Nicole Cadavid by her parents and next friends Luz Marina Cadavid and Jorge Cadavid v. Masood A. Ranginwala et al. (2013)

Memorandum of Decision

The minor plaintiff in this action alleged that on May 7, 2010 she was referred by her family medical practice to the emergency department at defendant Stamford Hospital for her complaint of severe abdominal pain.   At the hospital the plaintiff was treated by defendant Ranginwala, a physician who discharged her with a diagnosis of probable viral gastroenteritis.   On May 11, 2010 the plaintiff returned to the emergency department at Stamford Hospital and was seen by another physician, defendant Alexandr Rafailov, who discharged her with a diagnosis of an ovarian cyst.   On May 12, 2010 the plaintiff returned to the emergency department and, following a CT scan, was diagnosed with a perforated appendix.

In the first count of her complaint the plaintiff claims that Drs. Ranginwala and Rafailov were professionally negligent in failing to diagnose her appendicitis on either May 7 or May 11, by failing to conduct appropriate tests and by discharging her prematurely.   She further alleges that both doctors were, at all relevant times, employees of defendant Emergency Medicine Physicians of Fairfield County, LLC. In the second count of her complaint the plaintiff claims that Stamford Hospital was negligent in the training and supervision of Drs. Ranginwala and Rafailov.   In her third count the plaintiff claims that Stamford Hospital is vicariously liable for the negligence of Emergency Medicine Physicians of Fairfield County, LLC, as it was acting as the agent of Stamford Hospital.   The fourth count alleges the liability of Stamford Hospital for the negligence of Drs. Ranginwala and Rafailov on the theory of apparent authority.   The fifth count alleges the liability of Stamford Hospital for the negligence of Emergency Medicine Physicians of Fairfield County, LLC on the theory of apparent authority.   The sixth count alleges the liability of Stamford Hospital for the negligence of Drs. Ranginwala and Rafailov on the theory of non-delegable duty.   The seventh count alleges the liability of Stamford Hospital for the negligence of Emergency Medicine Physicians of Fairfield County, LLC on the theory of non-delegable duty.   The eighth count is brought against Dr. Ranginwala personally.   The ninth count is brought against Dr. Rafailov personally.   The tenth count alleges that Stamford Hospital was negligent in failing see that the physicians staffing its emergency department were properly hired, credentialed and qualified.   The eleventh count alleges that Stamford Hospital is liable for the negligence of Drs. Ranginwala and Rafailov on the theory of actual authority.

Presently before the court is a motion to strike, dated February 12, 2013 filed by defendant Stamford Hospital. (# 143.00.) That motion seeks to strike the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh counts of the plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that:  1) Connecticut does not acknowledge the existence of causes of action in tort based on apparent authority;  and 2) the doctrine of non-delegable duty does not apply to hospitals.   The plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to strike on March 4, 2013.   Stamford Hospital filed a reply memorandum of law on March 14, 2013 and the motion was heard on short calendar on April 22, 2013.

DISCUSSION

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498 (2003).  “[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied ․ It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted ․ Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 318 (2006).

APPARENT AUTHORITY—FOURTH AND FIFTH COUNTS

In its motion to strike the fourth and fifth counts, Stamford Hospital claims that Connecticut does not recognize a cause of action against a principal founded on torts committed by an apparent agent.   Stamford Hospital claims that the case of L and V Contractors, LLC v. Heritage Warranty Ins. Risk Retention Group, Inc., 136 Conn.App. 662 (2012), controls.

The Connecticut Supreme Court has defined the concept of apparent authority in Fireman's Fund Ind. Co. v. Longshore Beach & Country Club, Inc., 127 Conn. 493, 496–97 (1941).   The court stated:  “Apparent and ostensible authority is such authority as a principal intentionally, or by want of ordinary care, causes or allows a third person to believe that the agent possesses.   This authority to act as agent may be conferred if the principal affirmatively or intentionally or by lack of ordinary care, causes or allows third persons to act on an apparent agency.   It is essential to the application of the above general rule that two important facts be clearly established:  (1) that the principal held the agent out to the public as possessing sufficient authority to embrace the particular act in question, or knowingly permitted him to act as having such authority;  and (2) that the person dealing with the agent knew of the facts and acting in good faith had reason to believe and did believe that the agent possessed the necessary authority.   The apparent power of an agent is to be determined by the acts of the principal and not by the acts of the agent ․” (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)

