Carmen Lopez et al. v. Brideport Board of Education et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

I

BACKGROUND

On May 8, 2013, the plaintiffs, Carmen Lopez, a voter and taxpaying resident of the city of Bridgeport, and Deborah Reyes–Williams, a voter and taxpaying resident of the city of Bridgeport and the mother of four minor children currently enrolled in Bridgeport public schools, filed a one-count amended complaint in the nature of quo warranto, an action used to oust a public officer from office, in which they allege that the defendant, Paul Vallas, the acting superintendent of Bridgeport public schools, does not hold valid title to his office.¹  A bench trial was held on June 24 and 25 of 2013, during which the court took testimony from four witnesses:  Vallas, Stefan Pryor, the Commissioner of Education, Dr. Robert Villanova, Director of the Executive Leadership Program at the University of Connecticut Neag School of Education and Tom DeFranco, the Dean of the Neag School of Education.   The parties also submitted numerous exhibits into evidence.   Counsel for the parties presented closing argument on June 25, 2013.

II

FACTS

Vallas came to Connecticut in December of 2011 to assess and evaluate the City of Bridgeport public school system, at the invitation of his friend and colleague Stefan Pryor, the newly appointed Commissioner of Education for the State of Connecticut.   Before his arrival, Vallas served as a school teacher in the 1970s and later was an instructor at a military academy run by the United States National Guard.   Following that, he spent time in state and city government in Illinois.   He also previously served as the chief executive officer of Chicago public schools, the chief executive officer of Philadelphia public schools and as a superintendent in Louisiana.

The applicable statute at the time, General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 10–157, effective June 3, 2011 to June 30, 2012, set forth the following requirements for Connecticut school superintendents:

(a) Any local or regional board of education shall provide for the supervision of the schools under its control by a superintendent who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the board.   The superintendent shall have executive authority over the school system and the responsibility for its supervision.   Employment of a superintendent shall be by election of the board of education.   Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no person shall assume the duties and responsibilities of the superintendent until the board receives written confirmation from the Commissioner of Education that the person to be employed is properly certified or has had such certification waived by the commissioner pursuant to subsection (c) of this section.   The commissioner shall inform any such board, in writing, of the proper certification, waiver of certification or lack of certification or waiver of any such person not later than fourteen days after the name of such person is submitted to the commissioner pursuant to section 10–226.   A majority vote of all members of the board shall be necessary to an election, and the board shall fix the salary of the superintendent and the term of office, which shall not exceed three years.   Upon election and notification of employment or reemployment, the superintendent may request and the board shall provide a written contract of employment which includes, but is not limited to, the salary, employment benefits and term of office of such superintendent.   Such superintendent shall, at least three weeks before the annual town or regional school district meeting, submit to the board a full written report of the proceedings of such board and of the condition of the several schools during the school year preceding, with plans and suggestions for their improvement.   The board of education shall evaluate the performance of the superintendent annually in accordance with guidelines and criteria mutually determined and agreed to by such board and such superintendent.

(b) A local or regional board of education may appoint as acting superintendent a person who is or is not properly certified for a specified period of time, not to exceed ninety days, with the approval of the Commissioner of Education.   Such acting superintendent shall assume all duties of the superintendent for the time specified, provided such period of time may be extended with the approval of the commissioner, which he shall grant for good cause shown.

(c) The commissioner may, upon request of an employing local or regional board of education, grant a waiver of certification to a person (1) who has successfully completed at least three years of experience as a certified administrator with a superintendent certificate issued by another state in a public school in another state during the ten-year period prior to the date of application, or (2) who the commissioner deems to be exceptionally qualified for the position of superintendent.   In order for the commissioner to find a person exceptionally qualified, such person shall (A) be an acting superintendent pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, (B) have worked as a superintendent in another state for no fewer than fifteen years, and (C) be certified or have been certified as a superintendent by such other state.

Vallas, who had never taken any graduate courses in education and who was not certified as a superintendent in Connecticut, was introduced by Pryor to Robert Trefry, the then Chairman of the Bridgeport Board of Education.   Thereafter, on December 16, 2011, Trefry sent two separate letters to Pryor pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 10–157(b), one asking Pryor to appoint Vallas as acting superintendent for ninety (90) days commencing on January 1, 2012, and the other requesting a nine-month appointment running from April 1, 2012 to December 31, 2012.   By two separate letters dated December 23, 2011, Pryor simultaneously approved both requests.

During Vallas' tenure as acting superintendent, General Statutes § 10–157 was amended, effective July 1, 2012, by Public Act 12–116.   The amendment made no alterations to subsection (a) of § 10–157, but amended subsections (b) and (c) to provide as follows:

(b) A local or regional board of education may appoint as acting superintendent a person who is or is not properly certified for a probationary period, not to exceed one school year, with the approval of the Commissioner of Education.   During such probationary period such acting superintendent shall assume all duties of the superintendent for the time specified and shall successfully complete a school leadership program, approved by the State Board of Education, offered at a public or private institution of higher education in the state.   At the conclusion of such probationary period, such appointing local or regional board of education may request the commissioner to grant a waiver of certification for such acting superintendent pursuant to subsection (c) of this section.

(c) The commissioner may, upon request of an employing local or regional board of education, grant a waiver of certification to a person (1) who has successfully completed at least three years of experience as a certified administrator with a superintendent certificate issued by another state in a public school in another state during the ten-year period prior to the date of application, or (2) who has successfully completed a probationary period as an acting superintendent pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, and who the commissioner deems to be exceptionally qualified for the position of superintendent.

Pryor approved the appointment of Vallas as acting superintendent for the probationary period of January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2013 by letter dated January 23, 2013 to Jacqueline Kelleher, the then Chair of the Bridgeport Board of Education.²

In late February of 2013, Vallas contacted Villanova.³  When Vallas and Villanova first spoke on the phone, Vallas inquired about UConn programs and courses in general.   Vallas' Chief of Staff had also made inquiries with respect to the Executive Leadership Program;  Vallas, however, was not eligible for the program, as it had a fifteen (15) graduate credit course prerequisite.   Villanova proposed an independent study course in district leadership for Vallas;  Villanova testified, unconvincingly, that the Executive Leadership Program was not appropriate for Vallas given Vallas' extensive experience and time limitations, making no mention of the fact that Vallas did not qualify to participate in the Executive Leadership Program.

Vallas and Villanova first met in person in late February or early March 2013, and together designed a three credit independent study course for Vallas.   Ultimately, the course standards were reduced to writing, although Vallas began his work on the course prior to their being finalized.⁴  This was the first and only time that Villanova, who had run the Executive Leadership Program for ten years, had ever been asked to provide such an independent study like that provided to Vallas, and within days, prior to Vallas even submitting any work, Villanova invited Vallas to present to Villanova's district leadership class.

