John Ruffin v. Leo Arnone et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANTS' MOTION # 118

On February 15, 2012, the plaintiff, John Ruffin (Ruffin), filed his complaint against the defendants, Leo Arnone, Timothy Burke, and the Connecticut attorney general's office.   Ruffin is claiming relief, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on the defendants' alleged violation of Ruffin's federal and state rights by:  (1) denying Ruffin access to the courts (no access to law library, legal assistance, or supplies) and causing him harm, (2) forcing him to choose between constitutionally protected rights (food, clothing, hygiene products, and legal supplies), and (3) developing and enforcing an unconstitutional indigent policy.   Ruffin brings these claims to remedy the alleged deprivation, under the color of state law, of rights guaranteed by the eight and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution.

In support of his claims for relief, Ruffin alleges the following facts:  He is a Connecticut inmate.   He was sued by the state of Connecticut, acting through Arnone, for the recovery of the costs of his incarceration (recovery action), pursuant to General Statutes § 18–85a et seq.   Ruffin's mother left a life insurance benefit to him, in the amount of $14,448.03.   The defendants had the entire sum frozen, until a hearing could be held.   Due to a lack of training in law, lack of funds to defend against the state's claim, lack of access to a law library, and lack of assistance from “Inmate Legal Assistance,” Ruffin was forced to settle.¹

Ruffin further alleges that he was forced to choose between constitutionally protected rights.   On April 15, 2011, Burke distributed a memo which stated that inmates will no longer be able to exchange socks, t-shirts, and underwear unless indigent.   Ruffin has a prison job which earns $10.50 bi-weekly, and Ruffin alleges that he is required to purchase, inter alia, hygiene supplies, medical supplies, clothing, and legal supplies.   In May 2011, the defendants denied several requests by Ruffin for supplies, including requests for pens, blank paper, envelopes, carbon paper, free postage, and access to a photocopier.   The requests were repeatedly denied because Ruffin was not indigent.   The defendants' indigent policy states that an inmate must have less than $5 in his prison account for ninety days.   On May 25, 2011, in response to the plaintiff's written complaint that he could not afford to pay for pens, paper, postage, photocopies, cosmetics, and food, Burke replied that Ruffin must purchase the items he needs by budgeting and spending his money according to his priorities.

On December 27, 2012, the defendants filed a motion to strike Ruffin's complaint, with an accompanying memorandum.   On January 15, 2013, Ruffin filed an objection to the motion to strike.   This matter was argued on March 27, 2013.

“The proper method to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint is to make a motion to strike prior to trial.”  Gulack v. Gulack, 30 Conn.App. 305, 309, 620 A.2d 181 (1993).   In addition, “Practice Book ․ § 10–39, allows for a claim for relief to be stricken only if the relief sought could not be legally awarded.”  Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 325, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998).  “It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 116–17, 19 A.3d 640 (2011).   A motion to strike “admits all facts well pleaded, it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).   In the end, “[i]f any facts provable under the express and implied allegations in the plaintiff's complaint support a cause of action ․ the complaint is not vulnerable to a motion to strike.”  Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991);  see also Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, 298 Conn. 124, 130, 2 A.3d 859 (2010) (motion must be denied where provable facts support a cause of action).

The defendants' memorandum in support of their motion to strike asks the court to strike the complaint on the following grounds:  (1) the claim is an impermissible collateral attack upon a settlement in another matter;  (2) Ruffin has failed to allege a claim upon which relief can be granted;  (3) the defendants are protected by qualified immunity;  and (4) Ruffin is not entitled to injunctive relief.

As to the first, third and fourth grounds in the memorandum, they are not fairly within the vague language of the motion to strike, which only cites that the complaint is legally insufficient.²  They will not be considered because the court should not consider grounds not set forth in the motion to strike.  Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 259, 765 A.2d 505 (2001).

