Carmen Lopez et al. v. Bridgeport Board of Education (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE # 142

I

BACKGROUND

In their amended complaint, filed on May 8, 2013, the plaintiffs, Carmen Lopez and Deborah Reyes–Williams, allege that the defendant, Paul Vallas, the acting superintendent of Bridgeport public schools, does not have legal title to the office of acting superintendent because he has not participated in or completed an appropriate school leadership program as required by General Statutes § 10–157(b).¹  The plaintiffs allege further that Vallas was originally appointed to the position of acting superintendent in December of 2011 and has held office continuously since that time, thereby exceeding the specified period of “one school year” that § 10–157(b) permits him to serve as acting superintendent.²

The following, which is relevant to the defendant's motion, is based upon various representations made by the parties at a hearing before the court on June 7, 2013.   Earlier this year, the defendant began and completed a school leadership program (three-month program) ³ that was intended to fulfill the requirements of § 10–157(b).  On April 15, 2013, the state board of education (state board) approved the three-month program as sufficient and/or appropriate for the purposes of § 10–157(b).⁴  The plaintiffs have also alleged and asserted that the defendant informally participated in a separate thirteen-month school leadership program offered by the University of Connecticut's Neag School of Education (thirteen-month program), but did not complete it.   The plaintiffs claimed at the June 7, 2013 hearing that the defendant's failure to complete the thirteen-month program was due in part to his failure to satisfy its prerequisites for enrollment, and that the three-month program was created especially for the defendant so that he could satisfy § 10–157(b),⁵ a process they claim was an attempt to circumvent that section.

On June 14, 2013, the defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude any evidence pertaining to the merits or sufficiency of any school leadership program identified by General Statutes § 10–157 or the plaintiff's amended complaint on the two grounds that (1) an action in quo warranto is narrow and does not consider the manner in which a defendant obtained his public office, thus rendering the evidence irrelevant and (2) the sufficiency of a school leadership program is a political question over which the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, thereby rendering the evidence irrelevant.⁶  The plaintiffs filed a memorandum in objection on June 20, 2013.

II

DISCUSSION

“The purpose of a motion in limine is to exclude irrelevant, inadmissible and prejudicial evidence from trial ․ A trial court should exclude evidence if it would create undue prejudice and threaten an injustice if admitted.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Lo Sacco, 26 Conn.App. 439, 444, 602 A.2d 589 (1992).  “The decision whether, in the first instance, the court should entertain a motion in limine is a discretionary one.   As a general proposition, the purpose of the motion is to insulate the jury from exposure to harmful inadmissible evidence ․ A ruling excluding (or admitting) evidence claimed to be cumulative is also a discretionary one.”   (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Tech Air of Naugatuck v. CTR of Charlotte, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 04 0184947 (July 17, 2007, Gallagher J.) (43 Conn. L. Rptr. 792, 793).⁷

“ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is material to the determination of the proceeding more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”  (Emphasis added.)  Connecticut Code of Evidence § 4–1.  “Questions of relevance must be determined in each case by reliance on reason and judicial experience as no exact test of relevancy is found in the law ․ Evidence is admissible when it tends to establish a fact in issue or to corroborate other direct evidence in the case ․ A fact is relevant whenever its existence, either alone or in connection with other facts, makes more certain or probable the existence of another fact ․ [A]ny fact may be proved which logically tends to aid the trier in the determination of the issue ․ Relevant evidence is admissible if the trial court, in the exercise of its broad discretion, determines that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.”  (Citations omitted;  emphasis added;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Lynch v. Granby Holdings, Inc., 32 Conn.App. 574, 581, 630 A.2d 609 (1993), rev'd on other grounds, 230 Conn. 95, 644 A.2d 325 (1994).

With respect to the first ground for his motion, the defendant contends that the substantive merits of the three-month program or the thirteen-month program are not relevant to this dispute because the cause of action for quo warranto is narrow in scope.   The defendant reasons that quo warranto permits a plaintiff to challenge only the defendant's title to a public office, not the manner in which the officer obtained the office or is carrying out its duties and, further, that the substance or merits of a particular school leadership program are not relevant to the issue of whether the defendant holds a valid title to his office.

