Michael Banziruk v. Harry Banziruk et al. (2013)

RULING RE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RESTORE CASE TO DOCKET (# 143)

INTRODUCTION

This case was resolved by an agreement that was entered on the record on February 20, 2013.   The action was withdrawn on that same day.   On April 1, 2013, the plaintiff moved to restore the case to the docket.   The defendants objected to that motion.   This matter came before the court and was heard on June 18, 2013.   The court denied the motion from the bench on June 18, 2011;  and represented that the latter ruling would be followed by a written opinion.

I

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 4, 2010, the plaintiff, Michael Banziruk, filed a complaint alleging that he is a co-executor and beneficiary of the estate of his mother, Mary K. Banziruk, who died on September 12, 2003.   The complaint alleges that he had advanced funds to the decedent in the amount of $245,880.   He claims that on December 16, 2003, he presented the latter claim to his brother, defendant Harry Banziruk.¹  He also alleges that in April 2004 he presented the claim to his other brother, defendant Nicholas H. Banziruk.   The plaintiff then filed a claim for the advanced funds with the Torrington Probate Court on August 10, 2009.   The claim was denied by the Torrington Probate Court on the ground that it was untimely.   The plaintiff then filed the present appeal.

On March 23, 2011, the court denied Harry Banziruk's motion for summary judgment, finding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the plaintiff presented his claim to Harry Banziruk within the two-year period provided in the applicable statute of limitations, General Statutes § 45a–375(c).

On June 12, 2012, this court denied Harry Banziruk's motion to dismiss the complaint.   In the course of that ruling, and construing the facts in a manner most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court disagreed with Harry Banziruk's argument that the case should be dismissed because the plaintiff's notice of claim was not timely filed pursuant to General Statutes § 45a–375(c).  The court found that Harry's Banziruk's argument on the motion to dismiss was essentially the same argument he raised in his unsuccessful motion for summary judgment.   For all of the foregoing reasons, the court denied the motion to dismiss.

The court thereafter made multiple accommodations in response to the parties' request for court assistance in resolving the dispute.   To that end, the court held at least six pretrial conferences.   On the scheduled trial date, February 20, 2013, the parties reached an agreement, which was put on the record.   Per the agreement, the plaintiff then withdrew the action.

In substance, the settlement agreement called for the parties to enter into a mutual distribution agreement in the Torrington Probate Court.   The settlement agreement provided that all the parties would sign the mutual distribution agreement and execute mutual releases relative to claims against the estate, and that the plaintiff would release claims related to the estate in reference to the wife and children of Harry Banziruk.   The mutual distribution agreement was to include an indemnification arrangement whereby all parties would indemnify and hold each other harmless from any and all claims related to the estate, except as to state or federal tax obligations that might arise from gift giving practices occurring more than fifteen years ago.   Further, the mutual distribution agreement was to provide that the plaintiff's claim would be reduced to the fair market value of the inventory file of August of 2009.

The settlement agreement also provided that the plaintiff would withdraw this action and the parties would then prepare the mutual distribution agreement, approved by the decree of the Torrington Probate Court, with “a right to Mr. Conti and Mr. [Michael] Banziruk a reinstatement of the action in the event of noncompliance.”   That “right,” the parties agreed, was subject to the court's approval.   Hr'g Tr. 3–4, February 20, 2013.²

The settlement agreement further provided that any claims regarding personal property, advanced by Nicholas Banziruk, were to be appended to the mutual distribution agreement and that list would be reviewed by the plaintiff and Harry Banzimk.   The Probate Court was to address any disputes arising out of claims for personal property within the homestead estate of Woodbine.   The house at 90–94 Woodbine Street was to be quitclaimed to the plaintiff and he was also to receive miscellaneous checks in the approximate amount of $8,700 as well as unclaimed property and personalty within the home, subject to a claim by Nicholas Banziruk.

After the foregoing settlement agreement was put on the record, the court canvassed the parties.   Each party acknowledged his agreement with the terms that had been set forth on the record, each expressed his belief that that agreement was fair and equitable under the circumstances, and each asked the court to accept the agreement and issue it as an order of the court.   Per the settlement agreement, the plaintiff withdrew the case on February 20, 2013.   The plaintiff then moved to restore the case to the docket on April 1, 2013.

Neither the plaintiff's motion to restore the case to the docket nor Harry Banziruk's objection provided the court with sufficient information to address the motion.   Therefore, the court directed the parties to file memoranda clarifying the bases for the motion and the objection.   Both the plaintiff and Harry Banziruk filed their respective memorandum on April 15, 2013.   Nicholas Banziruk filed his memorandum on April 18, 2013.

