State of Connecticut v. Thomas Obst (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO SUPPRESS

On February 20, 2013, the defendant, Thomas Obst, filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized from his motor vehicle on December 14, 2011, on the ground that it is the fruit of an unlawfully extended traffic stop.   A hearing was held on the defendant's motion to suppress on February 26, 2013.   The following facts are supported by the testimony of three Connecticut State Troopers, whom the court finds credible.

I

FACTS

On December 14, 2011, at approximately 10:30 p.m., Trooper Mark Jesudowich of the Connecticut State Police, Troop L in Litchfield, Connecticut, observed the motor vehicle driven by the defendant, Thomas Obst, swerve over the white fog line, the white dashed line and the double white dashed line near exit 42 on Route 8 in Litchfield, Connecticut.   Trooper Jesudowich followed the defendant's vehicle for approximately three miles prior to initiating a motor vehicle stop in order to find a safe location to conduct the stop.   Trooper Jesudowich initiated the motor vehicle stop between exits 41 and 40 on Route 8. Trooper Jesudowich approached the passenger side of the defendant's vehicle and immediately observed that the defendant was eating a Kit–Kat bar in a “devouring like manner.” ¹  Trooper Jesudowich also observed that the defendant's movements were jerky, he couldn't maintain eye contact and his pupils were highly constricted.   Upon speaking with the defendant, Trooper Jesudowich observed that the defendant's thought process was rambling and inconsistent, and the defendant was unable to speak with Trooper Jesudowich in a manner normal for traffic stops.   Trooper Jesudowich determined, based on his experience,² that the defendant's actions were not indicative of the normal nervousness associated with a motor vehicle stop.   After attempting to speak with the defendant for approximately two to three minutes, Trooper Jesudowich obtained the defendant's motor vehicle documents and proceeded to his vehicle.   Trooper Jesudowich suspected that the defendant was either under the influence of drugs or narcotics, and/or had drugs or narcotics in his vehicle.   Trooper Jesudowich's observations of the defendant were consistent with what he had experienced in other situations where it was determined that the operators were under the influence of a narcotic or drug.   Trooper Jesudowich proceeded to call for back-up in order to have the defendant exit the vehicle.

Upon the arrival of Trooper Rodney Valdes, in a back-up capacity, the defendant was asked to step outside of his vehicle.³  The defendant was brought to the rear of his vehicle and was asked questions by Trooper Jesudowich to further ascertain whether the defendant was under the influence of narcotics or drugs.⁴  The defendant's answers were short and unresponsive, and Trooper Jesudowich was unsure whether the defendant understood the questions.   At some point, the defendant mentioned that he had a previous arrest for illegal drugs.⁵  The defendant was patted down and no weapons were found.   During the patdown, the defendant continued to move in an uncontrolled manner.   The defendant was handcuffed.

At approximately 10:45 p.m., Trooper Jesudowich called for a narcotics canine unit to assist with the investigation based on his reasonable suspicion that the defendant was under the influence of a drug or narcotic, and that there may have been evidence of such items in his vehicle.   Trooper Jesudowich did not believe that the defendant had consented to a search of the vehicle at that time.   As there were no narcotics canine units at Troop L, one had to be requested from Troop B, located in Canaan, Connecticut.   It took the narcotics canine unit approximately ten minutes to arrive on the scene after receiving the request.

Trooper Dominic Goguen and the narcotics dog arrived at the scene shortly after 11:00 p.m. An exterior air scent of the defendant's vehicle was conducted and the narcotics dog alerted on the driver's side door and window.⁶  The defendant was asked whether he wanted the dog to enter the vehicle or for Trooper Goguen to hand search the vehicle.   The defendant requested that Trooper Goguen hand search the vehicle.   Trooper Goguen found an unlocked briefcase on the passenger's side floor containing a large sum of money and a container containing unlabeled prescription pills.   At which point, the defendant was placed under arrest at approximately 11:20 p.m. A total of approximately fifty minutes elapsed between the time the defendant was pulled over and the time he was placed under arrest.

The defendant was charged with possession of narcotics with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 21a–278(a);  possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a–279(a);  illegal storage of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a–257;  failure to maintain lane in violation of General Statutes § 14–236;  and failure to carry an operator's license in violation of General Statutes § 14–213.

