LLC v. Town of Haddam et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This slander of title action involves the intersection of General Statutes § 12–117a, concerning appeals from tax assessments, and General Statutes § 12–175, which authorizes the filing of continuing tax liens.

The following facts are undisputed:  The plaintiff is the record owner of fourteen (14) vacant building lots in a residential subdivision in the town of Haddam.   The town of Haddam assessed these lots at values above what the plaintiff believed were fair and appropriate.   The plaintiff filed an appeal with the Superior Court for the judicial district of New Britain challenging the assessment for these properties.   The plaintiff paid 75 percent of the taxes claimed due by the town of Haddam as permitted by § 12–117a.   Although the plaintiff paid said 75 percent of the taxes due, thereafter the tax collector of the town of Haddam filed, in May of 2012, a “Certificate of Continuing Tax Lien for Not More Than Fifteen Years” (certificate of continuing tax lien) against the building lots pursuant to § 12–175.   Prior to filing the certificate of continuing tax lien, the tax collector sent a demand notice to the plaintiff.   The notice contains the following language “[y]our failure to pay this account within fifteen days will make it the duty of the [c]ollector to initiate proceedings as follows.”   The demand letter then listed the various actions that could be taken including levy on property, such as the sale of the real estate, demand upon banking institutions, and the garnishment of wages.   The only action taken by the tax collector, following the demand letter, was the filing of the certificate of continuing tax lien.   The tax appeal was resolved by stipulated judgment, and the tax collector of the town of Haddam has calculated the amount the plaintiff is required to pay for the taxes actually due and owing on said building lots.   In calculating the amount due, the tax collector of the town of Haddam imposed lien fees in the total amount of $336.   The plaintiff has paid all of the sums due to the tax collector of the town of Haddam and the town of Haddam has released all of the tax liens previously filed.

In its amended complaint for slander of title, the plaintiff alleges, “the [d]efendant [t]ax [c]ollector's recordation of tax liens against the properties owned by [the plaintiff] on which [the plaintiff] has paid the 75 [percent] tax required by [General Statutes] [§ ]12–117a constitutes a false statement as to the current tax obligations encumbering these properties.”   The plaintiff argues that because it paid 75 percent of the taxes due, pursuant to § 12–117a the town has no right to take any action regarding any claimed balance due, including filing a certificate of continuing tax lien.   The crux of the plaintiff's claim is that the tax collector had no right to file the certificate of continuing tax lien, thus it is a false statement constituting a slander of title.   The defendant maintains that the filing of a certificate of continuing tax lien pursuant to § 12–175 is not prohibited by § 12–117a.

“A cause of action for slander of title consists of the uttering or publication of a false statement derogatory to the plaintiff's title, with malice, causing special damages as a result of diminished value of the plaintiff's property in the eyes of third parties.   The publication must be false, and the plaintiff must have an estate or interest in the property slandered.   Pecuniary damages must be shown in order to prevail on such a claim.”  (Emphasis added;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gilbert v. Beaver Dam Assn. of Stratford, Inc., 85 Conn.App. 663, 672–73, 858 A.2d 860 (2004).

In order to determine whether the filing of the certificate of continuing tax lien under these circumstances constitutes a false statement, the court must first look to whether such filing is permitted under §§ 12–117a and 12–175.   This involves statutory construction.   As our Supreme Court has stated:  “When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature ․ In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1–2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.   If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered ․ The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.”   (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Regan v. Regan, 143 Conn.App. 113, 120 (2013).   Furthermore, “[a] court must construe a statute as written ․ The intent of the legislature, as [our Supreme Court] has repeatedly observed, is to be found not in what the legislature meant to say, but in the meaning of what it did say ․ [T]his court cannot, by judicial construction, read into legislation provisions that clearly are not contained therein.”  (Emphasis added;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 121.

