LLC v. CLS LLC (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE (# 122)

The plaintiff Pro–Klean Cleaning & Restoration Services, LLC moves to strike the defendant CLS–Norwalk, LLC's April 24, 2013 counterclaim on the ground that “CLS–Norwalk's Answer to the Plaintiff's [sic] Complaint was files [sic] in August of 2012, the pleadings had been closed since April 1, 2013 and the time for filing the counterclaim had passed pursuant to Connecticut Practice Book Section [sic] § 25–11.”  Practice Book § 25–11 is indeed titled “Order of Pleadings,” but Chapter 25 of the Practice Book is titled “Superior Court—Procedure in Family Matters,” and Practice Book § 25–1 defines what constitutes “ ‘family matters' within the scope of these rules.”   The present action involves breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and negligence claims between a cleaning company and one of its clients.   It does not qualify as a “family matter” under Practice Book § 25–1, despite the multiplicity of examples contained in the section.   Therefore, the Practice Book section upon which the plaintiff relies to argue the untimeliness of the defendant's counterclaim does not apply.

“In ruling on a motion to strike the trial court is limited to considering the grounds specified in the motion.”  Meredith v. Police Commission, 182 Conn. 138, 140, 438 A.2d 27 (1980).   The ground specified in the motion here is that the defendant's counterclaim is legally insufficient because it was filed untimely under Practice Book § 25–11.   Because Practice Book § 25–11 is inapplicable to the subject matter of the present action, however, it cannot be the basis for striking the counterclaim on the ground of untimeliness and consequent legal insufficiency.   The plaintiff specifies no other legal basis for striking the counterclaim in the motion.  “[G]rounds other than those specified should not be considered by the trial court in passing upon a motion to strike.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 259, 765 A.2d 505 (2001).   Because the only ground specified by the plaintiff and properly before the court is one that relies upon an inapplicable legal standard, the motion to strike necessarily fails, and the court accordingly denies it.

Mullins, J.

Mullins, Raheem, J.