Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. III (2013)

ORDER

The respondent, Emerson V. Briggs III, has been presented before the court as a result of his conviction of a serious crime pursuant to the provisions of Practice Book Section 2–41.   Specifically, Mr. Briggs pleaded guilty to a charge of Receipt of Child Pornography in violation of 18 USC 2252A(a)(2)(A).   A criminal judgment was entered on December 4, 2008 in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under the caption of United States v. Emerson Vincent Briggs, Case No. 08–215–01.   Mr. Briggs received a total effective sentence of 70 months to serve, a fine of $12,500, and supervised release for a period of ten years.

On December 17, 2012, the respondent was suspended from the practice of law in the District of Columbia pending formal proceedings and a final resolution of disciplinary matters in that jurisdiction.   The Chief Disciplinary Counsel now seeks, pursuant to the provisions of Practice Book Section 2–41(e), an interim suspension of the respondent's license to practice law in this jurisdiction, pending final disposition of the disciplinary proceedings in the District of Columbia.¹

The respondent appeared before the court and does not appear to contest that he has been convicted of a “serious crime” as defined in Section 2–41(c) of the Practice Book. However, the respondent notes that under Practice Book § 2–41(e), the court has discretion as to whether to enter an order of interim suspension.   The respondent asserts that the court's discretion should be guided by the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.   The incarceration portion of the respondent's criminal sentence has been served and he is currently under supervised release.   He has undergone and continues to undergo mental health treatment related to the conduct which led to his conviction.   He does not believe that the court could find he presents an imminent danger to clients.   Therefore, based on the ABA standards, the respondent argues that an interim suspension from the practice of law is not justified.

While full consideration of the ABA standards would certainly be appropriate at the time of proceedings to determine “the extent of the final discipline to be imposed,” Practice Book § 2–41(e), such extensive inquiry is not warranted at this time.   The court's focus when entering an interim order is not sanctions of the individual, but safeguarding the integrity of the administration of justice until a final determination regarding sanctions may be made.

Although the court was impressed with the respondent's awareness of the harm he has caused, the efforts he has made toward rehabilitation and his sincere remorse, the court believes that the respondent's continued practice of law before the courts of this state while disciplinary proceedings based on his conviction are pending in another jurisdiction would be detrimental to the administration of justice.

Therefore, pursuant to Section 2–41(e) of the Practice Book, the court orders that the respondent Emerson V. Briggs III be suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis, retroactive to December 17, 2012, pending final disposition of disciplinary proceedings in the District of Columbia.

BY THE COURT,

David M. Sheridan

Judge of the Superior Court.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. There was a four-year delay between the respondent's conviction and the sending of written notice of the conviction to the Chief Disciplinary Counsel pursuant to Practice Book § 2–41(a).   Respondent attributed this to his pre-trial detention and subsequent incarceration..  FN1. There was a four-year delay between the respondent's conviction and the sending of written notice of the conviction to the Chief Disciplinary Counsel pursuant to Practice Book § 2–41(a).   Respondent attributed this to his pre-trial detention and subsequent incarceration.

Sheridan, David M., J.