On February 20, 2013, the defendant filed an amended motion to suppress all items seized from his motor vehicle, including but not limited to (1) six eight-sided yellow colored pills imprinted with “40”;  (2) eighteen circular peach colored pills imprinted with “113”;  (3) one blue colored plastic crush/container;  (4) $7,800;  and (5) $227.

After the February 26, 2013 hearing, on March 27, 2013, the State filed a response to the motion to suppress, followed by a reply from the defendant on April 12, 2013, and a response from the State on April 17, 2013.

The defendant moves to suppress the evidence on the grounds that (1) Trooper Jesudowich lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion justifying the motor vehicle stop, and (2) the search was illegal in that it exceeded the scope of a permissible motor vehicle stop for an unreasonably prolonged period of time and without specific facts justifying the continued investigation.

II

DISCUSSION

The Fourth Amendment requires that all searches and seizures be reasonable in their execution.  “A traffic stop is a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.”   State v. Allardyce, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford at Geographic Area 14, Docket No. CV 14 100642594 (May 3, 2011, Dewey, J.).   The right to make a traffic stop, however, “does not justify a subsequent unreasonable detention.”  Id. “An officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop ․ do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.”  (Emphasis omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Jenkins, 298 Conn. 209, 236, 3 A.3d 806 (2010).   Accordingly, in the present case, this court must determine (1) whether the initial investigative stop was valid, and (2) whether Trooper Jesudowich's inquiry of the defendant measurably extended the duration of the stop.

Furthermore, where a “defendant moves to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search, the burden is on the state to prove the existence of an exception to the warrant requirement.”  State v. Diaz, 226 Conn. 514, 553, 628 A.2d 567 (1993).   Thus, in the present case, the State has the burden of showing that Trooper Jesudowich had probable cause to search the defendant's vehicle and lawfully seize the evidence.   See State v. Winfrey, 302 Conn. 195, 202–03, 24 A.3d 1218 (2011) (warrantless search of an automobile permissible if police have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband).

A

Initial Investigative Stop

“An investigatory stop is authorized if the police officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Dalzell, 96 Conn.App. 515, 524, 901 A.2d 706 (2006), rev'd in part on other grounds, 282 Conn. 709, 924 A.2d 809 (2007).  “When a reasonable, articulable suspicion exists, the detaining officer may conduct an investigative stop of the suspect in order to confirm or dispel his suspicions.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Id. “A police officer has the right to stop a motor vehicle operating on a Connecticut highway even if the reason for the stop is only an infraction under our traffic laws.”  State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 122, 547 A.2d 10 (1988).

In the present case, Trooper Jesudowich observed the defendant's vehicle swerve over the white fog line, the white dashed line and the double white dashed lines.   Based on these observations, Trooper Jesudowich initiated a motor vehicle stop.   Failure to maintain a lane is an infraction prohibited under Connecticut law, General Statutes § 14–236.   Therefore, there was a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a traffic violation occurred and, as a result, the initial investigatory stop of the defendant's vehicle was justified.

B

Duration of Investigative Stop

“Whether an officer's continued detention of a person is consistent with constitutional limits is a deeply factual question dependent on the particular facts and circumstances of the particular case.”   State v. Nieves, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CR 10 169457 (August 25, 2010, Wenzel, J.).  “Our Supreme Court recently addressed the proper analysis for considering the constitutionality of the detention of a motorist during a routine traffic stop in State v. Jenkins, 298 Conn. 209, 3 A.3d 806 (2010).”  State v. Sward, 124 Conn.App. 546, 551, 5 A.3d 965 (2010).

In State v. Jenkins, our Supreme Court stated that “[c]ourts considering the constitutionality under the fourth amendment of a police officer's interaction with a motorist during a routine traffic stop apply the principles developed under the line of case law implementing the central holding of Terry v. Ohio, [392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ] ․ Under Terry, where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot ․ the officer may briefly stop the suspicious person and make reasonable inquiries aimed at confirming or dispelling his suspicions ․

