LLC v. Irene Forbotnick et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT MARK DIORIO, KENNETH URBANSKI AND MILITARY HOUSING ADJUSTERS, LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (# 169)

Defendants Mark DiOrio, Kenneth Urbanski and Military Housing Adjusters, LLC (hereinafter “MHA”) move for summary judgment on plaintiff Tim–El Construction, LLC's (hereinafter “Tim–El”) claims against them sounding in tortious interference with a contractual relation and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, § 42a–110b (hereinafter “CUTPA”).   Tim–El was hired by defendants Irene Forbotnick and Gloria Hughes (hereinafter “the other defendants”) to perform rehabilitation work on their property, which had been damaged by fire.   MHA is a public insurance adjuster hired by the other defendants.   Mr. DiOrio and Mr. Urbanski are affiliated with MHA. The court's review of the file in this matter reveals a truly extraordinary amount of motion practice, particularly in view of the fact that this action involves a residential property.

“Practice Book § 17–49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  Connecticut Medical Insurance Co. v. Kulikowski, 286 Conn. 1, 4–5 (2008).  “Because litigants ordinarily have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by the finder of fact, the party moving for summary judgment is held to a strict standard.   The moving party must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.   A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case.   The burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact is on the party seeking summary judgment.   It is not enough for the moving party merely to assert the absence of any disputed factual issue;  the moving party is required to bring forward evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings to show the absence of any material dispute.   The party opposing summary judgment must present a factual predicate for his argument to raise a genuine issue of fact.   Once raised, if it is not conclusively refuted by the moving party, a genuine issue of fact exists, and summary judgment is inappropriate.”   Vollemans v. Wallingford, 103 Conn.App. 188, 193 (2007), affirmed 289 Conn. 57 (2008).

Plaintiff's opposition to this Motion relies exclusively on the affidavit of plaintiff's principal, Timothy Rohner, together with the documentation cited therein.   Based on the court's review of those materials, it finds no basis whatsoever for plaintiff's claims against MHA. In relation to the tortious interference claim, it appears that MHA did all it could to foster a successful contractual relationship between Tim–El and the other defendants, even after that relationship turned sour.   As far as the CUTPA claim is concerned, while the affidavit contains allegations that raise the possibility that MHA may have engaged in some deceptive behavior as it related to other defendants, there is no evidence whatsoever that Tim–El was harmed by that behavior and may, in fact, have been helped by it.

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the lack of any tortious interference or unfair and/or deceptive behavior on the part of MHA that resulted in harm to plaintiff.   As a result, defendants Mark DiOrio, Kenneth Urbanski and Military Housing Adjusters, LLC are entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law on all counts brought against them in this action.

James W. Abrams, Judge

Abrams, James W., J.