Luigi Osso v. Marc Automotive, Inc. et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS

The issue presented is whether the Court should grant the apportionment defendants' (Rashad and Greenburgh) motion to dismiss because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them.

FACTS

On April 12, 2013, the plaintiffs, Luigi and Maria Osso, filed a four-count complaint against the defendants, Marc Automotive, Inc. and Children's Center of Hamden, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as “Children's Center”).   The complaint alleges the following relevant facts.   Children's Center is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Connecticut that receives financial remuneration from the State in exchange for taking custody and assuming responsibility for the housing and safety of minor children.   Prior to April 20, 2010, Children's Center had assumed custody of a minor named Brian Michael Sabia.   Subsequent to their adoption of custody but prior to the events of April 20, 2010, Sabia left the Children's Center on at least four occasions;  on one such occasion, Sabia stole and wrecked a car from the lot of Marc Automotive, Inc. On April 20, 2010, Sabia walked away from the Children's Center for a fifth time, stole a car from Marc Automotive, Inc. and, while being pursued by the police in the village of Irvington, New York, crashed into and severely injured Luigi Osso. The plaintiffs claim that Children's Center's negligence resulted in injuries to Luigi Osso and loss of consortium to Maria Osso.

On August 21, 2012, Children's Center filed a five-count apportionment complaint pursuant to General Statutes §§ 52–572h and 52–102b against five parties:  Sabia;  Gianpaolo DiLisio;  Angela Rashad; ¹  the village of Elmsford, New York (hereinafter referred to as “Elmsford”);  and the town of Greenburgh, New York (hereinafter referred to as “Greenburgh”).   In this apportionment complaint, Children's Center alleged that Angela Rashad was a police officer for Greenburgh who was engaged in the police chase of Sabia on the night of the accident.   Children's Center claimed that, if the plaintiffs' injuries were the result of negligence, the injuries were caused in whole or in part by the negligence of Rashad by, inter alia, engaging in a high speed car chase with Sabia when it was not reasonably safe to do so and the negligence of Greenburgh by, inter alia, failing to properly train its officers about responding to emergency situations and high speed chases.

On October 17, 2012, Rashad and Greenburgh filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them.   They submitted a memorandum of law and two affidavits in support of their motion.   On March 13, 2013, Children's Center filed its memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss.   Although submitting no new evidence, Children's Center referenced its previous objection to two motions for protective order that it filed on November 8, 2012, and several unauthenticated exhibits submitted in conjunction with that memorandum.²

The Court heard the matter at short calendar on March 18, 2013.

DISCUSSION

“A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the Court is without jurisdiction.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 301 Conn. 759, 774, 23 A.3d 1192 (2012).  “Because a lack of personal jurisdiction may be waived by the defendant, the rules of practice require the defendant to challenge that jurisdiction by a motion to dismiss.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Golodner v. Women's Center of Southeastern Connecticut, Inc., 281 Conn. 819, 825, 917 A.2d 959 (2007).

“When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light ․ In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).  “In contrast, if the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss ․ other types of undisputed evidence ․ and/or public records of which judicial notice may be taken ․ the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint ․ Rather, those allegations are tempered by the light shed on them by the [supplementary undisputed facts] ․ If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant's motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits ․ or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings.”  (Citations omitted;  emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 651–52.

“[W]here a jurisdictional determination is dependent on the resolution of a critical factual dispute, it cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss in the absence of an evidentiary hearing to establish jurisdictional facts ․ Likewise, if the question of jurisdiction is intertwined with the merits of the case, a court cannot resolve the jurisdictional question without a hearing to evaluate those merits ․ An evidentiary hearing is necessary because a court cannot make a critical factual [jurisdictional] finding based on memoranda and documents submitted by the parties.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 652–53.   If a trial court “resolve[s] a critical fact on the basis of the complaint and the affidavits, both of which contained controverted facts ․ the court improperly decided the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing.”  Coughlin v. Waterbury, 61 Conn.App. 310, 315–16, 763 A.2d 1058 (2001).