Second, the defendant argues that the merits and sufficiency of a particular school leadership program present a political question over which this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, thereby rendering such evidence irrelevant.   In particular, the defendant argues that four of the six factors identified by Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 990 A.2d 206 (2010), as governing a court's analysis under the political question doctrine weigh in favor of a finding that the issue of sufficiency presents a political question.   The defendant also observes that, with the exception of constitutional challenges, courts in Connecticut have been reluctant to involve themselves in questions pertaining to educational policy.

In response to the defendant's first ground for his motion, the plaintiffs argue that quo warranto includes an examination of any statutory requirements that must be met before an individual can hold a public office.  Section 10–157 requires the defendant to attend and complete a school leadership program and, therefore, evidence pertaining to either or both the three-month or the thirteen-month program is relevant to this dispute.

As to the defendant's second ground, the plaintiffs argue that the political question doctrine does not apply to this case at all because the state board was not acting in a legislative capacity when it approved the three-month program on April 15, 2013.   The plaintiffs also contend that, assuming the doctrine does apply, none of the six factors from Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, supra, 295 Conn. 240, are present here.   Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the defendant has improperly relied upon the political question doctrine as a basis for his motion in limine because the doctrine is jurisdictional in nature and the defendant does not claim that the court does not have jurisdiction in this case.⁸

The court will begin with the political question doctrine.   The Supreme Court recently conducted a comprehensive review of the doctrine in Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, supra, 295 Conn. 254–56, wherein the court stated:  “We first set forth the fundamental principles that underlie justiciability.   Because courts are established to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable ․ Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute ․ (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse ․ (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power ․ and (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant ․ As we have recognized, justiciability comprises several related doctrines, namely, standing, ripeness, mootness and the political question doctrine, that implicate a court's subject matter jurisdiction and its competency to adjudicate a particular matter ․

“The political question doctrine itself is based on the principle of separation of powers ․ as well as the notion that the judiciary should not involve itself in matters that have been committed to the executive and legislative branches of government.   To conclude that an issue is within the political question doctrine is not an abdication of judicial responsibility;  rather, it is a recognition that the tools with which a court can work, the data which it can fairly appraise, the conclusions which it can reach as a basis for entering judgments, have limits ․ Whether a controversy so directly implicates the primary authority of the legislative or executive branch, such that a court is not the proper forum for its resolution, is a determination that must be made on a case-by-case inquiry ․

“Following Baker v. Carr, [369 U.S. 186, 211, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962) ], [i]n considering whether a particular subject matter presents a nonjusticiable political question, we have articulated [six] relevant factors, including:  a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;  or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;  or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;  or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;  or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;  or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.   Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground of a political question's presence ․ Furthermore, simply because the case has a connection to the political sphere [is not] an independent basis for characterizing an issue as a political question ․ Indeed, the principle that a case should not be dismissed for nonjusticiability as a political question unless an unusual need for unquestioned adherence to that decision is inextricable from the case, means that courts should view such cases with a heavy thumb on the side of justiciability, and with the recognition that, simply because the case is connected to the political sphere, it does not necessarily follow that it is a political question.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   The Supreme Court has also stated that, in the course of examining whether a particular dispute presents a political question, it is appropriate to “[address] the specific forms of relief that the plaintiffs seek.”  (Internal quotation mark omitted.)  Id., 261.

With respect to the first factor—constitutional commitment to a coordinate branch of government—the defendant argues, incongruently, that § 10–157(b), not some provision of the Constitution of Connecticut, reserves the evaluation of a school leadership program to the legislature by providing that an acting superintendent “shall successfully complete a school leadership program, approved by the State Board of Education ․” (Emphasis added.)   The plaintiffs first counter that the state board was not acting in a legislative capacity when it approved the three-month program on April 15, 2013, and was also not involved in a rulemaking procedure pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, General Statutes §§ 4–166 through 4–189g.   In support of their claim, the plaintiffs assert that political questions do not emanate from statutes, both because it is the traditional role of the courts to interpret and enforce statutes and there is no precedent for the notion that a statute can create a political question.⁹  The plaintiffs also argue that no article of the Constitution of Connecticut is implicated by the present case.

