Luigi Osso v. Marc Automotive, Inc. et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS

ISSUE AND SUBMISSION

The issue presented is whether the Court should grant the apportionment defendants' (DiLisio and Elmsford) motion to dismiss because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them.

FACTS

On April 12, 2013, the plaintiffs, Luigi and Maria Osso, filed a four-count complaint against the defendants, Marc Automotive, Inc. and Children's Center of Hamden, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as “Children's Center”).   The complaint alleges the following relevant facts.   Children's Center is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Connecticut that receives financial remuneration from the State in exchange for taking custody and assuming responsibility for the housing and safety of minor children.   Prior to April 20, 2010, Children's Center had assumed custody of a minor named Brian Michael Sabia.   Subsequent to their adoption of custody but prior to the events of April 20, 2010, Sabia left the Children's Center on at least four occasions;  on one such occasion, Sabia stole and wrecked a car from the lot of Marc Automotive, Inc. On April 20, 2010, Sabia walked away from the Children's Center for a fifth time, stole a car from Marc Automotive, Inc. and, while being pursued by the police in the village of Irvington, New York, crashed into and severely injured Luigi Osso. The plaintiffs claim that Children's Center's negligence resulted in injuries to Luigi Osso and loss of consortium to Maria Osso.

On August 21, 2012, Children's Center filed a five-count apportionment complaint pursuant to General Statutes §§ 52–572h and 52–102b against five parties:  Sabia;  Gianpaolo DiLisio;  Angela Rashad a/k/a Angela Riley;  the village of Elmsford, New York (hereinafter referred to as “Elmsford”);  and the town of Greenburgh, New York (hereinafter referred to as “Greenburgh”).   In this apportionment complaint, Children's Center alleged that DiLisio was a police officer for Elmsford who was engaged in the police chase of Sabia on the night of the accident.   Children's Center claimed that, if the plaintiffs' injuries were the result of negligence, the injuries were caused in whole or in part by the negligence of DiLisio by, inter alia, engaging in a high speed car chase with Sabia when it was not reasonably safe to do so and the negligence of Elmsford by, inter alia, failing to properly train its officers about responding to emergency situations and high speed chases.

On October 18, 2012, DiLisio and Elmsford filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them.   They submitted a memorandum of law and two affidavits in support of their motion.   On March 13, 2013, Children's Center filed its memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss.   Although submitting no new evidence, Children's Center referenced its previous objection to two motions for protective order that it filed on November 8, 2012, and several unauthenticated exhibits submitted in conjunction with that memorandum.¹  On March 15, 2013, DiLisio and Elmsford filed a reply to Children's Center's memorandum in opposition.

The Court heard the matter at short calendar on March 18, 2013.

DISCUSSION

“A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 301 Conn. 759, 774, 23 A.3d 1192 (2012).  “Because a lack of personal jurisdiction may be waived by the defendant, the rules of practice require the defendant to challenge that jurisdiction by a motion to dismiss.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Golodner v. Women's Center of Southeastern Connecticut, Inc., 281 Conn. 819, 825, 917 A.2d 959 (2007).

“When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light ․ In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).  “In contrast, if the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss ․ other types of undisputed evidence ․ and/or public records of which judicial notice may be taken ․ the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint ․ Rather, those allegations are tempered by the light shed on them by the [supplementary undisputed facts] ․ If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant's motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits ․ or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings.”  (Citations omitted;  emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 651–52.

“[W]here a jurisdictional determination is dependent on the resolution of a critical factual dispute, it cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss in the absence of an evidentiary hearing to establish jurisdictional facts ․ Likewise, if the question of jurisdiction is intertwined with the merits of the case, a court cannot resolve the jurisdictional question without a hearing to evaluate those merits ․ An evidentiary hearing is necessary because a court cannot make a critical factual [jurisdictional] finding based on memoranda and documents submitted by the parties.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 652–53.   If a trial court “resolve[s] a critical fact on the basis of the complaint and the affidavits, both of which contained controverted facts ․ the court improperly decided the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing.”  Coughlin v. Waterbury, 61 Conn.App. 310, 315–16, 763 A.2d 1058 (2001).