“A Terry stop does not give law enforcement officers carte blanche to stop and detain citizens indefinitely or unreasonably because, if an investigative stop continues indefinitely, at some point it can no longer be justified as an investigative stop.   But our cases impose no rigid time limitation on Terry stops.   While it is clear that the brevity of the invasion of the individual's [f]ourth [a]mendment interests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion ․ we have emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes ․ Thus, the Supreme Court has rejected attempts to impose ‘a hard-and-fast time limit’ on Terry stops, in favor of a reasonableness inquiry where, [i]n assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant ․ A court making this assessment should take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing ․

“Applying this reasoning in the traffic stop context, the United States Supreme Court recently followed Muehler v. Mena, [544 U.S. 93, 100–01, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005),] wherein it had determined that the police did not violate the fourth amendment rights of a woman detained during the execution of a search warrant by questioning her about her immigration status, and concluded that [a] lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is pulled over for investigation of a traffic violation.   The temporary seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop.   Normally, the stop ends when the police have no further need to control the scene, and inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave ․ An officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop, this [c]ourt has made plain, do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” ⁷  (Citations omitted;  emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Jenkins, supra, 298 Conn. 232–36.

“Thus, questions permissible under Terry during a routine traffic stop include inquiries about whether the car or driver are carrying contraband, as well as concomitant requests for consent to search the vehicle ․ These inquiries are permissible even if they are irrelevant to the initial purpose of the stop, namely, the traffic violation, so long as they do not measurably extend the stop beyond the time necessary to complete the investigation of the traffic violation and issue a citation or warning.   Consideration of that time period necessarily includes the completion of tasks attendant to the traffic stop, including a check of the driver's license, vehicle registration, and criminal history, and the writing of the citation or warning, as well as background questions about the destination and purpose of the driver's trip ․ Indeed, given that complications with respect to these tasks may well result in an extension of the time of detention without rendering it unreasonable under the fourth amendment, [w]hether a particular detention is reasonable in length is a fact-intensive question, and there is no per se time limit on all traffic stops.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 237–38.

Our Supreme Court has emphasized “that in evaluating the duration of a traffic stop, the reviewing court still must consider the stop through the lens of the time reasonably necessary to effectuate the initial purpose of the traffic stop, and expansions of the stop beyond that time are constitutionally impermissible in the absence of an independent basis of objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion.. .[J]udicial review of routine traffic stops goes beyond a strict stopwatch test;  reasonableness is not measured solely by the temporal duration of the stop alone but, rather, requires scrupulous consideration of the reasonableness of the officers' actions during the time of the stop.”   (Citations omitted;  emphasis added.)  State v. Jenkins, supra, 298 Conn. 242;  see New Mexico v. Leyva, 149 N.M. 435, 442, 250 P.3d 861 (2011) ( “[t]he length of the detention should be reasonably limited to the time it takes to complete the underlying justification for the stop ․ [T]he temporal limitations of a Terry stop generally require an investigating officer return a driver's documents and permit the driver to depart as soon as the reason for the traffic stop has been completed ․ unless, of course, the officer has developed reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigation into other criminal activity ․” (citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted));  see also United States v. Loya, 528 F.3d 546, 553 (8th Cir.2008) (“[a]n officer may expand the scope of a traffic stop beyond the initial reason for the stop and prolong the detention if the driver's responses and the circumstances give rise to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity unrelated to the stop is afoot”).

In other words, where an officer's actions and inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop measurably extend the duration of the stop, that stop becomes unreasonably prolonged where the officer lacks an independent reasonable suspicion to inquire into those unrelated matters.

“With respect to whether the results of the initial stop aroused further suspicion warranting a prolonged inquiry, [t]he police officer's decision ․ must be based on more than a hunch or speculation ․ In justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Jenkins, supra, 298 Conn. 244–45.  “Because a reasonable and articulable suspicion is an objective standard, we focus not on the actual state of mind of the police officer, but on whether a reasonable person, having the information available to and known by the police, would have had that level of suspicion ․ The nature of the crime under investigation, the degree of suspicion, the location of the stop, the time of day, the reaction of the suspect to the approach of police are all facts which bear on the issue of reasonableness ․ [N]ervous, evasive behavior ․ is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion ․ [P]olice officers may reasonably act upon observation of a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but which taken together warranted further investigation.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Miller, 137 Conn.App. 520, 538–39, 48 A.3d 748, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 914, 54 A.3d 179 (2012).