Initially, the course description for the independent study course at issue provided as follows:

This independent study course is designed based on the standards for School District Leadership derived from both ELCC and Connecticut's Common Core of Leading:  Connecticut Leadership Standards.   Each course module and associated assessment is specifically connected to an identified leadership standard.   The course is also designed to take into consideration the district leadership experiences and knowledge based of the enrolled student.   The course is designed as a seminar and class sessions may be a combination of in-person seminars and technology assisted discussions.   This is a graduate course with a special focus on best practices in district leadership.5

For the actual course, Vallas and Villanova met briefly in passing on one occasion, had two meetings approximately two hours long and had several telephone conversations.⁶  The court finds, based on the clear and unequivocal testimony of Vallas, that he never attended a class or in-person seminar, nor did he participate in any technology assisted discussions.   The court explicitly rejects the testimony of Villanova that their meetings or phone calls constituted the “seminar and class sessions” contemplated in the course description, and further rejects as not credible Villanova's testimony that his telephone calls to Vallas constituted the “technology assisted discussions” as referenced in the course description.⁷  Villanova admittedly used the wrong language in the course description that was submitted to the State Board of Education.   He meant “purposeful conversation” when he used the term “seminar” in the course description;  the reference to in-person seminar actually came from prior work Villanova did.   Villanova also testified, and the court agrees, that a class is normally more than one student, and he also testified that class sessions and seminars meant the same thing.   Villanova basically envisioned having nine discussions, in person or on the phone, with Vallas, despite the course description submitted to the State Board of Education.   The court notes that Villanova revised the course description language, adding the language that the independent study course came from a specific request from Vallas, for submission to the State Board of Education, yet inexplicably failed to correct the language regarding the non-existent classes, seminars, and technology assisted discussions when he clearly had the opportunity to do so.

Vallas submitted six papers to complete the course.   The first was submitted on April 10, 2013,⁸ the second sometime thereafter, and the subsequent in rapid succession:  # 3 on May 15, 2013, # 4 and # 5 on May 29, 2013, and # 6 on May 30, 2013.   The court accepts Vallas' testimony that the work, although done over the course of ten weeks while fulfilling his employment as acting superintendent, could have been completed in a week.

Villanova informed Vallas within twenty-four hours of each submission that his papers met or exceeded expectations.   Vallas submitted his last paper by email on May 30, 2013, at approximately 12:30 p.m., and Villanova submitted a final “A” grade ⁹ for Vallas that same day.¹⁰

On April 15, 2013, Pryor presented a report to the State Board of Education.   His report explained that “the UConn Neag School of Education developed an individualized, non-certification leadership program ” (emphasis added) for Vallas.¹¹  The State Board of Education, pursuant to the amended statute, approved “the school leadership program offered by the University of Connecticut Neag School of Education.”   By correspondence that same day, Pryor informed Tom DeFranco, the Dean of the Neag School of Education, of this resolution.¹²

By correspondence dated June 14, 2013, Kenneth Moales, Chairman of the Bridgeport Board of Education, wrote to Pryor, requesting a waiver of certification for Vallas pursuant to § 10–157(b);  by correspondence dated June 17, 2013, Pryor granted the waiver, finding, inter alia, that Vallas had completed his probation and had completed a school leadership program approved by the State Board of Education.

The court finds that the State Board of Education approved what they believed was a UConn approved program, with requirements of classes, seminars, and technology assisted discussions that simply did not take place.   This independent study course was not a UConn approved program;  and the course Vallas completed was not the program the State Board of Education approved.

III

ANALYSISAQuo Warranto

The cause of action of quo warranto is governed by General Statutes § 52–491, which provides:  “When any person or corporation usurps the exercise of any office, franchise or jurisdiction, the Superior Court may proceed, on a complaint in the nature of a quo warranto, to punish such person or corporation for such usurpation, according to the course of the common law and may proceed therein and render judgment according to the course of the common law.”   An action in quo warranto “lie[s] to prevent the usurpation of a public office or franchise ․ by placing the burden on the defendant to prove lawful entitlement to a particular office ․ and oust[ing] individuals illegally occupying public offices ․ The purpose of the proceeding, therefore, is to test the actual right to the office and not merely a use under color of right ․ In other words, in a quo warranto proceeding, a plaintiff may contest an individual's right to hold an office;  however, a challenge to the manner in which a lawful incumbent is exercising the powers, privileges and duties pertaining to an office exceeds the scope of such an action.   Thus, the writ of quo warranto developed and has continued as a limited and extraordinary remedy ․ to test who the lawful public official is.”  (Citations omitted;  emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Bateson v. Weddle, 306 Conn. 1, 11, 48 A.3d 652 (2012).

During closing arguments, counsel for Vallas argued that he has satisfied his burden of establishing title to his public office because he has shown that he complied with each of the strictures of General Statutes § 10–157.¹³  Vallas contended that he presented evidence satisfying each of the statute's requirements and, accordingly, that he does hold valid title to his public office.   Of particular relevance to this court's decision, Vallas also argued that § 10–157 gives to the State Board of Education the authority and discretion to define key terms and phrases in the statute, such as “school leadership program” and, therefore, the court may not do so without engaging in a political question.¹⁴  Finally, Vallas argued that any period of time that he served as acting superintendent prior to his present appointment does not exhaust the “probationary period” he is permitted by § 10–157(b) because any prior appointments by the Commissioner of Education were valid under General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 10–157(b).

The plaintiffs presented three responses at trial.   First, the plaintiffs argued that Vallas has not successfully completed a “probationary period” within the meaning of subsection (b), a phrase that is left undefined by that subsection.   The plaintiffs argued that a “probationary period” is a discernable period of time and, here, subsection (b) states that said period of time is not to exceed “one school year.”   The plaintiffs take the position that Vallas had already served as acting superintendent for a period of time greater than one calendar year at the time he was appointed to his present term of office and, therefore, subsection (b) does not permit him to serve a new probationary period.¹⁵

Second, the plaintiffs challenged whether the course completed by Vallas is a “school leadership program” within the meaning of § 10–157, on the theory that it was not and, instead, claim that Vallas participated in a “sham” course designed to circumvent the strictures of § 10–157.   In particular, the plaintiffs argued that although § 10–157 does not define “school leadership program,” a court is competent to construct the meaning of that phrase in accordance with the principles of statutory interpretation.¹⁶  Without presenting a specific interpretation of what “school leadership program” should mean, the plaintiffs argue that the legislature intended subsection (b) to have teeth;  subsection (b) contemplates that a “school leadership program” will be a substantive program, not a single course, and the course completed by Vallas therefore does not satisfy the statute.   The plaintiffs also argued that (1) a single course does not constitute a program;  (2) Vallas had at least some input in its creation;  (3) the course does not meet any standard of any type and the evidence at trial establishes that no real evaluation of Vallas' work was ever performed by Villanova;  and (4) the approval of the course by the State Board of Education is not enough to make it sufficient if the course does not independently qualify as a “school leadership program” within the meaning of § 10–157(b).