In the present case, DiLisio and Elmsford argue that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction on two grounds.   First, they argue that their behavior does not fall into any of the applicable statutes for the assertion of longarm jurisdiction.   Second, DiLisio and Elmsford contend that, even if their actions are deemed to fall within one of the longarm statutes, the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over them would violate due process.

In its memorandum in opposition to DiLisio and Elmsford's motion to dismiss, Children's Center does not concretely address under which provisions of the longarm statutes it believes that this Court may assert jurisdiction;  rather, it argues that various facts gleaned from the various pieces of evidence that it references in its objection suggest contractual relationships and other relationships between Elmsford and nearby towns and agencies including Connecticut towns and agencies.   It then argues that this Court can authorize discovery for the purposes of determining its own jurisdiction, that discovery is ongoing and that it would be premature to address the question of whether the contacts are sufficient for the Court to assert continued jurisdiction over DiLisio and Elmsford.

Finally, in their March 15, 2013 reply to Children's Center's memorandum in opposition, DiLisio and Elmsford make several counterarguments.   First, they argue that, contrary to Children's Center's contentions that the motion to dismiss would be premature as the case is in the middle of discovery, this motion was not premature because it was brought in accordance with the applicable rules and procedures.   Second, they note that many of Children's Center's factual allegations rely on unsubstantiated evidence and that Children's Center has not submitted an affidavit or any other type of substantiated evidence.   Third, they argue that many of these factual allegations arising from this unsubstantiated evidence do not demonstrate that there are sufficient minimum contacts here to satisfy due process.

“When a defendant files a motion to dismiss challenging the court's jurisdiction, a two part inquiry is required.   The trial court must first decide whether the applicable state long-arm statute authorizes the assertion of jurisdiction over the [defendant].   If the statutory requirements [are] met, its second obligation [is] then to decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the [defendant] would violate constitutional principles of due process.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd., 236 Conn. 602, 606, 674 A.2d 426 (1996).  “Only if [the court] find[s] the statute to be applicable do[es][it] reach the question whether it would offend due process to assert jurisdiction.”  Lombard Bros., Inc. v. General Asset Management Co., 190 Conn. 245, 250, 460 A.2d 481 (1983).  “If a challenge to the court's personal jurisdiction is raised by a defendant, either by a foreign corporation or by a nonresident individual, the plaintiff must bear the burden of proving the court's jurisdiction.”  Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd., supra, 607.

The longarm statute applicable to nonresident individuals is found within § 52–59b(a), which provides in relevant part:  “As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident individual ․ who in person or through an agent:  (1) Transacts any business within the state;  (2) commits a tortious act within the state ․ (3) commits a tortious act outside the state causing injury to person or property within the state ․ if such person or agent (A) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or (B) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce;  (4) owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state;  or (5) uses a computer, as defined in [General Statutes § 53–451(a)(1) ], or a computer network, as defined in [§ 53–451(a)(3) ], located within the state.”

“In analyzing jurisdiction under General Statutes § 52–59b, Connecticut courts often follow judicial interpretation given to New York Civil Practice Law § 302, which was used by the legislature as a model for Connecticut's long arm statute.”   Schembri v. Physicians for Women, P.C., Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV 323672 (May 19, 1997, Stodolink, J.) (19 Conn. L. Rptr. 465, 467), citing Zartolas v. Nisenfeld, 184 Conn. 471, 474, 440 A.2d 179 (1981).  “Under New York's C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3), [t]he situs of the injury is the location of the original event which caused the injury, not the location where the resultant damages are subsequently felt by the plaintiff.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id.