Typically, “[d]eciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the [c]onstitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, supra, 295 Conn. 257.   The court agrees with the plaintiff that there is no constitutional commitment of the issue of approval of a “school leadership program” to a coordinate branch of government because § 10–157(b) is a mere statute, not a constitutional provision.   Accordingly, the first factor from Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell does not weigh in the defendant's favor.

With respect to the second through fourth factors,¹⁰ the defendant argues that:  there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue because it is not of the type that courts routinely address in their judicial function;  a decision in the present case is impossible without an initial policy determination of a kind that is outside judicial discretion;  and resolution of the present dispute would, of necessity, express a lack of respect due coordinate branches of government.

In response, the plaintiffs argue that the law does provide judicially manageable standards for resolving the present dispute in § 10–157 and, to the extent that the statute may appear to grant discretion to the state board to approve a “school leadership program,” a court is permitted to review an agency's decision by applying the arbitrary and capricious standard or the abuse of discretion standard.¹¹  In addition, the plaintiffs argue, the court is not being asked to make a policy determination, but only to uphold a policy decision that was initially made by the legislature, not the state board, when the legislature drafted subsection (b) to include the requirement of a “school leadership program.”   Finally, the plaintiffs contend that a ruling on the issue would not express a lack of respect for a coordinate branch of government because the state board is not a branch of government, but a state agency.

The court agrees that the plain meaning of the text of § 10–157(b) commits to the state board the determination of whether to approve a particular educational program.   But this alone does not deprive the court of judicially manageable standards by which to evaluate whether a particular school leadership program is or was sufficient.   Instead, the court agrees with the plaintiff and concludes below that the statute intends a specific meaning by the phrase “school leadership program” and that the court may exercise its powers of statutory construction to determine the meaning of that phrase at trial,¹² which here is an issue of first impression.   Further, the statute requires more than merely that the program be “approved” by the state board.   Whether a program was “approved” and whether a program was a “school leadership program” are two separate lines of inquiry.   Thus, for example, an acting superintendent could not reasonably claim that he or she had participated in the required § 10–157(b) school leadership program if he or she completed a cooking class, even if that cooking class had received the approval of the state board.¹³

The court also agrees with the plaintiffs that a resolution of the present claim at trial will not require the court to make a policy determination of the type not for judicial discretion but, rather, to construe the meaning of “school leadership program” as that phrase is used by § 10–157(b), an endeavor courts are competent to undertake.   Finally, the court agrees with the plaintiff that, because the state board is not a branch of government, a resolution of the issue would not require the court to express a lack of respect for a coordinate branch of government.   The court also notes that, because it is the role of the courts to construe and enforce statutes, ruling upon even highly contentious and difficult disputes is not an expression of a lack of respect, but merely a fulfillment of the court's role in government.

Moreover, the court agrees with the plaintiffs that the present case, which challenges the defendant's title to his public office, and the remedy sought by the plaintiffs, ouster of the defendant from his office, can only be understood in the context of the statute that authorizes the defendant to hold his office in the first instance:  § 10–157.   Thus, the court must examine the interaction of § 10–157 and the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint in order to determine whether the proffered evidence is relevant to the present dispute.

The plaintiffs contend that § 10–157, as a whole, exists to ensure that every individual serving as a superintendent in Connecticut can satisfy statutorily mandated certification requirements.   In this context, subsection (b), which serves as a narrow exception to the statute's certification requirements, mandates, inter alia, that an acting superintendent participate in and complete a “school leadership program.”   The plaintiffs reason that the phrase “school leadership program,” as used in § 10–157, has a specific meaning that the court may determine by applying principles of statutory construction and, further, that because the plaintiffs intend to ask the court at trial to find that the three-month program is not a “school leadership program” within the meaning of the statute, evidence pertaining to the merits and sufficiency of the program is relevant.   The defendant has not proposed a construction of the statute insofar as the requirement of a “school leadership program” is concerned.