In L and V Contractors, LLC v. Heritage Warranty Ins. Risk Retention Group, supra, the case relied on by Stamford Hospital, our Appellate Court reversed a Superior Court decision which, following a trial, had found a defendant vicariously liable for the torts committed by its apparent agent, reasoning:  “Connecticut ․ has yet to apply the doctrine of apparent authority to allow for a principal to be held liable to a third person who was harmed by the tortious conduct of a person held out as the principal's agent.   In Mullen v. Horton, 46 Conn.App. 759, 771, 700 A.2d 1377 (1997), this court observed that other states have used the doctrine of apparent authority to hold a principal, who represents that another is his servant or agent and thereby causes a third person to rely justifiably on the care or skill of such agent, vicariously liable for harm caused to the third person by the lack of care or skill of his servant or agent.   The court, however, noted that the doctrine had never been used in such a manner in Connecticut and, therefore, concluded that the doctrine of apparent authority was inapplicable to the case before it ․ In Davies v. General Tours, Inc., 63 Conn.App. 17, 31, 774 A.2d 1063 (2001), cert. granted on other grounds, 256 Conn. 926, 776 A.2d 1143 (2001) (appeal withdrawn October 18, 2001), this court again determined that the doctrine of apparent authority should not be used to hold a principal liable for the tortious conduct of a person held out as its agent.   Citing Mullen, we determined that apparent authority is not a viable ground on which to premise liability against a [principal] sued for the torts of an alleged agent.”   (Emphasis added;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  136 Conn.App. at 496–97.

In contrast to the present case, the facts before the Appellate Court, in L and v. Contractors, Mullen and Davies, did not involve claims of professional medical negligence.   In L and v. Contractors, the owner of an SUV claimed that a transmission company, AAMCO, which had contracted with a transmission repair shop owner to assume the AAMCO brand name when dealing with customers, was responsible for the alleged statutory theft by the repair shop of the plaintiff's SUV. In Mullen, a counselee-parishioner claimed that a religious institution was responsible for the tortious conduct of a priest-psychologist arising out of a sexual relationship while the priest was providing spiritual and psychological counseling to the plaintiff.   In Davies, a plaintiff traveler claimed that a vacation tour company was responsible for the negligence of a tour bus driver for an injury the plaintiff sustained while dismounting a tour bus.

In fact, in Davies, the Appellate Court itself noted a meaningful distinction between that case and cases involving negligence claims against hospitals.   See Center v. Kost, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 08 5021444 (August 4, 2011, Wilson, J.) (52 Conn. L. Rptr. 426, 431) (“In fact, the court in Davies distinguished itself from Superior Court cases where causes of actions were permitted against hospitals for acts of independent contractors who were held out to be employees.”).   Specifically, the Davies court stated:  “The plaintiff cites [Wilverding v. Ostrowitz, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 334949 (February 28, 2000) (26 Conn. L. Rptr. 632, 633);  Francisco v. Hartford Gynecological Center, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford–New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 513841 (March 1, 1994) (11 Conn. L. Rptr. 191, 192) ] ․ Those cases, at most, permitted causes of action against hospitals for the acts or omissions of independent contractors who were held out by the hospitals to be employees, not partners.   We have found no Connecticut authority favoring the plaintiff's proposition that this same reasoning should apply to the tenuous relationship between a tour operator and an independent contractor ․” (Emphasis in original.)   Davies v. General Tours, Inc., supra, 63Conn.App. 32–33.

Although it stated that “Connecticut ․ ha[d] yet to apply the doctrine of apparent authority [in the tort context]”;  L and V Contractors, LLC v. Heritage Warranty Ins. Risk Retention Group, Inc., supra, 136 Conn.App. 669;  the Appellate Court, in L and v. Contractors, failed to address numerous Superior Court decisions that had previously recognized apparent authority as a proper basis for tort liability in medical malpractice cases.   For instance, in a case preceding L and v. Contractors, Judge Jennings noted that “[s]everal trial courts, state and federal, have nonetheless denied hospitals' motions for summary judgment directed to vicarious liability claims of apparent agency in medical malpractice cases.” ¹  Spaulding v. Rovner, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Stamford–Norwalk, Docket No. X08 CV 044001232 (April 3, 2009, Jennings, J.) (47 Conn. L. Rptr. 544, 547).   See also Center v. Kost, supra, 52 Conn. L. Rptr. 426, 431, citing Menzie v. Windham Community Memorial Hospital, 774 F.Sup. 91, 97 (D.Conn.1991).