The longarm statute applicable to foreign corporations, § 33–929(f), provides in relevant part:  “Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state, by a resident of this state or by a person having a usual place of business in this state, whether or not such foreign corporation is transacting or has transacted business in this state and whether or not it is engaged exclusively in interstate or foreign commerce, on any cause of action arising as follows:  (1) Out of any contract made in this state or to be performed in this state;  (2) out of any business solicited in this state by mail or otherwise if the corporation has repeatedly so solicited business, whether the orders or offers relating thereto were accepted within or without the state;  (3) out of the production, manufacture or distribution of goods by such corporation with the reasonable expectation that such goods are to be used or consumed in this state and are so used or consumed, regardless of how or where the goods were produced, manufactured, marketed or sold or whether or not through the medium of independent contractors or dealers;  or (4) out of tortious conduct in this state, whether arising out of repeated activity or single acts, and whether arising out of misfeasance or nonfeasance.”   The General Statutes define “foreign corporation” in this context broadly;  see General Statutes § 33–602(15) (defining “foreign corporation” as “a corporation incorporated under a law other than the law of this state”);  and at least one prior decision of the Superior Court has applied this longarm statute to a foreign municipality.   See Santa Buckley Energy, Inc. v. Arlington, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 12 6027767 (October 31, 2012, Gilardi, J.T.R.) [55 Conn. L. Rptr. 44].

“Section 33–929 (f)(4) ․ requires that the alleged tortious conduct be committed within Connecticut for jurisdiction to exist ․ It is not enough that the consequences of the defendants' acts impact a plaintiff in Connecticut;  the tortious conduct must be directly and expressly targeted at the forum state to support jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.”   (Citations omitted.)   Swain v. American Capital Strategies, Ltd., Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Middletown, Docket No. X04 CV 03 0103924 (August 4, 2004, Quinn, J.).

In the present case, DiLisio and Elmsford have each submitted an affidavit in support of their motion to dismiss.²  In his signed and sworn affidavit, DiLisio attests to the following facts.   He is a resident of New York and has been employed in law enforcement for Elmsford since December 19, 2005.   Though currently employed as a detective, he was first employed as a police officer and held that position on April 21, 2010.   He has never been employed in Connecticut, has never been a resident of Connecticut and has never engaged in any business transactions in Connecticut.   Finally, during the circumstances at the center of the Ossos' complaint, DiLisio at no time left the State of New York.

Michael Mills, the village administrator for Elmsford, submitted a signed and sworn affidavit testifying as to the following relevant facts.   Mills has been village administrator for Elmsford since November 2002, and in this capacity has personal knowledge and understanding of the village's dealings and business transactions with other municipalities.   Elmsford has no business relationship with Connecticut, does not conduct any business in Connecticut and has not entered into any contracts with Connecticut.   Additionally, Elmsford does not have any continuous and systematic business contacts with Connecticut and does not purposely direct its business activities at Connecticut residents.

Children's Center has referenced a significant number of exhibits from a prior pleading in their objection, but has not submitted an affidavit authenticating any of these exhibits, and no independent basis for authenticating them is immediately apparent.   Although the Court has discretion to consider unauthenticated evidence when no party has objected;  see Barlow v. Palmer, 96 Conn.App. 88, 92, 898 A.2d 835 (2006);  DiLisio and Elmsford have contested Children's Center's reliance on this evidence in the present matter, and it will therefore not be considered.

As it is undisputed that DiLisio is a resident of the State of New York, the Court must find that he is subject to the Court's jurisdiction pursuant to at least one provision of § 52–59b(a) to sustain Children's Center's objection.   All allegations levied by Children's Center's apportionment complaint at DiLisio concern his alleged negligence or other misconduct in the high speed pursuit of Sabia.   There are no allegations within the complaint that any of his actions while engaged in this high speed pursuit occurred in Connecticut;  indeed, as DiLisio attests in his affidavit and Children's Center does not attempt to refute, at no time during the incident in question did DiLisio leave the State of New York. Subdivisions (1) and (2) of § 52–59b therefore provide no basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over DiLisio.³  Further, subdivision (3) fails to provide such a basis as there is neither any allegation or fact in the record to indicate that her participation in such high speed chases constitute a “persistent course of conduct” for DiLisio nor do the allegations underlying Children's Center's claims against her involve any act that can be reasonably construed as the solicitation of business or the derivation of substantial revenue from goods or services within this state, interstate commerce or international commerce.   Finally, Children's Center has not alleged or demonstrated that DiLisio owns any property in Connecticut or has used a computer or computer network located within this state with regards to the alleged high speed chase.   Therefore, subdivisions (4) and (5) also do not provide a basis for jurisdiction.   It is submitted that there is no basis under § 52–59b(a) for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over DiLisio.