Part of the totality of circumstances that a court considers “are those inferences and deductions made by officers under the particular circumstances, since law enforcement officials are trained to cull significance from behavior that would appear innocent to the untrained observer.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Nash, 278 Conn. 620, 635, 899 A.2d 1 (2006).   The United States Supreme Court has stated that reviewing courts “must look at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing ․ This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.”   (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002).

“It would be error for [a] court to dismiss or discount observations or factors noted and relied upon by police officers merely because, separately, those observations or factors are amenable to an innocent explanation ․ Even though each of a series of acts might perhaps appear innocent, a court must not consider them insufficient to form the basis for a reasonable suspicion if, when taken together, collectively, they amount to reasonable suspicion.”   (Citation omitted.)   State v. Merritt, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CR 05 0039563 (June 7, 2005, Robinson, J.);   see United States v. Arvizu, supra, 534 U.S. 273–74.

In State v. Jenkins, supra, 298 Conn. 214–17, “the defendant motorist was stopped by a police officer at 11:15 p.m. for making abrupt lane changes without using his vehicle's turn signals ․ The officer approached the defendant's vehicle, asked some questions concerning the stop and the defendant's travel plans, and then went back to his cruiser to check the defendant's personal and vehicular information ․ This check revealed no outstanding warrants pertaining to the defendant ․ The officer then began to write an infraction ticket for the illegal lane changes ․ The officer returned to the defendant's vehicle and asked the defendant to get out of the car for the purposes of explaining the ticket ․ Due to the defendant's nervous demeanor and account of his travels, the officer asked him if he had anything illegal on his person or in his vehicle ․ The defendant was patted down, which revealed no contraband, and then he voluntarily permitted the officer to search his car ․ The officer found what he believed to be cocaine in the defendant's car and placed the defendant under arrest ․ From the time that the officer initiated the stop, until the defendant consented to the search of his vehicle, only ten to fifteen minutes had passed ․ In all, the entire stop lasted at most twenty minutes.”  (Citations omitted.)  State v. Sward, supra, 124 Conn.App. 551.   Our Supreme Court held that the officer “did not measurably or unreasonably prolong [the] traffic stop of the defendant.”   State v. Jenkins, supra, 246;  see State v. Sward, supra, 124 Conn.App. 554, 556 (“entire traffic stop ․ [met] the reasonableness inquiry articulated in Jenkins ” and officer “did not unlawfully extend the duration of the traffic stop by requesting that the defendant exit his vehicle or by questioning the defendant further about whether he had consumed any alcohol that night”).