The court concludes that the language of §§ 12–117a and 12–175 is plain and unambiguous.¹  Upon examining the text of § 12–117a as written, the court agrees with the plaintiff's position that the language of § 12–117a “clearly allows the [t]own to take action to collect real property taxes up to seventy-five percent of the tax claimed due” and also agrees with the defendant that “the act of filing a certificate of continuing lien is not an action to collect more than seventy-five ․ percent of the assessed tax in violation of § 12–117a.”   The court finds that the statute is not susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, and is therefore unambiguous.

The court further concludes that § 12–117a does not affect or prohibit the filing of a certification of continuing tax lien under § 12–175.   The court has based its conclusion upon the following considerations.   First, the plaintiff acknowledges that there appears to be no decided cases which support its position.   Second, § 12–117a does not mention liens filed under § 12–175.   If the legislature intended to suspend such lien filings when the partial payment provision of § 12–117a is utilized, they could have easily done so.   See Regan v. Regan, supra, 143 Conn. 121, quoting parenthetically Walter v. State, 63 Conn.App. 1, 8, 774 A.2d 1052 (“We are also mindful that [t]he court may not, by construction, supply omissions in a statute or add exceptions or qualifications, merely because it opines that good reason exists for so doing ․ In such a situation, the remedy lies not with the court but with the General Assembly.” [internal quotation marks omitted] ), cert. denied, 256 Conn. 930, 776 A.2d 1148 (2001).   Third, § 12–175 must be construed in relation to General Statutes § 12–172, which creates a tax lien.  Section 12–172 provides in relevant part that a tax lien “shall exist from the first day of October ․ in the year previous to that in which such tax ․ becomes due ․” Consequently, a tax lien is already in existence at time a party seeks the benefit of the partial payment provisions of § 12–117a.   The provisions of § 12–175 provide for the “continuance” of the tax lien for up to fifteen (15) years, however they do not provide for a collection or enforcement mechanism.   If a lien is not continued, it would lapse after two years from the date the taxes first become due and the town loses its priority rights and the right to foreclose.   See General Statutes §§ 12–172 and 12–181.

The court concludes that the filing of a certificate of continuing tax lien does not constitute an action to collect more that 75 percent of the taxes due in contravention of § 12–117a.   Although the demand letter indicated that certain actions that could contravene § 12–117a may be initiated, no such actions were initiated.   Because § 12–117a does not affect or prohibit the filing of a certificate of continuing tax lien under § 12–175, the filing of the certificate of continuing tax lien in this case does not constitute a false statement by the defendant.   Thus, the plaintiff has not sustained its burden regarding the false statement element of a cause of action for slander of title.   See Carroll v. Kasson Grove Property Owners Assn., Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 03 0091742 (August 17, 2007, Sheedy, J.).   Accordingly, judgment may enter for the defendant.

Domnarski, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Section 12–117a states in relevant part:  “The pendency of such application shall not suspend an action by such town or city to collect not more than seventy-five per cent of the tax so assessed or not more than ninety per cent of such tax with respect to any real property for which the assessed value is five hundred thousand dollars or more, and upon which such appeal is taken.”  Section 12–175 states in relevant part:  “In addition to the method of procuring the continuance of the lien provided in section 12–174, the tax collector of any municipality may continue any tax lien upon any item of real estate by making out a certificate containing the information requires by the provisions of section 12–173 ․”.  FN1. Section 12–117a states in relevant part:  “The pendency of such application shall not suspend an action by such town or city to collect not more than seventy-five per cent of the tax so assessed or not more than ninety per cent of such tax with respect to any real property for which the assessed value is five hundred thousand dollars or more, and upon which such appeal is taken.”  Section 12–175 states in relevant part:  “In addition to the method of procuring the continuance of the lien provided in section 12–174, the tax collector of any municipality may continue any tax lien upon any item of real estate by making out a certificate containing the information requires by the provisions of section 12–173 ․”

Domnarski, Edward S., J.