Questions of statutory construction begin with General Statutes § 1–2z, which provides:

“The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.   If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.”

When construing a statute, the court's “fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature ․ In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply ․ In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1–2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.   If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Friezo v. Friezo, 281 Conn. 166, 181–82, 914 A.2d 533 (2007).

Section 10–157 provides, in its entirety:  “(a) Any local or regional board of education shall provide for the supervision of the schools under its control by a superintendent who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the board.   The superintendent shall have executive authority over the school system and the responsibility for its supervision.   Employment of a superintendent shall be by election of the board of education.   Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no person shall assume the duties and responsibilities of the superintendent until the board receives written confirmation from the Commissioner of Education that the person to be employed is properly certified or has had such certification waived by the commissioner pursuant to subsection (c) of this section.   The commissioner shall inform any such board, in writing, of the proper certification, waiver of certification or lack of certification or waiver of any such person not later than fourteen days after the name of such person is submitted to the commissioner pursuant to section 10–226.   A majority vote of all members of the board shall be necessary to an election, and the board shall fix the salary of the superintendent and the term of office, which shall not exceed three years.   Upon election and notification of employment or reemployment, the superintendent may request and the board shall provide a written contract of employment which includes, but is not limited to, the salary, employment benefits and term of office of such superintendent.   Such superintendent shall, at least three weeks before the annual town or regional school district meeting, submit to the board a full written report of the proceedings of such board and of the condition of the several schools during the school year preceding, with plans and suggestions for their improvement.   The board of education shall evaluate the performance of the superintendent annually in accordance with guidelines and criteria mutually determined and agreed to by such board and such superintendent.

“(b) A local or regional board of education may appoint as acting superintendent a person who is or is not properly certified for a probationary period, not to exceed one school year, with the approval of the Commissioner of Education.   During such probationary period such acting superintendent shall assume all duties of the superintendent for the time specified and shall successfully complete a school leadership program, approved by the State Board of Education, offered at a public or private institution of higher education in the state.   At the conclusion of such probationary period, such appointing local or regional board of education may request the commissioner to grant a waiver of certification for such acting superintendent pursuant to subsection (c) of this section.

“(c) The commissioner may, upon request of an employing local or regional board of education, grant a waiver of certification to a person (1) who has successfully completed at least three years of experience as a certified administrator with a superintendent certificate issued by another state in a public school in another state during the ten-year period prior to the date of application, or (2) who has successfully completed a probationary period as an acting superintendent pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, and who the commissioner deems to be exceptionally qualified for the position of superintendent.”  (Emphasis added.).

Subsection (a) states the duties and responsibilities of a superintendent and also creates certain requirements that an individual must satisfy in order to formally serve as such.   If an individual cannot satisfy those requirements, subsection (a) directs the reader to subsection (b), which permits an individual to serve a “probationary period” as acting superintendent and, further, provides that during such a probationary period the individual must fulfill certain mandates, including that the individual shall attend and complete an approved school leadership program at an institution of higher learning in Connecticut.   Finally, subsection (c) permits an individual to receive a waiver of the formal certification requirements of subsection (a) if that individual has dutifully completed the mandates of subsection (b).