In so holding, the court in State v. Jenkins, supra, 298 Conn. 247 expressly distinguished the facts from “the protracted questioning” in United States v. Peralez, 526 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir.2008).   In United States v. Peralez, supra, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a trooper had violated the Fourth Amendment by improperly extending the duration of a traffic stop to enable a drug dog to sniff the exterior of a vehicle.   In that case, the trooper initially stopped the vehicle for violating the state's license plate law.  Id. Three minutes into the stop, the trooper informed the driver, Salinas, that he would be issued a warning ticket and, as the trooper began to complete the ticket, he asked Salinas if he would be willing to answer questions about the vehicle, to which Salinas agreed.  Id. “At this point, there was ‘absolutely not’ anything about Salinas' actions or comments causing [the trooper] to be concerned that criminal activity was afoot.”  Id. The trooper engaged Salinas “in discussion on topics related to drug trafficking ․ [and] asked Salinas if there were drugs or large amounts of cash in the van.   He asked if anyone had used drugs in the van recently.  [The trooper] drew Salinas' attention to Drake, who was sitting in the rear of the police car, and noted he is a canine handler.  [The trooper] asked if there was any reason Drake would indicate to the odor of drugs ‘when’ Drake walked around the van.”  Id. Salinas denied that there were drugs in the vehicle, denied using drugs himself and knew of no reason that Drake would alert on the vehicle.  Id. Half-way through completing the warning ticket, the trooper obtained the identification of Peralez, a passenger in the vehicle, and called to check on both men's identifications.  Id. “This routine part of any traffic stop did not occur until ten minutes after the trooper told Salinas he would receive only a warning ticket.   Dispatch responded regarding Salinas's license after one minute.   Before dispatch responded on Peralez, [the trooper] took Drake out of the patrol car and walked him around the van.”  Id. Drake indicated to the odor of illegal drugs and, as a result, the van was searched and evidence obtained.  Id. Peralez's motion to suppress was granted ⁸ and the state appealed.  Id.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed ⁹ the magistrate judge's conclusion that “the trooper unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop and the prolonged detention was not de minimis in length under the circumstances of [the] case ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id. The Eighth Circuit explained that “[n]othing unusual occurred during the traffic stop that would have warranted a longer-than-typical detention.   The trooper determined after three minutes that the driver of the van need only receive a warning ticket for the obstructed license plate ․ The stop was delayed because of the trooper's drug interdiction questioning, not because of anything related to the investigation or processing of the traffic violation.”  (Citations omitted.)  Id. The Eighth Circuit noted that an officer may extend or expand the scope of a traffic stop beyond the original justification for the stop if the encounter becomes consensual or the officer develops reasonable suspicion that other criminal activity is afoot.  Id. The Eighth Circuit held that neither of those circumstances were present.  Id. In fact, the government did not even contend that the trooper “had reasonable suspicion that the van's occupants were engaged in illegal activities when the trooper began asking drug interdiction questions.   Indeed, [the trooper] testified at the suppression hearing that he did not have any reason to suspect illegal activity when he shifted the focus of his inquiries.”  Id. The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that there is “a split among the circuit courts as to whether an officer conducting a traffic stop based upon probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment by asking a few questions about matters unrelated to the traffic violation, even if this conversation briefly extends the length of the detention.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id. The Eighth Circuit determined that it “need not decide whether a brief extension would comport with the Fourth Amendment in the context of a probable-cause stop, because the delay caused by [the trooper's] questions cannot be categorized as brief ․ The off-topic questions more than doubled the time [the defendant] was detained ․ [T]he questions unrelated to the traffic violation constituted the bulk of the interaction between the trooper and the van's occupants.   This was not a brief extension.   The extent and duration of the trooper's focus on non-routine questions prolonged the stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete its purpose.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id.

The present case is distinguishable from United States v. Peralez, supra, 526 F.3d 1115, based on this court's findings that Trooper Jesudowich formed a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant was under the influence and/or in possession of drugs and/or narcotics sufficient to prolong the duration of the stop to investigate those suspicions, and that the duration of the stop was not unreasonable.

The defendant argues that Trooper Jesudowich did not have a reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of the traffic stop.   The defendant contends that Trooper Jesudowich had never met the defendant, did not know whether the defendant suffered from attention deficit disorder, and did not ask any pertinent questions about the defendant's medical history.   Furthermore, the defendant asserts that there was no visible indication that he had contraband in the vehicle and no weapons were located on his person.   Finally, the defendant notes that Trooper Jesudowich did not administer any field sobriety tests.   Despite these deficiencies, the defendant argues, the investigation improperly continued “as if probable cause had been established for the operation of a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs and drugs were visible in the vehicle.”

As an initial matter, the court clarifies that a police officer need only have a reasonable and articulable suspicion of additional criminal activity to warrant a measurable extension of the duration of the stop.   See State v. Jenkins, supra, 298 Conn. 244–45.   This court credits Trooper Jesudowich's observations and experience, and finds that Trooper Jesudowich formed an independent basis of objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion which permitted the prolonged duration of the traffic stop.   Taken collectively, Trooper Jesudowich's experience and observations of the defendant allowed Trooper Jesudowich to form a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant was under the influence and/or in possession of drugs and/or narcotics, and to prolong the duration of the stop to investigate those suspicions.   The defendant is asking this court to discount Trooper Jesudowich's observations because, separately, according to the defendant, those observations or factors are amenable to an innocent explanation, such as an underlying medical condition.   This court declines to do so.