Turning to the allegations against Elmsford, Elmsford raises three arguments for why there is no longarm jurisdiction over it in the present case.   The first two can be quickly addressed.   Elmsford claims that it is questionable whether Connecticut can exercise longarm jurisdiction over it because there is no longarm statute that confers jurisdiction over foreign municipalities.   It also claims that, if the Court treats Elmsford similarly to a foreign corporation under § 33–929, that jurisdiction would be improper under that statute because the Ossos are neither residents of this state nor do they have a usual place of business in this state.

As noted previously in this opinion, however, the General Statute's definition for foreign corporation as it relates to § 33–929 is quite broad and has been applied in the past by the Superior Court to apply to foreign municipalities.   See pp. 7–8 of this memorandum.   Further, villages can be incorporated entities under New York law.   See N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 1–102 (McKinney 2011) (providing that each village “heretofore or hereafter incorporated shall continue to be a municipal corporation in perpetuity under its corporate name and the same shall in that name be a body politic and corporate in fact and in law ․”).  Therefore, as a foreign municipality, § 33–929 applies to Elmsford.

Additionally, in response to Elmsford's second argument, § 52–102b provides the means for a defendant to “serve a writ, summons and complaint upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable pursuant to said section for a proportionate share of the plaintiff's damages ․ in a negligence action subject to § 52–572h;  General Statutes § 52–102b(a);  and that this complaint “shall be equivalent in all respects to an original writ, summons and complaint, except that it shall include the docket number assigned to the original action and no new entry fee shall be imposed.”  General Statutes § 52–102b(b).  Here, the apportionment claim against Elmsford was brought not by the Ossos, but rather by Children's Center, which the original complaint alleges is incorporated under Connecticut law and has its principal place of business in Hamden, Connecticut.   Therefore, as Children's Center is a Connecticut resident or at least has a usual place of business in this state, the Osso's residency is irrelevant to the present analysis.

Elmsford's third argument concerning longarm jurisdiction is that there is no basis under § 33–929(f) for asserting jurisdiction over it.   Like those allegations by Children's Center against DiLisio, all of Children's Center's allegations against Elmsford concern the latter's tortious behavior—specifically, Elmsford's purported failure, inter alia, to train properly and to supervise adequately its officers in addressing situations such as the high speed chase here and to enact and enforce policies to prevent its officers from engaging in such high speed chases.   On the face of these allegations and without any basis for finding a connection between them and any contracts made or to be performed in Connecticut, any solicitation of business in Connecticut or any production, manufacture or distribution of goods in Connecticut by Elmsford, subdivisions (1), (2) and (3) of § 33–929(f) do not apply.   Further, despite having the burden of proof to demonstrate jurisdiction in this matter, Children's Center has alleged no facts within its apportionment complaint or provided any admissible evidence from which this Court could find that any negligent action by Elmsford concerning the training or supervision of its officers concerning high speed chases or the enaction or enforcement of its policies occurred within Connecticut.   There is thus no basis under subdivision (4) for finding that Elmsford could have committed a tortious act within Connecticut.   Therefore, there is no basis under § 33–929(f) for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over Elmsford.

The arguments of Children's Center in opposition are unavailing for two reasons.   To begin, many of its arguments concerning personal jurisdiction focus on aspects of the due process analysis.   The Court does not reach those considerations, however, unless it first finds that a defendant's activities bring it within the longarm statute.   This is true even if constitutional due process would not be offended by the exercise of jurisdiction.   See Bennett v. Performance Racing & Marine, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 98 0417998 (January 27, 1999, Silbert, J.) (“[i]f the conduct of a foreign corporation does not fit within the terms of § 33–929(f), the courts of this state do not have personal jurisdiction over that corporation, even though jurisdiction would otherwise be conferred under the federal due process clause of the U.S. [C]onstitution”).