Third, the plaintiffs argued that Pryor's waiver of Vallas' certification was invalid because (1) the Bridgeport board did not submit evidence sufficient for Pryor to find that Vallas had completed a “school leadership program” or that he was exceptionally qualified and (2) the evidence submitted at trial established that Pryor did not adequately vet Vallas when evaluating whether he was “exceptionally qualified” because Pryor was unable to provide specific details of that process during his testimony.

Vallas' title to his public office is governed by § 10–157.   Accordingly, in order to satisfy his burden in this quo warranto proceeding, Vallas must satisfy the court that he has complied with the strictures of that section.   Section 10–157 does not purport, however, to define any of its terms.   Similarly, although General Statutes § 10–144o does provide definitions for Chapter 166 of the General Statutes, of which § 10–157 is a part,¹⁷ that section does not define any terms of § 10–157 that are material to this dispute.   Moreover, because the operative version of § 10–157 was only recently enacted, a construction of the meaning of the statute is an issue of first impression that also presents a question of law.   See Dickman v. Office of State Ethics, Citizen's Ethics Advisory Board, 140 Conn.App. 754, 767, 60 A.3d 297 (2013) (“The plaintiff's claim presents a matter of statutory construction, which is a question of law”).

B

Standard for Statutory Construction

A court's interpretation of a statute begins with General Statutes § 1–2z, which provides:  “The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.   If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.”

“When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature ․ In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply ․ In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1–2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.   If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered ․ When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Friezo v. Friezo, 281 Conn. 166, 181–82, 914 A.2d 533 (2007).

“In the absence of a statutory definition, we turn to General Statutes § 1–1(a), which provides in relevant part:  ‘In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language ․’ To ascertain the commonly approved usage of a word, we look to the dictionary definition of the term.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Stone–Krete Construction, Inc. v. Eder, 280 Conn. 672, 677–78, 911 A.2d 300 (2006).¹⁸

C

General Statutes § 10–157

As it presently exists, § 10–157 mandates that an individual must obtain a certification before he or she may serve as a superintendent in Connecticut.   General Statutes § 10–157(a).  Section 10–157 also creates an exception by which an individual who does not possess or is not eligible for a formal certification, but who is otherwise qualified to serve as superintendent, may do so.   Specifically, § 10–157(b) creates an avenue by which the individual may obtain a waiver of certification from the Commissioner of Education.   In order to receive such a waiver, subsection (b) directs the individual to serve for a “probationary period, not to exceed one school year,” which requires the individual to be appointed by a local school board with the approval of the Commissioner of Education.   As an additional requirement, subsection (b) requires that during the pendency of the probationary period, the individual “shall successfully complete a school leadership program, approved by the State Board of Education, offered at a public or private institution of higher education in the state.”   Thus, there are two components to a “school leadership program.”   Such a program is (1) approved by the State Board of Education and (2) a program that is offered by an institution of higher education.   That is to say, with respect to this second component, that a proposed course of study is only properly designated as a “program” if it already constitutes a “program” at the institution that offers it.

Once an individual “has successfully completed a probationary period as an acting superintendent pursuant to subsection (b) of this section,” the local appointing school board may request from the Commissioner of Education a waiver of that individual's formal certification requirements pursuant to subsection (c).  Subsection (c) allows the commissioner to grant the waiver if he or she finds (1) that the individual successfully completed the probationary period and (2) that the individual is exceptionally qualified.

In the context of the present case, in order to satisfy his burden in an action proceeding in quo warranto, Vallas, who has received a waiver of certification requirements from Pryor, must establish that the waiver is valid.   Thus, Vallas must show (1) that he completed a probationary period and (2) that he also completed a school leadership program.¹⁹  Any conclusion as to whether he has done so, however, requires the court to first construe the meaning of the phrases “probationary period” and “school leadership program.”

D

Construction of “probationary period”

Section § 10–157(b) does not define “probationary period.”   The Merriam–Webster dictionary defines “probation” in relevant part as “1. critical examination and evaluation or subjection to such examination and evaluation. 2a. subjection of an individual to a period of testing and trial to ascertain fitness (as for a job or school) ․” Merriam–Webster Dictionary (11th Ed.2009).²⁰  Merriam–Webster defines “period” as “1:  the completion of a cycle, a series of events, or a single action.”  Id. Further meaning is gleaned from the manner in which the statute was amended by Public Act 12–116.   Prior to the statute's amendment, § 10–157(b) provided that a local board of education could request approval from the Commissioner of Education to appoint an uncertified individual as an acting superintendent for a period “not to exceed ninety days.”   That version of the statute also allowed for a ninety day period to be extended “with the approval of the commissioner, which he shall grant for good cause shown.”   General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 10–157(b).  The prior version did not place any restrictions on the length of an extension or number of extensions a single acting superintendent could receive.²¹  General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 10–157(b).

Effective July 1, 2012, Public Act 12–116 amended § 10–157(b), instituting two changes that are relevant to the court's present inquiry.   First, the Public Act replaced the ninety day period with a “probationary period, not to exceed one school year.”  General Statutes § 10–157(b).  Second, the new version no longer contains language permitting an extension of the probationary period.  General Statutes § 10–157(b).²²

Accordingly, the phrase “probationary period,” within the context of § 10–157(b), means a single period ²³ during which an individual is to be evaluated for the position of superintendent.   As the court has already stated, the goal of subsections (b) and (c), which together provide a narrow exception to subsection (a), is to allow an individual who does not or cannot satisfy the formal certification requirements of subsection (a) to become a superintendent through an alternative procedure through which the individual demonstrates his or her competency and qualification to formally serve as such.   Therefore, the notion that an individual is to be evaluated during a subsection (b) probationary period is congruent with the construction of § 10–157 as a whole.

In the present case, the evidence established that Pryor found, as stated in his June 17, 2013 letter, that Vallas had successfully completed a probationary period on the basis of Vallas' performance during his tenure as acting superintendent since 2012.   Although the plaintiffs argued briefly during closing argument that Pryor did not have a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that Vallas had successfully completed a probationary period, the court rejects this argument, and finds that Vallas' probationary period concluded on June 17, 2013.

This conclusion is not, however, dispositive to the present dispute because Pryor also granted through the June 17, 2013 letter a waiver of Vallas' certification requirements upon, inter alia, a finding that Vallas had completed a school leadership program.   The question remaining before the court therefore becomes whether Vallas was entitled to a subsection (c) waiver of certification on this basis which requires the court to construe the meaning of “school leadership program.”