The Appellate Court, in L and v. Contractors, Mullen and Davies, failed to follow, or even address, Fireman's Fund Ind. Co. v. Longshore Beach & Country Club, Inc., supra, 127 Conn. 493, wherein our Supreme Court considered apparent authority as a valid legal basis for imposing tort liability against a principal.   In Fireman's Fund, the plaintiff, an insurer subrogated to the rights of its insured vehicle owner, claimed, inter alia, that a country club was vicariously liable for the negligence of its employee/night watchman, who, acting within the scope of his implied or apparent authority, damaged the plaintiff's vehicle while valet parking it.   While the Court ultimately decided that the allegations, in substance, had not sufficiently pleaded apparent authority, the Court analyzed the apparent authority based tort claim as an otherwise valid legal theory.   Specifically, the Court stated:  “Upon these facts the plaintiff ․ claims that [the employee] was acting either within the scope of his implied or his apparent authority ․ The trial court concluded that [the employee] was negligent, and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident, but that he was not acting within the scope of his employment with the defendants, and was not engaged in the performance of any duty assigned to him by the defendants, or any that was incidental thereto, nor in furtherance of the defendants' interests ․” Id., 496.   After setting forth “[a] statement of the law governing the situation as to apparent authority ․” (citation omitted) id. 496–97;  the Court concluded:  “Applying these tests to the facts found, it is apparent that [the employee] was not acting at the time even in the apparent ․ scope of his authority.”   Id., 497.

The Supreme Court has acknowledged Fireman's Fund for its application of apparent authority in tort.   In Hanson v. Transportation General, Inc., 245 Conn. 613, 617 n.5 (1998), the Court stated:  “This appeal does not involve the rights of a third party tort victim to recover against [a principal] for the misconduct of one of its drivers on the basis of the principles of actual, implied, or apparent authority.   See, e.g., Beckenstein v. Potter & Carrier, Inc., 191 Conn. 120, 132–41 (1983) (discussing agency principles in contract case);  Fireman's Fund Ind. Co. v. Longshore Beach & Country Club, Inc., 127 Conn. 493, 496–97 (1941) (applying similar agency principles in tort action).” ²

At least two Superior Court decisions, which are discussed at length below, placed significant weight on the notion that L and v. Contractors is inconsistent with Fireman's Fund and, in turn, Hanson.   See Carasone v. Gemma Power Systems, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 12 6033846 (April 17, 2013, Wilson, J.) [55 Conn. L. Rptr. 914];  Bordonaro v. Anesthesia Associates of Torrington, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield at Litchfield, Docket No. CV 10 6002739 (October 23, 2012, Danaher, J.) [55 Conn. L. Rptr. 2].

Since the Appellate Court's ruling in 2012 in L and v. Contractors, two Superior Court cases have addressed, and declined to follow, that case.   In Carasone v. Gemma Power Systems, LLC, supra, Docket No. CV 12 6033846, the plaintiff, a construction worker employed by a subcontractor, sued a general contractor, based on apparent authority, for the subcontractor's negligence during a construction accident.   In addressing the general contractor defendant's motion to strike a count premised on apparent authority, Judge Wilson stated:  “Although the defendant cites ․ L & v. Contractors ․ to [argue] that apparent authority cannot be used to premise liability against a defendant sued for the torts of an alleged agent ․ there is Supreme Court authority which appears to state otherwise ․ [I]mportantly, L & v. Contractors ․ does not address Fireman's Fund ․ wherein as this court noted, our Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of apparent authority in the context of a negligence action.   See also, Hanson ․” Carasone v. Gemma Power Systems, LLC, supra, Docket No. CV 12 6033846.   In denying the motion to strike, the court concluded:  “Having shepardized Fireman's Fund ․ this court finds that it is still good law.   Accordingly, applying the principles of [Fireman's Fund ] to the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint, this court ․ determine[s] ․ apparent authority [to be] sufficiently alleged.”   Id.

