This is extremely hurtful to Ashley who suffers from low self-esteem.   Christian's behavior has the flavor of the behaviors exhibited by an abusive partner in a domestic violence situation.”   Dr. Schroeder recommended separation if the behaviors do not end.

When presented with evidence that the children would need to be removed from their foster home by the summer of 2013, Dr. Schroeder did not waiver in her belief that termination of parental rights was still in the best interests of the children.   The children would need to transition and process their emotions around the fact that they had been in their current foster home for three years.   Notably, Christian told Dr. Schroeder that he would oppose moving to a new home unless he got to know them first.   None of the credible clinical evidence presented to this court supports the claim that maintaining Mayra C.'s parental rights is in the best interests of the children, even though the children would be losing their current foster parents.   In fact, the clinical evidence strongly supports this court's finding that while the children were “bonded” to their mother, the children consistently did poorly the more they visited with their mother.

For most of DCF's involvement with the family, Jose C. has been absent.   When DCF first opened its case, Jose C. cooperated with a substance abuse evaluation which determined that he had an ongoing problem with alcohol and cocaine abuse.   He demonstrated no insight into how this affected him and his ability to parent his children.   Although he was referred for intensive outpatient treatment, Jose C. was unsuccessfully discharged from the program for failing to attend appointments and failing to provide urine screens.   The children have also witnessed ongoing incidents of domestic violence between Jose C. and Mayra C. Since the children entered foster care in January 2010, Jose C.'s whereabouts have been unknown.   As of the date of trial, Jose C. had outstanding warrants for his arrests.   Although Mayra C. has reported that Jose C. is living with his parents in Puerto Rico, the paternal grandparents have denied this.   Jose C. has not provided financial support for the children, nor has he visited with them or sent them gifts, cards or letters.   He has not contacted DCF to inquire of their well-being since January 2010.

III. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PETITION

A. REASONABLE EFFORTS

In order to terminate parental rights, unless the court grants the petition due to the consent of the respondent parent, DCF must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that it made ‘reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1).  “[The] court need not make that finding, however, if the evidence establishes that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Shaiesha O., 93 Conn.App. 42, 47 (2005).   See In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539 (2009).   Moreover, “such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to section 17a–111b, or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1).

“The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Shaiesha O., supra, 93 Conn.App. 48.   Although “[n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is ․ defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn ․ [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Ryan R., 102 Conn.App. 608, 619, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 923, 924 (2007);  In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 255 (2000).   The court must look to events that occurred prior to the date the petition was filed to determine whether reasonable efforts at reunification were made.  In re Shaiesha O., supra, 93 Conn.App. 47.

With respect to Jose C., the court finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to locate the father based on its affidavit of diligent search.   Pursuant to § 17a–112(j), the court further finds that reasonable efforts to reunify are not required given that there is clear and convincing evidence that the father has been willfully absent from the lives of his children since at least January 2010, when the children were placed in foster care.   DCF did provide services for substance abuse treatment in 2008, but the father failed to follow through with those services.   He has shown no interest in the children nor any sense of responsibility for them, as is manifested by his failure to be in contact with DCF to inquire of the children's well-being, and by the father's failure to send to them cards, gifts, letters or to provide financial support.

The court further finds that DCF has proved by clear and convincing evidence that it has made reasonable efforts to locate the mother and to reunify the children with their mother.   The evidence establishes that Mayra C. has been provided numerous referrals for services for her mental health issues as well as for parenting, visitation and housing since at least 2010 when the children were placed into foster care.   Because Mayra C. did not follow through with mental health treatment, she was consistently found ineligible for supportive housing services.   Mayra C.'s housing and employment situation did not stabilize until July 2011.

The court also finds by clear and convincing evidence the alternative ground that Mayra C. has been unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reunification services, particularly with respect to services to address her mental health and parenting issues.   Although she reports taking medication daily, Mayra C. has failed consistently to comply with mental health treatment and when she has attended sessions, she makes clear that she sees no need to engage in treatment.   Even more troubling is the quality of visitation and its toxic effect on the children.   Despite concrete parenting support and interventions during which the mother was given feedback, support and re-direction to improve her skills, Mayra C. demonstrated little improvement in the quality of her disastrous visits with the children.

