Michael Arnett v. Kyle R. Vashalifski et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The defendants, Kyle R. Vashalifski and Elizabeth T. Vashalifski, move to strike the second and third counts of the complaint which purport to allege claims for damages for statutory recklessness, under General Statutes § 14–295, and common-law recklessness, respectively.

A motion to strike “admits all the facts well pleaded;  it does not admit conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleading.”   Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108 (1985).

The plaintiff's position is that in order to state a valid cause of action for statutory damages under § 14–295, a plaintiff need only recite that a reckless breach of any statute listed in § 14–295 has occurred.   That is, the plaintiff has no obligation to plead the underlying facts which support the legal conclusion of recklessness according to this argument.   The court disagrees with this proposition.

Before 1988, § 14–295 read in pertinent part as follows:

Each person, who, by neglecting to conform to any provisions of sections 14–230 to 14–242, inclusive, or section 14–245, or 14–247, causes any injury to the person or property of another, shall be liable to the party injured in double or treble damages if, in the discretion of the court in which any action is pending, double or treble damages are just, with the costs of such action.

By its terms, the former version of § 14–295, used a negligence standard to expose a defendant to liability for multiple damages if, within the discretion of the trial judge, such multiplication was warranted.   However, before 1985, a judicial gloss had burnished § 14–295 by restricting the imposition of multiple damages to cases where “the violation of the rules of the road has been deliberate or at least under conditions which indicate that the defendant was conducting himself with reckless disregard of the rights of others.”   Jack v. Scanlon, 4 Conn.App. 451, 455 (1985) (emphasis added).

In 1988, our legislature revamped § 14–295 to adopt, inter alia, this judicial gloss expressly.  “And the third thing the amendment does, it incorporates the language of the Supreme Court decision as the standard to be [deliberate] or with reckless disregard in order for treble damages to be awarded has to be the standard, not simple negligence,” 31 H.R. Proc., Pt. 11, 1988 Sess, p. 3684, Rep. Tulisano speaking.

Section 14–295 now explicitly confines the availability of multiple damages to cases where a plaintiff “has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of [certain statutory provisions] ․” (emphasis added).   The court refuses to regard this phrase as creating a shibboleth that is satisfied by the mere utterance of the word “reckless” in the pleadings.   Instead, the court construes “specifically pleaded” to encompass the normal rules of pleading set forth in Practice Book § 10–1.   That is, the plaintiff's allegations must go beyond a statement of legal conclusions, such as that a defendant violated a statute “recklessly,” and specify the material facts which establish the viability of that legal conclusion.

Section 14–295 makes available the possibility of double or treble damages against drivers who deliberately or recklessly violate enumerated motor vehicle laws.   This statute sets forth no new definition of recklessness different from the common law;  rather it “incorporates standards [for recklessness] that have long been recognized at common law.”  Bishop v. Kelly, 206 Conn. 608, 614 (1988).  Section 14–295 simply affords an additional remedy for those who are injured by the deliberate or reckless misconduct of others in violation of certain listed, statutory provisions.   It is still incumbent, however, upon a plaintiff, wishing to take advantage of the multiple damages provision of § 14–295, to plead a claim of reckless behavior properly by asserting those material facts which demonstrate the manner in which the specified motor vehicle laws were violated deliberately or recklessly.

Reckless misconduct implies a conscious disregard of a high risk, such as embarking on a particularly dangerous course of action after actual warning.   Id. 83–84.   Recklessness involves ignoring a perceived risk, Sheiman v. LaFayette Bank and Trust Co., 4 Conn.App. 39, 45 (1985);  or egregious conduct that includes an extreme departure from ordinary care and where danger is apparent, Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 533 (1988).   A reckless actor is one who recognizes a substantial risk of harm to others and consciously chooses to act despite such knowledge.  Mooney v. Wabrek, 129 Conn. 302, 308 (1942).   The essence of recklessness is the conscious choice to engage in dangerous behavior.

Because the second and third counts merely repeat the negligence claims of the first count, and lack any factual allegations supporting the legal conclusions of reckless operation, as recklessness is defined by the cases cited above, the motion to strike is granted as to both the second and third counts, Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79, 81–83 (1940).

Sferrazza, J.

Sferrazza, Samuel J., S.J.