In Bordonaro v. Anesthesia Associates of Torrington, supra, Docket No. CV 10 6002739, a factually similar case to the present one, a plaintiff claimed that a hospital was vicariously liable for the negligence of a surgeon and nurse during the plaintiff's surgery at the hospital, based on a theory of apparent agency.   On moving for summary judgment, the hospital sought to establish that it did not employ the plaintiff's treating surgeon and nurse, but rather, AAT, a contractor the hospital had engaged, controlled the medical treatment the plaintiff received.   The hospital also argued that L and v. Contractors precluded the apparent authority claims against it.   Judge Danaher rejected that argument, reasoning:  “It is true that our Supreme and Appellate courts have yet to recognize apparent agency in the context of medical malpractice actions.   Nonetheless, there is ample Superior Court authority in support of the proposition that apparent authority may be maintained as a cause of action in medical malpractice actions.” ³  Id. In a footnote, the court further reasoned:  “L & V Contractors was not decided in the medical malpractice context and, more importantly, that case does not address Fireman's Fund ․ and Hanson ․” Id.

Important policy reasons have been noted in decisions allowing medical malpractice claims against hospitals based on apparent authority.   For example, in Francisco v. Hartford Gynecological, No. CV 92 0513841 (March 1, 1994, Corradino, J.) [11 Conn. L. Rptr. 191], the court denied a hospital defendant's motion for summary judgment, reasoning:  “There is no analytical reason not to extend [apparent authority] to the hospital situation, in fact there are several good policy reasons for doing so.”  Id. Among the policies noted in Francisco:  “It would be absurd to require ․ a patient to be familiar with the law of respondeat superior and so inquire of each person who treated him ․ whether he ․ is an employee of the hospital or an independent contractor.  Capan v. Divine Providence Hospital, 430 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa.1981).   Similarly ․ it would be unfair to allow the secret limitations on liability contained in a doctor's contract with the hospital to bind the unknowing patient ․ Public outrage would surely follow an announcement by a ․ hospital that it regards all staff doctors as completely independent professionals, conducts no supervision of their performance and takes no interest in their competence.  Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1191 (Oh.1980).   The public should have a right to assume that the ․ hospital to which it goes for treatment exercises medical supervision over and is responsible for the negligence of medical personnel providing services whether the hospital styles them as independent contractors or not.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id.

For the reasons stated above, the court finds that the Appellate Court's rulings in L and v. Contractors, Mullen and Davies, do not, as a matter of law, preclude the plaintiff's tort claims based on apparent authority as pleaded in the fourth and fifth counts of her complaint.

Having determined that medical malpractice claims may be asserted on the basis of apparent authority, the court will review the allegations of the fourth and fifth counts to determine whether they sufficiently allege such a cause of action.  Fireman's Fund requires in order to adequately allege a claim based on apparent authority “that two important facts be clearly established:  (1) that the principal held the agent out to the public as possessing sufficient authority to embrace the particular act in question, or knowingly permitted him to act as having such authority;  and (2) that the person dealing with the agent knew of the facts and acting in good faith had reason to believe and did believe that the agent possessed the necessary authority.”  Fireman's Fund Ind. Co. v. Longshore Beach & Country Club, Inc., supra, 127 Conn. 497.

In relevant part, the plaintiff alleges in her fourth and fifth counts the following.   While the plaintiff sought medical treatment from the hospital, the hospital failed to inform the plaintiff that Ranginwala and Rafailov were anything other than employees of the hospital, or that Emergency Medical Physicians of Fairfield County, LLC. was a subcontractor, which, in effect, would limit the hospital's responsibility for the actions of Ranginwala and Rafailov.   The hospital failed to inform the public of the contours of this arrangement, as well.   The hospital had an exclusive contract with Emergency Medical Physicians of Fairfield County, LLC to provide emergency medical treatment at the hospital, the type of treatment provided to the plaintiff.   Resulting from the hospital's actions, the plaintiff believed, in good faith, that Ranginwala and Rafailov, as well as Emergency Medical Physicians of Fairfield County, LLC, were the apparent agents of the hospital.   Accordingly, construing these allegations in the manner most favorable to the plaintiff, the court finds that the plaintiff has pleaded legally sufficient claims of apparent authority in her fourth and fifth counts and, accordingly, the court denies Stamford Hospital's motion to strike as to those counts.

NON–DELEGABLE DUTY—SIXTH AND SEVENTH COUNTS

“Nondelegable duties generally are imposed, most often by statute, contract or common law, in recognition of the policy judgment that certain obligations are of such importance that employers should not be able to escape liability merely by hiring others to perform them ․ In such circumstances, the nondelegable duty doctrine means that [the employer] may contract out the performance of [its] nondelegable duty, but may not contract out [its] ultimate legal responsibility.”  (Emphasis added;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Atelier Constantin Popescu v. JC Corporation, 134 Conn.App. 731, 750 (2012), citing Machado v. Hartford, 292 Conn. 364, 371–72 (2009).