In the present case, Rashad and Greenburgh argue that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction on two grounds.   First, they argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction over them pursuant to the applicable longarm statutes, General Statutes §§ 33–929 and 52–59b.   Second, Rashad and Greenburgh contend that due process would be violated if jurisdiction is extended to haul them into Connecticut Courts.

In response, Children's Center does not concretely address under which provisions of the longarm statutes it believes that this Court may assert jurisdiction;  rather, it argues that various facts gleaned from the pieces of evidence that it references in its objection suggest contractual relationships and other relationships between Greenburgh and nearby towns and agencies including Connecticut towns and agencies.   It then argues that this Court can authorize discovery for the purposes of determining its own jurisdiction, that discovery is ongoing and that it would be premature to address the question of whether the contacts are sufficient for the Court to assert continued jurisdiction over Rashad and Greenburgh.

“When a defendant files a motion to dismiss challenging the court's jurisdiction, a two part inquiry is required.   The trial court must first decide whether the applicable state long-arm statute authorizes the assertion of jurisdiction over the [defendant].   If the statutory requirements [are] met, its second obligation [is] then to decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the [defendant] would violate constitutional principles of due process.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd., 236 Conn. 602, 606, 674 A.2d 426 (1996).  “Only if [the court] find[s] the statute to be applicable do[es][it] reach the question whether it would offend due process to assert jurisdiction.”  Lombard Bros., Inc. v. General Asset Management Co., 190 Conn. 245, 250, 460 A.2d 481 (1983).  “If a challenge to the court's personal jurisdiction is raised by a defendant, either by a foreign corporation or by a nonresident individual, the plaintiff must bear the burden of proving the court's jurisdiction.”  Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd., supra, 607.

The longarm statute applicable to nonresident individuals is found within § 52–59b(a), which provides in relevant part:  “As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident individual ․ who in person or through an agent:  (1) Transacts any business within the state;  (2) commits a tortious act within the state ․ (3) commits a tortious act outside the state causing injury to person or property within the state ․ if such person or agent (A) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or (B) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce;  (4) owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state;  or (5) uses a computer, as defined in [General Statutes § 53–451(a)(1) ], or a computer network, as defined in [§ 53–451(a)(3) ], located within the state.”

“In analyzing jurisdiction under General Statutes § 52–59b, Connecticut courts often follow judicial interpretation given to New York Civil Practice Law § 302, which was used by the legislature as a model for Connecticut's long arm statute.”   Schembri v. Physicians for Women, P.C., Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV 323672 (May 19, 1997, Stodolink, J.) (19 Conn. L. Rptr. 465, 467), citing Zartolas v. Nisenfeld, 184 Conn. 471, 474, 440 A.2d 179 (1981).  “Under New York's C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3), [t]he situs of the injury is the location of the original event which caused the injury, not the location where the resultant damages are subsequently felt by the plaintiff.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id.

The longarm statute applicable to foreign corporations, § 33–929(f), provides in relevant part:  “Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state, by a resident of this state or by a person having a usual place of business in this state, whether or not such foreign corporation is transacting or has transacted business in this state and whether or not it is engaged exclusively in interstate or foreign commerce, on any cause of action arising as follows:  (1) Out of any contract made in this state or to be performed in this state;  (2) out of any business solicited in this state by mail or otherwise if the corporation has repeatedly so solicited business, whether the orders or offers relating thereto were accepted within or without the state;  (3) out of the production, manufacture or distribution of goods by such corporation with the reasonable expectation that such goods are to be used or consumed in this state and are so used or consumed, regardless of how or where the goods were produced, manufactured, marketed or sold or whether or not through the medium of independent contractors or dealers;  or (4) out of tortious conduct in this state, whether arising out of repeated activity or single acts, and whether arising out of misfeasance or nonfeasance.”   The General Statutes define “foreign corporation” in this context broadly;  see General Statutes § 33–602(15) (defining “foreign corporation” as “a corporation incorporated under a law other than the law of this state”);  and at least one prior decision of the Superior Court has applied this longarm statute to a foreign municipality.   See Santa Buckley Energy, Inc. v. Arlington, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 12 6027767 (October 31, 2012, Gilardi, J.T.R.) [55 Conn. L. Rptr. 44].