E

Construction of “school leadership program”

Section 10–157(b) requires that an acting superintendent who is serving a probationary period “shall successfully complete a school leadership program, approved by the State Board of Education, offered at a public or private institution of higher education in the state.”   As previously noted in this court's recent memorandum of decision in this case, “the requirement of a school leadership program is best understood as intending to qualify an uncertified individual to receive a waiver of certification pursuant to § 10–157(c), which in turn leads to the conclusion that the purpose of a school leadership program is to serve as a substitute to the formal certification requirements of § 10–157(a).   In this fashion, the statute provides an avenue for an individual to formally become a superintendent when that individual does not possess the specific experience and certification required by § 10–157(a), but is otherwise qualified to be a superintendent.”   Lopez v. Bridgeport Board of Education, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 13 6034307 (June 25, 2013).  Section 10–157 does not purport to define “school leadership program” and no definition is available elsewhere within Chapter 166 of the General Statutes.²⁴  Similarly, the court did not undertake to define “school leadership program” in its previous decision because the issue was not before it at the time.

The Merriam–Webster dictionary defines program, in relevant part, as “3:  a plan or system under which action may be taken toward a goal.”   Merriam–Webster Dictionary (11th Ed.2009).   The Merriam–Webster dictionary defines “leadership” as “1. the office or position of a leader 2. the capacity to lead 3. the act or an instance of leading.”  Id. Accordingly, the plain language of § 10–157(b) provides that an individual serving a probationary period must complete a program, offered at an institution of higher education within the state, which is intended to instruct or train the individual in the act of leading a school or school district.

As stated in section II of this opinion, the court finds that the course completed by Vallas was not a school leadership program within the meaning of the statute.²⁵  There are two components to the requirement of § 10–157(b) that an individual complete a “school leadership program.”   First, a proposed course of study does not qualify as a program for the purposes of § 10–157(b) unless it is offered by an institution of higher education.   That is to say, a proposed course of study may only be called a “program” within the meaning of subsection (b) if the institution that offers it recognizes the course of study as a “program.”   Second, the program must be approved by the State Board of Education.

The only evidence presented at trial establishes that the course taken by Vallas was not a “program.”   The defendant's own witness, Villanova, testified that the course was not a program offered by UConn.   Further, the plaintiff's witness, DeFranco, testified at trial that the course completed by Vallas did not qualify as a program within his understanding of that phrase, because a three-credit course would not qualify as a program and because the course did not pass through the rigorous approval process that a program would undergo before being offered at UConn.²⁶

Vallas completed a single course of three credits and did not produce any evidence at trial of any other “program” at the Neag School of Education or UConn comprised of only a single three credit course.   In addition, other evidence before the court establishes that a “program” means something more intensive than a single course.   For example, the “executive leadership program” offered by the Neag School of Education, a thirteen-month program, the completion of which all parties agree is necessary for an individual to receive a subsection (a) certification, is an intensive program that includes, inter alia, course instruction, mentoring, and an internship with another superintendent.²⁷

The court also rejects Vallas' argument that § 10–157 gives the State Board of Education the authority to define terms within that section, including the meaning of “school leadership program,” and that the State Board of Education defined the course as a program through its April 15, 2013 resolution.   The statute gives the State Board of Education the authority to approve a program.  Section 10–157(b) does not explicitly give or commit to the sole discretion of the State Board of Education the authority to define terms within the statute.   Had the legislature intended to grant such authority, it could have done so through the inclusion of language in the statute providing, for example, that “the State Board of Education shall adopt regulations defining and setting standards for a ‘school leadership program.’  “ ²⁸ The General Assembly did not, however, insert this or similar language into the statute.

An agency's interpretation of the language of a statute that the agency is charged with enforcing is relevant to a court's construction of that statute.   But here, the State Board of Education has not offered a definition of the phrase “school leadership program” except to the extent that it may have indirectly implied a definition of that phrase when it approved the course.   Moreover, even if the State Board of Education had issued a definition of “school leadership program,” the court would not be bound by that interpretation because the matter is an issue of first impression and the language of § 10–157, in its present form, has not been previously interpreted by any other court.   See Byrd v. Bechtel/Fusco, 90 Conn.App. 641, 878 A.2d 1162, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 919, 888 A.2d 87 (2005) (although agency interpretation of statute that agency is charged with interpreting is typically afforded deference, rule does not apply when construction of the statute has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny), citing Donahue v. Southington, 259 Conn. 783, 787, 792 A.2d 76 (2002).

Finally, even if the course was a “program” within the meaning of § 10–157, the court has also found, in section II of this opinion, that Vallas did not successfully complete a school leadership program because the course that Vallas did complete was not the course that the State Board of Education believed it had approved.   On April 15, 2013, the State Board of Education passed the following resolution:  “RESOLVED, That the State Board of Education, pursuant to subsections (b) and (c) of Section 10–157 of the Connecticut General Statutes, approves the school leadership program offered by the University of Connecticut Neag School of Education, as described in Attachment A, to satisfy the statutory requirement for completion of a probationary period by an acting superintendent, and directs the Commissioner to take the necessary action.”

Attachment A is a document entitled “Department of Educational Leadership Independent Study Course:  District Leadership Spring 2013.”   As noted in section II of this opinion, Villanova's testimony establishes that “Attachment A” is the product of a collaborative effort between Villanova and Vallas.   It provides:  “Course Description:  This independent study course is designed based on the standards for School District Leadership derived from both ELCC and Connecticut's Common Core of Leading:  Connecticut Leadership Standards.   Each course module and associated assessment is specifically connected to an identified leadership standard.   The course is also designed to take into consideration the district leadership experiences and knowledge base of the enrolled student.   The course is designed as a seminar and class sessions may be a combination of in-person seminars and technology assisted discussions.   This is a graduate course with a special focus on best practices in district leadership.   This course was designed in response to Bridgeport acting superintendent Paul Vallas' request for coursework that would be submitted for approval to the State Board of Education in fulfillment of the requirement that he successfully complete a school leadership program during his probationary period prior to obtaining a waiver of certification.   The design of the independent student course and assessments is based upon the professional experiences of Mr. Vallas.”  (Emphasis added.).

The remainder of Attachment A is a chart, composed of four columns, that contains six “standards” for evaluation.²⁹  Villanova's testimony established that the fourth column, i.e., the colunm on the far right-hand side of the chart, contained text that was prepared by Vallas himself.