As to the second ground, the defendants argue that, in regard to the constitutional right of access to the courts, meaningful access to the court is the touchstone, and inmate Ruffin must demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.   The defendants contend that Ruffin has not plead a legally sufficient claim because he failed to prove injury.   Specifically, the defendants argue that Ruffin has failed to show that a nonfrivolous claim has been frustrated or impeded due to their actions.   On the face of the motion to strike, the defendants are seeking to strike the entire complaint, which presumably includes all three “claims for relief.” ³

As to the defendants' ground regarding legal sufficiency, Ruffin contends that neither the library nor the “Inmate Legal Assistance Program” was available to him.   He argues that this constitutes a denial of access to the courts.   Ruffin also contends that he suffered injury because he could not properly defend the underlying case brought against him, and that he effectively lost about $7,224 after the settlement.

First claim—Right of access to the courts

The decisions of the United States Supreme Court have grounded the § 1983 right of access to courts in the article four privileges and immunities clause, the first amendment petition clause, the fifth amendment due process clause, and the fourteenth amendment equal protection and due process clauses to the United States constitution.  Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n.12, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 153 L.Ed.2d 413 (2002).  “To state a valid § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law, and (2) this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States ․ The United States Supreme Court recently restated that in any action under § 1983, the first step is to identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been violated ․ Therefore, the contours of the federal right of access to the courts must be examined.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Lombardi Rest Home, Inc. v. Richter, 63 Conn.App. 646, 653, 778 A.2d 230 (2001).  “It is well established that ‘prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts ․ [and that such access must be] adequate, effective and meaningful.’  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821–22, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977).”  Sadler v. Commissioner of Correction, 100 Conn.App. 659, 661, 918 A.2d 1033, cert. denied, 285 Conn. 901, 938 A.2d 593 (2007).

“[T]he fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Sadler v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 100 Conn.App. 661.  “Because Bounds did not create an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense ․ Insofar as the right vindicated by Bounds is concerned, meaningful access to the courts is the touchstone ․ and the inmate therefore must go one step further and demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996);  see also Lombardi Rest Home, Inc. v. Richter, supra, 63 Conn.App. 654 (“To establish a violation of the right to access the courts, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the alleged deprivation actually interfered with their access to the courts or prejudiced an existing action ․ In addition, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that an ‘actual injury’ resulted from the denial of access to the courts.”  [Citation omitted.] ).

“[T]he injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal claim.   Nearly all of the access-to-courts cases in the Bounds line involved attempts by inmates to pursue direct appeals from the convictions for which they were incarcerated ․ or habeas petitions ․ In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), we extended this universe of relevant claims only slightly, to civil rights actions-i.e., actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate basic constitutional rights.”   (Emphasis omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Lewis v. Casey, supra, 518 U.S. 354.

“Bounds does not [however] guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims.   The tools it requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement.   Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Sadler v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 100 Conn.App. 661.  “In other words, a prisoner has no constitutional right of access to the courts to litigate an unrelated civil claim.”  Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1160 (9th Cir.2003).

In regard to the present right of access claim, Ruffin is essentially alleging that the defendants interfered with his right to defend an action by denying him access to the law library, legal assistance, and supplies.   However, Bounds does not provide a right to law library access or legal assistance in every case.   The prior case merely sought to recoup the state's costs for incarcerating Ruffin.   It did not involve an attack by Ruffin on his conviction or the conditions of his confinement.   Under Lewis, the frustrated legal claim must be a nonfrivolous direct criminal appeal, habeas corpus proceeding, or civil rights challenge to conditions of confinement.⁴  Because the allegations here do not meet that test, Ruffin has failed to plead any violation of his constitutional right to meaningful court access.

Second claim for relief—Forcing the plaintiff to choose between protected rights

The crux of Ruffin's argument regarding his second claim for relief rests on allegations that he lacks sufficient funds to cover both the costs of litigation and personal hygiene products, medical supplies, food and clothing.   The allegation is not simply that the defendants are violating his eight amendment rights by flatly denying him access to certain personal products and items.   The claim is that Ruffin is forced to choose between the constitutionally protected right to personal hygiene products, medical supplies, food and clothing and the Bounds right of access to the courts.

“[T]he treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.”  Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993).   To prevail on an eighth amendment claim, an inmate must provide evidence showing that the prison officials failed to provide for “basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety.”  DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 200, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989);  see also Arey v. Warden, 187 Conn. 324, 328–29, 445 A.2d 916 (1982) (“[u]nquestioned and serious deprivations of basic human needs ․ and deprivation of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities ․ are obvious cases of eighth amendment violations”).   Humane conditions include the basic elements of hygiene.   See, e.g., Myers v. Hundley, 101 F.3d 542, 543–44 (8th Cir.1996);  Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1405–06 (10th Cir.1996).