“Section 33–929 (f)(4) ․ requires that the alleged tortious conduct be committed within Connecticut for jurisdiction to exist ․ It is not enough that the consequences of the defendants' acts impact a plaintiff in Connecticut;  the tortious conduct must be directly and expressly targeted at the forum state to support jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.”   (Citations omitted.)   Swain v. American Capital Strategies, Ltd., Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Middletown, Docket No. X04 CV 03 0103924 (August 4, 2004, Quinn, J.).

In the present case, Rashad and Greenburgh have each submitted an affidavit in support of their motion to dismiss.³  In her signed and sworn affidavit, Rashad attests to the following facts.   Rashad has been a resident of New York for the last thirty-seven years and has served as a police officer for Greenburgh since January 6, 2003.   She does not, nor did she during the period of time at issue here, transact business, solicit business, engage in any persistent course of conduct or derive substantial revenue from goods or services utilized in Connecticut, nor has she committed tortious behavior within Connecticut at any time relevant to the present matter.   She does not own, use, lease or possess real property located in Connecticut nor has she used an applicable computer or computer network located within Connecticut.   The high speed chase at issue took place entirely within New York and at no time did the police chase enter Connecticut.   Further, all training and supervision that Rashad has received in her capacity as a police officer for Greenburgh was within New York;  no part of either occurred in Connecticut.   Bart Talamini, the controller for Greenburgh, submitted a signed and sworn affidavit testifying as to the following relevant facts.   Greenburgh is a municipal corporation located in New York and existing pursuant to its laws.   Greenburgh does not nor has it had during the period of time at issue here offices, facilities or real property within Connecticut.   Similarly, it does not nor did it during the period of time at issue here regularly transact or do business in Connecticut, solicit any business in Connecticut, engage in any other persistent course of conduct vis-a-vis Connecticut, derive substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in Connecticut or produce, manufacture or distribute goods to be sold, used or consumed in Connecticut.   Like Rashad, Talamini attests that all parts of the high speed chase took place in New York. Finally, all decisions regarding the training and supervision of Greenburgh's police officers were made in New York as were all decisions pertaining to its enactment and enforcement of its policies.

To demonstrate the town's extrajurisdictional ties, Children's Center points to the fact that both New York and Connecticut are signatories to the Interstate Compact of Parole and Probation Supervision, which focuses on ensuring cooperation in the transfer of criminals between states.   Children's Center has also submitted Rashad's incident report concerning the incidents at the center of this dispute.   After the cessation of the high speed chase and the resulting accident, Rashad notes that she approached Sabia's car and that he explained that he had stolen the car from Connecticut.   She further notes that “a subsequent check of the [stolen vehicle's] VIN ․ through NYSPIN revealed that the vehicle had in fact a File 1 from Milford, Connecticut.”   Finally, Children's Center points to a resolution by Greenburgh to adopt USI Insurance Services of Connecticut, Inc., as its only authorized insurance representative.

As it is undisputed that Rashad is a resident of the State of New York, the Court must find that she is subject to the Court's jurisdiction pursuant to at least one provision of § 52–59b(a) to sustain Children's Center's objection.   All allegations levied by Children's Center's apportionment complaint at Rashad concern her alleged negligence or other misconduct in the high speed pursuit of Sabia.   There are no allegations within the complaint that any of her actions while engaged in this high speed pursuit occurred in Connecticut;  indeed, as Rashad attests in her affidavit and Children's Center does not attempt to refute, the high speed chase at issue took place entirely within the State of New York and at no times did Rashad enter the State of Connecticut.   Subdivisions (1) and (2) of § 52–59b therefore provide no basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over Rashad.⁴  Further, subdivision (3) fails to provide such a basis as there is neither any allegation or fact in the record to indicate that her participation in such high speed chases constitute a “persistent course of conduct” for Rashad nor do the allegations underlying Children's Center's claims against her involve any act that can be reasonably construed as the solicitation of business or the derivation of substantial revenue from goods or services within this state, interstate commerce or international commerce.