B. ADJUDICATORY GROUNDS OF THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PETITION

1. Abandonment

“A parent abandons a child if the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child ․ General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(A).   Abandonment focuses on the parent's conduct ․ Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare ․ Section 17a–112(j)(3)(A) does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child.   A parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child.   Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn.App. 41, 46–47 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 918 (2008), In re Justice V., 111 Conn.App. 500, 514 (2008).

With respect to Jose C., this court finds that the petitioner has met its burden by clear and convincing evidence with respect to the ground of abandonment.   Although this ground does not require evidence of total abandonment, in fact the evidence demonstrates that Jose C. has shown no interest, concern or responsibility for his children since they were placed in foster care.   Court records indicate that the last hearing involving his children which Jose C. attended was September 24, 2009.   As already found by this court in its findings of fact, Jose C. has not seen the children for nearly two years prior to the filing of the termination petition, nor has he contacted DCF to inquire of their well-being.   He has failed to provide to them financial or emotional support of any kind, including gifts, cards, letters or phone calls.   This court concludes that the father has abandoned both children within the meaning of Section 17a–112(j)(3)(A).

2. Failure to Rehabilitate

“General Statutes § 17a–112(j) provides, in relevant part, that the court may grant a petition for termination of parental rights ‘if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (B) the child ․ has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding ․ and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child ․’ ‘Personal rehabilitation, as used in the statute refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ․ [Section 17a–112] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time.’  “ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Jordon T., 119 Conn.App. 748 (2010), citing In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706 (1999).

In assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved his or her ability to manage his or her life, but rather whether the parent has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.  In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. 157, 180 (1999).   In addition, “[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time.”  In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230 (2000).

In light of the statutory elements of this ground, as well as the caselaw interpreting it, this court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has met its burden as to Mayra C. The court finds that the children were first adjudicated neglected on October 25, 2007 following nolo contendere pleas tendered by both the mother and the father.

The bulk of the petitioner's evidence focused on services provided since the second placement of the children in foster care in January 2010, although the court notes that protective supervision was extended repeatedly since the first adjudication of neglect in 2007.¹  As this court has already determined in its findings of facts, Mayra C. was repeatedly encouraged to seek services for her mental health issues, specifically her severe depression and was referred numerous times for mental health treatment.   Over time, she has demonstrated a pattern of either failing to follow through consistently with treatment, resulting in her discharge or in her perfunctory participation in services with the attitude that she did not require treatment and only attended sessions because DCF required her to do so.   Notably, there has been virtually no improvement in her ability to parent her children, despite nearly three years of significant parenting services.

While the visitation supervisor has duly documented those occasions in which the mother has done something positive, this court finds that the overall effect of visitation has been decidedly negative and detrimental to the children.

The visits reveal a troubling pattern of behavior reflecting the disturbing environment to which these children were exposed when they were in mother's care and what they would continue to face if returned to her care.   In too many visits, the mother has expressed her ambivalence about being a mother to these children, by being late, sighing, not engaging with the children, and having to be prompted to talk with the children.   The mother's parenting deficiencies include a lack of structure, poor boundaries, the lack of empathy, tolerance for abusive and inappropriate language between the children, lack of respect for rules and tolerance for and/or encouragement of sexually inappropriate conduct or behaviors.

After such visits, the children were returned to their foster home in which they were appropriately required to comply with reasonable rules of behavior.   It does not surprise this court that the behaviors of these children tended to deteriorate in the foster home when their own mother could not follow reasonable rules and guidelines for visitation or, when the mother communicated by her sighs, lack of engagement with the children, and her persistent lateness or absences that her children are not a priority.

The evidence before this court includes an incident in November 2012 in which Christian punched a girl on the bus after she made comments about his mother and about his being a foster child.   Clearly, this behavior is wholly unacceptable, but so too is the unacceptable, devastating dichotomy to which the children were exposed because the parent whom they love is incapable of parenting them in a way that makes them feel loved and secure.