“To demonstrate that the conditions of his confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the plaintiff must satisfy both an objective test and a subjective test.   First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the conditions of his confinement result in unquestioned and serious deprivations of basic human needs ․ Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants imposed those conditions with deliberate indifference.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 480 (2d Cir.1996);  see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).  “[T]o establish the objective element of an Eight Amendment claim, a prisoner must prove that the conditions of his confinement violate contemporary standards of decency.”  Phelps v. Kapnolas, 308 F.3d 180, 185 (2d Cir.2002).

Ruffin has an eight amendment right to humane conditions of confinement, and the right of access to the courts for the purpose of attacking one's conviction and/or challenging his conditions of confinement.   However, as previously discussed, Ruffin has not plead that access to the courts has been denied to him to attack his conviction or challenge the conditions of his confinement.   The impairment of his right to defend the recovery action is one of the incidental and perfectly constitutional consequences of conviction and incarceration.   Hence, Ruffin has not been forced to choose between two constitutionally protected rights, and his allegations are insufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted.⁵

iii. Third claim for relief—Unconstitutional indigent policy

Ruffin has also failed to allege facts that would establish that the indigent policy is unconstitutional.   Ruffin appears to claim that the indigent policy is unconstitutional because it forces him to choose between protected rights.   As set forth above, Ruffin has failed to plead a constitutional violation of his right to court access, and he has failed to plead that the indigent policy has forced him, or any other inmate, to choose between constitutionally protected rights.   The complaint does not allege that any other inmates were denied access to the courts nor specifically allege that Ruffin or any other inmates were deprived of basic human needs.

For all the forgoing reasons, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted.   The defendants' motion to strike is granted.

James T. Graham

Superior Court Judge

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The plaintiff does not mention the specific terms of the settlement in his complaint..  FN1. The plaintiff does not mention the specific terms of the settlement in his complaint.

FN2. Even that language is normally defective, as lacking the specificity required by Practice Book § 10–41, but that flaw may be waived by the plaintiff's failure, as here, to object to the form of the motion.   Stuart v. Freiberg, 102 Conn.App. 857, 861, 927 A.2d 343 (2007)..  FN2. Even that language is normally defective, as lacking the specificity required by Practice Book § 10–41, but that flaw may be waived by the plaintiff's failure, as here, to object to the form of the motion.   Stuart v. Freiberg, 102 Conn.App. 857, 861, 927 A.2d 343 (2007).

FN3. Paragraphs 22, 23 and 24 are listed below the heading “Claims for Relief.”   These paragraphs do not cite the types of relief sought.   Rather, they appear to set forth Ruffin's causes of action.   The relief sought by Ruffin is listed in a separate section, labeled “Requested Relief.”.  FN3. Paragraphs 22, 23 and 24 are listed below the heading “Claims for Relief.”   These paragraphs do not cite the types of relief sought.   Rather, they appear to set forth Ruffin's causes of action.   The relief sought by Ruffin is listed in a separate section, labeled “Requested Relief.”

FN4. Montanez v. Cuoco, 361 Fed.Appx. 291, 293–94 (2d Cir.2010), raises the question of whether active interference, such as a prison guard confiscating an inmate's legal paperwork, implicates the constitutional right to access.   There is no such allegation here..  FN4. Montanez v. Cuoco, 361 Fed.Appx. 291, 293–94 (2d Cir.2010), raises the question of whether active interference, such as a prison guard confiscating an inmate's legal paperwork, implicates the constitutional right to access.   There is no such allegation here.

FN5. Ruffin cites in his memorandum to Gluth v. Kangas, 951 F.2d 1504, 1508 (9th Cir.1991).   The Gluth decision preceded Lewis and is now inapposite to this issue..  FN5. Ruffin cites in his memorandum to Gluth v. Kangas, 951 F.2d 1504, 1508 (9th Cir.1991).   The Gluth decision preceded Lewis and is now inapposite to this issue.

Graham, James T., J.