Turning to the primary argument raised in its objection, Children's Center contends that dismissal would be inappropriate here as “the pertinent facts are in dispute, no such opportunity [to perform jurisdictional discovery] has been provided, and without more the [c]ourt has jurisdiction at least to allow discovery.”   Children's Center's Omnibus Opposition to Apportionment Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (# 167), p. 10.   DiLisio and Elmsford argue that Children's Center's contentions that it has been unable to conduct necessary jurisdictional discovery “stands in the face of [Children's Center's] factual allegations and does not explain why it has not been able to at least establish a minimal showing aside from pure allegations lacking substantive support.”   DiLisio and Elmsford's Reply to Children's Center's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (# 168), p. 3.

“The granting or denial of a discovery request rests in the sound discretion of the court”;  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 57, 459 A.2d 503 (1983);  though this discretion is limited by the Practice Book's rules on discovery.   See id., 57–60, citing Practice Book §§ 217 through 221 (now §§ 13–2 through 13–5).

Children's Center's situation is distinguishable from the case upon which it primarily relies, Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy.   There, “the [Supreme] Court held that when issues of fact are necessary to the determination of a court's jurisdiction, due process requires that a trial-like hearing be held, in which an opportunity is provided to present evidence and to cross-examine adverse witnesses ․ In that case, the trial court refused to postpone a hearing on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction to permit pre-hearing discovery on acknowledged issues of jurisdiction fact.   The Supreme Court ruled that, because the trial court had already recognized that a factual presentation was necessary, it was an abuse of discretion to deny the plaintiff any opportunity for discovery.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Cece–York v. Saturn of Stamford, Inc., Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Stamford, Docket No. X08 CV 09 5012420 (September 22, 2010, Jennings, J.T.R.), citing Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, supra, 190 Conn. 56, 60.

As the Court noted in Cece–York v. Saturn of Stamford, Inc., however, “Standard Tallow did not change the general rule that [s]hould the court find the affidavits and supporting memoranda to be sufficient, the court need not conduct an evidentiary hearing ․ or the rule that if affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant's motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counter affidavits ․ or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings ․” (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Cece–York v. Saturn of Stamford, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. X08 CV 09 5012420 (September 22, 2010, Jennings, J.T.R.), citing Hagar v. Zaidman, 797 F.Sup. 132, 134 (D.Conn.1992), and Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportion, 293 Conn. 342, 348, 977 A.2d 636 (2009).

In the present case, Children's Center, like the plaintiff in Cece–York v. Saturn of Stamford, Inc.,”has not pled allegations that raise jurisdictional issues of fact and the evidence before the court is sufficient to determine whether the court has jurisdiction over each of the individual [apportionment defendants] to this [m]otion to [d]ismiss.”  Cece–York v. Saturn of Stamford, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. X08 CV 09 5012420.   Their original pleadings note only the negligence of DiLisio, inter alia, for his behavior during the high speed chase and Elmsford, inter alia, for its training and supervision;  no allegation, however, can be reasonably construed to potentially place these acts or any part thereof within this state.   Additionally, even if prior evidentiary rulings have foreclosed the ability of Children's Center to pursue discovery directly from the apportionment defendants, Children's Center has neither submitted nor noted any attempt to acquire any competing affidavits or certified evidence from other persons not covered by the protective orders.   Finally, an examination of the allegations in the complaint and the apportionment complaint as tempered by the undisputed facts of record demonstrates that no material fact is in dispute, thus making an evidentiary hearing unnecessary in the present matter.   See Weihing v. Dodsworth, 100 Conn.App. 29, 38, 917 A.2d 53 (2007) (“the due process requirement of a hearing is required only when issues of facts are disputed” [emphasis in original] ).   Thus, this basis will not protect the apportionment claims of Children's Center from the present motion to dismiss.

As the Court can find that there is no basis under the applicable longarm statutes to exercise jurisdiction over DiLisio and Elmsford, it is further submitted that the Court does not have to address the second prong concerning due process.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted.