The court therefore agrees with the plaintiffs that the apparent underlying purpose of § 10–157 as a whole is to ensure that superintendents in the state of Connecticut have satisfied certain minimum certification requirements and, in addition, that subsection (b) exists as a narrow exception to this rule.   Furthermore, the court concludes that the purpose underlying the requirement that an acting superintendent participate in and complete a school leadership program is only understood when subsection (b) is read in tandem with subsection (c).  Together, these subsections permit the commissioner to waive an individual's § 10–157(a) certification requirements so that he or she can thereby formally serve as a superintendent if the individual, during the probationary period, which includes the successful completion of an approved school leadership program.   Thus, the requirement of a school leadership program is best understood as intending to qualify an uncertified individual to receive a waiver of certification pursuant to § 10–157(c), which in turn leads to the conclusion that the purpose of a school leadership program is to serve as a substitute to the formal certification requirements of § 10–157(a).   In this fashion, the statute provides an avenue for an individual to formally become a superintendent when that individual does not possess the specific experience and certification required by § 10–157(a), but is otherwise qualified to be a superintendent.

It is within this statutory context that the court must evaluate the plaintiffs' claim for relief in the form of ouster of the defendant from his public office on the theory that he does not hold a valid title to that office.   The defendant's title to the office of acting superintendent is defined by the paradigm contained in § 10–157, which contains mandates that must be satisfied in order for an individual to hold a valid title to the office of acting superintendent.

In light of the above, the court also agrees with the plaintiff that evidence of the merits and sufficiency of a school leadership program is relevant to this dispute, notwithstanding the fact that § 10–157(b) grants the state board authority to approve a school leadership program.   Put simply, whether a program was “approved” and whether a program was a “school leadership program” are two separate lines of inquiry and, in addition, the court will be called upon at trial to determine whether the three-month program that the defendant did complete qualifies as a school leadership program, rendering evidence of the details of the program relevant.   Accordingly, the evidence is relevant.

Finally, even absent the above, evidence showing only that an approved school leadership program did exist and that the defendant received, for example, a certificate of completion,¹⁴ would not render further evidence of the details of the school leadership program irrelevant.   This is because the finder of fact would be well served by additional evidence showing, by way of example only:  whether the program was actually completed,¹⁵ which would require an examination of the requirements of the program and whether the defendant did, in fact, submit work satisfying those requirements;  whether the program was actually approved, which would require an examination of whether the state board was aware of the program and its contents;  and whether the program that the defendant completed was the same program that was approved, which would require the fact finder to compare the details of the completed program to the details of the approved program.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion is denied.

BELLIS, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Section 10–157(b) provides:  “A local or regional board of education may appoint as acting superintendent a person who is or is not properly certified for a probationary period, not to exceed one school year, with the approval of the Commissioner of Education.   During such probationary period such acting superintendent shall assume all duties of the superintendent for the time specified and shall successfully complete a school leadership program, approved by the State Board of Education, offered at a public or private institution of higher education in the state.   At the conclusion of such probationary period, such appointing local or regional board of education may request the commissioner to grant a waiver of certification for such acting superintendent pursuant to subsection (c) of this section.”.  FN1. Section 10–157(b) provides:  “A local or regional board of education may appoint as acting superintendent a person who is or is not properly certified for a probationary period, not to exceed one school year, with the approval of the Commissioner of Education.   During such probationary period such acting superintendent shall assume all duties of the superintendent for the time specified and shall successfully complete a school leadership program, approved by the State Board of Education, offered at a public or private institution of higher education in the state.   At the conclusion of such probationary period, such appointing local or regional board of education may request the commissioner to grant a waiver of certification for such acting superintendent pursuant to subsection (c) of this section.”

FN2. For a more complete statement of other facts and procedural history, see this court's memorandum of decision regarding the defendant's motion to dismiss, which was entered on June 5, 2013.   Lopez v. Bridgeport Board of Education, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 13 6034307 (June 5, 2013, Bellis, J.)..  FN2. For a more complete statement of other facts and procedural history, see this court's memorandum of decision regarding the defendant's motion to dismiss, which was entered on June 5, 2013.   Lopez v. Bridgeport Board of Education, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 13 6034307 (June 5, 2013, Bellis, J.).

FN3. Based upon representations of the parties at the June 7, 2013 hearing, the defendant began and completed the program within a three-month period of time..  FN3. Based upon representations of the parties at the June 7, 2013 hearing, the defendant began and completed the program within a three-month period of time.

