Samuel Winston v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

STATEMENT OF CASE

This is a statutory appeal from Samuel H. Winston [hereinafter plaintiff] to the Superior Court pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 31–249b ¹ concerning unemployment compensation.   Plaintiff has appealed the decision of the Employment Security Appeals Division Board of Review [hereinafter board] affirming the appeals referee's decision to affirm the administrator's denial of unemployment benefits.   For the reasons stated herein, the court upholds the decision of the board and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

FACTS

The record discloses the following facts.   By a decision issued on October 6, 2011, the administrator ruled the plaintiff disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits effective August 14, 2011.   Specifically, the administrator found that the plaintiff voluntarily left suitable employment due to the loss of his personally owned vehicle, and was therefore ineligible for unemployment benefits.   On October 14, 2011, the plaintiff filed a timely appeal from the administrator's determination to the appeals referee.   The appeals referee conducted a hearing de novo on November 10, 2011, made findings of fact, and ruled that the plaintiff voluntarily left suitable employment due to the loss of his personally owned vehicle, thus affirming the administrator's determination of unemployment benefit ineligibility.   On November 30, 2011, the plaintiff filed a timely appeal from the appeals referee's determination to the board of review.   The board adopted the referee's findings of fact with modification.

The appeals referee made the following findings of fact.   The plaintiff worked for the subject employer as a cashier from April 15, 2011 to August 20, 2011, earning $9.00 per hour.   The plaintiff left his job because of the loss of use of his personally owned vehicle.   Specifically, the head gasket on the plaintiff's automobile needed replacement at a cost of approximately $1,800.00.   The plaintiff lacked the funds to repair his car.   The plaintiff obtained rides to work for a few weeks before leaving his job, however, the plaintiff was unable to secure rides to work on a long-term basis.   The employer is not on the bus route and taxi service was cost prohibitive.   The board adopted the referee's findings of fact and decision, but substituted August 20, 2011 for September 10, 2011 in finding of fact no. 1. Record, p. 32.   The board also added the following to finding of fact no.   4:  “The claimant's car broke down sometime in August.   He was able to secure a ride from a friend for a ‘couple days' after his car broke down, but his friend could not continue to give him a ride because it was out of his way.”   Record, p. 32.   The board also substituted “ten” for “ten/six” and “his” for “his/her” in the referee's Disposition and Order.   Record, p. 32.   The board and appeals referee further found that the plaintiff left suitable employment due to the loss of his personally owned vehicle used to get to and from work;  it would have cost the plaintiff approximately $1,800.00 to repair his vehicle;  he lacked the funds needed to make the necessary repairs;  and the plaintiff explored alternatives prior to leaving the job.   The board and appeals referee concluded that the statutory exception under the law does not provide for eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits to an individual who has left suitable employment due to the loss of his personally owned vehicle.   Based on the record the board affirmed the referee's decision on February 20, 2012.   The plaintiff filed a timely appeal to the Superior Court on March 12, 2012.  General Statutes § 31–249b.   The court heard argument on the appeal on May 6, 2013.

DISCUSSION

“In the processing of unemployment claims ․ the administrator, the referee and the employment security board of review decide the facts and then apply the appropriate law ․ [The administrator] is charged with the initial responsibility of determining whether claimants are entitled to unemployment benefits.  [See generally] General Statutes § 31–241 ․ This initial determination becomes final unless the claimant or the employer files an appeal within twenty-one days after notification of the determination is mailed.   [General Statutes § 31–241(a) ].   Appeals are taken to the employment security appeals division which consists of a referee section and the board of review.  [See] General Statutes §§ 31–237a, 31–237b ․ The first stage of claims review lies with a referee who hears the claims de novo.   The referee's function in conducting this hearing is to make inquiry in such manner, through oral testimony or written and printed records, as is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and carry out justly the provisions ․ of the law.  General Statutes § 31–244.   Such appeals are heard on the record of the hearing before the referee although the board may take additional evidence or testimony if justice so requires.   Any party, including the administrator, may thereafter continue the appellate process by appealing to the Superior Court and, ultimately, to [the Appellate and Supreme Courts].”  Ray v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 133 Conn.App. 527, 531, 533–34, 36 A.3d 269, 269 (2012).

The court's standard of review in an unemployment compensation appeal is limited.   The court in hearing this appeal does not hear the case de novo.  “In an appeal to the court from a decision of the board, the court is not to find facts.”  Id., 533.  “The court may not substitute its conclusions for those of the board.”  Id., 534.

“To the extent that an administrative appeal, pursuant to General Statutes § 31–249b, concerns findings of fact, a court is limited to a review of the record certified and filed by the Board of review.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Latina v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 54 Conn.App. 154, 159, 733 A.2d 885 (1999).  “The court must not retry the facts nor hear evidence ․ If, however, the issue is one of law, the court has the broader responsibility of determining whether the administrative action resulted from an incorrect application of the law to the facts found or could not reasonably or logically have followed from such facts.   Although the court may not substitute its own conclusions for those of the administrative board, it retains the ultimate obligation to determine whether the administrative action was unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal, or an abuse of discretion.”  United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 209 Conn. 381, 385–86, 551 A.2d 724 (1988).