In her sixth and seventh counts, the plaintiff alleges that the Stamford Hospital is vicariously liable for the negligence of (1) Emergency Medical Physicians of Fairfield County, LLC, a non-hospital entity responsible for staffing its emergency room, and (2) the physicians employed by Emergency Medical Physicians of Fairfield County, LLC. The basis for these claims is the assertion that Stamford Hospital had a non-delegable duty to care for its patients.

In its motion to strike Stamford Hospital claims that Connecticut does not recognize the existence of any non-delegable duty which a health care provider owes to its patients.   The Stamford Hospital relies on two recent Superior Court decisions rejecting similar claims.  Tiplady v. Maryles, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk, Docket No. 075003525 (June 25, 2010, Tierney, J.) [50 Conn. L. Rptr. 282], involved claims which for all practical purposes, were indistinguishable from those in the present case.   The plaintiff brought suit against Stamford Hospital and Emergency Medical Physicians of Fairfield County, LLC claiming that both were responsible for the negligence of an emergency care physician employed by Emergency Medical Physicians of Fairfield County, LLC. and who was assigned to work in Stamford Hospital's emergency department.   The court granted Stamford Hospital's motion to strike a count based on non-delegable duty holding that “Connecticut does not recognize a claim based on non-delegable duty against a Connecticut hospital for the negligence of a physician employed by a non-hospital entity as emergency room physicians staffing that hospital's emergency room.”

Dunn v. Chen, Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford/Norwalk Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. CV 085008536 (December 17, 2010, Brazzel–Massaro, J.) [51 Conn. L. Rptr. 191], involved a claim based on the negligence of an anesthesiologist employed by a medical group which provided anesthesiology services to patients at Norwalk Hospital.   The court granted a motion to strike a count based on the existence of a non-delegable duty owed by the hospital to the patient to provide non-negligent health care services.   The court granted the motion holding that state regulations governing the establishment of hospitals did not create non-delegable duties with respect to the provision for medical services at the hospital.

In her opposition to the motion to strike the sixth and seventh counts the plaintiff does not cite any Connecticut cases recognizing the existence of the concept in a similar situation.   Instead the plaintiff rested her arguments on decisions in other jurisdictions (principally New York) and general public policy claims.   The court agrees with the decisions in Tiplady, supra, and Dunn, supra, and accordingly grants the motion to strike the sixth and seventh counts of the plaintiff's complaint.

