Qin Qi Shi et al. v. 84 LLC (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE ATTORNEYS FEES

I

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter is before the court on the plaintiff Qin Qi Shi's post-trial affidavit of attorney fees and bill of costs (# 122).   The defendants filed an objection as to the attorneys fees only (# 124), to which the plaintiff filed a response on May 28, 2013 (# 125).   The parties were given until June 19, 2013, to request a hearing;  neither side requested a hearing concerning the motion.

This case concerns the breach of contract claims brought by plaintiffs Qin Qi Shi, Shi Restaurant, LLC (Shi Restaurant) and Anthony Sereslis Realty (Sereslis) against defendants Sarajevo 84, LLC (Sarajevo) and Skender Cirikovic.   The plaintiff Sereslis sued to obtain a broker's commission which it claimed to be entitled to under an exclusive right to sell agreement it entered into with the defendant Cirikovic on or about June 6, 2008.   The plaintiffs Shi and Shi Restaurant sought monetary damages from the defendants for a breach of an agreement for the sale of business assets and a corresponding lease regarding the same property.

A court trial of this case was conducted on November 6 and 9, 2012, during which testimony and exhibits were presented.   Post-trial briefs were filed on December 11, 2012.   A written memorandum of decision was entered on March 28, 2013, which entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs Shi and Shi Restaurant in the amount of $2,611.60 as against Sarajevo 84, LLC and Skender Cirikovic, awarded these plaintiffs attorneys fees based on the terms of the breached contract, and ordered the prevailing plaintiffs to file an affidavit of attorneys fees.¹  Thereafter, the matter has proceeded as set forth above.

II

DISCUSSION

The plaintiff Qin Qi Shi seeks attorneys fees in the amount of $10,845, representing 48.2 hours of time at the attorney's $225 hourly rate.

The defendants have not objected to the hourly rate sought.   The gravamen of the defendants' objection is that the number of hours billed is excessive, both in relation to the award of damages, $2,611.60, and in comparison to the amount of time allegedly spent by defendants' counsel on this matter.   Defendants point specifically to only three billing entries, and argue additionally without supporting documentation that the 48.2 hours claimed by plaintiff is more than twice than that billed by defendants' counsel in total.   Defendants also argue that plaintiff is not entitled to recover attorneys fees for work on behalf of the plaintiff Sereslis, who was represented by the same counsel but did not prevail at trial, that the subject matter of the action was not difficult or complicated, and that the court should award a fee that is reasonable in light of these circumstances.

“It is well established that a trial court calculating a reasonable attorneys fee makes its determination while considering the factors set forth under rule 1.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct ․ These factors include the time and labor spent by the attorneys, the novelty and complexity of the legal issues, fees customarily charged in the same locality for similar services, the lawyer's experience and ability, relevant time limitations, the magnitude of the case and the results obtained, the nature and length of the lawyer-client relationship, and whether the fee is fixed or contingent ․ When awarding attorneys fees, the court must consider all of the factors and not seize on one to the exclusion of the others.” ²  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Rodriguez v. Annona, 88 Conn.App. 193, 202, 868 A.2d 807 (2005).   However, the court is not required to ascribe a particular weight to any of the factors.   See Commission of Human Rights & Opportunities v. Brookstone Court, L.L.C., 107 Conn.App. 340, 352, 945 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 288 Conn. 907, 953 A.2d 651 (2008).

“[T]he initial estimate of a reasonable attorneys fee is properly calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on a litigation times a reasonable hourly rate ․ The courts may then adjust this lodestar calculation by other factors.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ernst v. Deere & Co., 92 Conn.App. 572, 576, 886 A.2d 845 (2005).  “It is axiomatic, however, that the determination of reasonableness of attorneys fees appropriately takes into consideration a range of factors, among which the time and labor expended is but one consideration.   See O'Brien v. Seyer, 183 Conn. 199, 206, 439 A.2d 292 (1981) (factors properly considered in determining reasonable compensation to attorney summarized in Code of Professional Responsibility, now rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct);  Steiger v. J.S. Builders, Inc., 39 Conn.App. 32, 38–39, 663 A.2d 432 (1995) (adopting list of factors to be considered by trial court if it determines plaintiff is entitled to attorneys fees, costs in unfair trade practices litigation).”  Esposito v. Esposito, 71 Conn.App. 744, 749–50, 804 A.2d 846 (2002).