Finally, Rashad has attested that she owns no real property in Connecticut nor has she used a computer or computer network located within this state.   The only time that Children's Center has demonstrated that Rashad used a computer network was when she accessed NYSPIN subsequent to the high speed chase and discovered the connection between Sabia's stolen car and Connecticut.   Children's Center has not provided any allegation or evidence suggesting that the computer or computer network is located in Connecticut.   As there are no facts in the record to contradict Rashad's statements, subdivisions (4) and (5) also do not provide a basis for jurisdiction.   Therefore, there is no basis under § 52–59b(a) for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over Rashad.

Turning to the allegations against Greenburgh, Talamini attests that Greenburgh is a municipal corporation created under New York law and existing within New York. See also N.Y. TOWN LAW § 2 (McKinley 2004) (“[a] town is a municipal corporation comprising the inhabitants within its boundaries ․”).  Thus, to exercise jurisdiction over Greenburgh, the Court must find that it is subject to the longarm provisions of § 33–929(f).

Like those allegations by Children's Center against Rashad, all of Children's Center allegations against Greenburgh concern the latter's tortious behavior—specifically, Greenburgh's purported failure, inter alia, to train properly and to supervise adequately its officers in addressing situations such as the high speed chase here and to enact and enforce policies to prevent its officers from engaging in such high speed chases.   On the face of these allegations and without any factual basis for finding a connection between them and any contracts made or to be performed in Connecticut, any solicitation of business in Connecticut or any production, manufacture or distribution of goods in Connecticut by Greenburgh, subdivisions (1), (2) and (3) of § 33–929(f) do not apply.   Talimini's affidavit further notes that the entirety of the high speed chase took place in New York, the police never entered Connecticut during the chase and that all aspects of its training and supervision of its officers and its enactment and enforcement of its policies have occurred in New York. As no evidence submitted by Children's Center includes or suggests facts to the contrary, there is no basis under subdivision (4) for finding that Greenburgh committed a tortious act within Connecticut.   It is therefore submitted that there is no basis under § 33–929(f) for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over Greenburgh.

The arguments of Children's Center in opposition are unavailing for two reasons.   To begin, many of its arguments concerning personal jurisdiction focus on aspects of the due process analysis.   The Court does not reach those considerations, however, unless it first finds that a defendant's activities bring it within the longarm statute.   This is true even if constitutional due process would not be offended by the exercise of jurisdiction.   See Bennett v. Performance Racing & Marine, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 98 0417998 (January 27, 1999, Silbert, J.) (“[i]f the conduct of a foreign corporation does not fit within the terms of § 33–929(f), the courts of this state do not have personal jurisdiction over that corporation, even though jurisdiction would otherwise be conferred under the federal due process clause of the U.S. [C]onstitution”).

Turning to the primary argument raised in its objection, Children's Center contends that dismissal would be inappropriate here as “the pertinent facts are in dispute, no such opportunity [to perform jurisdictional discovery] has been provided, and without more the [c]ourt has jurisdiction at least to allow discovery.”   Children's Center's Omnibus Opposition to Apportionment Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (# 167), p. 10.   Rashad and Greenburgh have not addressed this argument either preemptively in their motion to dismiss or in any pleading submitted subsequent to Children's Center's objection.

“The granting or denial of a discovery request rests in the sound discretion of the court” (internal quotation marks omitted);  Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 57, 459 A.2d 503 (1983);  though this discretion is limited by the Practice Book's rules on discovery.   See id., 57–60, citing Practice Book §§ 217 through 221 (now §§ 13–2 through 13–5).

Children's Center's situation is distinguishable from the case upon which it primarily relies, Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy.   There, “the [Supreme] Court held that when issues of fact are necessary to the determination of a court's jurisdiction, due process requires that a trial-like hearing be held, in which an opportunity is provided to present evidence and to cross-examine adverse witnesses ․ In that case, the trial court refused to postpone a hearing on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction to permit pre-hearing discovery on acknowledged issues of jurisdiction fact.   The Supreme Court ruled that, because the trial court had already recognized that a factual presentation was necessary, it was an abuse of discretion to deny the plaintiff any opportunity for discovery.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Cece–York v. Saturn of Stamford, Inc., Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Stamford, Docket No. X08 CV 09 5012420 (September 22, 2010, Jennings, J.T.R.), citing Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, supra, 190 Conn. 56, 60.