By Iannotti, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Specifically, these exhibits include:  portions of the DMA 2000 Hazard Mitigation Plan—Greater Greenburgh Planning Area, New York (Exhibit [Ex.] A);  the home page from the Greenburgh police department's website (Ex. B);  a portion of the Facebook page for the Greenburgh drug and alcohol task force (Ex. C);  a portion of the New York state SCIP implementation report (Ex. D);  a web page concerning stolen cars from the Elmsford police department's website (Ex. E);  a web page on accreditation from the Elmsford police department's website (Ex. F);  a portion of the Blueprint for Effective Law Enforcement (Ex. G);  a portion of Standard 43.4, entitled “Vehicle Pursuits,” from the New York state law enforcement accreditation program's Standards and Compliance Verification Manual (Ex. H);  a directory of offices for states participating in the Interstate Compact for Parole and Probation Supervision (Ex. I);  the April 22, 2010 police report produced by Rashad (Ex. J);  the October 27, 2011 resolution by town board of Greenburgh to retain USI Insurance Services of Connecticut, Inc. (Ex. K);  and copies of notices of deposition sent to Greenburgh and Elmsford (Ex. L)..  FN1. Specifically, these exhibits include:  portions of the DMA 2000 Hazard Mitigation Plan—Greater Greenburgh Planning Area, New York (Exhibit [Ex.] A);  the home page from the Greenburgh police department's website (Ex. B);  a portion of the Facebook page for the Greenburgh drug and alcohol task force (Ex. C);  a portion of the New York state SCIP implementation report (Ex. D);  a web page concerning stolen cars from the Elmsford police department's website (Ex. E);  a web page on accreditation from the Elmsford police department's website (Ex. F);  a portion of the Blueprint for Effective Law Enforcement (Ex. G);  a portion of Standard 43.4, entitled “Vehicle Pursuits,” from the New York state law enforcement accreditation program's Standards and Compliance Verification Manual (Ex. H);  a directory of offices for states participating in the Interstate Compact for Parole and Probation Supervision (Ex. I);  the April 22, 2010 police report produced by Rashad (Ex. J);  the October 27, 2011 resolution by town board of Greenburgh to retain USI Insurance Services of Connecticut, Inc. (Ex. K);  and copies of notices of deposition sent to Greenburgh and Elmsford (Ex. L).

FN2. The Court should not consider DiLisio's and Mills' affidavits to the extent that information within them consists of unsupported legal conclusions.  “[A] party's conclusory statements, in the affidavit and elsewhere ․ do not constitute evidence sufficient to establish the existence of disputed material facts.”  Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 583, 687 A.2d 111 (1996)..  FN2. The Court should not consider DiLisio's and Mills' affidavits to the extent that information within them consists of unsupported legal conclusions.  “[A] party's conclusory statements, in the affidavit and elsewhere ․ do not constitute evidence sufficient to establish the existence of disputed material facts.”  Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 583, 687 A.2d 111 (1996).

FN3. Children's Center attempts to portray the actions of the other apportionment defendants as being “engaged in the business of law enforcement, particularly the recovery of stolen vehicles.”   Children's Center's Onmibus Opposition to Apportionment Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (# 167), p. 13.   All of its allegations against DiLisio, however, relate to various acts of perceived misconduct in the high speed chase that ultimately lead to the Ossos' injuries.   Thus, authorizing jurisdiction under subdivision (1) would be inappropriate for the additional reason that Children's Center has not pointed to any action by DiLisio that could reasonably be construed as “transacting business.”  Boone v. William W. Backus Hospital, 272 Conn. 551, 559, 864 A.2d 1 (2005) (“[t]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court”)..  FN3. Children's Center attempts to portray the actions of the other apportionment defendants as being “engaged in the business of law enforcement, particularly the recovery of stolen vehicles.”   Children's Center's Onmibus Opposition to Apportionment Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (# 167), p. 13.   All of its allegations against DiLisio, however, relate to various acts of perceived misconduct in the high speed chase that ultimately lead to the Ossos' injuries.   Thus, authorizing jurisdiction under subdivision (1) would be inappropriate for the additional reason that Children's Center has not pointed to any action by DiLisio that could reasonably be construed as “transacting business.”  Boone v. William W. Backus Hospital, 272 Conn. 551, 559, 864 A.2d 1 (2005) (“[t]he interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court”).

Iannotti, Frank A., J.