The court finds that the reports and testimony of the DCF social worker, Ms. Medina, Mr. d'Amore-Chasse, Ms. Romero and Dr. Schroeder provide highly credible, compelling evidence of what this court concludes is mother's toxic effect on the children.   It is clear that the children struggle with their loyalty toward their mother, feelings which are juxtaposed against all the ways in which she has demonstrated to them that she cannot parent them.   The fact that the children have been described as anxious and even devastated when the mother has been late or has missed visits altogether is met with complete indifference by the mother.   That she took a half hour to emerge from her bedroom when the children were brought to the apartment in which she was living speaks volumes to this court as to the mother's motivation and capacity to care for her children and empathize with their feelings.   That the mother must be repeatedly reminded to initiate and engage in conversation with her children in visits that occurred only once weekly, and now scheduled twice monthly, is deeply troubling.   Although the evidence well documents how the children have a pattern of behavioral issues following visits, this court does not require expert opinion to appreciate the insidious and painful effect these visits have on her children.

Dr. Schroeder powerfully testified of her concern that, if Mayra C. were to remain involved with the children, she should not be permitted to undermine their ability to attach and remain stable in their placement.   Unfortunately, the mother has had a track record of having a negative influence on the children;  indeed, this court finds that her passivity as a parent has a negative impact on the children.   While the children have made progress, this court credits Dr. Schroeder's testimony that the children continue to have significant, unresolved issues, exacerbated by their lack of permanency.   With their history of trauma and prolonged period of foster care, the children are challenging, even for caregivers who have basic skills and are minimally competent.   The petitioner, who has established that the mother cannot manage visits consistently and well, has also proven that mother's mental health issues, specifically severe depression, is worsened with stress.   The mother acknowledges this.   As a result, this court cannot envision the mother ensuring that her children will continue to get their mental health needs met with ongoing therapy.   Given the evidence, this court cannot envision that the mother will ensure that the children will get to school every day and on time.   Similarly, if returned to her care, the children would return to their habit of getting out of bed whenever they want.   Indeed, Ashley has admitted that her reason for wanting to return to mother's care is because her mother had no rules.   Mayra C. has not shown that she can effectively intervene in disputes in which Christian degrades and humiliates Ashley;  if returned to the mother's care, Christian's abuse of Ashley would continue unabated.

In a structured and nurturing family setting, the children have made progress.   They have chores, have gone to school regularly and face appropriate discipline and consequences when required.   The children have learned to seek out their foster parents when they are troubled, although learning to trust new caregivers will be a significant challenge.   They have been proud of their accomplishments and activities at school, including their participation in plays and receiving awards and acknowledgments for good behavior.   What sense of self-worth and accomplishment they have managed to achieve must be nurtured as they confront the challenges and trauma of a new placement.   At the same time, that progress is limited by their lack of permanency.   As Dr. Schroeder testified, the children endure significant additional stress as a result of their need to know where they are going to live.   The mother is so clearly not an option for permanency and indeed, a major impediment to the children's health and stability.   So long as her parental rights are intact, the children are foreclosed, emotionally as well as legally, from moving toward permanency.   The children's progress and potential must no longer be encumbered by the mother's limitations.   This court concludes that in the context of the children's age and needs, the petitioner has met its burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the mother has failed to rehabilitate.

3. No Ongoing Parent–Child Relationship

The court may grant a petition for termination of parental rights “if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (3) ․ (D) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j).  This ground is established when there is no on-going parent-child relationship with the parent, which is defined as the relationship that ordinarily develops as the result of a parent having met, on a continuing, day-to-day basis, the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and when allowing further time for the establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child.  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(D).  “This part of the statute requires the trial court to undertake a two-pronged analysis.   First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop ․ In considering whether an on-going parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance ․ The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent ․ Feelings for the natural parent connote feelings of a positive nature only.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Jonathan G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525, 777 A.2d 695 (2001).   When the child's feelings toward the parent are ambivalent, there must be a finding that “no positive emotional aspects of the relationship survive.”  In re Jessica M., 217 Conn. 459, 470, 586 A.2d 597 (1991).   See also In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466, 470, 816 A.2d 707 (2003).   An on-going parent-child relationship does not contemplate a situation in which, regardless of fault, a child either has never known his or her parent, or in which no relationship has ever developed.  In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 645–46, 436 A.2d 290 (1980).   Moreover the ground contemplates a relationship that would result if a parent has met on a “day to day basis, the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child ․” Id.