A

Plaintiff's Position

The plaintiff's memorandum states that there is not a mutual distribution agreement because, despite the terms of the settlement agreement put on the record in open court, “after discussions with the Probate Court, the plaintiff indicated ․ that he preferred a compromise of claim rather than a mutual distribution.   The disagreement is not over the vehicle to effectuate the settlement, but it is over the language of the settlement.”   The plaintiff believes that his claim should be allowed in full and that he should be able to reach the assets of the estate, “whatever they are.”   The plaintiff claims that Harry Banziruk is of the view that the plaintiff's claim should only be allowed to the extent necessary to reach defined assets of the estate, which are those assets listed on the current inventory filed with the Probate Court.   Thus, according to the plaintiff, the main contention between the parties is whether any after-discovered assets should be shared or used to satisfy the plaintiff's claim.   The plaintiff is of the position that after-acquired assets should be used to satisfy his claim.

The plaintiff argues that the case should be restored to the docket because there was not a meeting of the minds, the terms of the agreement were not clear and unambiguous and, for that reason, the court cannot enforce summarily the settlement agreement.

B

Defendant Harry Banziruk's Position

Harry Banziruk objects to the motion because an enforceable settlement was reached between the parties and the plaintiff failed to prepare, as agreed, a mutual distribution agreement.   Rather, the plaintiff prepared an application to compromise claim for $245,880,³ to which Harry Banziruk objected because it exceeded the fair market value of the plaintiff's inventory of August 18, 2009.   According to Harry Banziruk, the August 18, 2009 inventory, which was the subject of the settlement agreement, showed the value of the family home at $105,000 and eight articles of personal property valued at $9,224.01, for a total value of $114,224.01.⁴  Harry Banziruk asserts that the plaintiff is bound to the limitations of the settlement agreement, which was to accept the fair market value of the estate's assets on his August 18, 2009 inventory.   Harry Banziruk also notes that the plaintiff failed to provide individual releases for Harry Banziruk's children and wife but did proffer an ambiguous indemnification agreement for Harry Banziruk.   Harry Banziruk argues that the plaintiff's attorney had the apparent authority to enter into a settlement agreement, he exercised that authority, and the plaintiff himself approved the agreement on the record.   Thus, the plaintiff is bound by the terms of the settlement agreement and should not be permitted to restore the case to the docket.

C

Defendant Nicholas Banziruk

Defendant Nicholas Banziruk, who is self-represented, joined in Harry Banziruk's opposition to the motion to restore the case to the docket.   He, like Harry Banziruk, affirmed his understanding that the agreement “was reduced to the value of the estate of Mary K. Banziruk,” which included real property valued between $110,000 to $120,000, plus “monies listed in the initial inventory” submitted to the Probate Court and listed at $8,700.

II

DISCUSSIONAStandard of Review

A motion to restore the case to the docket is analogous to a motion to open a judgment.  “Withdrawals are analogous to final judgments.   The right of a plaintiff to withdraw his action before a hearing on the merits, as allowed by § 52–80, is absolute and unconditional.   Under [the] law, the effect of a withdrawal, so far as the pendency of the action is concerned, is strictly analogous to that presented after the rendition of a final judgment or the erasure of the case from the docket.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Sicaras v. Hartford, 44 Conn.App. 771, 775–76, 692 A.2d 1290, cert. denied, 241 Conn. 916, 696 A.2d 340 (1997).  “The question of whether a case should be restored to the docket is one of judicial discretion.”  Id., 779.

“The principles that govern motions to open or set aside a civil judgment are well established.   Within four months of the date of the original judgment, Practice Book [§ 17–4] vests discretion in the trial court to determine whether there is a good and compelling reason for its modification or vacation ․ The exercise of equitable authority is vested in the discretion of the trial court and is subject only to limited review on appeal.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 288 Conn. 69, 94–95, 952 A.2d 1 (2008).

In the present case, the withdrawal took place after the parties reached a settlement agreement.   It is well established that the “court has the inherent power to enforce summarily a settlement agreement as a matter of law when the terms of the agreement are clear and unambiguous.”  Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 811, 626 A.2d 729 (1993).  “Agreements that end lawsuits are contracts ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id. “Summary enforcement is not only essential to the efficient use of judicial resources, but also preserves the integrity of settlement as a meaningful way to resolve legal disputes.   When parties agree to settle a case, they are effectively contracting for the right to avoid a trial.”  (Emphasis in original.)  Id., 812.