As the Court noted in Cece–York v. Saturn of Stamford, Inc., however, “Standard Tallow did not change the general rule that [s]hould the court find the affidavits and supporting memoranda to be sufficient, the court need not conduct an evidentiary hearing ․ or the rule that if affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant's motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counter affidavits ․ or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings ․” (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Cece–York v. Saturn of Stamford, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. X08 CV 09 5012420 (September 22, 2010, Jennings, J.T.R.), citing Hagar v. Zaidman, 797 F.Sup. 132, 134 (D.Conn.1992), and Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportion, 293 Conn. 342, 348, 977 A.2d 636 (2009).

In the present case, Children's Center, like the plaintiff in Cece–York v. Saturn of Stamford, Inc.,”has not pled allegations that raise jurisdictional issues of fact and the evidence before the court is sufficient to determine whether the court has jurisdiction over each of the individual [apportionment defendants] to this [m]otion to [d]ismiss.”  Cece–York v. Saturn of Stamford, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. X08 CV 09 5012420.   Their original pleadings note only the negligence of Rashad, inter alia, for her behavior during the high speed chase and Greenburgh, inter alia, for its training and supervision;  no allegation, however, can be reasonably construed to potentially place these acts or any part thereof within this state.   Additionally, none of the evidence submitted by Children's Center suggests any act by the apportionment defendants tying their past behavior in related matters or in the present one to Connecticut such that further discovery would prove useful.   Even if prior evidentiary rulings have foreclosed the ability of Children's Center to pursue discovery directly from the apportionment defendants, Children's Center has neither submitted nor noted any attempt to acquire any competing affidavits or certified evidence from other persons not covered by the protective orders.   Finally, an examination of the allegations in the complaint and the apportionment complaint as tempered by the undisputed facts of record demonstrates that no material fact is in dispute, thus making an evidentiary hearing unnecessary in the present matter.   See Weihing v. Dodsworth, 100 Conn.App. 29, 38, 917 A.2d 53 (2007) (“the due process requirement of a hearing is required only when issues of facts are disputed” [emphasis in original] ).   Thus, this basis will not protect the apportionment claims of Children's Center from the present motion to dismiss.

As the Court can find that there is no basis under the applicable longarm statutes to exercise jurisdiction over Rashad and Greenburgh, the Court does not have to address the second prong concerning due process.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted.

BY IANNOTTI, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The apportionment complaint and various other pleadings frequently refer to Rashad as “Angela Rashad a/k/a Angela Riley.”   To guarantee consistency, any references within this memorandum will refer to her solely as “Angela Rashad.”.  FN1. The apportionment complaint and various other pleadings frequently refer to Rashad as “Angela Rashad a/k/a Angela Riley.”   To guarantee consistency, any references within this memorandum will refer to her solely as “Angela Rashad.”