As to Jose C., the petitioner has not made a serious attempt to allege or prove facts to support an adjudication based on this ground.   The petition, summary of facts and social study focus on evidence which support abandonment but do not demonstrate, prior to the adjudicatory date of December 6, 2011, what are the children's feelings for or relationship with their biological father.   The court acknowledges that with children who are very young, who have never known their father, the facts that support abandonment often support the ground of no ongoing parent-child relationship.   This, however, is not the case here.   The children knew their father and had a relationship with him, but the quality of that relationship and their memories of him prior to the adjudicatory date have never been alleged or proven.   The court does note that there is post-adjudicatory evidence that the children have vivid, negative memories of Jose C.'s violence and substance abuse.   When Mayra C. referred to the father in a visit on April 13, 2012 suggesting that Christian shared something positive with Jose C., specifically reading, Christian disputed that Jose C. read, and said that Jose C. was drunk all the time.   Ashley challenged her that their father was even “a little good” since, as she recalled, Jose C. threatened to kill them.   While it is highly likely that these negative feelings and memories existed long before the filing date of the termination of parental rights petitions, which, coupled with the father's long absence in the lives of these children in the two years of their foster care placement, would have been sufficient to support a finding of no ongoing parent-child relationship, the petitioner's failure properly to allege and prove this ground warrants this court's dismissal of it.

C. DISPOSITION OF THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PETITION

As our courts have long observed, the deleterious effects of prolonged temporary care is well known.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292 (1983).  “It is undisputed that children require secure, stable, long-term, continuous relationships with their parents or foster parents.   There is little that can be as detrimental to a child's sound development as uncertainty ․” Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513, 102 S.Ct. 3231, 73 L.Ed.2d 928 (1982).

In considering all of the above facts, this court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of Christian and Ashley C. that their parents' rights be terminated.   The evidence is powerful and compelling that the children need to be freed psychologically and emotionally from the prospect of returning to their mother's care.   The mother cannot care for them, and the children have a desperate need for a caring, structured, loving and permanent home.

In contesting the termination of parental rights petition against the mother, the attorneys for the mother and the children argue primarily that it is not in the best interest to terminate the parental rights of the mother because the children would be losing both their mother AND the foster parents.   This court acknowledges that the loss of their foster parents is a severe loss to these children.   It is tragic, especially because the children have made much progress while in their care.   The foster parents' unavailability, however, is a function of circumstances which are not within the control of this court or any party at this point.   In contrast, the mother, even post-termination and without any legal standing to assert a right to visitation, can influence DCF, in its discretion, to consider whether she might have an appropriate role in the lives of the children.   As statutory parent, DCF, in its discretion and in consultation with the children's therapeutic providers, could determine whether mother could be appropriately supportive of the children while they transition to their next, and hopefully, permanent placement.   In short, termination means the severance of all legal rights, but it need not mean the automatic severance of the children's emotional relationship with their mother, unless the mother's conduct continues to undermine the children's ability to bond with others and to move forward in their lives.

The children will require extraordinary support from DCF and their clinical providers to handle the loss of their foster parents.   If the mother cannot play an appropriate and supportive role for the children post-termination, the children will also require significant support to address the additional loss of their emotional as well as legal relationship with their mother.   Counsel for the mother and the children, however, have provided no evidence from any mental health provider or therapist that supports their claim that the mother's rights should not be terminated because it would be detrimental to the children's best interest.   In fact, the evidence indicates that the children's progress has been impeded because permanency and resolution of their legal status has been delayed.   Moreover, the children themselves have recently started to come to terms with the fact that they will not return to their mother.   The current social worker, Leonora Hall, testified that the children have acknowledged that life was chaotic with their mother, with their exposure to domestic violence and the fact that she did not get them to school.   The children have acknowledged that they were scared when they were in their mother's care.   They have also recognized that the life they have in their current foster home is very different from their life with their mother because of the stability which they have experienced.   The court notes that at eleven and twelve years of age, the children are old enough to understand the implications of having a mother who repeatedly has to be told to engage in a conversation with her children in a two-hour visit.   As Ms. Hall testified, “they're ․ aware that their mother cannot meet all their needs.”   In fact, they have shared with their social worker that “they're kind of okay with [adoption]” to the point that they are insisting that if they are adopted, that they be adopted separately.