The issues of whether the terms of the agreement are clear and unambiguous, and whether the parties agreed on the terms of the agreement, are determined as of the time the parties entered into the settlement.  DAP Financial Management Co. v. Mor–Fam Electric, Inc., 59 Conn.App. 92, 97, 755 A.2d 925 (2000) (“the test of disputation ․ must be applied to the parties at the time they entered into the alleged settlement”).   The issue for the court to determine is whether a dispute regarding the terms of the agreement existed between the parties at the time they reached the settlement.  Id., 98.

B

Analysis

In the present case, it is undisputed that the parties agreed to a mutual distribution of the estate assets.   Hr'g Tr. 2–3.   That mutual distribution agreement was, pursuant to the agreement of the parties, tied to the assets listed on the inventory that the plaintiff had filed with the Probate Court.   Counsel for Harry Banziruk stated that the “claim of Mr. Michael Banziruk is being reduced to the fair market value on the inventory file of August of 2009 by Mr. Conti.”  (Emphasis added.)   Hr'g Tr. 3. Mr. Conti, the attorney for the plaintiff, then stated:  “Wait, we're accepting—we're accepting in kind those assets on the inventory for the claim.”  (Emphasis added.)   Hr'g Tr. 3. Counsel for Harry Banziruk responded:  “Yes. That's what I tried to say.   Did it come out the wrong way?”   Mr. Conti replied:  “Well, it's a little different.”   Hr'g Tr. 3. At no time during this exchange did plaintiff's counsel state or suggest that the settlement agreement contemplated that the plaintiff could recover assets not included in the estate inventory.   Moreover, plaintiff's counsel did not state or suggest that the settlement agreement would be resolved by virtue of a compromise of claim rather than by a mutual distribution agreement.

An inventory must be filed by the fiduciary of an estate.  General Statutes § 45a–341.   Thereafter, claims against the estate are filed and paid.   General Statutes §§ 45a–354 et seq.   Once claims have been paid, the remainder of the estate, which is necessarily defined by the inventory, is distributed to the heirs and distributees.  General Statutes § 45a–425 et seq.   Under certain circumstances, a mutual distribution is permitted.   General Statutes § 45a–434(c) states in relevant part that “[w]henever there has been a contest with respect to the validity, admissibility to probate or construction of a will, if all persons interested in the estate, including persons interested as contestants or fiduciaries acting on behalf of a contestant, make and file in the court an agreement as to the division of the estate, in writing ․ such agreement shall be a valid division of the estate if approved by the Court of Probate.”

It is readily apparent that a mutual distribution is intended to divide the property of the estate, after the debts and charges have been paid, and, thus, is to be based on the established inventory of the estate.   See Hotchkiss' Appeal, 89 Conn. 420, 427, 95 A. 26 (1915).   With some exceptions, distributions are ordered only upon completion of all other steps in the administration of the estate, and “in the ordinary case, the distribution then made will apply to the entire distributable estate.”   G. Wilhelm, Settlement of Estates in Connecticut (3d Ed.2013) § 9:277, p. 9–100.   A compromise of a claim, on the other hand, is a means of resolving a doubtful or disputed claim or action.   A compromise of claim, unlike a mutual distribution, is not necessarily intended to effect a complete distribution of estate assets and so need not bear any particular relationship to the inventory of the estate.   See General Statutes § 45a–151.

Several points are clear regarding the settlement agreement in the present case.   First, all parties understood that the case could not be reopened without the approval of the court and that a plaintiff's motion to reopen the judgment necessarily would be based on “noncompliance.”   Second, and more important, it was, and is, unimpeachably clear that the parties agreed to enter into a mutual distribution agreement.   The fact that the plaintiff now “prefers” a compromise of claim instead of a mutual distribution agreement is a complete non sequitur.   What the plaintiff now “prefers” is not any part of the settlement agreement put on the record on February 20, 2013.   Third, it is crystal clear that the plaintiff's recovery, however categorized, was to be on the inventory.   The plaintiff is now demanding a potential recovery of assets that do not appear on the inventory filed with the Probate Court.⁵

A mutual distribution agreement is a settlement of a dispute over the distribution of a family member's estate, and it “is favored both in law and in equity.”  Warner v. Warner, 124 Conn. 625, 631, 1 A.2d 911 (1938).   Such an agreement is a valid contract among parties who are of legal age and have vested interests in the estate being divided.  Dickinson's Appeal from Probate, 54 Conn. 224, 227, 6 A. 422 (1886).   The parties bargained for a mutual distribution agreement and the plaintiff is obligated to enter into such an agreement.   The parties agreed that the mutual distribution agreement would be based on the estate inventory;  no one agreed that any party could make claims against assets not listed in the inventory of the estate.   The plaintiff, despite having entered into a settlement agreement, is now attempting to expand the reach of his claim beyond the terms of that settlement agreement.   This, he cannot do.   This court concludes that the parties “meant what they said and said what they meant ․” Tallmadge Bros., Inc. v. Iroquois Gas Transmission System, L.P., 252 Conn. 479, 497, 746 A.2d 1277 (2000).