“[A]ppeals from the board to the Superior Court are specifically exempted from governance by General Statutes § 4–166, et seq., the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. All appeals from the board to the court are controlled by General Statutes § 31–249b.  Section 31–249b specifically provides that any finding of the board ‘shall be subject to correction only to the extent provided by section 519 [now § 22–9] of the Connecticut Practice Book ․’ Practice Book § 519(a) specifies that the trial court ‘does not retry the facts or hear evidence.   It considers no evidence other than that certified to it by the board, and then for the limited purpose of determining whether ․ there was any evidence to support in law the conclusion reached.  [The court] cannot review the conclusions of the board when these depend upon the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses ․’ Practice Book § 515A [now § 22–4] provides the mechanism for the correction of the board's findings.   If the appellant desires that the findings be corrected, the appellant must, within two weeks of the filing of the record in the Superior Court, file with the board a motion for correction of the findings ․ [A] motion for correction is a necessary prerequisite to a challenge to the board's decision.   Because the plaintiff failed to comply with that prerequisite, he cannot challenge the board's findings on appeal to the Superior Court ․

“Our Supreme Court ratified this precedent in JSF v. Promotions, Inc. v Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 265 Conn. 413, 422, 828 A.2d 609 (2003), concluding that a plaintiff's ‘failure to file a timely motion for correction of the board's findings in accordance with [Practice Book] § 22–4 prevents further review of those facts found by the board ․’ “ Shah v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 114 Conn.App. 175–76, 968 A.2d 971 (2009).  Practice Book § 22–4 “provides the mechanism for the correction of the board's findings [and a timely motion to correct has been held to be] “a necessary prerequisite to a challenge to the board's decision.”  Shah, supra, 114 Conn.App. 175.   The absence of such a motion to correct “prevents further review of those facts found by the board ․ and is determinative of the appeal.”  Id., 176.

The record reflects that the plaintiff in the present case did not file a motion to correct the board's findings.   Therefore, the plaintiff cannot challenge the factual findings, which findings are now conclusive.  Shah, supra, 114 Conn.App. 175–76.   Based on the plaintiff's failure to file a motion to correct, this court's review is limited “to determine, on the record, whether there is a logical and rational basis for the decision of the [board] or whether, in the light of the evidence, [the board] has acted illegally or in the abuse of [its] discretion.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Calnan v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 43 Conn. 779, 785, 686 A.2d 134 (1996).

This appeal is governed by General Statutes § 31–236(a)(2)(A), which provides in relevant part that an individual is ineligible for benefits, “[i]f, in the opinion of the administrator, the individual has left suitable work voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer, until such individual has earned at least ten times such individual's benefit rate ․” General Statutes § 31–236(a)(2)(A)(iii) further provides in relevant part that “no individual shall be ineligible for benefits if the individual leaves suitable work ․ due to the discontinuance of transportation, other than the individual's personally owned vehicle used to get to and from work, provided no reasonable alternative transportation is available.”  (Emphasis added.)   See also Regs. Conn. State Agencies, § 31–236–17(b)(3).  “An individual leaves suitable work ‘for [good] cause’ within the meaning of the statute, when he leaves employment “for reasons which would impel the ordinary reasonable person to leave and which provide the individual with no reasonable alternative but to terminate his employment.   As a matter of law, therefore, a claimant must show that his basis for leaving employment is objectively reasonable and that no reasonable alternative to termination exists.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Acro Technology, Inc. v. Administrator, 25 Conn.App. 130, 135, 593 A.2d 154, 157 (1991).   A plaintiff is disqualified if he voluntarily left suitable work without good cause attributable to the employer.

Here, based on the record, it was reasonable for the board to conclude that the plaintiff voluntarily left suitable work without good cause attributable to his employer.  Connecticut General Statutes § 31–236(a)(2)(A)(iii) specifically provides that the loss of the individual's personally owned vehicle used to get to and from work does not qualify as good cause.   Therefore based on the record, the board appropriately concluded that the plaintiff is disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to the statute.

CONCLUSION

The board's ruling is reasonable and consistent with the applicable statute, regulations and case law, as the record supports it's finding that the plaintiff voluntarily left suitable employment without good cause attributable to his employer.   Accordingly, the board's decision to affirm the referee's decision and dismiss the plaintiff's appeal is supported by the record, consistent with the law, and was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or illegal.   The court therefore affirms the board's decision and dismisses the plaintiff's appeal.

Wilson, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. General Statutes § 31–249b provides in relevant part:  “At any time before the board's decision has become final, any party, including the administrator, may appeal such decision, including any claim that the decision violates statutory or constitutional provisions, to the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford or for the judicial district wherein the appellant resides ․”.  FN1. General Statutes § 31–249b provides in relevant part:  “At any time before the board's decision has become final, any party, including the administrator, may appeal such decision, including any claim that the decision violates statutory or constitutional provisions, to the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford or for the judicial district wherein the appellant resides ․”

Wilson, Robin L., J.