The defendant's motor vehicle was stopped at approximately 10:30 p.m. and, within two to three minutes, Trooper Jesudowich developed a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was under the influence and/or in possession of drugs or narcotics based on the defendant's consumption of the candy bar, uncontrollable movements, inability to maintain eye contact, highly constricted pupils, and rambling and inconsistent thoughts and speech.   Based on his experience that such behavior was uncharacteristic of the normal nervous behavior displayed during a traffic stop, Trooper Jesudowich immediately called for back-up.   Trooper Jesudowich's suspicions were not dispelled after additional questioning of the defendant, as the defendant's answers were short and unresponsive, and the defendant continued to move in an uncontrolled manner.   Trooper Jesudowich called for a narcotics canine unit at 10:45 p.m. This court finds that the length of time between the initial stop and the request for the narcotics canine unit was reasonable, as Trooper Jesudowich was acting in a diligent manner to dispel or confirm his suspicions that the defendant was under the influence of and/or in possession of drugs and/or narcotics.

The narcotics canine unit arrived at approximately 11:00 p.m., some fifteen minutes after being requested by Trooper Jesudowich.   Troop L did not have a narcotics canine unit and, therefore, it was necessary to request one from Troop B in Canaan, Connecticut.   It took Trooper Goguen approximately ten minutes to arrive on the scene after receiving the request.   The court finds that the additional length of time between the request for the narcotics canine unit and its arrival to be reasonable based on the circumstances presented.

Upon arrival of the narcotics canine unit, Trooper Goguen spoke with Trooper Jesudowich and then engaged the defendant in conversation to attempt to determine what contraband might be present in the vehicle.   Trooper Goguen and the canine then began an exterior air scent of the defendant's vehicle, which involved introducing the canine to the defendant's vehicle, giving him the command to search for narcotics and a search around the defendant's vehicle.   The canine made one complete pass around the vehicle.   Upon the second pass, the canine alerted that there was an odor of narcotics emanating from the driver's open window and the canine attempted to jump into the vehicle.   Trooper Goguen pulled the canine back.   The exterior search took approximately three to four minutes.   The defendant requested that Trooper Goguen, as opposed to the canine, search the vehicle.   Trooper Goguen did so and located the evidence at issue.   The defendant was immediately placed under arrest at 11:20 p.m. This court finds that the twenty-minute period that elapsed between the time the narcotics canine unit arrived and the defendant was placed under arrest was reasonable as the troopers were acting in a diligent manner to dispel or confirm the suspicion that the defendant was under the influence and/or in possession of narcotics and/or drugs.

In sum, this court finds that the State has met its burden of showing that the prolonged inquiry was based on specific facts of additional criminal activity sufficient to justify a continued investigation and that the duration of the stop was not unreasonable.

C

Automobile Exception to the Warrant RequirementDP1⌑“The United States Supreme Court first recognized the automobile exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), where the court explained that if [a] search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid.  Likewise, under our state constitution, our automobile exception permits a warrantless search of an automobile whenever the police have probable cause to do so ․ as where the searching officer[s] have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband ․ The probable cause determination must be based on objective facts that could have justified the issuance of a warrant by a neutral magistrate at the time the search was made.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Winfrey, supra, 302 Conn. 202–03.

“Probable cause to search exists if:  (1) there is probable cause to believe that the particular items sought to be seized are connected with criminal activity or will assist in a particular apprehension or conviction ․ and (2) there is probable cause to believe that the items sought to be seized will be found in the place to be searched.”  (Emphasis omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Longo, 243 Conn. 732, 741, 708 A.2d 1354 (1998).

In the present case, this court finds that the warrantless search of the defendant's vehicle was supported by probable cause arising from the defendant's uncontrolled movements, erratic speech and thoughts, highly restricted pupils, and the positive alert for narcotics from the canine sniff.   See State v. Torres, 31 Conn.App. 443, 451, 625 A.2d 239 (1993), aff'd, 230 Conn. 372, 645 A.2d 529 (1994) (“[i]t is well recognized that a dog's positive alert for narcotics may be sufficient to constitute probable cause, or at least an important component thereof, where there is a showing that the dog is reliable in detecting the particular narcotics at issue”).¹⁰  The reasonable inferences drawn from Trooper Jesudowich's observations, coupled with the canine's positive alert for narcotics and the defendant's admission of a prior narcotics arrest, all supported Trooper Jesudowich's actions in this case.