The State Board of Education approved what they believed was a UConn approved program, with requirements of classes, seminars, and technology assisted discussions that simply did not take place.   The course completed by Vallas was not a “program offered by the University of Connecticut Neag School of Education.”  (Emphasis added.)   Furthermore, Vallas never attended a class or in-person seminar, nor did he participate in any technology assisted discussions, each of which the course description submitted to the State Board of Education indicated would occur.   Therefore, although Vallas completed a course, he did not complete the “program” that was approved by the State Board of Education.

Because Vallas did not complete a school leadership program, he was not entitled to a waiver of certification pursuant to § 10–157(c).  The waiver certification that he did receive on June 17, 2013 was invalid.

The writ of quo warranto is granted.   The court orders that Paul Vallas be removed from his office.   Judgment shall enter accordingly.

BY THE COURT,

Bellis, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. This action was originally brought against three defendants, Paul Vallas, the Bridgeport Board of Education (Bridgeport board) and Commissioner of Education Stefan Pryor, via a verified complaint filed April 1, 2013.   At a hearing held on April 24, 2013, the court dismissed the action against Pryor for lack of personal jurisdiction due to improper service of process.   He was never re-served.   The plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew the action against the Bridgeport board on May 8, 2013.   Thus, Vallas is the only remaining defendant.   For a more thorough discussion of the procedural history of this case, see this court's two memoranda of decision issued on June 5, 2013 and June 25, 2013, respectively.   See Lopez v. Bridgeport Board of Education, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 13 6034307 (June 5, 2013, Bellis, J.);   See Lopez v. Bridgeport Board of Education, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 13 6034307 (June 25, 2013, Bellis, J.)..  FN1. This action was originally brought against three defendants, Paul Vallas, the Bridgeport Board of Education (Bridgeport board) and Commissioner of Education Stefan Pryor, via a verified complaint filed April 1, 2013.   At a hearing held on April 24, 2013, the court dismissed the action against Pryor for lack of personal jurisdiction due to improper service of process.   He was never re-served.   The plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew the action against the Bridgeport board on May 8, 2013.   Thus, Vallas is the only remaining defendant.   For a more thorough discussion of the procedural history of this case, see this court's two memoranda of decision issued on June 5, 2013 and June 25, 2013, respectively.   See Lopez v. Bridgeport Board of Education, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 13 6034307 (June 5, 2013, Bellis, J.);   See Lopez v. Bridgeport Board of Education, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 13 6034307 (June 25, 2013, Bellis, J.).

FN2. Vallas was appointed as acting superintendent and put on the probationary period pursuant to 10–157 as amended on January 23, 2013.   Although moot at this point, it appears that from July 1, 2012, until at least the end of 2012, Vallas was not in compliance with the new law..  FN2. Vallas was appointed as acting superintendent and put on the probationary period pursuant to 10–157 as amended on January 23, 2013.   Although moot at this point, it appears that from July 1, 2012, until at least the end of 2012, Vallas was not in compliance with the new law.

FN3. Villanova spends half of his time in the role of Director of the Executive Leadership Program.   The Executive Leadership Program, if successfully completed, results in endorsement for the Connecticut Superintendent certification (093).   It is an intensive, thirteen month program, and one of a number of programs at UConn..  FN3. Villanova spends half of his time in the role of Director of the Executive Leadership Program.   The Executive Leadership Program, if successfully completed, results in endorsement for the Connecticut Superintendent certification (093).   It is an intensive, thirteen month program, and one of a number of programs at UConn.

FN4. Vallas never applied for admission to the University of Connecticut and paid no admission fees as either an in-state or out-of-state resident, although he did apply to participate in the independent study course, paying approximately $2,200 for the course..  FN4. Vallas never applied for admission to the University of Connecticut and paid no admission fees as either an in-state or out-of-state resident, although he did apply to participate in the independent study course, paying approximately $2,200 for the course.

FN5. Villanova added the following language to the course description for the April 15, 2013 State Board of Education meeting:  “This course was designed in response to Bridgeport acting superintendent Paul Vallas' request for coursework that would be submitted for approval to the State Board of Education in fulfillment of the requirement that he successfully complete a school leadership program during his probationary period prior to obtaining a waiver of certification.   The design of the independent study course and assessment is based upon the professional experiences of Mr. Vallas.”.  FN5. Villanova added the following language to the course description for the April 15, 2013 State Board of Education meeting:  “This course was designed in response to Bridgeport acting superintendent Paul Vallas' request for coursework that would be submitted for approval to the State Board of Education in fulfillment of the requirement that he successfully complete a school leadership program during his probationary period prior to obtaining a waiver of certification.   The design of the independent study course and assessment is based upon the professional experiences of Mr. Vallas.”

FN6. Although Vallas' educational records from the University of Connecticut were marked for identification, none of the records relating to the independent study coursework at issue were before the court as full exhibits.   Similarly, while Vallas testified that he had retained records of his meetings and phone conversations with Villanova, the court was similarly not presented with those records or indeed any evidence as to the dates or times of any of the purported meetings or telephone conversations to support the testimony, with the exception of the mention of a future meeting in a May 15, 2013 email..  FN6. Although Vallas' educational records from the University of Connecticut were marked for identification, none of the records relating to the independent study coursework at issue were before the court as full exhibits.   Similarly, while Vallas testified that he had retained records of his meetings and phone conversations with Villanova, the court was similarly not presented with those records or indeed any evidence as to the dates or times of any of the purported meetings or telephone conversations to support the testimony, with the exception of the mention of a future meeting in a May 15, 2013 email.

FN7. Villanova offered some confusing testimony regarding the use of Power Point that was of no value to the court.   Vallas offered no testimony regarding the use of Power Point or other technology..  FN7. Villanova offered some confusing testimony regarding the use of Power Point that was of no value to the court.   Vallas offered no testimony regarding the use of Power Point or other technology.

FN8. In the meantime, on March 20, 2013, Vallas signed a three year employment contract with the city, contingent upon his obtaining certification or a waiver..  FN8. In the meantime, on March 20, 2013, Vallas signed a three year employment contract with the city, contingent upon his obtaining certification or a waiver.