FN4. Based upon the June 7, 2013 hearing, it is unclear whether the defendant began the three-month program prior to or subsequent to its approval by the state board on April 15, 2013..  FN4. Based upon the June 7, 2013 hearing, it is unclear whether the defendant began the three-month program prior to or subsequent to its approval by the state board on April 15, 2013.

FN5. At the June 7, 2013 hearing, the defendant disputed each of these claims..  FN5. At the June 7, 2013 hearing, the defendant disputed each of these claims.

FN6. The argument that a particular issue is a political question typically goes to whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.   See Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 990 A.2d 206 (2010).   The defendant explains in his memorandum, however, that he has not filed a motion to dismiss the action because his argument is not that the plaintiffs' claim of quo warranto presents a political question, only that the sufficiency of the school leadership program, a discrete sub-issue, the disposition of which is not necessary to resolution of the plaintiffs' claims, does..  FN6. The argument that a particular issue is a political question typically goes to whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.   See Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 990 A.2d 206 (2010).   The defendant explains in his memorandum, however, that he has not filed a motion to dismiss the action because his argument is not that the plaintiffs' claim of quo warranto presents a political question, only that the sufficiency of the school leadership program, a discrete sub-issue, the disposition of which is not necessary to resolution of the plaintiffs' claims, does.

FN7. Here, however, the parties have not requested a jury trial and thus the issue of jury confusion is not present..  FN7. Here, however, the parties have not requested a jury trial and thus the issue of jury confusion is not present.

FN8. The plaintiffs also present an independent ground for a finding that the evidence is relevant;  namely, that the defendant's position would also fail under a more favorable ground that the defendant could have asserted, but did not.   Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that the defendant should have asserted the “no law to apply” doctrine on the theory that § 10–157 commits the decision to approve a school leadership program to agency discretion, thus depriving the court of law to apply, but that the defendants would fail even under this theory.   Consideration of this argument is not necessary to the disposition of the present motion because it is not responsive to the two grounds stated in the defendant's motion..  FN8. The plaintiffs also present an independent ground for a finding that the evidence is relevant;  namely, that the defendant's position would also fail under a more favorable ground that the defendant could have asserted, but did not.   Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that the defendant should have asserted the “no law to apply” doctrine on the theory that § 10–157 commits the decision to approve a school leadership program to agency discretion, thus depriving the court of law to apply, but that the defendants would fail even under this theory.   Consideration of this argument is not necessary to the disposition of the present motion because it is not responsive to the two grounds stated in the defendant's motion.

FN9. Because the court concludes that the defendant cannot establish that one of the six factors of a political question analysis causes the approval of a school leadership program to be a political question, it does not address the plaintiffs' argument that the state board was not acting in a legislative capacity when it approved the three-month program on April 15, 2013, or that political questions cannot emanate from statutes..  FN9. Because the court concludes that the defendant cannot establish that one of the six factors of a political question analysis causes the approval of a school leadership program to be a political question, it does not address the plaintiffs' argument that the state board was not acting in a legislative capacity when it approved the three-month program on April 15, 2013, or that political questions cannot emanate from statutes.

FN10. The defendant makes no attempt to contend that the fifth or sixth factors—unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made and the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments—are present in this case.   The court concludes that they are not..  FN10. The defendant makes no attempt to contend that the fifth or sixth factors—unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made and the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments—are present in this case.   The court concludes that they are not.

FN11. General Statutes § 4–183(j) provides, for example and in pertinent part:  “The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.   The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:  (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;  (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency (3) made upon unlawful procedure;  (4) affected by other error of law;  (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record;  or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.”  (Emphasis added.).  FN11. General Statutes § 4–183(j) provides, for example and in pertinent part:  “The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.   The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:  (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;  (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency (3) made upon unlawful procedure;  (4) affected by other error of law;  (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record;  or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.”  (Emphasis added.)

