IN RE: Grace B.1 (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On June 10, 2013, Joette Katz, the commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, (“DCF”), filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Jennifer D. and Leonard B. to their child, Grace B. (d.o.b. April 11, 2003).   Previously, in November 2011, a neglect petition was filed in this case.   Both the mother and the father appeared in court on January 11, 2012.   The parties were advised of their rights, the father who had been the primary parent of Grace since March 2005, admitted that Grace was uncared for in that she had specialized needs that could not be met in the home.   The child's mother stood silent and was allowed to plead nolo contendre since she had not been caring for the child in the previous four years.   A finding that Grace was uncared for on January 11, 2012, and on that same date, Jennifer signed for and received Specific Steps as ordered by the court (Dyer, J.)

It should be noted that all times relevant, Jennifer D. used the Moosup address of her father as her legal address.   She was served at that address for the neglect petition and for the termination of parental rights petition.   DCF social workers have interviewed her at the home of her father in Moosup and have seen DCF documents addressed to her that she has received at that address.   Jennifer has had three children in all.   None of them are in her care.   One of those children, Jazmyn, is in the care of Jennifer's sister and they also live at the grandfather's home in Moosup.   The court finds based upon the testimony of the social worker and Petitioner's Exhibit A., that Jennifer uses the Moosup address of her father as her legal address and that she receives mail at that address.

Jennifer has failed to appear in court with respect to this proceeding.   Based upon a review of the file, the court concludes that there is no other proceeding pending in any other court regarding Grace and that neither of her parents has ever claimed American Indian tribal affiliation.   This court has jurisdiction.

The initial plea date for this proceeding was June 25, 2013.   The father appeared and was represented by counsel.   The father presented to the court properly executed forms consenting to the termination of his parental rights to Grace.   Having canvassed the father, the court found that he had been represented by competent counsel who was present with him when he executed the consent form.   The court further found that the consent had been knowingly and voluntarily entered with a full understanding of the legal consequences of his action.   The consent was accepted by the court.  (Dyer, J.)

The Department of Child and Families (DCF) through counsel has moved to amend the petition to withdraw the non-consensual grounds and to change the grounds to consent § 17a–112(I) of the father.   Without objection, the motion was granted.

Over the years Jennifer has demonstrated little interest in any her children.   Her son, aged 6, lives with the biological father.   Her daughter Jazmyn lives with a maternal aunt.   Grace who lived with her mother for her first six years of her life, was exposed to her mother's substance abuse, criminal conduct, transience, and poor supervision.   In March 2008, Jennifer was arrested and incarcerated on charges of burglary, larceny, prostitution, and assault.   At that time Grace went to live with her father and has never been in Jennifer's care since that time.

Grace was horribly damaged by her time with her mother.   Between 2008 and 2010, Grace demonstrated problematic behavior that ultimately led to the child's admission to Natchaug Hospital for psychiatric treatment.   She had manifested homicidal ideation.   She stabbed her father's girlfriend, she cut up her new school clothing, butchered her hair, cut up money in her father's wallet and was otherwise out of control.

From September 1, 2011 until June 2012, Grace resided in a safe home.   In June of 2012, Grace transitioned to the present therapeutic foster home where she currently resides.

Grounds

As statutory grounds for terminating the mother's rights, the petition alleges failure to rehabilitate.  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3) provides in relevant part that termination is warranted if the trial court, in the adjudicative phase, finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child (1) has been found by the Superior Court ․ to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding ․ and (2) the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b–129 and (3) the parent has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706 (1999).

(1) The record reflects a finding that Grace was adjudicated to be uncared for in that she was permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to her well being on January 11, 2012.

(2) The record further reflects that specific steps were provided to the mother at the time of the initial order of temporary custody.

(3) The third factual determination for this court, and that which requires greater factual attention is:  whether the mother has achieved rehabilitation as contemplated under C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B), that is, rehabilitation sufficient to render her able to care for this particular child.

“Personal rehabilitation as used in the statute refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ․ [Section 17a–112] requires the trial court to analyze the [parents'] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time ․ [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [that the parents have] achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [they] can assume a responsible position in [their] child's life ․ [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved her ability to manage her own life, but rather whether she has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue ․ As part of the analysis, the trial court must obtain a historical perspective of the respondent's child caring and parenting abilities, which includes prior adjudications of neglect, substance abuse and criminal activity.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 353–54, 776 A.2d 487 (2001).   See also In re Christopher L., 135 Conn.App. 232 (2012).

In assessing rehabilitation, the court also notes that the petition alleges that Jennifer has abandoned her daughter Grace.  “A parent abandons a child if the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child ․ General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(A).   Abandonment focuses on the parent's conduct ․ Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare.

A parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child.   Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn.App. 41, 46–47 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 918 (2008), In re Justice V., 111 Conn.App. 500, 514 (2008).

“It is not lack of interest alone which is the criterion in determining abandonment.   Abandonment under General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(A) requires failure to maintain interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child.   Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child ․ Where a parent fails to visit a child, fails to display any love or affection for the child, has no personal interaction with the child, and no concern for the child's welfare, statutory abandonment has occurred ․” (Internal citations omitted.)  In re Rayna, 13 Conn.App. 23, 36, 534 A.2d 897 (1987).  “General Statutes [§ 17a–112(j)(3)(A) ] does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child.   A parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child.   Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Drew R., 47 Conn.App. 124, 129–30 (1997).

It is clear from the evidence that Jennifer has not had actual custody of the child in more than five years.   Jennifer has had conferences with two social workers who have explained the process of rehabilitation to her.   The court has issued Specific Steps which provide a guide for Jennifer to rehabilitate and reunify.   In January 2013, the current social worker met with Jennifer at her father's home in Moosup.   She laid out the possible scenarios that could occur to a child in DCF care, including termination of parental rights, as well as reunification.   The worker set up weekly supervised visitation for Jennifer on Fridays.   Jennifer attended two visits.

Jennifer does not contact the foster family to inquire about Grace, she does not attend medical visits, she does not send support payments, she does not write letters nor visit with Grace.   She has not phoned, nor sent e-mail.   Where a parent falls to visit a child, fails to display any love or affection for the child, has no personal interaction with the child, and no concern for the child's welfare, statutory abandonment has occurred.

In this case, Jennifer's lack of concern or care for Grace also demonstrates a failure to rehabilitate as well.   The court is satisfied that the allegations of failure to rehabilitate and abandonment have each been proven.

DISPOSITION;

“During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child.”  In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 103 (2000).  “In arriving at that decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in General Statutes [17a–112(k) ].”  In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 528 (2001) (quoting In re Denzel A., 53 Conn.App. 827, 833 (1999)).   The seven factors “serve simply as guidelines to the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered.”  In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. at 104.   The court considers each of them in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section.   The court makes the following seven written findings:

(1) As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the mother and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the mother, the court finds that the social worker reviewed mother's deficiencies with her and in particular set up visitation to establish a connection with the child and substance abuse evaluation and treatment to deal with the mother's most problematic behavior.   DCF cannot make a parent take an interest in their child nor provide motivation where none exists.   Here Jennifer stopped her visits and failed to follow through with substance abuse treatment.

(2) As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, the court finds that DCF made such efforts.   Jennifer has generally abdicated parental responsibility for five years or more.

(3) As to the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, the court finds specific steps were ordered as to both parents.   Jennifer has not been motivated to comply with the specific steps in accordance with her own wishes.   She has not been able to restore herself to a rehabilitative status that would benefit the child within the reasonably foreseeable future.

(4) As to the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.   Within the past year Grace has been able to establish a secure bonded relationship with her foster mother.   Her behavior has stabilized and she is showing remarkable progress.   Her mother no longer has a parental relationship with Grace.

Fortunately for Grace she is in a loving and supportive foster family.   She has been dealing with her issues and with her genetic loading.   She is doing well and is bonded and attached to her foster parents.   All of her educational and medical needs are being addressed.

(5) As to the age of the child:  Grace was born on April 11, 2002.   She is eleven years old.

(6) As to the efforts the parents have made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the children to return such children home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child;  the court finds as follows:  father has failed to maintain contact.   Previously discussed.

(7) As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent, the court finds no unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parent or third parties.

With respect to the best interests of the child contemplated by C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Leonard, by his consent, and of Jennifer, by her conduct, is in the best interest of the child.

In finding that termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in the child's best interest, the court has examined multiple relevant factors including the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of her present environment;  her length of stay in foster care;  the nature of her relationship with foster mother and biological parents;  the degree of contact maintained with the biological parents;  and her genetic bond to her parents.  In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559 (2000);  In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167 (2000);  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816 (1999).   The court has also balanced the child's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the potential benefit of maintaining a connection with the biological parents.

It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of Jennifer D. and Leonard B. to Grace are hereby terminated.   The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for the child.

The Commissioner will file, within 30 days hereof, a report as to the status of this child as required by statute and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.

The Clerk of any Court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of this child shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, 81 Columbia Avenue, Willimantic of the date when said adoption is finalized.

Judgment may enter accordingly.

It is so ordered this 17th day of July 2013.

Foley, Judge Trial Referee # 416

Foley, Francis J., J.T.R.