FN9. Although Vallas, inexplicably, could not recall the number of credits or the “A” grade he received in the course less than a month prior to his testimony at court, the evidence established that he passed the three credit independent study course with an “A.” Vallas and his witnesses were, at times, less than candid with the court, Pryor when questioned regarding Vallas' departure from New Orleans, Vallas when asked to review documents to refresh his recollection, and Villanova with regard to the “flex” extended to Vallas.   Nonetheless, the court acknowledges that all three men have dedicated themselves to important educational issues, and that Vallas and Pryor, based on their testimony and by virtue of their involvement with the Bridgeport Public School system, are deeply committed to improving the plight of the school system.   Based on the testimony of Vallas and Pryor, Vallas has made great strides during his tenure in Bridgeport towards improving the schools for the children of Bridgeport..  FN9. Although Vallas, inexplicably, could not recall the number of credits or the “A” grade he received in the course less than a month prior to his testimony at court, the evidence established that he passed the three credit independent study course with an “A.” Vallas and his witnesses were, at times, less than candid with the court, Pryor when questioned regarding Vallas' departure from New Orleans, Vallas when asked to review documents to refresh his recollection, and Villanova with regard to the “flex” extended to Vallas.   Nonetheless, the court acknowledges that all three men have dedicated themselves to important educational issues, and that Vallas and Pryor, based on their testimony and by virtue of their involvement with the Bridgeport Public School system, are deeply committed to improving the plight of the school system.   Based on the testimony of Vallas and Pryor, Vallas has made great strides during his tenure in Bridgeport towards improving the schools for the children of Bridgeport.

FN10. The court rejects Villanova's testimony that this was normal turn around time, and finds, based on Villanova's testimony, that Villanova extended what he termed as “flex” to Vallas.   The evidence was overwhelming that from the start, efforts were made to accommodate the appointment of Vallas as superintendent of the Bridgeport public school system at every level.   There is no doubt that Vallas received preferential treatment and that continued as Vallas designed, with Villanova, and participated in the independent study course..  FN10. The court rejects Villanova's testimony that this was normal turn around time, and finds, based on Villanova's testimony, that Villanova extended what he termed as “flex” to Vallas.   The evidence was overwhelming that from the start, efforts were made to accommodate the appointment of Vallas as superintendent of the Bridgeport public school system at every level.   There is no doubt that Vallas received preferential treatment and that continued as Vallas designed, with Villanova, and participated in the independent study course.

FN11. The report inaccurately and repeatedly refers to the three credit course as a program.   In fact, UConn did not develop a program for Vallas, and Vallas did not participate in a program at UConn..  FN11. The report inaccurately and repeatedly refers to the three credit course as a program.   In fact, UConn did not develop a program for Vallas, and Vallas did not participate in a program at UConn.

FN12. The court accepts DeFranco's testimony explaining that a three credit course could not be considered a program at UConn, and the testimony of both DeFranco and Villanova with respect to the formal, rigorous process involved in obtaining program approval at UConn, right through to the Board of Trustees..  FN12. The court accepts DeFranco's testimony explaining that a three credit course could not be considered a program at UConn, and the testimony of both DeFranco and Villanova with respect to the formal, rigorous process involved in obtaining program approval at UConn, right through to the Board of Trustees.

FN13. More specifically, Vallas argues that § 10–157(b) requires, in the present case:  (1) that he be appointed to a term, not more than one year, with the approval of the Commissioner of Education;  (2) that he complete a school leadership program that has been approved by the State Board of Education;  (3) that the Bridgeport board request a waiver of the certification of Vallas required by § 10–157(a);  (4) that the commissioner find that Vallas successfully completed his probationary period;  (5) that the commissioner find that Vallas is exceptionally qualified for the position of superintendent;  and (6) that the commissioner grant to Vallas a waiver of the certification requirements of § 10–157(a)..  FN13. More specifically, Vallas argues that § 10–157(b) requires, in the present case:  (1) that he be appointed to a term, not more than one year, with the approval of the Commissioner of Education;  (2) that he complete a school leadership program that has been approved by the State Board of Education;  (3) that the Bridgeport board request a waiver of the certification of Vallas required by § 10–157(a);  (4) that the commissioner find that Vallas successfully completed his probationary period;  (5) that the commissioner find that Vallas is exceptionally qualified for the position of superintendent;  and (6) that the commissioner grant to Vallas a waiver of the certification requirements of § 10–157(a).

FN14. Vallas raised this argument previously during the pendency of this case on identical grounds.   The court dispensed with it in its memorandum of decision regarding Vallas' motion in limine, issued on June 25, 2013.   See Lopez v. Bridgeport Board of Education, supra, Docket No. CV 13 6034307 (June 25, 2013).   Because Vallas has not presented new or different grounds for his argument that an evaluation of the sufficiency of a “school leadership program” is a political question, the court does not undertake to address the argument again.   To the extent this argument should be construed as a motion to dismiss, it is denied..  FN14. Vallas raised this argument previously during the pendency of this case on identical grounds.   The court dispensed with it in its memorandum of decision regarding Vallas' motion in limine, issued on June 25, 2013.   See Lopez v. Bridgeport Board of Education, supra, Docket No. CV 13 6034307 (June 25, 2013).   Because Vallas has not presented new or different grounds for his argument that an evaluation of the sufficiency of a “school leadership program” is a political question, the court does not undertake to address the argument again.   To the extent this argument should be construed as a motion to dismiss, it is denied.

FN15. The court disagrees with the plaintiffs that periods of time Vallas served under previous appointments that were made under General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 10–157(b), such as the original ninety day appointment and nine month extension, exhaust any period of time available to him under the current version of § 10–157(b).  Significantly, the statute was amended while Vallas was already serving as acting superintendent pursuant to the nine month extension and nowhere in the statute is there an indication that a period of time already being served by an acting superintendent pursuant to a prior appointment should apply to exhaust a “probationary period.”   Further, that the statute was amended indicates only a legislative intent to replace the previous scheme of a ninety day appointment with the availability of extensions, but does not indicate an intent to invalidate appointments that were then being served..  FN15. The court disagrees with the plaintiffs that periods of time Vallas served under previous appointments that were made under General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 10–157(b), such as the original ninety day appointment and nine month extension, exhaust any period of time available to him under the current version of § 10–157(b).  Significantly, the statute was amended while Vallas was already serving as acting superintendent pursuant to the nine month extension and nowhere in the statute is there an indication that a period of time already being served by an acting superintendent pursuant to a prior appointment should apply to exhaust a “probationary period.”   Further, that the statute was amended indicates only a legislative intent to replace the previous scheme of a ninety day appointment with the availability of extensions, but does not indicate an intent to invalidate appointments that were then being served.

FN16. The plaintiffs also argued, in response to Vallas' repeated argument that any evaluation of the sufficiency of the course is a political question, that an analysis of whether the course qualifies as a school leadership program is a permissible undertaking for the court.   The plaintiffs clarified that they have not asked the court to serve as a second “grader” of Vallas' coursework but, rather, to decide whether the course itself fits within the meaning of “school leadership program” that is contemplated by § 10–157..  FN16. The plaintiffs also argued, in response to Vallas' repeated argument that any evaluation of the sufficiency of the course is a political question, that an analysis of whether the course qualifies as a school leadership program is a permissible undertaking for the court.   The plaintiffs clarified that they have not asked the court to serve as a second “grader” of Vallas' coursework but, rather, to decide whether the course itself fits within the meaning of “school leadership program” that is contemplated by § 10–157.

