William McKinney v. The Warden (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

THE COURT:  Good afternoon, everyone.

ATTY. MELCHIONNE:  Good afternoon, Your Honor.

ATTY. DEARINGTON:  Good afternoon.

THE COURT:  The Court is ready to issue a decision but I've been informed by the marshals that—that due to Mr. McKinney's current behavior, that he did not wish to be present for the—for my ruling and in order to deescalate the situation and for all safety of everyone involved, I did allow Mr. McKinney to be transferred back to Cheshire.   So, I'm going to issue my decision in his absence.

The petitioner, William McKinney, filed this habeas petition on or about March 20, 2012, alleging in essence that he's receiving inadequate mental health treatment;  that he is not being allowed to transfer to—and that he's allowed to be transferred to Garner, where he believes is a more appropriate place for him to receive the treatment.   As relief, he requests a transfer to another facility.

Under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 1976, in order to establish an Eighth Amendment claim arising out of inadequate medical care, a prisoner must prove deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.   Prison officials will be found to have violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution if, by virtue of their deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs, they refuse to provide care or treatment for that inmate.

Under Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 1993, when the state takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.   The rationale for this principle is simple enough:  when the state by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself and at the same time failed to provide for his basic human needs—for example, food, clothing, shelter, medical care and reasonable safety—it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment.   Contemporary standards of decency require no less.   Although accidental or inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care to a prisoner would not violate the Eighth Amendment, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners violates the amendment because it constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain contrary to contemporary standards of decency.

A claim that the conditions of a prisoner's confinement violate the Eighth Amendment requires an inquiry into the prison official's state of mind.

Whether one characterizes the treatment received by the prisoner as inhuman conditions of confinement, failure to attend to his medical needs or a combination of both, it is appropriate to apply the deliberate indifference standard.

The Connecticut Supreme Court adopted in Faraday v. Commissioner of Correction, 288 Conn. 326, 2008, the standard of deliberate indifference includes both subjective and objective components.   First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, sufficiently serious.   Second, the government official must act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.   An official acts with the requisite deliberate indifference when that official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety;  the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm, exists and he must also draw the—the same inference.   Thus, an official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have received but did not does not violate the Eighth Amendment.

Accordingly, to establish a claim of deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must prove that the official's actions constituted more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety.   Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault;  requiring proof of a state of mind that is equivalent of criminal recklessness.

In the—in the same case, Faraday, it is well established that mere disagreement over the proper treatment does not create a constitutional claim.   As long as the treatment given is adequate, the fact that a prisoner might prefer a different treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation.

The petitioner, Mr. McKinney, has provided no evidence today that the treatment he is receiving is inadequate nor that the respondent is deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.   We've heard testimony today from Dr. Gagne and Dr. Matthews, and The Court found their testimony very credible.   They are clearly experts in their field;  they believe the treatment that he is receiving is more than adequate.   The Court also heard testimony from Dr. Manohar and while The Court does not discredit his testimony, his contact with the petitioner was very limited;  he only saw him three times over a three-month period and, therefore, The Court places more credibility as to Doctors Gagne and Matthews testimony and diagnosis as well.

And the petitioner also requests a transfer to a different facility.   As a general matter, under State v. Campbell, 224 Conn. 168, 1992, so long as the conditions of confinement do not otherwise violate the Constitution—as long as the confinement is otherwise constitutional, a defendant has no due process right to be sentenced to a particular type of facility.

Therefore, for all the foregoing reasons, the petition is denied and the judgment's entered for the respondent.

Hunchu Kwak, Superior Court Judge

Kwak, Hunchu, J.