This court is skeptical that the mother can play an appropriate role as a resource or that she could support the children in their desperate need for a permanent home because the mother has not heretofore demonstrated that potential.   Nevertheless, it is a phenomenon that is part and parcel of an open adoption, premised upon that rare but cherished situation wherein a parent can accept his or her own limitations as a parent and honor their children's right to healing and their need for a safe and permanent home in the care of someone else.   In its discretion, DCF, as statutory parent, is empowered to determine what, if any, role the mother can play in the future of her children.   What this court will not do, however, is close off any possibility of permanency and stability for these children by keeping the parents' rights intact.   This court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interests of Christian and Ashley that the parental rights of Mayra C. and Jose C. be terminated.

In arriving at this conclusion, the court also considers the mandatory seven factors outlined in General Statutes § 17a–112(k) as to each parent.

1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.

As described in Part II of this decision, DCF has offered timely and appropriate services to the mother in its attempts to reunify her with the children.   The father chose to be absent from the lives of these children since their placement in foster care;  therefore, services were not possible.

2. Finding regarding whether the DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

Based on the above findings, the court finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify the parents with their respective children pursuant to the Federal Child Welfare Act of 1980 to the extent that services were appropriate with respect to the mother, but were not possible with respect to the father.

3. Finding regarding the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order.

Both parents were provided specific steps outlining the services required for reunification;  mother also cooperated with a court-ordered evaluation.   Father did not follow through with specific steps and ultimately abandoned the children.   The mother complied with some services but inadequately and inconsistently and did not benefit from mental health treatment and parenting services.

4. Findings regarding the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardian of his person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.

Christian and Ashley love their mother and continue to have feelings of loyalty for her but they have also developed a trusting relationship and emotional bond with their foster parents.   The children appear to have negative feelings and memories of their father.

5. Finding regarding the age of the child.

Christian is nearly twelve years old and Ashley is eleven years old.

6. Finding regarding the efforts the parent has made to adjust her circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return him to his home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to:  (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child.

The father has made no efforts to communicate with the children or DCF since the children have been in foster care.   The mother has participated in some services and visitation but has done so inconsistently and has not benefitted from the services offered.

7. Finding regarding the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.

Neither parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with their children as a result of the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent or of any other person or by their economic circumstances.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(2), the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of Christian and Ashley C. that the parental rights of their parents, Mayra C. and Jose C., be terminated.

IV. ORDERS

It is accordingly ORDERED that the parental rights of Mayra C. and Jose C. are hereby TERMINATED as to their children, Christian and Ashley C. The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed statutory parent for the children.   The agency is directed to facilitate the adoption of the children as expeditiously as possible.   DCF may petition the Superior Court for the adoption of either or both children pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–129b.   Should the petitioner file adoption petitions in the probate court, the Clerk of the Probate Court with jurisdiction over the subsequent adoption of the children shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Middletown of the date when said adoption is finalized.

A case plan shall be submitted within thirty (30) days from the date of this order, and further reports shall be timely presented to this court as required by law.

Judgment may enter accordingly.

ELGO, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The court file reveals that a motion to modify disposition to commitment was withdrawn by DCF on March 6, 2008.   One year later, on April 3, 2009, DCF sought and procured an ex parte order of temporary custody for the children (Rubinow, J.), which was subsequently vacated by the court (Baldwin, J.) on April 21, 2009 following an unusual agreement in which the parties stipulated to the evidence in an otherwise contested order of temporary custody hearing..  FN1. The court file reveals that a motion to modify disposition to commitment was withdrawn by DCF on March 6, 2008.   One year later, on April 3, 2009, DCF sought and procured an ex parte order of temporary custody for the children (Rubinow, J.), which was subsequently vacated by the court (Baldwin, J.) on April 21, 2009 following an unusual agreement in which the parties stipulated to the evidence in an otherwise contested order of temporary custody hearing.

Elgo, Nina F., J.