FN17. More specifically, § 10–144o provides definitions of various terms for sections §§ 10–145 through 10–158a, inclusive..  FN17. More specifically, § 10–144o provides definitions of various terms for sections §§ 10–145 through 10–158a, inclusive.

FN18. The full text of § 1–1(a) is:  “In the construction of statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language;  and technical words and phrases, and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood accordingly.”.  FN18. The full text of § 1–1(a) is:  “In the construction of statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language;  and technical words and phrases, and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood accordingly.”

FN19. Although a school leadership program must be completed during the pendency of a probationary period, the statute contemplates that completion of a school leadership program is a separate and distinct requirement from the completion of a probationary period.   As concluded in section IIID and E of this opinion, a probationary period is intended as an evaluation of an acting superintendent's qualification to be a superintendent.   In contrast, a school leadership program is designed to instruct and train an acting superintendent in the leadership of a school or school district.   An individual seeking a subsection (c) waiver of certification must satisfy both requirements..  FN19. Although a school leadership program must be completed during the pendency of a probationary period, the statute contemplates that completion of a school leadership program is a separate and distinct requirement from the completion of a probationary period.   As concluded in section IIID and E of this opinion, a probationary period is intended as an evaluation of an acting superintendent's qualification to be a superintendent.   In contrast, a school leadership program is designed to instruct and train an acting superintendent in the leadership of a school or school district.   An individual seeking a subsection (c) waiver of certification must satisfy both requirements.

FN20. “If a statute or regulation does not sufficiently define a term, it is appropriate to look to the common understanding of the term as expressed in a dictionary.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Historic District Commission v. Hall, 282 Conn. 672, 679–80, 923 A.2d 726 (2007)..  FN20. “If a statute or regulation does not sufficiently define a term, it is appropriate to look to the common understanding of the term as expressed in a dictionary.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Historic District Commission v. Hall, 282 Conn. 672, 679–80, 923 A.2d 726 (2007).

FN21. There is no case law interpreting this specific provision of the prior statute, but its plain language does not contemplate or suggest that the number of extensions are limited..  FN21. There is no case law interpreting this specific provision of the prior statute, but its plain language does not contemplate or suggest that the number of extensions are limited.

FN22. The previous version of subsection (c) permitted a local board of education to seek from the Commissioner of Education a waiver of the certification requirements contained in § 10–157(a) if an acting superintendent possessed certain prior experience or if the commissioner deemed the individual to be “exceptionally qualified.”   General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 10–157(c) also contained certain minimum criteria that an acting superintendent was required to satisfy before the commissioner was permitted to make a determination that the individual was “exceptionally qualified.”   In particular, in order to be deemed exceptionally qualified, an acting superintendent was required to (1) have served as an acting superintendent pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 10–157(b), (2) have worked as a superintendent in another state for at least fifteen years and (3) have been certified by that other state as a superintendent.   Today, § 10–157(c) continues to allow the Commissioner of Education to grant a waiver of certification, which the commissioner may grant if he or she finds the individual to be “exceptionally qualified.”   The current version no longer contains, however, the minimum criteria required for the commissioner to make that determination.  General Statutes § 10–157(c).  In addition, the current version of § 10–157(c) permits a waiver of certification to be granted only if an acting superintendent “has successfully completed a probationary period as an acting superintendent pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.”  General Statutes § 10–157(c).  The prior version, in contrast, only required an individual “to be ” an acting superintendent.   (Emphasis added.)   General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 10–157(c)..  FN22. The previous version of subsection (c) permitted a local board of education to seek from the Commissioner of Education a waiver of the certification requirements contained in § 10–157(a) if an acting superintendent possessed certain prior experience or if the commissioner deemed the individual to be “exceptionally qualified.”   General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 10–157(c) also contained certain minimum criteria that an acting superintendent was required to satisfy before the commissioner was permitted to make a determination that the individual was “exceptionally qualified.”   In particular, in order to be deemed exceptionally qualified, an acting superintendent was required to (1) have served as an acting superintendent pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 10–157(b), (2) have worked as a superintendent in another state for at least fifteen years and (3) have been certified by that other state as a superintendent.   Today, § 10–157(c) continues to allow the Commissioner of Education to grant a waiver of certification, which the commissioner may grant if he or she finds the individual to be “exceptionally qualified.”   The current version no longer contains, however, the minimum criteria required for the commissioner to make that determination.  General Statutes § 10–157(c).  In addition, the current version of § 10–157(c) permits a waiver of certification to be granted only if an acting superintendent “has successfully completed a probationary period as an acting superintendent pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.”  General Statutes § 10–157(c).  The prior version, in contrast, only required an individual “to be ” an acting superintendent.   (Emphasis added.)   General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 10–157(c).