David R. Tobin, J.T.R.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. “See Kafri v. The Greenwich Hospital Association et al., 2000 WL 306620 (D.Conn., February 24, 2000, Nevas, J.) ․ Wilverding v. Ostrowitz et al., Docket No CV96–0334949S, Superior court, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport (February 28, 2000, Skolnick, J.) (2000 Conn.Super. LEXIS 607) [26 Conn. L. Rptr 632];  LeConche v. Elligers et al., Docket No CV88–348312, Superior court, Judicial District of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford (July 6, 1991, Stengel, J.) (1991 Conn.Super. LEXIS 1693) [4 Conn L. Rptr. 373];  Francisco v. Hartford Gynecological Center, Inc. et al., Docket No. CV92–0513841S, Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford (March 1, 1994, Corradino, J.) (1994 Conn.Super. LEXIS 521) [11 191] [11 Conn. L. Rptr. 191];  Koniak v. Sawhney et al., Docket No. CV93–0412154S, Superior Court, Judicial District of Ansonia/Milford at Milford (January 13, 1994, Rush, J.) (1994 Conn.Super. LEXIS 95);  Franklin v. Murray et al., Docket No. X01CV01–0170608S, Superior Court, Judicial District of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket at Waterbury (March 12, 2004, Sheedy, J.) (2004 Conn.Super. LEXIS 685);  ․;   and McClelland v. Day Kimball Hospital, Docket No. X07CV98–0071389S, Superior Court, Judicial District of Tolland, Complex Litigation Docket at Rockville (February 2, 2001, Bishop, J.) (2001 Conn.Super. Lexis 366) [29 Conn. L. Rptr. 166].”  (Citations omitted.)   Spaulding v. Rovner, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Stamford–Norwalk, Docket No. X08 CV 04 4001232 (April 3, 2009, Jennings, J.) (47 Conn. L. Rptr. 544, 547–48).Judge Jennings distinguished these cases “by the fact that they involved medical services (radiology, emergency care, or anesthesia) to patients who had gone to the hospital seeking diagnostic or imaging services or care or treatment of a particular ailment and were provided the requested services by professionals based at the hospital who had no previous relationship with the patient, who were arranged by or contracted for by the hospital under circumstances where the patient was not told and did not know that the provider was an independent contractor.”  Id. The allegations in the present case fall within these parameters..  FN1. “See Kafri v. The Greenwich Hospital Association et al., 2000 WL 306620 (D.Conn., February 24, 2000, Nevas, J.) ․ Wilverding v. Ostrowitz et al., Docket No CV96–0334949S, Superior court, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport (February 28, 2000, Skolnick, J.) (2000 Conn.Super. LEXIS 607) [26 Conn. L. Rptr 632];  LeConche v. Elligers et al., Docket No CV88–348312, Superior court, Judicial District of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford (July 6, 1991, Stengel, J.) (1991 Conn.Super. LEXIS 1693) [4 Conn L. Rptr. 373];  Francisco v. Hartford Gynecological Center, Inc. et al., Docket No. CV92–0513841S, Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford (March 1, 1994, Corradino, J.) (1994 Conn.Super. LEXIS 521) [11 191] [11 Conn. L. Rptr. 191];  Koniak v. Sawhney et al., Docket No. CV93–0412154S, Superior Court, Judicial District of Ansonia/Milford at Milford (January 13, 1994, Rush, J.) (1994 Conn.Super. LEXIS 95);  Franklin v. Murray et al., Docket No. X01CV01–0170608S, Superior Court, Judicial District of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket at Waterbury (March 12, 2004, Sheedy, J.) (2004 Conn.Super. LEXIS 685);  ․;   and McClelland v. Day Kimball Hospital, Docket No. X07CV98–0071389S, Superior Court, Judicial District of Tolland, Complex Litigation Docket at Rockville (February 2, 2001, Bishop, J.) (2001 Conn.Super. Lexis 366) [29 Conn. L. Rptr. 166].”  (Citations omitted.)   Spaulding v. Rovner, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Stamford–Norwalk, Docket No. X08 CV 04 4001232 (April 3, 2009, Jennings, J.) (47 Conn. L. Rptr. 544, 547–48).Judge Jennings distinguished these cases “by the fact that they involved medical services (radiology, emergency care, or anesthesia) to patients who had gone to the hospital seeking diagnostic or imaging services or care or treatment of a particular ailment and were provided the requested services by professionals based at the hospital who had no previous relationship with the patient, who were arranged by or contracted for by the hospital under circumstances where the patient was not told and did not know that the provider was an independent contractor.”  Id. The allegations in the present case fall within these parameters.

FN2. The portion of the Fireman's Fund opinion that the Court specifically referenced in Hanson, i.e., pages 496–97, discusses exclusively the concept of apparent authority..  FN2. The portion of the Fireman's Fund opinion that the Court specifically referenced in Hanson, i.e., pages 496–97, discusses exclusively the concept of apparent authority.

FN3. Among the Superior Court decisions cited by Judge Danaher in Bordonaro v. Anesthesia Associates of Torrington, supra, Docket No. CV 10 6002739 [55 Conn. L. Rptr. 2], and which have not been previously cited in this memorandum, include the following.   Wellons v. Bristol Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No.CV 09 5014713 (May 10, 2012, Sheridan, J.) (54 Conn. L Rptr. 13), Aube v. Middlesex Hospital, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Waterbury, Docket No X10 CV 04 4010594 (October 3, 2008, Scholl, J.), Koniak v. Sawhney, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia–Milford, Docket No.CV 93 042154 (January 13, 1994, Rush, J.)..  FN3. Among the Superior Court decisions cited by Judge Danaher in Bordonaro v. Anesthesia Associates of Torrington, supra, Docket No. CV 10 6002739 [55 Conn. L. Rptr. 2], and which have not been previously cited in this memorandum, include the following.   Wellons v. Bristol Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No.CV 09 5014713 (May 10, 2012, Sheridan, J.) (54 Conn. L Rptr. 13), Aube v. Middlesex Hospital, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Waterbury, Docket No X10 CV 04 4010594 (October 3, 2008, Scholl, J.), Koniak v. Sawhney, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia–Milford, Docket No.CV 93 042154 (January 13, 1994, Rush, J.).

Tobin, David R., J.T.R.