It has been repeatedly held that an award under a contract clause which provides for reasonable attorneys fees requires an evidentiary showing of reasonableness.  Appliances, Inc. v. Yost, 186 Conn. 673, 680, 443 A.2d 486 (1982);  Storm Associates, Inc. v. Baumgold, 186 Conn. 237, 245–46, 440 A.2d 306 (1982).   As discussed in Appliances, Inc. v. Yost, supra, 680–81, and Piantedosi v. Floridia, 186 Conn. 275, 279, 440 A.2d 977 (1982), courts may rely on their general knowledge of what has occurred at the proceedings before them to supply evidence in support of an award of attorneys fees.

“It [is] within the discretion of the court to determine whether the effort expended was reasonable under the circumstances and to rely on its familiarity and expertise with the complex legal issues involved to determine the reasonableness of the attorneys fees.”  Gina M.G. v. William C., 77 Conn.App. 582, 596, 823 A2.d 1274 (2003).

Our Supreme Court has observed that “[a] court has few duties of a more delicate nature than that of fixing counsel fees.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., 265 Conn. 210, 258, 828 A.2d 64 (2003).

Keeping all of the above principles in mind in determining the reasonable number of hours expended on this litigation, the court will first address the defendant's argument that the plaintiff is not entitled to fees for the attorney's work performed in relation to the unsuccessful claims of the plaintiff Sereslis.   Upon review of the affidavit of attorneys fees, the only time therein which clearly was exclusively dedicated to the Sereslis claims was that in connection with reviewing defendants' request to revise and filing an amended complaint in response, a total of 2 hours.   As such, these hours will not be included in the plaintiff's award of attorneys fees.

It is apparent that the remainder of hours, with the exception of several billing entries which reference a “client” in the singular, represents work done collectively for Shi and the unsuccessful co-plaintiff Sereslis.   The court acknowledges that because to some extent that the plaintiffs' respective claims involve a common core of facts and are based on related legal theories, some of the attorney's time will have been devoted generally to the litigation as a whole.   Although, as a result, it becomes impossible to separate with mathematical precision the hours expended, particularly in the absence of detailed analysis by either counsel, it is appropriate for the court to discount those hours in order to “award only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained.”  Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983).

The reasonableness of the hourly rate claimed is not disputed, and based on the court's general knowledge of hourly rates, the rate is found to be reasonable.

The court agrees that the issues presented in this case were not novel or unusually difficult or complex, and acknowledges that the plaintiff's degree of success was modest.

Having subtracted the 2 hours referenced above, and having given consideration to the remaining claimed hours expended, the rate charged, the amount in controversy, the lack of complexity, the degree of difficulty, the shared time in relation to the co-plaintiff, and the other factors discussed above, including the court's own knowledge as to the reasonableness of the fees sought under the circumstances here, the court determines the attorneys fees to be $5,717.25.

No objection was filed as to plaintiff's bill of costs.   The court declines to award costs for “Lexis Computer Research.”   Costs are taxed in the amount of $1,057.60.   It is so ordered.

BY THE COURT

Gleeson, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Judgment was also entered in favor of defendants Sarajevo and Cirikovic as against plaintiff Sereslis..  FN1. Judgment was also entered in favor of defendants Sarajevo and Cirikovic as against plaintiff Sereslis.

FN2. Rule 1.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides in relevant part:  “The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:“(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;“(2) The likelihood, if made known to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;“(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;“(4) The amount involved and the results obtained;“(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;“(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;“(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services;  and“(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.”.  FN2. Rule 1.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides in relevant part:  “The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:“(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;“(2) The likelihood, if made known to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;“(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;“(4) The amount involved and the results obtained;“(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;“(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;“(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services;  and“(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.”

Gleeson, Marcia J., J.