FN2. Specifically, these exhibits include:  portions of the DMA 2000 Hazard Mitigation Plan—Greater Greenburgh Planning Area, New York (Exhibit [Ex.] A), the home page from the Greenburgh police department's website (Ex. B);  a portion of the Facebook page for the Greenburgh drug and alcohol task force (Ex. C);  a portion of the New York state SCIP implementation report (Ex. D);  a web page concerning stolen cars from the Elmsford police department's website (Ex. E);  a web page on accreditation from the Elmsford police department's website (Ex. F);  a portion of the Blueprint for Effective Law Enforcement (Ex. G);  a portion of Standard 43.4, entitled “Vehicle Pursuits,” from the New York state law enforcement accreditation program's Standards and Compliance Verification Manual (Ex. H);  a directory of offices for states participating in the Interstate Compact for Parole and Probation Supervision (Ex. I);  the April 22, 2010 police report produced by Rashad (Ex. J), the October 27, 2011 resolution by town board of Greenburgh to retain USI Insurance Services of Connecticut, Inc. (Ex. K);  and copies of notices of deposition sent to Greenburgh and Elmsford (Ex. L).None of these exhibits are accompanied by an affidavit authenticating their contents.   Before the Court may admit documentary evidence, “there must be a preliminary showing of its genuineness, i.e., that the proffered item of evidence is what its proponent claims it to be.”   Conn.Code Evid. § 9–1(a), commentary.   Notwithstanding this rule, Courts have the discretion to consider unauthenticated documentary evidence when there is no objection.   See Barlow v. Palmer, 96 Conn.App. 88, 92, 898 A.2d 835 (2006)..  FN2. Specifically, these exhibits include:  portions of the DMA 2000 Hazard Mitigation Plan—Greater Greenburgh Planning Area, New York (Exhibit [Ex.] A), the home page from the Greenburgh police department's website (Ex. B);  a portion of the Facebook page for the Greenburgh drug and alcohol task force (Ex. C);  a portion of the New York state SCIP implementation report (Ex. D);  a web page concerning stolen cars from the Elmsford police department's website (Ex. E);  a web page on accreditation from the Elmsford police department's website (Ex. F);  a portion of the Blueprint for Effective Law Enforcement (Ex. G);  a portion of Standard 43.4, entitled “Vehicle Pursuits,” from the New York state law enforcement accreditation program's Standards and Compliance Verification Manual (Ex. H);  a directory of offices for states participating in the Interstate Compact for Parole and Probation Supervision (Ex. I);  the April 22, 2010 police report produced by Rashad (Ex. J), the October 27, 2011 resolution by town board of Greenburgh to retain USI Insurance Services of Connecticut, Inc. (Ex. K);  and copies of notices of deposition sent to Greenburgh and Elmsford (Ex. L).None of these exhibits are accompanied by an affidavit authenticating their contents.   Before the Court may admit documentary evidence, “there must be a preliminary showing of its genuineness, i.e., that the proffered item of evidence is what its proponent claims it to be.”   Conn.Code Evid. § 9–1(a), commentary.   Notwithstanding this rule, Courts have the discretion to consider unauthenticated documentary evidence when there is no objection.   See Barlow v. Palmer, 96 Conn.App. 88, 92, 898 A.2d 835 (2006).

FN3. The Court should not consider Rashad's and Talamini's affidavits to the extent that information within them consists of unsupported legal conclusions.  “[A] party's conclusory statements, in the affidavit and elsewhere ․ do not constitute evidence sufficient to establish the existence of disputed material facts.”  Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn 574, 583, 687 A.2d 111 (1996)..  FN3. The Court should not consider Rashad's and Talamini's affidavits to the extent that information within them consists of unsupported legal conclusions.  “[A] party's conclusory statements, in the affidavit and elsewhere ․ do not constitute evidence sufficient to establish the existence of disputed material facts.”  Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn 574, 583, 687 A.2d 111 (1996).

FN4. Children's Center attempts to portray Rashad's actions, as well as the actions of the other apportionment defendants, as being “engaged in the business of law enforcement, particularly the recovery of stolen vehicles.”   Children's Center's Onmibus Opposition to Apportionment Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (# 167), p. 13.   All of its allegations against Rashad, however, relate to various acts of perceived misconduct in the high speed chase that ultimately lead to the Ossos' injuries.   Therefore, authorizing jurisdiction under subdivision (1) would be inappropriate for the additional reason that Children's Center has not pointed to any action by Rashad that could reasonably be construed as “transacting business.”  Boone v. William W. Backus Hospital, 272 Conn. 551, 559, 864 A.2d 1 (2005) (“[t]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court”)..  FN4. Children's Center attempts to portray Rashad's actions, as well as the actions of the other apportionment defendants, as being “engaged in the business of law enforcement, particularly the recovery of stolen vehicles.”   Children's Center's Onmibus Opposition to Apportionment Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (# 167), p. 13.   All of its allegations against Rashad, however, relate to various acts of perceived misconduct in the high speed chase that ultimately lead to the Ossos' injuries.   Therefore, authorizing jurisdiction under subdivision (1) would be inappropriate for the additional reason that Children's Center has not pointed to any action by Rashad that could reasonably be construed as “transacting business.”  Boone v. William W. Backus Hospital, 272 Conn. 551, 559, 864 A.2d 1 (2005) (“[t]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court”).

Iannotti, Frank A., J.