The court finds that the settlement agreement is clear and unambiguous.   The parties agreed to enter into a mutual distribution agreement and the settlement agreement called for the distribution of the assets listed on the estate's inventory.   There is no justification for the plaintiff's failure to abide by the terms of the agreement into which he entered.   There is no basis for restoring this case to the docket.   The motion is denied.

So ordered.

BY THE COURT,

John A. Danaher III

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The complaint alleges that Harry Banziruk was co-trustee of the estate at the time that the plaintiff presented the claim..  FN1. The complaint alleges that Harry Banziruk was co-trustee of the estate at the time that the plaintiff presented the claim.

FN2. In the course of putting the agreement on the record, the following colloquy occurred:  Attorney Conti, plaintiff's counsel, stated:  “And I reserve the right to reinstate, obviously, your Honor.   It's always subject to the Court approval.   The Court:  Of course.   Atty Conti:  But we'll reserve the right to reinstate if we can't reach an agreement in 60 days.”  (Emphasis added.)   Hr'g Tr. 5. Thereafter, the court discussed, with the parties, the logistics associated with completing the mutual distribution agreement and stated:  “I will grant the request to permit you to reinstate this in 60 days if you have to ․ File a motion and, but—but my hope is that—Atty.   Conti:  File within 60 days.   The Court:  I know you're not going to drop this, you're going to move right on it and get it resolved.”   Hr'g Tr. 12..  FN2. In the course of putting the agreement on the record, the following colloquy occurred:  Attorney Conti, plaintiff's counsel, stated:  “And I reserve the right to reinstate, obviously, your Honor.   It's always subject to the Court approval.   The Court:  Of course.   Atty Conti:  But we'll reserve the right to reinstate if we can't reach an agreement in 60 days.”  (Emphasis added.)   Hr'g Tr. 5. Thereafter, the court discussed, with the parties, the logistics associated with completing the mutual distribution agreement and stated:  “I will grant the request to permit you to reinstate this in 60 days if you have to ․ File a motion and, but—but my hope is that—Atty.   Conti:  File within 60 days.   The Court:  I know you're not going to drop this, you're going to move right on it and get it resolved.”   Hr'g Tr. 12.

FN3. Harry Banziruk attached, as Exhibit E to his memorandum, a copy of an Application for Permission to Compromise Claim.   That exhibit asks the Probate Court to agree to a compromised claim in favor of Michael Banziruk, it is unsigned but carries a date line of March 2013, and seeks recovery of $245,880, a figure that was not a part of the settlement agreement that the parties put on the record on February 20, 2013..  FN3. Harry Banziruk attached, as Exhibit E to his memorandum, a copy of an Application for Permission to Compromise Claim.   That exhibit asks the Probate Court to agree to a compromised claim in favor of Michael Banziruk, it is unsigned but carries a date line of March 2013, and seeks recovery of $245,880, a figure that was not a part of the settlement agreement that the parties put on the record on February 20, 2013.

FN4. Harry Banziruk attached, as Exhibit C to his memorandum, a copy of the inventory signed by the plaintiff and dated August 18, 2009.   That exhibit is completely consistent with Harry Banziruk's representations, in his memorandum, regarding the contents of the inventory..  FN4. Harry Banziruk attached, as Exhibit C to his memorandum, a copy of the inventory signed by the plaintiff and dated August 18, 2009.   That exhibit is completely consistent with Harry Banziruk's representations, in his memorandum, regarding the contents of the inventory.

FN5. At oral argument, counsel for the plaintiff pointed out his colloquy with his client, Hr'g Tr. 7, a discussion that, he argued, could be read to imply that the plaintiff would be entitled to assets beyond those in the inventory.   The court rejects that claim.   The comments to which plaintiff's counsel refers were clearly in the nature of a general explanation.   The agreement was set forth at Hr'g Tr. 2–5..  FN5. At oral argument, counsel for the plaintiff pointed out his colloquy with his client, Hr'g Tr. 7, a discussion that, he argued, could be read to imply that the plaintiff would be entitled to assets beyond those in the inventory.   The court rejects that claim.   The comments to which plaintiff's counsel refers were clearly in the nature of a general explanation.   The agreement was set forth at Hr'g Tr. 2–5.

Danaher, John A., J.