Moreover, this court also finds that the aforementioned circumstances provided probable cause to search the entire vehicle, including any containers, for drugs or narcotics.   See State v. Longo, supra, 243 Conn. 739 (automobile exception “permits a search of any containers found in the car, such as a locked box, which might contain the contraband sought in that search”).  “If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 738, quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982).  “The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile ․ is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe thatPAGE 20] it may be found.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Longo, supra, quoting United States v. Ross, supra, 824.   Because the unlocked briefcase on the passenger's side floor was a container which could have held narcotics or drugs, it was not necessary for Trooper Jesudowich to obtain a warrant before searching it.   See United States v. Ross, supra, 824–25;  State v. Longo, supra, 738–39.

III

CONCLUSION

The evidence seized from the defendant's vehicle was not the fruit of an unlawfully extended traffic stop, and the warrantless search of the defendant's vehicle and the containers therein was supported by probable cause.   Therefore, the motion to suppress is denied.

So ordered.

BY THE COURT

Marano, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Trooper Jesudowich described the manner of consumption as a “cookie-monster type, or competitive eating style.”.  FN1. Trooper Jesudowich described the manner of consumption as a “cookie-monster type, or competitive eating style.”

FN2. In his almost four years as a State Trooper, Trooper Jesudowich initiated approximately one thousand motor vehicle stops, of which ten to fifteen resulted in arrests for driving under the influence..  FN2. In his almost four years as a State Trooper, Trooper Jesudowich initiated approximately one thousand motor vehicle stops, of which ten to fifteen resulted in arrests for driving under the influence.

FN3. “Connecticut has recognized the right of an officer to order a person out of a vehicle, even when the stop is simply for an infraction.”   State v. Nieves, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CR 10 169457 (August 25, 2010, Wenzel, J.)..  FN3. “Connecticut has recognized the right of an officer to order a person out of a vehicle, even when the stop is simply for an infraction.”   State v. Nieves, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CR 10 169457 (August 25, 2010, Wenzel, J.).

FN4. Trooper Jesudowich did not suspect that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol and, therefore, did not administer any standard field sobriety tests..  FN4. Trooper Jesudowich did not suspect that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol and, therefore, did not administer any standard field sobriety tests.

FN5. It is unclear from the testimony at the hearing and the parties' briefs whether the defendant was handcuffed before or after his admission of a prior drug arrest and whether the admission was in direct response to a question asked by Trooper Jesudowich or Trooper Valdes..  FN5. It is unclear from the testimony at the hearing and the parties' briefs whether the defendant was handcuffed before or after his admission of a prior drug arrest and whether the admission was in direct response to a question asked by Trooper Jesudowich or Trooper Valdes.

FN6. A “canine sniff of the exterior of [a] car [is] not a search ․ for purposes of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution ․ While the fourth amendment protects people from unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate expectations of privacy, the canine sniff is sui generis, and, consequently, the exposure of [a defendant's personal property] which [is] located in a public place, to a trained canine [does] not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   State v. Kelly, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia–Milford, Docket No. CR 06 61742 (January 8, 2009, Hartmere, J.), citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409–10, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005);  United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983);  see State v. Blanco, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CR 06 00129932 (August 5, 2007, Calmar, J.) (44 Conn. L. Rptr. 163, 166 n.5) (“[t]he use of a drug detecting dog in and of itself does not constitute a search ․ Therefore, the use of the dog, with or without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, does not implicate the fourth amendment”)..  FN6. A “canine sniff of the exterior of [a] car [is] not a search ․ for purposes of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution ․ While the fourth amendment protects people from unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate expectations of privacy, the canine sniff is sui generis, and, consequently, the exposure of [a defendant's personal property] which [is] located in a public place, to a trained canine [does] not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   State v. Kelly, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia–Milford, Docket No. CR 06 61742 (January 8, 2009, Hartmere, J.), citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409–10, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005);  United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983);  see State v. Blanco, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CR 06 00129932 (August 5, 2007, Calmar, J.) (44 Conn. L. Rptr. 163, 166 n.5) (“[t]he use of a drug detecting dog in and of itself does not constitute a search ․ Therefore, the use of the dog, with or without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, does not implicate the fourth amendment”).