FN23. The statute limits the number of probationary periods a particular individual may serve to a single probationary period, i.e., available to the individual only once, for the following reasons.   First, the statute refers to the period as “a probationary period” in the singular tense.   (Emphasis added.)  General Statutes § 10–157(b).  Second, the removal by Public Act 12–116 of a provision allowing an acting superintendent to receive or obtain an extension of his or her time as acting superintendent supports the interpretation of “probationary period” as a single period.   Compare General Statutes § 10–157(b) with General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 10–157(b).  Third, the fact that the General Assembly explicitly elected to label the period a “probationary period” when it had not previously been called as such, suggests that it is limited.   Fourth, the notion that the statute intends to strictly construe the number of terms allowed is congruent with subsection (a), which limits the term a superintendent may serve to three years at a time barring reappointment, thus indicating that the statute does not contemplate flexibility.   Fifth, the Supreme Court has previously strictly construed the term of appointment provided by the predecessor statute to § 10–157, General Statutes (Rev. to 1949) § 1442, albeit within a different factual context.   See Alcorn v. Thomas, 127 Conn. 426, 429, 17 A.2d 514 (1941) (examining § 1442 and finding inapplicable doctrine that public officer “shall hold over until his successor is elected” because “where, by the Constitution or statute, a fixed term is specified, without provision for continuance thereafter, the incumbent ceases to hold office de jure after the expiration of the term”).   Sixth, allowing more than one probationary period would defeat the purpose of creating a narrow exception to the formal certification requirements of subsection (a) because it would allow them to be circumvented by an individual who simply served one probationary period after another, whereby the individual could serve as acting superintendent indefinitely.   This would be contrary to the goal of the statute, which is to permit an exceptionally qualified individual a single opportunity to demonstrate that he or she does not require a subsection (a) certification because he or she has credentials and experience that are similar to a certification.   Subsections (b) and (c) therefore do much more than merely provide a second method by which an individual may become a superintendent, and a strict construction of the number of terms of office allowed an acting superintendent is appropriate..  FN23. The statute limits the number of probationary periods a particular individual may serve to a single probationary period, i.e., available to the individual only once, for the following reasons.   First, the statute refers to the period as “a probationary period” in the singular tense.   (Emphasis added.)  General Statutes § 10–157(b).  Second, the removal by Public Act 12–116 of a provision allowing an acting superintendent to receive or obtain an extension of his or her time as acting superintendent supports the interpretation of “probationary period” as a single period.   Compare General Statutes § 10–157(b) with General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 10–157(b).  Third, the fact that the General Assembly explicitly elected to label the period a “probationary period” when it had not previously been called as such, suggests that it is limited.   Fourth, the notion that the statute intends to strictly construe the number of terms allowed is congruent with subsection (a), which limits the term a superintendent may serve to three years at a time barring reappointment, thus indicating that the statute does not contemplate flexibility.   Fifth, the Supreme Court has previously strictly construed the term of appointment provided by the predecessor statute to § 10–157, General Statutes (Rev. to 1949) § 1442, albeit within a different factual context.   See Alcorn v. Thomas, 127 Conn. 426, 429, 17 A.2d 514 (1941) (examining § 1442 and finding inapplicable doctrine that public officer “shall hold over until his successor is elected” because “where, by the Constitution or statute, a fixed term is specified, without provision for continuance thereafter, the incumbent ceases to hold office de jure after the expiration of the term”).   Sixth, allowing more than one probationary period would defeat the purpose of creating a narrow exception to the formal certification requirements of subsection (a) because it would allow them to be circumvented by an individual who simply served one probationary period after another, whereby the individual could serve as acting superintendent indefinitely.   This would be contrary to the goal of the statute, which is to permit an exceptionally qualified individual a single opportunity to demonstrate that he or she does not require a subsection (a) certification because he or she has credentials and experience that are similar to a certification.   Subsections (b) and (c) therefore do much more than merely provide a second method by which an individual may become a superintendent, and a strict construction of the number of terms of office allowed an acting superintendent is appropriate.

FN24. In addition, a review of the legislative history of Public Act 12–116 indicates that at least one member of the House of Representatives, Representative Roldan, characterized the “school leadership program” as “undefined” by the statute.   See 55 H.R. Proc., Pt. 23, 2012 Sess., p. 7612, remarks of Representative Kelvin Roldan..  FN24. In addition, a review of the legislative history of Public Act 12–116 indicates that at least one member of the House of Representatives, Representative Roldan, characterized the “school leadership program” as “undefined” by the statute.   See 55 H.R. Proc., Pt. 23, 2012 Sess., p. 7612, remarks of Representative Kelvin Roldan.

FN25. The court's finding here is limited to the narrow conclusion that the course completed by Vallas was not a “school leadership program” as that phrase is understood by subsection (b) and, accordingly, that the course was not subject to submission to the State Board of Education for approval.   Thus, any approval by the State Board of Education was void ab initio.   The court makes no findings as to whether the program was properly “approved” by the State Board of Education, in the sense that the court will not review, and indeed has no basis upon which to review, whether the State Board of Education's April 15, 2013 approval was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.   See, e.g., General Statutes § 4–183(j) (“The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are ․ arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion”)..  FN25. The court's finding here is limited to the narrow conclusion that the course completed by Vallas was not a “school leadership program” as that phrase is understood by subsection (b) and, accordingly, that the course was not subject to submission to the State Board of Education for approval.   Thus, any approval by the State Board of Education was void ab initio.   The court makes no findings as to whether the program was properly “approved” by the State Board of Education, in the sense that the court will not review, and indeed has no basis upon which to review, whether the State Board of Education's April 15, 2013 approval was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.   See, e.g., General Statutes § 4–183(j) (“The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are ․ arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion”).

FN26. Because § 10–157(b) explicitly directs that the “school leadership program” an acting superintendent need complete must also be offered by an institution of higher education within the state, it is appropriate, in the course of determining the plain meaning and understanding of the word “program” as it is used by the statute, to look to the plain meaning of that word as understood by administrative officials at institutions of higher education in the state.   DeFranco testified at trial that he would be involved in the approval of any “program” at the Neag School of Education in a “signatory capacity.”.  FN26. Because § 10–157(b) explicitly directs that the “school leadership program” an acting superintendent need complete must also be offered by an institution of higher education within the state, it is appropriate, in the course of determining the plain meaning and understanding of the word “program” as it is used by the statute, to look to the plain meaning of that word as understood by administrative officials at institutions of higher education in the state.   DeFranco testified at trial that he would be involved in the approval of any “program” at the Neag School of Education in a “signatory capacity.”

FN27. Vallas argues that it is improper for the court to look to the executive leadership program as a standard by which to evaluate whether the course was a “program” within the meaning of the statute because § 10–157(b) is intended to circumvent the certification requirements of § 10–157(a) and the executive leadership program is intended to allow an individual to obtain a subsection (a) certification.   But the court's conclusion is not that the three credit course fails to qualify as a “school leadership program” on the ground that it was not the “executive leadership program”;  instead, the executive leadership program serves as a separate example of a “program” at the very institution at which Vallas took and completed the course..  FN27. Vallas argues that it is improper for the court to look to the executive leadership program as a standard by which to evaluate whether the course was a “program” within the meaning of the statute because § 10–157(b) is intended to circumvent the certification requirements of § 10–157(a) and the executive leadership program is intended to allow an individual to obtain a subsection (a) certification.   But the court's conclusion is not that the three credit course fails to qualify as a “school leadership program” on the ground that it was not the “executive leadership program”;  instead, the executive leadership program serves as a separate example of a “program” at the very institution at which Vallas took and completed the course.

FN28. For example, General Statutes § 32–9p provides, in relevant part:  “The Commissioner of Economic and Community Development shall adopt regulations, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54, which define what constitutes a ‘major plant closing, relocation or layoff for purposes of sections 132–9p to 32–9s, inclusive.”   And General Statutes § 19a–73 provides, in relevant part:  “The Commissioner of Public Health shall adopt regulations, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54, to define occupational history.”.  FN28. For example, General Statutes § 32–9p provides, in relevant part:  “The Commissioner of Economic and Community Development shall adopt regulations, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54, which define what constitutes a ‘major plant closing, relocation or layoff for purposes of sections 132–9p to 32–9s, inclusive.”   And General Statutes § 19a–73 provides, in relevant part:  “The Commissioner of Public Health shall adopt regulations, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54, to define occupational history.”

FN29. During the trial, both Vallas and Villanova also referred to the six standards as “tasks” or “modules.”.  FN29. During the trial, both Vallas and Villanova also referred to the six standards as “tasks” or “modules.”

Bellis, Barbara N., J.