FN12. The construction of a statute is purely a question of law.   See Dickman v. Office of State Ethics, 140 Conn.App. 754, 767, 60 A.3d 297 (2013) (“The plaintiff's claim presents a matter of statutory construction, which is a question of law”).   The court does not offer an interpretation of the phrase “school leadership program” in this decision..  FN12. The construction of a statute is purely a question of law.   See Dickman v. Office of State Ethics, 140 Conn.App. 754, 767, 60 A.3d 297 (2013) (“The plaintiff's claim presents a matter of statutory construction, which is a question of law”).   The court does not offer an interpretation of the phrase “school leadership program” in this decision.

FN13. The two lines of inquiry are, of necessity, related in the sense that the state board would likely also consider whether a program it was considering approving was also a “school leadership program” within the meaning of the statute.   That does not, however, on its own mean that the court may not also do so, especially considering that the current dispute presents an issue of first impression.   For example, although it is customary for courts to afford deference to an interpretation of a statute given by an agency charged with enforcing that statute, such deference is not warranted when the particular question of statutory interpretation is one of first impression.   See Byrd v. Bechtel/Fusco, 90 Conn.App. 641, 878 A.2d 1162, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 919, 888 A.2d 87 (2005) (although agency interpretation of statute that agency is charged with interpreting is typically afforded deference, rule does not apply when matter is issue of first impression), citing Donahue v. Southington, 259 Conn. 783, 787, 792 A.2d 76 (2002).   Thus, even if the court were to determine that the question of the state board's approval of the three-month program is wholly committed by statute to the discretion of the state board, the court would still have authority to construe the statute here because the meaning of “school leadership program” within the context of § 10–157 is purely a question of statutory interpretation and one of first impression.   In addition, there is precedent in this state, in particular Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, supra, 295 Conn. 280, which, although it addressed a different factual predicate, suggests that it is appropriate for a court to determine whether a particular educational program is “minimally adequate.”.  FN13. The two lines of inquiry are, of necessity, related in the sense that the state board would likely also consider whether a program it was considering approving was also a “school leadership program” within the meaning of the statute.   That does not, however, on its own mean that the court may not also do so, especially considering that the current dispute presents an issue of first impression.   For example, although it is customary for courts to afford deference to an interpretation of a statute given by an agency charged with enforcing that statute, such deference is not warranted when the particular question of statutory interpretation is one of first impression.   See Byrd v. Bechtel/Fusco, 90 Conn.App. 641, 878 A.2d 1162, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 919, 888 A.2d 87 (2005) (although agency interpretation of statute that agency is charged with interpreting is typically afforded deference, rule does not apply when matter is issue of first impression), citing Donahue v. Southington, 259 Conn. 783, 787, 792 A.2d 76 (2002).   Thus, even if the court were to determine that the question of the state board's approval of the three-month program is wholly committed by statute to the discretion of the state board, the court would still have authority to construe the statute here because the meaning of “school leadership program” within the context of § 10–157 is purely a question of statutory interpretation and one of first impression.   In addition, there is precedent in this state, in particular Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, supra, 295 Conn. 280, which, although it addressed a different factual predicate, suggests that it is appropriate for a court to determine whether a particular educational program is “minimally adequate.”

FN14. The defendant argued at the June 7, 2013 hearing, for example, that the only evidence that would be required and, therefore, relevant, would be evidence showing that the defendant (1) participated in and completed a program and (2) that the program was approved by the state board..  FN14. The defendant argued at the June 7, 2013 hearing, for example, that the only evidence that would be required and, therefore, relevant, would be evidence showing that the defendant (1) participated in and completed a program and (2) that the program was approved by the state board.

FN15. For example, the plaintiffs have alleged and asserted, in particular at the June 7, 2013 hearing, that any program in which the defendant did participate was illusory or does not fit within the meaning of “school leadership program” as that phrase is used in § 10–157..  FN15. For example, the plaintiffs have alleged and asserted, in particular at the June 7, 2013 hearing, that any program in which the defendant did participate was illusory or does not fit within the meaning of “school leadership program” as that phrase is used in § 10–157.

Bellis, Barbara N., J.