FN7. In Jenkins, our Supreme Court noted that prior to Muehler v. Mena, supra, 544 U.S. 100–01, “some federal and state jurisdictions had interpreted Terry to mean that questioning must be limited to the purpose of the traffic stop, and could not be extended beyond that purpose without either consent or an independent basis of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity ․ [but that] this more restrictive type of fourth amendment analysis has, with respect to the federal constitution, been unequivocally overruled by the holding of Muehler.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Jenkins, supra, 298 Conn. 243–44 n.26. In Jenkins, our Supreme court rejected the Appellate Court's statement of the law that “[i]n determining if a seizure has exceeded the scope of a permissible motor vehicle stop, the court must determine whether the officer's action was justified at its inception and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Jenkins, supra, 219..  FN7. In Jenkins, our Supreme Court noted that prior to Muehler v. Mena, supra, 544 U.S. 100–01, “some federal and state jurisdictions had interpreted Terry to mean that questioning must be limited to the purpose of the traffic stop, and could not be extended beyond that purpose without either consent or an independent basis of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity ․ [but that] this more restrictive type of fourth amendment analysis has, with respect to the federal constitution, been unequivocally overruled by the holding of Muehler.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Jenkins, supra, 298 Conn. 243–44 n.26. In Jenkins, our Supreme court rejected the Appellate Court's statement of the law that “[i]n determining if a seizure has exceeded the scope of a permissible motor vehicle stop, the court must determine whether the officer's action was justified at its inception and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Jenkins, supra, 219.

FN8. The magistrate judge's recommendation was adopted by the district court, which granted the defendant's motion to suppress.  Id..  FN8. The magistrate judge's recommendation was adopted by the district court, which granted the defendant's motion to suppress.  Id.

FN9. Although the Eighth Circuit concluded that “the traffic stop was improperly extended,” it held, nonetheless, that “the dog sniff was not a result of that improper extension” and, therefore, reversed the district court's order granting the motion to suppress.  Id. The Eighth Circuit explained that the trooper “did not prolong the search to enable a drug detecting dog to arrive on the scene;  Drake was available at the outset of the stop.  [The trooper] indicated to both the driver and [the passenger] that he intended to run Drake around the exterior of the van, regardless of the responses to the trooper's expanded inquiries ․ [N]othing in the record indicates that the answers to the questions posed during the unlawful expansion of the traffic stop caused [the trooper] to utilize Drake.   The dog sniff was not ‘the consequence of a constitutional violation.’․   It took less than a minute for Drake to circle the van and indicate the presence of contraband.   This momentary delay, which occurred while [the trooper] was waiting for the response to his inquiries about Peralez's driver's license, did not unreasonably extend the traffic stop ․ This delay would have occurred regardless of the [t]rooper's off-topic questions.   Because Peralez's prolonged seizure for questioning about drug trafficking was not a but-for cause of obtaining the evidence, suppression is not warranted.”  (Citations omitted.)  Id..  FN9. Although the Eighth Circuit concluded that “the traffic stop was improperly extended,” it held, nonetheless, that “the dog sniff was not a result of that improper extension” and, therefore, reversed the district court's order granting the motion to suppress.  Id. The Eighth Circuit explained that the trooper “did not prolong the search to enable a drug detecting dog to arrive on the scene;  Drake was available at the outset of the stop.  [The trooper] indicated to both the driver and [the passenger] that he intended to run Drake around the exterior of the van, regardless of the responses to the trooper's expanded inquiries ․ [N]othing in the record indicates that the answers to the questions posed during the unlawful expansion of the traffic stop caused [the trooper] to utilize Drake.   The dog sniff was not ‘the consequence of a constitutional violation.’․   It took less than a minute for Drake to circle the van and indicate the presence of contraband.   This momentary delay, which occurred while [the trooper] was waiting for the response to his inquiries about Peralez's driver's license, did not unreasonably extend the traffic stop ․ This delay would have occurred regardless of the [t]rooper's off-topic questions.   Because Peralez's prolonged seizure for questioning about drug trafficking was not a but-for cause of obtaining the evidence, suppression is not warranted.”  (Citations omitted.)  Id.

FN10. Trooper Goguen testified to the training necessary in order for a trooper and dog to become part of a canine unit, as well as the annual recertification required for both.   A showing was made that Trooper Goguen's dog was reliable in narcotics detection..  FN10. Trooper Goguen testified to the training necessary in order for a trooper and dog to become part of a canine unit, as well as the annual recertification required for both.   A showing was made that Trooper Goguen's dog was reliable in narcotics detection.

Marano, Richard M., J.