Gulf Oil Limited Partnership v. State of Connecticut (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE NO. 120 MOTION TO DISMISS

The defendant here, the State of Connecticut (hereinafter, the “defendant” or “state”), has filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint.   The state contends the plaintiff's claim for inverse condemnation is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.   This court is not persuaded.   For reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss is denied.

FACTS

On April 23, 2012, the plaintiff, Gulf Oil Limited Partnership, filed a one-count complaint sounding in inverse condemnation against the defendant, the state of Connecticut.   In its complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts.   The plaintiff owns an oil and gas terminal distribution facility located at 500 Waterfront Street in New Haven, Connecticut.   Beginning in December 2009 through September 2011, the defendant conducted construction activities “on, along and above” the plaintiff's property, including “the construction of bridge piers, the erection of structural steel and the construction of bridge decking and other appurtenances.”   As a result of these activities, the defendant prevented the plaintiff from “gaining access to the [p]roperty through its northerly and southerly entrance and exit gates to permit the loading of gasoline tanker trucks ․ utilizing the portion of the [p]roperty immediately adjacent to Waterfront Street along its fence line for parking of trucks and gasoline trailers ․ operating its gasoline loading racks located adjacent to Waterfront Street, and ․ receiving gasoline tanker trucks for loading due to the constant and unannounced changing of the traffic flow patterns on Waterfront Street.”   The plaintiff concludes that by failing to obtain the necessary property rights, the defendant has violated article first, § 11, of the Constitution of Connecticut.

On August 7, 2012, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff's claim is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.   Specifically, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's complaint lacks sufficient allegations to demonstrate that the defendant's actions resulted in a total destruction of the economic value of the plaintiff's property.   Because the plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a cause of action for inverse condemnation, the defendant asserts that the plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.   The plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in support of its objection to the motion to dismiss on October 5, 2012.   In its objection, the plaintiff asserts that it has properly pleaded a cause of action for inverse condemnation.   Specifically, the plaintiff argues that it has pleaded facts that demonstrate that the defendant prevented the plaintiff from having any access to its property on multiple occasions.   The matter was heard at the short calendar on May 20, 2013.

DISCUSSION

“A motion to dismiss ․ properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011).  “[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Id. “Claims involving the doctrines of common-law sovereign immunity and statutory immunity, pursuant to [General Statutes] § 4–165, implicate the court's subject matter jurisdiction.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Kelly v. Albertsen, 114 Conn.App. 600, 605, 970 A.2d 787 (2009).   Accordingly, “a motion to dismiss is the appropriate procedural vehicle to raise a claim that sovereign immunity ․ bars the action.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Manifold v. Ragaglia, 94 Conn.App. 103, 116, 891 A.2d 106 (2006).

“[I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ․ clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 303 Conn. 402, 413–14, 35 A.3d 188 (2012).  “[T]he well established notion [is] that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 301 Conn. 759, 774, 23 A.3d 1192 (2011).

The defendant argues that the plaintiff's action is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  “[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is not available to the state as a defense to claims for just compensation arising under article first, § 11, of the Connecticut Constitution ․ The word ‘taken’ in article first, § 11 of our state constitution means the exclusion of the owner from his private use and possession, and the assumption of the use and possession for the public purpose by the authority exercising the right of eminent domain ․ [T]here is no taking in a constitutional sense unless the property cannot be utilized for any reasonable and proper purpose ․ as where the economic utilization of the land is, for all practical purposes, destroyed ․ A constitutional taking occurs when there is a substantial interference with private property which destroys or nullifies its value or by which the owner's right to its use or enjoyment is in a substantial degree abridged or destroyed ․ To survive a motion to dismiss on the ground of sovereign immunity, a complaint must allege sufficient facts to support a finding of a taking of land in a constitutional sense.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Tamm v. Burns, 222 Conn. 280, 284, 610 A.2d 590 (1992).

The plaintiff argues that the state's actions resulted in a taking in the form of inverse condemnation.  “Inverse condemnation is a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant ․ An inverse condemnation claim accrues when the purpose of government regulation and its economic effect on the property owner render the regulation substantially equivalent to an eminent domain proceeding ․” (Citations omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.)   Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Groton, 262 Conn. 45, 73, 808 A.2d 1107 (2002).   “Connecticut law on inverse condemnation requires total destruction of a property's economic value or substantial destruction of an owner's ability to use or enjoy the property.”  Bristol v. Tilcon Minerals, Inc., 284 Conn. 55, 85, 931 A.2d 237 (2007).

As set forth above, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant's construction activities prevented the plaintiff from fully accessing its property on multiple occasions between December 2009 and September 2011, which interfered with its ability to load gasoline tanker trucks.   The plaintiff further alleges that the defendant failed to obtain the plaintiff's property rights through eminent domain proceedings and, thus, the plaintiff was deprived of the ability to use and exercise ownership over the property without receiving just compensation.   Although the defendant argues that the plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded a claim for inverse condemnation, the defendant asks the court to interpret the complaint in an overly technical manner.  “When a ․ court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light ․ In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gold v. Rowland, 296 Conn. 186, 200–01, 994 A.2d 106 (2010).   In reading the allegations in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has alleged that the defendant's actions substantially interfered with its ability to use its property through denying access to the property on several occasions.  Bristol v. Tilcon Minerals, Inc., supra, 284 Conn. 87.   Accordingly, the plaintiff's claim is not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is denied.

By the Court,

Nazzaro, J.

Nazzaro, John J., J.